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SOCIAL ORGANIZATION~~3~~ AND POLITICAL CHANGE
IN A CYPRIOT VILLAGE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the way that modern political change affects social relationships in a prosperous predominantly Greek-Cypriot village. The first chapter traces the main social, political, demographic and economic changes to have affected the village in this century. The second chapter considers in detail the importance of land-holdings, of supplementary occupations, and of status distinctions derived from education and work in the villagers' system of social evaluation. Chapter 3, in considering kinship and affinity as institutional constraints on the conduct of individuals, also stresses one prize of success in the village arena - the desirability of one's children as marriage partners. The fourth chapter is concerned with other types of social relations which constrain men, in particular fictive kinship, friendship and membership in the village itself (which is defined in a number of ways); this leads directly to the description of the village as a solidary community.

Chapter 5 analyses the leadership opportunities provided by administrative office in the village, and considers how far power is achieved and diffused in other ways. Chapter 6 examined the scope of politics in the village, particularly the meaning of the opposition between left and right wing supporters, as well as the benefits of political alignment. The seventh chapter is a brief survey of politics leading up to Independence in 1959-60, and a slightly fuller discussion of the events of the last decade.

Chapter 8 to 11 are all concerned with the detailed description and analysis of the most important political processes to affect the village since Independence. A number of internal disputes are the subject of chapter 8; in chapter 9 the village, in alliance with neighbouring villages, struggles to get government to start building a dam; in chapter 10 the administration of an agricultural cooperative shows prominent villagers in action, while chapter 11 concerns the first important elections to have taken place in the island for ten years, as they were seen to affect the village. In the final chapter I assess the introduction of new political resources into village politics, and the various ways in which some measure of control over political conflict is maintained.

INTRODUCTION

There is one unusual feature of the fieldwork which led to this thesis, which is that it was carried out in a village where I was not only an observer, but for many people a kinsman and, in a limited sense, a fellow villager (chorianos). I was born in London of a Scots-Irish mother and Greek-Cypriot father, brought up by my mother and her brothers and sisters, speaking English only; my contact with my father was scant, and until 1966 my knowledge of Greek language or culture limited to what accompanied the study of Classical Greek to Ordinary Level, G.C.E.

In 1966 the possibility of doing fieldwork in Cyprus was discussed with Professor Raymond Firth, and in the summer of that year I visited the island for the first time, spending six weeks mainly in the village where my father was born, here called Kallo. I was warmly received by a number of relatives and their friends, and enjoyed my stay, while also looking at Kallo and other villages with a view to fieldwork. On returning to London there were further discussions with Professor Firth, who thought that in the absence of major sociological or social anthropological research on the island there was a strong case to be made for my going ahead, if for no other reason than to fill, however inadequately, a major ethnographic gap. Then, too, there was the assurance of practical local support in the initial stages of study; finally, there was the fact of my personal interest in understanding rural Cypriot society coupled with my cultural distance from it, a normal situation for a fieldworker, but

marked by the assurance of certain privileged initial access to information, and goodwill.

For obvious reasons, we discussed whether or not my father's village was a sensible choice for the major portion of fieldwork. It was clearly not the normal way to select a village, and as it turned out, Kallo is unusually wealthy, and perhaps unusually politically active. But the typicality of rural communities remains an unsolved problem for fieldworkers, and Professor Firth was of the opinion that "If you have a strong suit, lead from it", adding the caveat that if after a few weeks or months, the costs of my kinship ties were seen to outweigh their benefits to my work, it would always be possible to move to another community, and keep the Kallo situation as a control.

In the event, although the dual roles of kinsman and anthropologist were at times a strain, the benefits seemed to me then, and still do seem, to outweigh the disadvantages. This is an issue which I hope at some future time to analyse in detail, but I shall not pursue it further here, except to express the hope that those people who have made it possible for me to carry out this study will not regret that they once encouraged me to remain in Kallo, and not to have gone elsewhere.

Most of the material described here, then, comes from this village in which I was a very privileged stranger, a village which was not selected by any criterion of randomness or typicality.

The first period of fieldwork was from February 1968 until May 1969, some fourteen months, during which two

short breaks were taken in Israel which together came to a month; the second was in company with two villagers, for one of whom we were seeking special medical care. In December 1969 and January 1970 I spent a further three weeks in Cyprus, most of which was in Kallo. Finally, there was a further three months in Cyprus, from the end of May 1970 to the start of September 1970, about one full month of which was spent in Kallo. For the major fieldwork I was supported by the SSRC. For the two shorter periods I was grateful for a Nuffield Small Grant, and was able to take a colleague, Dr. Edward Hammonds, a lecturer in Government at the Polytechnic of Central London, with me, to contribute to my study of the 1970 elections. However, all the data described in this thesis are the results of my own fieldwork.

During the major period of fieldwork a certain amount of quantitative work was done. Genealogies and life histories were taken from thirty of the oldest men and women in the village, which initially helped me form a picture of life before 1930. Since the cultivation of citrus trees plays so important a part in the village, at an early point a small survey of 23 men owning mature citrus trees was done to find out how they sold their fruit, the prices they obtained, with whom they cooperated economically and other such details. After ten months, a census of 200 from the 318 household heads in the village was carried out. This took nearly ten weeks, and although it had originally been intended to survey all households, I decided in view of the time factor to content myself with two-thirds only. Finally, in the last months in the village, 23 open ended depth interviews were

done with a number of informants already interviewed in the main census. These interviews were structured on certain topics - the numbers of certain kin and their residence, disputes recalled by informants, data on share-cropping, other forms of economic cooperation, and the use of personal contacts to secure administrative decisions of various kinds, outside the village. These interviews often took three hours or more to complete, and since a great deal of information had been obtained previously about the topics this phase proved extremely valuable. The schedules for these surveys are provided in appendices.

During preparation for fieldwork, I had decided to concentrate chiefly on aspects of property transfer, with special reference to the provision of houses at marriage, the composition of dowry, the way in which marriages were arranged and the consequences for village stratification of competition for the most eligible marriage partners. I had also read certain critiques of peasant village studies which led me to think that the intellectual difficulties of using a village as a unit of study and analysis were very great. There were several reasons for this view. One was that the analytic emphasis from Barnes (1954) to Mayer (1966) on networks and actions-sets had stressed the individual actor at the expense of larger collectivities. The literature of the Mediterranean and on Latin America, with some of which I was familiar, also stressed the contractual, impermanent aspect of social relations. The dyadic contract, as characterised by Foster and the ties between patron and client, from

the work of Pitt-Rivers onwards, tended to emphasise the choices of individuals, and the achieved nature of many aspects of peasant social relations. The absence of unilineal descent groups in Cypriot Greek life, and what Firth has termed the optative nature of relations within the kindred, also strengthened my view that much of my field-work would be concerned with individuals rather than with corporate groups.

There were other reasons for my expecting the village itself possibly to be a marginal unit of analysis only. A number of anthropologists had studied villages in the Mediterranean which were either poor, relatively small and isolated, or some combination of these. Pitt-Rivers' Alcala, Kenny's Romosierra, Friedl's Vasilika and Stirling's two Turkish villages all belonged to a first generation of studies where, although the village was taken as the main unit of analysis, there were clear indications (as there were in the work of Campbell) that the laws and agencies of the nation-state had been playing an ever-increasing part in structuring social relations. A second generation of fieldworkers, including Boissevain (1965), made it clear that the interpenetration of village and nation was such that it would have been quite unjustified to study a village as if it were a social isolate. Cohen (1965) was equally explicit about this. Lison-Tolosana (1966), while concentrating in the main on the interior relations of Belmonte, showed in his discussion of the period 1930-29 that political parties and ideologies from the national arena had had their

counterparts and consequences in the life of Belmonte. Although he did not discuss the articulation of the two units at the time of his fieldwork, this was an understandable omission in view of the obvious sensitivity to his informants of such issues.

The logical implication of stressing the individual actor, taken with the knowledge that the nation appeared to be swamping the rural communities of the Mediterranean, and thus producing rapid social change, led me seriously to question the value of taking a village as the prime unit of observation or analysis. I further argued that a village like Kallo, connected by only 26 miles of metalled road to the capital of Cyprus, and in terms of having modern houses, tractors and motor cars increasingly affected by modern technology, might well prove to have little in common with places like Alcalá and Sakaltutan (which had in any case been originally studied twenty years earlier). Lison-Tolosana's study of Belmonte, with its emphasis on the important and subtle differences in social differentiation suggested that a concentration on the relation between marriage and stratification might be rewarding; but it was not by any means certain to me that the way to do this was to look at a village. I considered selecting a cohort of people born in a particular place and following them in whatever directions their lives had taken them, and perhaps finding that the place itself - a former peasant village - was now little more than the figment of anthropological imagination, with its tendency to romanticise the gemeinschaft features of peasant communities in the way

that Redfield had done. Since writers like Lewis and Goldkind had argued the importance of stratification and social conflict, it was conceivable that notions such as village solidarity, or Pitt-Rivers' 'moral unity of the pueblo' would have totally disintegrated (in fact or theory) by the time I reached Kallo.

It came therefore as a considerable surprise, in early stages of drafting this thesis, to discover that one of the dominant themes which emerged was the extent to which a conscious preservation both of the village, its orderly life and prosperity, guided the actions (or at very least the tactical arguments) of village leaders; and that this commitment to the village itself clearly modified the impact of national politics and village life.

As must always be the case, my initial preconceptions and interests were greatly altered by fieldwork. The most notable change is shown by the fact that this thesis is mainly concerned with politics, rather than with kinship, marriage and property transfer. Secondly, that the village has emerged as a major focus of analysis.

Throughout my fieldwork I accompanied village leaders, and indeed all sort of villagers, on many visits outside the village. Many of these visits were to civil servants in the capital, or to village leaders in surrounding villages. Had I been aware of Bailey's important comments on single-interest relations, and Gluckman and Devons' recommendations on circumscription (Bailey, 1964; Devons and Gluckman, 1964)

I might have adopted a more formal approach to fixing the boundaries of my study. As it was, the sensitivity of many issues the villagers took to men in the capital provided me with a rough rule-of-thumb: if, as was often the case, it appeared that there was an element of guardedness on the part of the officials or politicians the villagers contacted, I did not try directly to get from them information on the reasons for their policies. That is, once having appeared with a village committee in a government office, I did not later return to the official in question, and seek in a private interview his views on the situation. Though this would undoubtedly have yielded important data, I felt rightly or wrongly that such actions might have both lost me rapport with the villagers themselves, created disquiet among the officials, and in the end have either altered the course of events or hampered my ability to collect data.

In a recent article Weingrod (1967) has criticised Bailey for the limitations of his 1963 study of the higher levels of Orissa politics. In my view Weingrod's comments, while logically correct, overlook the intricacies of fieldwork. The charge that there are gaps, or limits, to the data the individual fieldworker can collect is unanswerable but often trivial. In the final analysis, it is always a matter of judgement, whether or not to seek information on sensitive topics, the very quest for which may forfeit future cooperation. It is possible that, particularly with reference to the events described in chapters 8 and 9, I acted with too much caution, and much more, and highly valuable data could have been obtained. I cannot say.

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CHAPTER 1

THE RECENT HISTORY OF KALLO VILLAGE

i) Traditional Agriculture

Kallo village lies in the west central lowlands of Cyprus in an area which Christodoulou (1959:205) has described as the alluvial fan region. The 1960 Census put the village population at thirteen hundred; three miles to the west is Market Town with ten thousand people, and twenty-three miles to the east the island's capital, Nicosia, with over ninety thousand. The village is connected to both towns by good asphalt roads, as it is to a cluster of surrounding villages which provide most of those marriage partners who are not found within the village itself.

The village is among the richest in the island, since it enjoys perennial water from underground sources, and has through cash-cropping of potatoes, carrots and citrus fruits put this recent advantage to good use. Over the last sixty years the village population has steadily increased and there has been little emigration. From the approach roads, modern two- and three-storey brick houses can be seen above the citrus groves which have furnished the profits to build them. A closer look, nearer the nucleus of the village, shows the traditional mud-and-straw houses standing in walled courtyards, with outhouses for small stock and fowls. In poorer parts of the central lowlands, which lack

perennial water, such traditional houses still predominate, but the Market Town region has become a byword throughout the island for prosperity, and for the extravagant luxury of the new houses built.

The last hundred years have seen particularly rapid and important change in the lives of the villagers, and some of these changes will be the main concern of this chapter. The transition from an agriculture mainly based before 1920 on subsistence dry-farming of cereals, and legumes, and animal husbandry, to irrigated, mechanised cash-cropping is one which has been accompanied by other changes in communications, administration and politics. Each type of change has moved at its own pace, and each has affected and been affected by the others. The net result has undoubtedly been an increase in security for most villagers, and this is how they see the matter themselves. Old men talking about the past rarely fail to insist itan phtoschia tottes, 'those were days of poverty'.

In what follows I try to reconstruct some aspects of the period of traditional agriculture, parts of which are only now changing, but for which a rough transition point may be placed between 1920 and 1940, for reasons shortly to be made clear. Traditional agriculture relied on oxen to draw light scratch-ploughs, and the main crops were wheat, barley and oats, dependent on an erratic winter rainfall. Cereal farming was combined with small stock keeping. Oxen were needed for ploughing and threshing; sheep and goats were kept in mixed or separate flocks, and pigs and chickens were kept by most families, in their yards.

The oldest men had fixed on a figure of a hundred households for the village in the 'old days', and said that about two-thirds of these had either one or two oxen. Data from 1931⁽¹⁾ are somewhat different, since they show only enough oxen for two-thirds of the 166 householders to have one each. This point is important, for it has been persuasively argued by Stirling (1963:201-213) that in the traditional dry-farming situation of the Turkish villages he studied there were three key factors which affected household viability - manpower, land and oxen. His comments apply in the main to the Kallo situation: in Kallo, if one of the three factors was in short supply it seriously hampered the economic development of the domestic group. Those with a single ox only teamed up with other households which had only one ox; but such a strategy ceased to be completely efficient if one household, with an adequate amount of land, needed the continual (as opposed to the occasional) use of two oxen during the ploughing season.

Households with oxen which were not fully occupied hired them sometimes to those who needed them. Some families yoked an ox with a mule. Some ploughed with mules alone; others sharecropped. The people with greatest difficulties were those with neither land nor draft animals, since they had only their labour to sell either as ploughmen for the largest landowning peasants, or outside the village on various government road-building projects which flourished throughout the island from the arrival of the British in 1878. Genealogies, informant memories and the village birth

register all show the existence of landless labourers in the village who sometimes emigrated permanently in search of a living.

It is clear from other sources that the possession of a pair of oxen was regarded as some sort of norm for household viability, at least to the authorities:

Christodoulou (1959:94), quoting Lang, tells us that in the 1860's the Turkish rulers wanted to float funds for an Agricultural Bank and collected a bushel of wheat and a bushel of barley from every owner of a pair of ploughing oxen. Oxen as the basis for such a levy, and grain as its medium, suggest the subsistence character of the village. The Agricultural Bank did not get started at this time since the ensuing revenue was embezzled. Such events seem not to have been uncommon in the nineteenth century, and must have played some part in shaping the villager's expectations of government initiatives.

Table 1 shows how population has changed in Kallo. Both houses and people were static from 1881 to 1901, but twenty years later the population has gone up by over 40% although the number of houses increased by only a quarter. There was another static period, 1921 to 1931, but by the 1946 census the 1881 population has doubled, and continued to rise to 1960. The oldest Kallotes remembered their fathers had ploughed up unoccupied land near the village; this was often halitika, unoccupied government owned land. Yet in the early period there were landless families, some of whose members left the village in search

TABLE 1POPULATION OF KALLO, 1881-1960

	<u>Christians</u>	<u>Muslims</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Houses</u>
1881	N A	N A	451	114
1891	329	116	445	121
1901	348	104	452	122
1911	423	97	520	130
1921	546	101	647	150
1931	598	68	666	166
1946	898	76	974	212
1960	1,219	72	1,291	287
1969 (estimate)			1,431	318

Source: Cyprus Government Censuses

- Note (1) There was no 1941 Census due to the 1939-45 World War.
- (2) At time of writing no more recent census has been carried out.
- (4) For a discussion of the Muslim population, see Appendix
- (5) In 1969 I counted 318 houses in Kallo. Allowing an average of 4.5 persons per house, this yields 1,431 for the village population.

of wages. The probable explanation for the failure of the landless to themselves occupy some of the vacant land which existed around the outskirts of the village must lay in their lack of resources. Effectively to take over free land needed personal courage or kin-support, seed-corn, use of oxen and tools as well as sufficient food in the shape of dry corn to live for at least one season without working for others.

Old people say that when they were young land was 'very cheap' and quote purchases of a donum for a pound or two; but when asked about wage-labouring rates, the price of corn and other staples, the size of wedding gifts, they produce figures which show their claim to have been illusory. Proportionately, land may have been somewhat cheaper than it is today, but it was certainly not as cheap as old people think when looking back.

One way in which a landless man could break out of the difficulties of his position was to hire himself out to a land-rich villager as a mistarkós, a wage-labourer. He would often eat and sleep in the house of his employer, and spend his days either ploughing or shepherding. If he went on doing this and saved his entire earnings for five or ten years he could end up with enough money to purchase a minimal small-holding. In some cases if he was a good worker and of sound character he might have ended up by marrying one of his employer's daughters, and receiving land in this way. Several of the older men who are now regarded in the village as prosperous started out in this way, and it may have even been commoner in earlier periods.

It was possible then for a landless man slowly through hard work and thrift to acquire cash and land; it was much easier for a man with some land to lose it through a variety of factors. Any of these factors could also interfere with the efforts of a landless man to improve his position, and this undoubtedly happened. But it is not what informants tend to remember: they remember dramatic success and dramatic failure. In 1878 the British found the prisons full of debtors, and commentators on conditions between this time and 1940 rarely fail to mention the proneness of the peasantry to indebtedness. In this matter Kallo was no exception. Informants give a variety of reasons for starting on the short, sharp slide into bankruptcy - unexpected sickness (particularly tuberculosis) could through the high costs of medical care at the hands of town doctors consume the land of a previously prosperous family in a year or two; drought years, especially when as in 1870-74 several such years followed each other in succession, could hit a family with small margins very hard; litigation of any kind was sometimes the precipitating factor, arising over matters of inheritance, trespass or debt; natural hazards, the fierce hailstorms which are common in Cyprus, and for many years the plagues of locusts, also added to the list. There were also reasons which reflected more on character - those debts which resulted from gambling, from lavish hospitality, or from the pursuit of women. For each context the villagers remember at least one person whose loss of property illustrates either the hazards of life or weakness of character - an

additional hazard which they believe to be inherited, but yet subject to some measure of personal control.

In this traditional period the existence of money-lenders satisfied the perennial peasant need for seasonal credit, in addition to the kind of credit which might be needed as a result of one or several of the factors just mentioned. The moneylenders were sometimes townsmen: Storrs (1939:491) found four out of the twelve-man Legislative Assembly were so involved, but were also often the more prosperous peasants in the village. Informants when remembering certain men always characterise them by this occupation - tokistis - from the word tókos meaning 'interest'. It was usually necessary to pledge a piece of land for cash or for grain. The old men say 'in those days we were hungry. My father had to give a donum of land for a sack of corn to eat.' Once a man had borrowed cash against land it was all too probable that the mounting interest would soon compel him to mortgage yet other fields. Here the idiom used is tókos epi tókon, that is, interest upon interest, to describe the rapidly mounting spiral of debt, which might end in foreclosure. The whole moneylending transaction produced great bitterness in the village, and suggests that during periodic crises the rich got richer and the poor poorer⁽²⁾.

However, as Surridge pointed out in his examination of village debt (1930:36-45), there was another common kind of rural debt - that caused by expansion, or prestige spending. Whenever people had surplus cash they tended to buy more land, often by making a downpayment, and hoping to pay off the balance in a short period. Obviously, a short run of

bad luck could turn the expansion into contraction, but this suggests the value the traditional peasant put on increasing his holding; holdings were unlikely to remain stable through time but tended to get bigger or smaller. It is obvious that there is both a strong element of uncontrollable risk in such a system as well as ample room for good decisions to pay off and poor decisions to prove harmful. The place of prestige spending, which in this context usually involved the costs of seeing one's children married and set up in their own domestic unit with their own land, would also have been critical. Surridge mentions that at the time he carried out his survey, officials were wont to complain that villagers were prone to get into debt through marrying off their children. This is a feature of village life which does not seem to have declined but if anything to have intensified in recent years.

ii) Changes in Traditional Agriculture

The picture of a traditional village economy based in the main on mixed farming of cereals and legumes, with occasional sales of surpluses was to be modified by a number of changes dating roughly from the 1920's⁽³⁾. These involved the increasing use of summer irrigation, the cultivation of new land, changes in the occupational structure, and the control of peasant debt through a credit cooperative society; to all these must be added the continued increase in village population previously mentioned. Political changes will be discussed in a later section.

The dry-farming period came to a close when in 1916 a group of twenty Kallotes, including several Turks, decided to form a company to bring up the underground water of the region by the chain-of-wells system. This technique had been tried over twenty years earlier by some of the Market Town farmers, and it is probable that when the Kallo company formed, it was following some demonstrated Market Town success⁽⁴⁾. The technique required a cash outlay since it involved substantial underground tunnelling by specialists, and it is probable that the men putting up the money would not in any case have wished to do such heavy manual work. The chain of wells was dug, starting from the east and running for several miles until it reached Kallo. The summer water thus brought up was divided among the share-holders in units of not less than three hours each according to the amount of capital they had put up. Water came to each member roughly every eight days, for as many units as he was entitled, and with this water he irrigated his summer crop.

The value of such a system was immediately apparent to the whole village and within a short time a second company had formed with some sixty members which proceeded to dig its own chain of wells parallel to those of the first company. There were vigorous protests from the members of the first company for they feared that the competing well system would encroach on their own water supply. Their fears proved justified so they retaliated by deepening their own well system until they had regained their water at the expense of the water of the second company. Informants say that the

dispute split the village into two opposed factions, and that it divided kinsmen and friends. One informant claimed his mother and father were members of different companies, one by inheritance and the other by purchase.

After several attempts by each side to settle the matter by further deepening of the wells - each attempt costing more money - the two companies went to court⁽⁵⁾. Informants said that the court case went on for two years and cost the village £3,000, which taking the price of good land as an index would have been worth £150,000 by present day prices. This seems a vast sum but informants were insistent that the dispute 'ruined the village' when the well-digging and legal fees were added to the bad feeling that resulted. In the event the court's judgement was interesting and may have provided, in view of the high costs of the conflict, a model to the village of how to conduct such matters in future. The ruling was that the two companies should merge. There were to be eighty members, each receiving his share of water every fifteen and a half days. The members of the first company also had their share of water reduced, so the gross effect for them seems to have been a loss of nearly half their volume of water over time. In the end about half of all the households in the village had access to some quantity of summer water. The water company still exists in the village, and 81 out of the 318 households are members. Although it is probably only chance that has left the present number of owners so close to the original number, it seems from the current shares that relatively little

subdivision has taken place. In 1970 only 15 of the 81 shares were less than three hours; and three hours of water will irrigate a field of two donums. Some owners have merged smaller shares, and some people who inherited shares but had no land have sold them.

It is not possible to decide how much the authority of the court contributed to this solution, and how much the villager's own perceptions of the costs of intransigence played a part. The men I interviewed were in late adolescence or their early twenties when these events took place, and it was their fathers and grandfathers who took the decisions. Certainly legal disputes over water rights have a very long history in Cyprus, as Christodoulou makes clear (1959:88-90); nor is the principle of a shareholding company necessarily a new one. The one certain point is that before 1920 there was relatively little summer water available for Kallo's land, but from the time the water companies became active, more and more summer cropping became possible.

Unfortunately, the actual extent of the increase cannot be gauged with great precision. A survey published in 1931⁽⁶⁾ gives the following information: there were 3,231 donums of arable land - about 1,000 acres. The 169 households - three more than listed as complete in the 1931 census - had between them 118 oxen, 193 donkeys, 11 mules and 3 horses. 16 persons had less than five donums and 21 persons had no land at all, but I assume that by persons, married householders were meant. Thus, at very least 27 of the 169 households had less than enough land to live on⁽⁷⁾.

Some clue as to how at least 15% of the households survived without enough land is given by Table 2. If all persons who did not return 'farmer' as their occupation in the 1923-35 data are added, the total is 42%. The listing of unskilled labourers (ergatis), shepherds, muleteers and artisans is suggestive of the patterns of supplementary work described by Davis (1968,1969) for Pisticci. If the 3,231 donums had been divided equally between 169 households, this would have given each household nearly 20 donums. The 1931 data show that 15% of the households fell a long way short of 20 donums, and it is a reasonable inference that the 42% who were not farmers also fell short of 20 donums, a figure adequate for subsistence.

The 3,231 donums in the report present a problem of interpretation, since what is meant by arable land is not explained. It might have been land irrigated in summer, but it might have been land used through winter rainfall only. Since very roughly one hour of water from the merged water company would have generously watered one donum every fifteen days, the conclusion is that there was roughly ten times more 'arable' land than available summer water; it is therefore more probable that the arable land refers to land put under cereals from winter rainfall.

By 1950, when Christodoulou (1959:205-6,216-17) included Kallo in his land use study, the village ranked highest of 27 sample villages for the extent of its summer irrigation, with 81% of its land so irrigated. The method cannot have been through powered pumps, for only 1.1% of the agricultural land is listed as mechanically irrigated;

TABLE 2

CHANGES IN OCCUPATION IN KALLO VILLAGE

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1923-35</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>1968-69</u> ⁽²⁾
	%	%
Civil servants (police, teachers, firemen, clerks, etc. ⁽³⁾)	0	9.5
Full time farmers	58	41
Skilled manual workers (tailors, builders, carpenters, etc.)	15	8
Unskilled labourers	10	15
Shepherds	7.5	4.5
Muleteers	6	0
Car owners/drivers	0	10
Others: coffee shop owners, retailers, etc.	3.5	11.5

- (1) Base number - 81 non-repeated sequential entries in the muktar's register of births. There is reason to think that the large majority - though not all - births were registered in the village in this period. Those which were not would have been children of wealthier farmers.
- (2) Base number - 195 person census of male household heads.
- (3) I learned from informants that at least two unmarried elementary school teachers were resident in the village in this period. One was from Kallo, one was not.

the chain-of-wells method which had started the original water company in 1916 had been employed by several other companies to give some water to most village land. However, the crop figures suggest a strong continuity with traditional agriculture: wheat accounted for 24% of land under cultivation; barley and oats another 19%. The other main crops were: cumin and aniseed 13.3%; food legumes 8.8%; and potatoes 8.5%. There were also about 2,000 olive trees on village land.

By 1969, when the village tax lists were consulted⁽⁸⁾, the picture was this: 4,529 donums of irrigated land were taxed within the village boundaries, and all but 278 donums were owned by persons resident in the village. Village residents also paid irrigation tax on between 300 and 400 donums of land in the boundaries of some adjoining villages, bringing the total to nearly 5,000 donums of irrigated land. The total village land was reckoned to be 6,500 donums in all, within the tax boundaries of the village. There were at least 27 pumps operating to supply village lands with water, and permits for pumps are subject to government licensing.

The 1931 and 1950 data do not make certain issues of boundaries and land categories clear, but the general picture suggests a great deal more land came under irrigation since 1931. The population of the village more than doubled between 1931 and 1960, but the area of irrigated land increased by two-thirds of the 1931 figure. During the latter part of this period too the use of fertilisers, later of tractors, and of trucks to take produce to larger markets

were altering the pattern of agriculture. Yet, as is shown by Table 2, the proportion of household heads employed as full time farmers fell from 58% to 41%. In real numbers, with adjustments for population increase, the picture is different again. The 58% of 166 household heads in 1931 would have yielded nearly 100 farmers. In 1969 there were 318 households, and 40% of these is over 120 farmers. This brings some of the data into perspective, and can be restated thus: the larger population was cultivating more land in 1969, and although the number of farmers probably increased the proportion of farmers was smaller. To anticipate the next chapter, by 1969 both the number and proportion of households without land had fallen from the 1931 figures.

It is worth noting in passing other changes in village occupations which underline the changes in the larger society. By 1969, muleteers have given place to car drivers, and a new category of civil servants has appeared.

Before leaving the question of the changes from traditional subsistence mixed farming, the results of which will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter, the change in the structure of debt must be mentioned. Briefly, as shown in Table 3, from 1923 the village possessed a local branch of the Cooperative Credit Society. At first the fledgling society had trouble finding a man with sufficient command of figures to handle the book-keeping. One of the village priests tried the job, but found it too hard on his fragile literacy. Then Evghenis, a prosperous

TABLE 3

THE RISE OF MEMBERSHIP 1923 - 42 IN THE
KALLO AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE SOCIETY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Membership Numbers</u> <u>Registered</u>
1923	1 - 17
1926	18 - 43
1927	44 - 61
1928	62 - 75
1929	76 - 98
1931	99 -100
1938	102 -110
1939	111 -152
1940	153 -157
1941-2	168 -217

Source: Records of the Kallo Agricultural
Credit Cooperative Society.

farmer of communist views, and a high standard of literacy, took it over for a number of years. He had differences with the committee and a poorer man took over the job, who was to keep it for over 30 years and still held it in 1970. The administration of the Credit Cooperative, and the difficulties that attended the proposed retirement of the secretary, are the subjects of later chapters. Here it is enough to note the continued growth of membership during the period under review, which coincided with a decline in the role of private moneylenders; debt and credit entered the control both of the village itself (for the Society is administered by a working committee of villagers) and of the government, which regularly audits the books and from which basic regulations are derived.

Before leaving the subject of agriculture it is of note that sometime after the merger of the two competing water companies a new Kallo company was formed in which many shareholders were residents of Kammari village, one mile to the south of Kallo. This was in the early 1930's. The new company operated successfully for many years, but its operation did not prevent the continual outbreak of disputes, sometimes violent, between Kallotes and Kammarites over the springtime flow of the Kari river, which flows past land of both villages. Springtime water could be brought to their fields through irrigation channels, and it was over their management that disputes took place. From the villagers accounts it seems that the quarrels and fights arose because no agreed convention existed for water division between the

villages. This issue was finally decided in the same way that the two companies issue had been decided - by a court ruling which made a clear allotment. However, for at least twenty years, while some individuals in the two villages cooperated through the new water company, others came into conflict over the river water. Although I hesitate to lay great emphasis on this, a further difference can be noted: individual Kallotes sometimes came to blows over water rights, but the issue between the two rival water companies did not produce physical violence, although it was costly in other ways. On the one hand fights between the two villages over the river water involved numbers of men and not isolated individuals. In later chapters I shall describe how the Kallotes continued to stop short of permitting violence between political groups within the village, although violence between individuals continues to occur.

(iii) Other Changes

There is no reason to think that village society was either closed or static during the nineteenth century; but it needs to be stressed since much of this chapter is concerned with change, and uses data which inevitably becomes more detailed as the present is approached. Even though it is probable that the majority of villagers who were farmers had few reasons connected with work to go far from the village, there were still occasions for travel. The capital was about eight hours away by mule, and serious sickness sometimes involved such a journey to seek a doctor. Those with cheese, melons, figs or other produce to sell went to

Nicosia, and sometimes much further afield, to the mountains of Troodos, or even to Paphos. Religious festivals were the times when villagers visited monasteries all over the island, or churches where there were icons with special powers to heal the sick. Some villagers had married outside Kallo or moved away, and sometimes Kallotes visited them for a baptism, wedding or funerary ritual.

Some news also reached the village through visits of government officials, the police, merchants seeking produce, peddlars and itinerant ballad-singers. Old men and women were able to repeat tchattísmata, the rhyming couplets in which nearly all peasant verse is formed, commemorating a notorious murder or the exploits of a celebrated bandit.

The life histories and genealogies of the oldest villagers showed how some of their forebears had left the village for longer or shorter periods. One Kallotis became a monk, another the director of a hospital in mainland Greece, at least two had been on trips to Greece for some education before the turn of the century. Several volunteered for the Greek Army during the engagements which continued on and off with the Turks and the Bulgarians between 1898 and 1915; others joined the British Army as muleteers during the two World Wars. At least two became merchant seamen and disappeared for many years; one man settled in Egypt and was a teacher. More recently, since 1920 one Kallotis emigrated to the U.S.A. and at least a dozen Kallo families are presently living in Britain. Others moved to the five towns of the island throughout the period; the main reasons which are usually given by informants

then ichen tipotes 'he had nothing', marriage, or the achievement of a status which made them out of place in or dissatisfied with village life.

The village then was not closed or static even if the patterns of agriculture and other work lent themselves to an inward-looking community. Education was a further factor which inevitably acted to introduce outside ideas. Before the British arrived there was already an expansion of popular education in the island, but after 1878 the pace of change undoubtedly quickened. Kallo perhaps already had its school, for only three years later in 1881 a government report⁽⁹⁾ states that Neophyttos Petrou received £16-13 for the year, raised by voluntary contribution, for teaching twenty Christian boys in Kallo, while Mula Mustapha for teaching twelve Muslim boys and three Muslim girls received a government payment of £10. In 1883 the number of Christian boys had risen to 59. In some other villages at this period the amounts paid to teachers ranged from 7/6 to £1 per pupil per year - a wide range which suggests that villagers may have bargained with teachers on annual contract, as old informants insist. In one village at least, the records mention a teacher who was to be paid by results, for he was to get money only "when the children can read and write and do accounts", a comment which suggests also the practical side of peasant interest in education.

In 1881 only 15% of school age children were in attendance but by 1901 this proportion had risen to 38% (Christodoulou, 1959:59). As the expansion of popular education

continued (Table 4) towards the point when practically every village in the island was to have its own elementary schools, Churchmen and members of the Legislative Assembly were prone to intervene in the appointment of teachers, since the teachers as the grateful recipients of such patronage could be relied on to mobilise support in villages for particular national figures. In 1929 Governor Storrs was meeting strong opposition from the patrons in his attempt to take the appointments of teachers out of such directly interested hands, and place them in those of the civil service.

In chapter seven, which discusses the political history of the island since 1878, the role of the schoolteachers as agents of nationalism is analysed. Here the concern has been with the history of the village, and it is necessary to note merely that teachers in general were strongly identified with the mainland, to whom they still refer as mother Greece. The literacy they taught could not have failed to introduce villagers to nationalist ideas, for the simple reason that the gap was so great between village dialect and written Greek, whether Demotiki or Katharevousa. The very act of learning to read and write the Greek language involved the creation of a link to a much wider society than the village imagine - and potentially, an addition to social identity, for those who wished to develop it.

(iv) The Concerns of Pre-War Village Politics

In the field of politics there had been formal possibilities of villagers participating in the life of the

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE AGED OVER 5 YEARS
WHO COULD READ AND WRITE

<u>Year</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
1911 ⁽¹⁾	44	14
1931	66.5	35.5
1946	71	49.5

Source: Christodoulou (1959:59)

Note (1) There are no figures for literacy
before 1911.

nation since 1882, when a Legislative Assembly of twelve members was created, with a suffrage extended to all males aged eighteen upwards, who had paid the *verghi*, a tax on able-bodied male householders or bread-winners, collected by muktars. How such formal participation worked in practice it is hard to say, but in October 1906 little more than 20,000 people voted, although the island's population at this time was over 235,000⁽¹⁰⁾. Intimidation sometimes took place at elections: of the 106 registered voters of Rizokarpasso who wished to vote for a certain candidate, only 20 voted at all, and of these only one for the man of his choice (Hill, 1952).

Kallo informants were able to remember two elections from the 1920's to the Legislative Assembly. They describe the 1926 election as if it were a contest between two men - Neoptolemos Paskalis, and a certain HajiPavlou. Paskalis they remember as a rich lawyer and moneylender, taking a pro-government position and ambivalent to Enosis. HajiPavlou though also a lawyer was from a poor family and from the Paphos district, renowned for its poverty and backwardness. Apart from being a fervent Enosist he declared that he would abolish the dekartiá, an agricultural tax which was a tithe on most produce. Paskalis said that if it was abolished it would only re-appear in other forms so it was a pointless exercise. MajiPavlou riposted. There was no reason why only farmers should pay tax, and if the luxuries that city people used were taxed - here he mentioned lipstick and perfume - it would be fairer. He also suggested that Church lands should be sold cheaply to farmers. Both these men made speeches in Kallo and

in the case of HajiPavlou not only his ideas but the actual words he used are remembered by the older men. There is a reason for this: they emphasise that he was first and foremost an orator, even a demagogue, and among other methods by which he fired people up were the use of the demotic or popular language (as opposed to the more complex, remote and archaic form used in speeches by most educated people, Katharevousa, Purified Greek); he also seems to have produced in each village he spoke in a simple rhyming tag, to characterise that particular village as a lead-in to his speech. Some tags were still remembered in 1970. HajiPavlou won the 1926 election handsomely.

Informants of varied political persuasions now remember the two men to have represented parties of the rich and of the poor respectively. However, the limited data obtained about how individual Kallotes voted do not support such a view⁽¹¹⁾. The situation was probably more complex. Although Paskalis, like certain other Representatives, was a moneylender and therefore had a high interest in agricultural debt, both literally and metaphorically, he got strong support in Kallo, and not always from the richer peasants, some of whom voted for HajiPavlou. Not all the villagers with large landholdings indulged in money-lending, since some of them preferred to put all surplus cash straight into land, and these men had no particular reasons to support Paskalis. Secondly, it must be remembered that even then the issue of Enosis had the effect of cutting across simple divisions of wealth. Furthermore, as Hill makes clear, from the earliest

years of British rule right down to the 1950's there was a fundamental dispute among Greek Cypriot politicians over the issue of cooperation with the government or complete boycott in the cause of Enosis. This helps to explain why Paskalis, who in the early 1920's had been a strong advocate of Enosis, could in a later period be seen by villagers as 'pro-government' - whoever in the Legislative Assembly voted in favour of any government policy ran the risk of being called a traitor if a period of nationalist agitation was starting up.

There was another reason for Paskalis' support in Kallo which once again is not a simple matter of rich and poor men's parties. Paskalis was the defence lawyer for certain Kallotes, the Andriadis family, who were accused of murder in 1926. They got off. The Andriades were at the time a group of eight brothers, who were physically tough, and managed between them to retain control of the muktarship for most of the period 1920-1955⁽¹²⁾. Some of them had a good deal of land, some had little. Occasionally they quarrelled among themselves but often stood together in the face of any challenge by other villagers. In 1926 several members of this group of cognates and affines killed a poor man from a weak family in a drunken brawl. In spite of attempts by the murdered man's kin to get justice - which included appeals to high police officials, the police seem to have found it impossible to get any useful witnesses to the murder, although the whole village knew who had done it, and several bystanders had seen it happen. The murdered man's relatives told me that since the Andriadis family had had one of its members as muktar,

it had built up good relations with police and other government officials, and had got the case dropped 'by feeding many people'. It seems probable that since the police did not get helpful testimony they would have had difficulty in securing a conviction in any case. One result of the affair was that Paskalis, as lawyer for some of the Andriades, received extra support during the elections, and although he lost at the district level, he received more votes than his rival in Kallo.

The office of mukhtar was clearly important in the village. Informants say that in the old days mukhtars were always well-off because among other things they had to have the spare time for the paper work the job involved; and furthermore they had to be able to offer hospitality to visitors. Their duties included responsibility for reporting crime and calling in the police; cooperation with any visiting officials; the official registration of births, deaths and land transfers, and the collection of certain taxes. In Kallo there were elections for the post, and informants remember that there were two factions in continual opposition over it. These factions had an essentially kinship core, they insist, although people could be attached by affinal, friendship or other links. It seems membership was not completely stable, and people did sometimes switch factions without suffering any very severe sanctions.

However, some informants speak of this period as if there was a good deal of stability to the factions. The earlier issue of the two water companies has been mentioned. Apart from the post of mukhtar, and the elections for the Legislative

Assembly, there was the Church Committee, and occasional elections for the post of Archbishop which could have served as foci for factional conflict. Some informants say "We always had two parties in those days, and if I was against you in one thing I was against you in all." Once again, the situation was almost certainly not so simple, even though it sounds very attractive. Informants state very emphatically that A and B voted for a particular party or issue, yet when A and B are directly questioned, it turns out that the original informant was wrong. It seems more likely that the meaning of the statement that there were always two stable parties is that the village frequently divided into opposed groups, and that there were always two - as opposed to three or more. Also, the statement suggests that if a man had a personal grudge against another, he was likely to oppose him just for the sake of so doing, and regardless of the issue⁽¹³⁾.

During this period people also remember that fights were common. They seem to have occurred after Church on Sundays, when men drank wine and got drunk, and when young men went to the swings (a form of very mild courtship game in which young men could see the young women of the village). The other common occasion for fights was at weddings. There were several groups of tough brothers who got into fights with other groups. These groups too are sometimes described by the word komma which is also used for political or electoral parties. "We were wild in those days" the old men say, and referring to the Andriadis brothers and their tendency both to control the post of muktar and to get tough with anyone

they didn't like, they add "The Andriades terrorised the village at that time".

In 1929 there was a second election for the Legislative Assembly in which HajiPavlou again stood, while a man called Triandafillides stood in place of Paskalis. At first Triandafillides was declared the winner but later electoral fraud was charged (not for the first time in Legislative Assembly elections) and after witnesses had been found who said they had been bribed, HajiPavlou was declared the winner. In Kallo at least one informant who had voted against HajiPavlou in 1926 now voted for him. The reason he gave me was dissatisfaction with the recent village muktar elections in which his candidate had failed. He normally voted with the Andriadis group, of which he was a member, but now he voted against them. Other informants are equally sure that at the national elections there were other cases of close kin voting for different candidates, and some describe the principle of choice and alignment as "everybody did as he liked...". Informants also remember being given sums of money to secure votes by agents of the candidates, and that large feasts were set up in the coffee-shops at which villagers caroused. They called out to the passers-by to join them, the clear implication being that to sit at the table meant to support the candidate. They add that different coffee-shops were, during the election period, the domains of the rival groups.

This period comes to a natural close in terms of the political issues under review when in 1931 there was something normally described as the 'Uprising' in the capital, during

which the Governor's Mansion was burned. It does not seem to have been an organised attempt at insurrection on the part of the Greek community but more a demonstration which got out of hand (Storrs, 1939:530). Kallo's contribution to the event was that several villagers went and cut the telegraph wire linking Market Town to the capital. Government troops shot a few people in nearby villages, and the government sent people to find out who had cut the wire. The muktar was removed, as were many muktars all over Cyprus, because the Government decided that many of them had been inadequately vigilant during the disturbances. The new muktar, Meletis, knew perfectly well who had cut the wire but when asked said he did not think it was anyone from the village. He always adopted the tactic of dealing with thefts and petty crimes himself, without telling the police, because in this way his sources of information remained open and he avoided reprisals. His attitude exemplifies the ambiguity in the role of muktar⁽¹⁴⁾. A little later he resigned for personal reasons, and the government replaced him with a man called Akis who was said to have given the police the names of the wire-cutters. The police gave the wire-cutters a beating up, but Akis himself did not avoid reprisals from those he had informed on: for a number of years he suffered repeated crop damage and stock theft.

After the Uprising the Legislative Assembly was suspended and the Governor ruled by decree; muktars remained appointees of the government, and this continues to be the case at time of writing. At one stroke, then, two issues were removed which had been a focus for village factions. The fact that muktars were no longer appointed meant that villagers

no longer could compete for control of the man who was most likely to mediate their relations with the larger society. The fact that urban politicians no longer made their periodic descents into the village arena meant that, on the formal political level, there was a pause in the incorporation of the village into the larger society.

(v) The Post-War Period: Left and Right

The 1930's are remembered in the village as days of extreme hardship. The island was hit by the economic depression which affected the Eastern Mediterranean as well as Europe, and Kallo was no exception. Prices of produce and land fell, there was much unemployment, and men travelled far from the village to get any work they could. The 1939-45 war, for which it was said earlier, some villagers volunteered, also provided new work opportunities outside the village, building aerodromes; as the island's economy picked up, there were other jobs to be had in the towns, and in service capacities on the British bases. The new job opportunities were accompanied by a more liberal political climate in which the organisation of trade unions was again permitted. Hill noted that in 1948 there were thirty four Greek political parties, which included twenty right-wing ones, and twelve of the left.

This rash of parties was not the first sign of organised politics in the island. Since the early 1920's there had been a small left wing movement, which had attempted to organise miners in the Troodos mountains and the Xeros region. Agitation for Enosis by the clergy, teachers and other

notables had been taking place since the British first arrived, and the Legislative Assembly had been the scene of frequent boycotts, by Greek members. Nationalist organisations, usually of an elite nature, seem to have existed throughout the period. The 1920's saw the start of a left wing movement which attempted to organise miners in the Troodos mountains. The Communist Party, which started in 1924, was banned in 1933 after the Uprising. It re-emerged in 1941 as AKEL, and succeeded in winning the municipal elections in Limassol and Famagusta, 1943.

In Kallo the prosperous farmer Evghenis had also declared himself a Communist before 1930 and had also drawn to his ideas a young Kallo schoolteacher, who came into head-on conflict with the Church authorities over his views, and was pressured into signing a document denying that he was an atheist. Old men recall how puzzled they were that two of the best-read men in the village should be communists, and one man in his middle forties in 1968 recalled how he had travelled as a boy of about ten with his father to the capital in the mid 1930's. There they saw a man carrying a placard, and people throwing eggs at him and hissing him. He asked his father why people were attacking the man, and the reply was "Because he is a Communist". 'I thought to myself, what a terrible person one must be to be a communist, that people were so angry against him', said my informant, later himself to become a leading Kallo communist. There is no question that the older men found the notion as puzzling as did the youngster, and the key to the puzzle was the idea of atheism, which, I shall argue

in a later chapter, clashed directly with the embryonic notions of Greek national identity which had reached some of the villagers.

By the early post-war period it appears that the left in Kallo had a good deal of support, and both leftists and rightists agree about this. The rightists recall that if they opened their mouths to argue in the coffee shops they were always outnumbered. In those days, 1945-50, the leftists had a strong soccer team, while the right were organised in a religious association linked to the Church⁽¹⁵⁾. Both of these associations primarily attracted men in their twenties.

The village now possessed the basis for political confrontations in the existence of groups of men consciously opposed to each other on the same lines as groups operating at the town level. The national leaders were busily rejecting and boycotting the government's tentative offers of limited internal self-government. However, there were two rounds of archiepiscopal elections in 1947 and 1948 which gave the national parties a chance to test their organisations by backing opposed candidates for the job. Makarios II⁽¹⁶⁾ was a strong anti-communist and was to win. The left in Cyprus, and of course in Kallo, backed a candidate who was considered more 'progressive'. Although he lost in Cyprus, in Kallo his supporters could have mobilised more votes than did those for Makarios II and this fact is taken by both right and left wing informants to prove that at that time the left was clearly stronger in sheer numbers. They also report that tempers ran higher in those days - "we were more fanatic then and we took

it all seriously."

The fanaticism took an interesting form which stopped the matter being proven by the actual result of the ballot: for ecclesiastical elections the electoral register was supervised by the village Church committee, which sent the register to the bishopric whence it returned with the names of certain villagers scored through in red ink, as communists, and thus atheists, and so ineligible to vote. It should be noted at this point that it was the son of the Church committee secretary who was leader of the left group: in his account it was the committee members themselves who had supplied the information to the bishopric; however, the secretary says that this did not occur but readily agrees the information must have been supplied by someone in the village.

The actual voting was to take place in the Church. When the leftists arrived they found the door barred to them and the amended register produced as justification. "We are Christians too and entitled to vote" they insisted, but this appeal failed. In normal village usage the idea of being Greek and of being Christian is one and the same, and in telling the story the Secretary of the Church Committee did not find it odd that the leftists insisted they were Christians: "Surely no man would deny he is a Christian?" he said. The priest came outside to collect the proxy votes of menstruating women (who were prohibited from entering the Church) and the leftists went away.

They decided to retaliate with a form of economic boycott. In the Orthodox Church a worshipper normally buys

a thin wax taper on entrance for a few copper coins. Later in the service he lights it and leaves it before an icon, whereupon after a few minutes a Church official extinguishes it. Later the Church melts down the tapers, makes new ones and re-sells them. The purchase of a taper is thus in a sense analogous to a collection in some other Churches except it also involves an act of ritual participation by the worshipper. The Kallo leftists decided to buy their own tapers and bring them into Church when they went, thus depriving the Church of a form of revenue. In addition, they did not hold a certain customary festival - yiorti tou spitiou - centring on the ritual blessing of the house at which it is customary for the priest and cantors to be feasted as well as paid a small fee for ritual services. This boycott was kept up for several years and only dropped when a local bishop was trying to muster possible support against the Archbishop and made peace with the left by suggesting they might like to put up a candidate for the Church Committee.

Kallo at this period had privately owned retail stores selling a wide range of essentials and run by villagers. Villagers felt that such shops overcharged for many commodities, and the shopkeepers were naturally forced to extend credit providing ample room for dispute in normal transactions, since among other things most villagers did not keep their own record of items purchased and were often frankly incredulous at the amount they might have run up over several months. When the Kallo leftists - following a trend that had already started as a result of initiatives by leftist organisations - started

collecting subscriptions for a Cooperative Retail Shop, which would be non-profit and dividend-paying, they found a good deal of support in the village. The right, however, at first stayed out and tried to persuade the villagers it was a bad idea. When they realised that the idea was in fact quite popular they decided to cooperate and by an agreement with the left were allowed to put two representatives on the five man committee which supervised the running of the shop.

(vi) Conclusion

This chapter has used a number of different types of material, mixing the recollections of old people, village and government records, my own census material, and some literary sources, to obtain a picture of Kallo village's recent history⁽¹⁷⁾. To build up such a picture there has inevitably been much reliance on inference to bridge gaps in the material, and no claim can be made to completeness. Any account of changes in Cypriot society as a whole has been by implication only, and brought in only so far as was essential to describe gross changes in village life. Such an attempt is seriously limited since it allows nothing to be said about how far Kallo has been typical of the development of rural Cyprus, but it is essential as an introduction to my main concern, the analysis of political processes in which Kallo villagers have been involved since 1960.

The picture which emerges has certain features in common with the course of change in European and Mediterranean peasant communities in the last hundred years, as well as that in certain countries during the later phases of colonial rule.

It involves rapid population growth, changes in agricultural technique, increase in persons living through wage labour facilitated by new roads, and motor transport; all this accompanied by increase in popular literacy, and increasing political activity by urban leaders.

To characterise the traditional period, the notion of 'moral community' used by Pitt-Rivers (1954:30-31) is useful, but with the notable difference that whereas Alcalá had a resident class of senoritos, Kallo lacked such a class. There were differences of wealth, but these were not strongly institutionalised. There was no landlord class, very few completely landless families, very few resident men distinguished by literacy. There was some occupational specialisation, and there is no reason to think that a landless labourer met a farmer with forty donums on terms of complete equality. Yet insofar as the main concerns of all villagers were land, marriage partners, honour and simply, economic survival, such social conflict as occurred between the Greeks of Kallo was within a common framework of values. The village was in this sense a moral community, and there are signs that it was in the political sense a solidary community as well. This does not suggest that social conflict did not take place, but that it was regulated by customary norms, which implied the wish to limit violent conflict between groups in the village.

It is not the suggestion that violent conflict did not take place in this period. The Andriadis family who 'terrorised the village' and controlled the post of mukhtar are proof enough that it did. The point here is that this was

both within a common frame of values, and was regulated. It did not lead to feud, to the expulsion of a kin group, or to the formation of politically corporate groups (Barth: 1959:71-91), and in this sense it resembles the competition between festa partiti described by Boissevain (1965:55-96). At the same time as such disputes over power, influence and personal prestige took place between Kallotes, they were able to settle other issues of direct economic importance to many of them, through the authority of the courts, themselves a consequence of British colonial rule. The two companies' dispute may in fact have cost the villagers so much money and pride, that it predisposed them to more rapid settlements in the future. With the neighbouring village of Kammari, there were for a number of years cooperative relations in a water company, and violent disputes over river water, again finally settled through the courts. The traditional agriculture was modified, first by the increasing use of summer water, then by the extension of village cultivation.

The village got larger, and occupations both changed and diversified. More villagers were farmers, but proportionately, fewer of them. The role of government affected the lives of villages, in the control of agricultural credit, and the national economy provided in the 1930s and 1940s new opportunities for wage labour. The flow of transactions between villagers and the larger society was increasing, and one sign of this was the attempts of urban politicians to appeal to rural voters. The 1931 Uprising put a temporary curb on this, but then the colonial government ten years later

relaxed its restraints, and by the end of the 1940's Kallo possessed associations of young men using the political slogans of the left and the right to align themselves. Behaviour which in the 1920's had seemed startlingly new, now had an organisational basis in village life, and this is reason enough to say - anticipating the argument of later chapters - that the villagers no longer lived within a single framework of values: a political change had taken place, as well as those changes in the agricultural and economic sectors. To assess the consequences of such political change for the social organisation of the village is the main task in the pages that follow.

Footnotes to Chapter 1.

- (1) Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1931.
Nicosia: Government Printing Office.
- (2) I have not enough information to decide if villagers when borrowing from other villagers received better terms than from townsmen, or were able to soften, later, the terms they received. Since certain Kallotes became owners of many donums by foreclosing on others, it is probable that constraints on foreclose existed only between close kin, and not between all co-villagers.
- (3) Cohen (1965: 19) gives an account of the struggle of Palestinian Arabs to secure the muna, subsistence needs for a family in a mixed cereal farming situation. Stirling (1965:44-97) gives a comparable account for a Turkish village 1949-50 before the advent of tractors.
- (4) The actual technique, and the cooperation if involves, are ancient. Jenness (1962) describes how the Market Town farmers started to dig a chain of wells but stopped when their funds ran out; in 1894, however, they received a loan from the Agricultural Board, and continued. Kallo villagers see themselves in rivalry with Market Town, and in two later chapters aspects of this rivalry over the construction of a dam and the administration of a citrus retail cooperative will be analysed in detail.

- (5) I have tried unsuccessfully to examine court records on this and several other cases.
- (6) See (1); I shall by donum always mean a government donum, about one third of an acre; a 'village donum' was roughly twice this and based on the amount of land a man with two oxen could plough in a working day. It was inevitably, then, a rough measure.
- (7) As both Christodoulou and Jenness make clear, local conditions of land fertility, water supply, crops grown and market conditions make island-wide estimates of land holdings needed for household viability extremely difficult, not to speak of the actual level of household consumption, or other income sources. I think it unlikely that in the traditional period, before summer water was used, a holding of less than eight acres could have kept a small family alive.
- (8) The agrophylakas, normally described as rural constable in English, is paid to perform a number of duties, one of which is keeping an up-to-date register of all land held within the village, and its tax status.
- (9) Cyprus Gazette, CO 456 (1881) and (1883-4).
- (10) Cyprus Blue Book, 1909-10.
- (11) It is worth noting that Kammari village also had a dispute between two water companies, similar to the one I have described for Kallo. I did not investigate it in any detail, but was told by a sophisticated Kammari informant that the dispute had been 'between the rich, in one company, and the poor, in the other'. The Kallotes do not describe their water company dispute this way, but they do so for the elections here described.
- (12) Even though after the 1931 Uprising the government appointed muktars, a member of the Andriades was later appointed. The issue of the election or appointment of muktars is complicated. Informants said that until 1931 there were elections for mukhtar in the village, and that after the Uprising, the Government appointed them. However, there is good evidence that the Government had already seriously modified the simple annual elections which they have taken over from the Ottomans in 1878, and which were still flourishing when Orr (1918) criticised the system. Shenis points out that the series of Village Authority Laws (10 of 1906, 10 of 1907, 18 of 1923, 38 of 1928, 22 of 1930 and 19 of 1931) had as one aim the codification of mukhtar's duties. Surridge, writing before the Uprising, describes a system in which villagers elected a number of possible representatives, from whom the Mejlis-i Idare nominated three, the Legislative Council Member for the District, two. From these five the Governor chose one to be mukhtar: the elections were to be

every two years. This blend of election and of appointment was converted into simple appointment in 1931.

- (13) Such behaviour is characteristic of factionalism everywhere, but it is well described and analysed by Frankenberg (1957:148-157) and Boissevain (1965).
- (14) Gluckman (1968a) has recently reviewed some of the literature on what he now terms 'inter-hierarchical roles'. Shenis (1962) has studied in detail the evolution of local government in Cyprus since early times.
- (15) Many of the men who in this period were calling themselves leftist no longer did so by the time of my fieldwork, and the membership of the leftist soccer team is one way in which the villages remember this. The right wing religious associations were to be used, throughout the island, by Grivas, to act as recruiting grounds for EOKA. Both these issues are examined later.
- (16) The President of the Republic of Cyprus is His Beatitude Makarios III.
- (17) For this introductory chapter I have employed a selection of the possible sources only: Hill (1952), and Christodoulou (1955) in his thesis, both give very extensive bibliographies of works on Cyprus in a number of languages. I have examined official publications for information relevant to Kallo and the Market Town district, but make no claim to have been exhaustive. In later chapters, only a selection of possible source material on the EOKA period and inter-communal conflicts since Independence have been employed. The main focus of this work is in the analysis of fieldwork data.

CHAPTER 2

LAND, WORK AND PRESTIGE

The size of a family's land-holding, and the types of work its members do together act as constraints in the village system of social prestige and differentiation. Economic and status factors together are partial determinants of political relations both within the village, and across its boundaries. In simplest terms, poor men are rarely political activists or leaders, but either act with great caution, or are the dependent clients of more powerful men. Those men who are full-time farmers dominate the competition for administrative office in the village, and also produce a majority of the political leaders. Their structural position allows them degrees of freedom not available to poorer men, or men whose work relies on the goodwill of others. The third feature of political life which can be partly attributed to the land holding and work patterns is the pre-eminence of teachers and civil servants as the natural brokers between the villagers, and men of power outside the village. There are, in addition, certain tensions in the relations between the farmers and the more educated men which become apparent in situations where leadership of the village involves confronting external authorities.

To discuss these structural constraints is also to clarify the nature of certain prizes for which the villagers compete in the village arena, for it will become clear in

this and the following chapters that the villagers' values focus on provision for their children, and this provision takes the form of land, houses, wealth, education, and appropriate marriage partners. Since most villagers still seek to marry their children to the children of co-villagers⁽¹⁾, they have certain common interests which cast light on why they also value a measure of peace in village politics.

(i) The Importance of Land

It might at first sight seem a truism to suggest that the distribution of land is essential to the understanding of the village. However, Kallo has certain features unusual in the ethnography of the Mediterranean, at least. Chiefly, these are that land is still the basis of prestige, it is valuable and valued and, relatively, it is evenly distributed; these facts taken together mean that Kallo provides for most people born into it the chance of a reasonable living in comparison with poorer villages, and it has not been depopulated in the ways commonly reported.

There has been some continuity with the traditional period, when land was more simply the basis for survival, in that the younger men in the village, acting on the advice of their fathers, still seek to obtain land, even when they have other sources of income. This is partly because in the current citrus boom, which will be described in the last section of this chapter, the returns on long-term investment in land are attractive. In living memory the value of land

has appreciated so dramatically that, at very least appearing as a safe investment in comparison with other things, it is the preferred method of investing surplus cash. Men are fond of pointing this out, by saying "I bought that field for £20 in 1940, and now they are offering me £500 for it and I'm not selling".

Nor is the value of land eroded simply because in general villagers as a category rank below townsmen. Speculation in land is the major source of investment for the urban elite; not all of this by any means is for building plots or tourist areas. Numbers of the urban elite are now armchair agriculturalists, and several MPs and senior civil servants and ministers have large citrus holdings in the Market Town area.

There are a number of ways the issue of land, work, and their consequences can be approached, and each method of analysis casts light on different aspects of the issue. First, it is worth considering five examples using qualitative material, to make the later use of numerical data more meaningful. The cases that follow are selected as illustrative of five contrasting patterns of land tenure, occupation, and provision for dependents.

(a) Makris, a poor labourer (Census no. 125)

Makris is 64, his wife 58. They have five children, and some would say it is a good thing they don't have more, for Makris himself received from his own parents no land at marriage in 1936, his family being one of the poorest in Kallo, and his wife, who provided their home, had only three and a half donums of good, irrigated land, and five of poor, unwatered land.

Makris has never bought any land; he has worked as an unskilled labourer all his life, he works as one today, and his income is irregular. His wife also works, either doing work in her home as a seamstress, when she was single, or in married life doing paid agricultural labour. He says 'what we get, we spend to eat'.

In spite of this, in 1965 he planted 180 citrus trees, and by 1972 he can expect to take £90 from them; but the trees will in fact be a vital part of the dowries for his 25 and 23 year old daughters, when grooms are found for them. The elder finished primary school only, and works as a wage labourer whenever she can, about the village. The younger finished secondary school and works in the Market Town office of a Kallo merchant; Makris' unmarried son is ill and cannot work.

Makris did manage to educate his oldest child, a son who now has a salaried white collar job in Market Town, for he managed to get a technical degree. Makris hopes this son will help a bit toward the marriages of the girls, but this will have to be done discreetly, lest his son's affines protest. By the standards of men in the poorer mountain or plains villages, Makris would not be considered really poor, although in Kallo he is described as poor by most villagers.

(b) Psylos, a semi-skilled wage worker (Census no. 88)

Psylos is 48; since his marriage in 1944 his wife has given him 7 children, of whom 5 are still unmarried. She also brought 10 donums of land to the marriage. He himself brought no land to the marriage, and has never managed to increase the landholding. He left school at 14, worked for two years as a kitchen boy in Nicosia, then for three years in the General Hospital as an Assistant Cook; later he had his own restaurant, but in 1944 joined the Army, and worked until 1948 in the Officers Mess. At present he is Cook in the Mining Hospital on the coast, and this brings him a steady salary of nearly £1,000 a year. He gets a further income of £500 a year from 168 mature orange trees he planted in 1955, and from which in 1968-69 he cut 100,000 fruit. His debts at the moment are: £1,030 from expenses in marrying off his daughter; £200 to the Agricultural Credit Society for farming costs; £25 to a villager for water; £16 to the truck cooperative in the village; £15 for fertiliser; plus a commitment of £10 a month school fees for

his twelve year old daughter who is going to a private commercial school.

Psylos has married off two daughters, one aged 22, the other aged 18; he has given them a total of 6 donums, and is still building the house for the second; at home he has a 20 year old son, who finished Technical School and works as a mechanic for the Mining Company; a 16 year old son, who also finished the Technical, and works as an electrician; a 14 year old son, still at the Technical; the 12 year old daughter already mentioned; and a 10 year old son at the primary school. Since he only has 4 donums of land left, which yields valuable income, he will not be in a position to give any land to the three oldest sons; it will probably go to the 12 year old girl when she marries. The sons have their trades to help them find wives with a little land and at least are not unskilled labourers. Fortunately, Technical School education is free; by most standards Psylos, thanks to his steady income from two sources, has been able to marry off his children reasonably well. His daughters have married young so his honour is intact. For a man who started life with so little land, he has managed to escape the major pitfalls. He cannot be called, in village terms, a very successful man; but nor can he be called a failure.

(c) Kandis, a solid full-time farmer (Census no. 30)

Kandis is 42; he got engaged at the relatively late age of twenty-seven, and married two years later, in 1956. From his parents he got 22 donums, and his wife got 8 from hers. This unusual ratio between his land and hers is partly explained by the nickname, The Tough, he bears, which caused him to do a number of prison sentences, one of four years, usually for theft.

He settled down after marriage, added another 14 donums to his already substantial holding, by purchase. The 44 donums (unless he buys more) will be divided between only three children. The oldest, a girl of thirteen, at secondary school, has a younger sister of nine, and there is a baby of four months. Kandis does not plan to have any more children and the spacing of them is suggestive.

Although as a single man he did some labouring jobs, in the early 1940's, since marriage he has been fully occupied with his land holding. Like most farmers, he has debts, but is cheerful about them, and says "I can't sleep at night if I'm

not in debt". The £2,500 he owes is split into £300 to the village Credit Society, for fertilisers; £500 to the import agent, he sold him the diesel pump that waters his land (and whose water he sells to others); this debt is for repairs, since the pump was recently damaged; and £1,500 to the Cooperative Central Bank to float his recent land purchases. In 1955, when he started to drill for the underground water he now enjoys, the debt was £3,000.

He planted 300 orange trees in 1955, another 300 in 1960, 220 in 1963, and in 1965, a massive 1,100. In 1968 he was receiving income from 600 of these trees, but was still cultivating 1,300 of them without income.

His land purchases have paralleled his citrus planting: 1955, 7 donums for £500; 1960, 3 donums for £900; 1968, 4 donums for £1,300. In each case these new plots joined other pieces of land he already owned, making their cultivation economically more efficient.

As Kendis gets older, his household expenses will increase if he chooses to give his children education. But even as things stand, and assuming he makes no further expansion of his land holdings, each child stands to get 15 donums, and this puts them in the elite of the village. They will be able to choose education, farming, or both. Kandis is a firm leftist, in spite of his success.

(d) Pattas, a civil servant with good citrus holdings
(Census no. 143)

Pattas is 34; his wife brought 14 donums to their marriage, as well as the customary dowry house. Pattas, tall, well-built, personable and intelligent, himself received 7 donums at marriage, and his personal attributes more than make up for his smaller portion of land, for he has put all 21 donums under citrus, in four plantings: 400 trees in 1958; 220 in 1961; 420 in 1962; 140 in 1968. His current debt stands at £2,500. But he grossed £2,000 from his citrus trees in 1968, so he is not concerned.

One reason he has done so well is that since 1955 he has had regular work as a prison officer; his salary of £650, in 1968 was about to rise to £850. This helped him finance the earlier planting of his land, and the situation is now economically self-propelled. He can, if he chooses, expand his holdings. He has four children, and plans not to have more.

He drives a four-year old English saloon that he bought second hand. His house cost £3,000 in contract labour and materials, and in it he has a radio, a refrigerator, a modern gas stove and a washing machine.

In 1961 he put down £500 towards a tractor, and his brother, a farmer, put £100. The brother then used the tractor to plough both their holdings, and also to plough those of other men, for profit. Pattas stated that the accounting system is informal: whenever the tractor needs repairs, each brother pays a half.

He has just bought two shares of £75 each in a new cooperative company which will sink a bore hole for underground water.

Pattas is typical of an emergent elite in the village, of those who have land which is profitable, and handsomely subsidises their other occupations. Other members tend to have more formal education than Pattas (to have finished the secondary school) but his wealth, life style, urban white-collar job and good political contacts make up for this deficit. His sister has married a veterinary doctor, he has a younger brother at university in Athens, and a younger sister who is finishing secondary school.

(e) Patris, a wealthy farmer (Census no. 148)

Patris is 47, and typical of the old elite, except that he made a most fortunate marriage. He came from a well-off and respected family, and received 12 donums from his parents. The woman he married was the adopted daughter of a childless man who, though a farmer, had become rich in land through money-lending to other villagers. The girl had five years elementary schooling, and was then engaged to a pharmacist in Market Town. This would have been a most prestigious match in the early 1940's, when few daughters of the village had married men of such status. But the engagement was broken off by the man.

Patris was tall, handsome, strong, and had finished elementary school. The match was arranged, and the girl brought a massive 120 donums of land to the marriage. From her family's point of view, it was better to save face with a worthwhile young man from the village, than to wait for another high status outsider, and risk further humiliation. In 1946, when they married, tractors were rare in Cyprus, and the new family would have more land than they could work anyway.

Patris was one of the first men in the village to buy a tractor, which he did in 1947, 'by halves' with the brother of his wife's mother. Later he bought another 12 donums of land which were particularly useful, and he leases some land to relatives.

Today his 5,000 citrus trees keep him completely occupied as a full-time farmer, and he has regularly employed at least one man as a labourer since 1953. He does not do this in order not to work himself, but simply to be able to get all the pressing work done.

His current debts are between £5,000 and £6,000 to several banks, and the Agricultural Credit Cooperative Society. In 1968 he received £4,000 gross from citrus, carrots and potatoes, of which he estimates some £2,000 as profit. In 1968 he was still increasing his citrus plantations, intending to plant 20 donums with seedlings.

The one cloud on his horizon is the fact that his seven children are all girls. The first one has married a young civil servant from the village, and Patris gave her 17 donums; her husband had no land. Patris was persuaded to take her away from secondary school to make the match, but plans to give the other girls more education. Two are studying in Greece, at universities, and their expenses are £900 a year; the four girls at secondary school need together a further £900 a year, he estimates.

Patris is one of the most prominent political figures in the village, being on several committees, and the local representative of PEK, the Nationalist Farmers Union. He appears frequently in later chapters.

Table 5 shows that it is rare for Kallo households to start married life with no land at all, and that over 70% of them started with holdings ranging from 6 to 25 donums. That is, a factor of four separates the largest from the smallest of these 70%.

There is obviously the possibility of acquiring land or losing it, through purchase or sale, as well as those alterations to a holding which arise from the developmental cycle of the domestic group. Table 6 shows a sample of men

TABLE 5LAND RECEIVED AT MARRIAGE⁽¹⁾: 191 HOUSEHOLDS

<u>Donums</u>	<u>Households</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
0	3	1.57
1 - 5	14	7.31
6 - 10	41	21.46
11 - 15	45	23.56
16 - 25	48	25.13
26 - 50	33	17.27
51 or more	7	3.66
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	191	99.97%
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Note (1) The amount refers to usufruct, and not to legal title only.

TABLE 6

CHANGE IN SIZE OF LAND HOLDING FOR 82 HOUSEHOLDERS
WHO FIRST MARRIED 1931-50

	<u>Holding static, or declining (1)</u>	<u>Holding increased after marriage (2)</u>
1931-40	9	27
1941-50	16	30
Total	<u>25 (30.5%)</u>	<u>57 (69.5%)</u>

Note (1) Holdings which declined through normal transfer of property to children at marriage are not included. Only cases where informants sold land in such a way as to make their holdings smaller are included.

(2) Cases included here are those in which the net result of an informant's sales and purchases was a larger holding than he and his wife had had at the start of their marriage. Cases where a person received title to land he had been working earlier are not included.

married between 1931 and 1950, most of whom by 1969 had completed the cycle, and it is notable that more than two-thirds of them had increased their holdings by purchase, from the amounts that were available to them at marriage.

These data by themselves cannot indicate the sort of expectations children of such households may reasonably have, for future portions of land, or access to education. Some hint of these things was provided by the five cases just given. To both must be added the villager's view of the matter. They make four basic distinctions: there are i phtoschi, the poor; there are i metrii, middling people; there are i kali, those who are all right; finally, there are i plousii, the rich, or i archontes, those who run things. Such terms do not have sharp boundaries, and the use of them varies from speaker to speaker. They may be the subject of disagreement, since by themselves they do not include the critical issue of the number of dependents who expect to extract shares from the combined property of the household. The matrix in Table 7 is an attempt in formal terms to illustrate this, and although the villagers do not need to formalise their view of social differences, they make similar calculations on an ad hoc basis, when trying to justify the use of terms like phtochos or plousios.

The matrix shows land holdings at maximum of 82 families married between 1931-50, expressed against the number of children in each family who will draw shares from the family holding. The effect of looking at land holding data in this way is to estimate the future portion a child may

LAND AT MAXIMUM AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN OF 82 households where first marriage of heads occurred between 1931 and 1950

		Number of children											
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Land in donums	51+				E ₂	E ₂	E ₂	E ₁	E ₃	M ₁	M ₁	M ₁	
	26-50			E ₂	E ₅	M ₃	M ₄	M ₁	M ₁	P ₂			
	16-25	E ₁	E ₁	E ₇	M ₁	M ₁	P ₅	P ₃	P ₄	P ₂	P ₁	P ₂	
	11-15	E ₁		M ₁	P ₂	P ₁	P ₂	P ₁	P ₂	P ₁	P ₁		
	6-10	E ₁ /M ₁			P ₁	P ₁	P ₁		P ₁		P ₁		P ₁
	1-15				P ₁	P ₁	P ₁						
	0									P ₁			

E—Elite, more than 6½ donums=27

M—Middling, 4-6½ donums=16

P—Poor, under 4 donums=39

This is a hypothetical model and does not represent actual shares of land received, but rather, probabilities of approximate shares.

expect to receive.

The matrix shows that some 27 families should be able to give each child more than $6\frac{1}{2}$ donums at marriage; another 18 families should give from 4 donums to $6\frac{1}{2}$ donums; and 37 families will have from 0 to 3 donums to give each child⁽²⁾.

Such tendencies depend on a number of assumptions - that each child receives roughly the same amount as its siblings, that both sexes receive equal amounts of land, and that the family does not lose its holding through some unforeseen disaster. In chapter three, when kinship and marriage are discussed, further data are introduced to modify these assumptions. The point here is to approximate, in formal terms, the villagers' way of discussing wealth in land. In brief, and to avoid labouring the point further, they see it as relative to the number of dependents and future beneficiaries; and they see land holding in a context of time, rather than as a static fact: they are less concerned with or impressed by what a family has, than what its children will have at marriage.

In the five cases the fact that men both own land and have non-agricultural jobs was apparent. Table 8 gives this a further perspective; it illustrates the tautology that farmers must have land: over 90% of those men with less than 16 donums have some other occupation than working their land holding. In this instance, the villager's own categories have a close fit with sociological distinctions for, generally, men only described themselves as ghiorgós, farmer, if they

TABLE 8

LAND HOLDINGS AT MAXIMUM AND OTHER OCCUPATIONS

<u>Donums at</u> <u>maximum (1)</u>	0-10	11-15	16-25	26-50	51 or more	
Full-time farmers	-	4	27	31	14	= 76
Mixed occupations	30	32	33	18	3	= 115
						<hr/> 191 <hr/>

Note (1) It must be remembered that this sample includes young men, who married since 1960, and most of them have probably not reached their maximum holdings yet. Nor will the classification made here necessarily remain stable over time.

had a sizeable land holding, and no other occupation. There were a number of cases where this fit was less good, but since it is a matter of pride - for the older men at least - to be what I here call full-time farmers, informants were usually careful not to claim this status for themselves unreasonably, for this would have invited scorn from others who would, they feared, have pointed out to me the facts.

There is one further complication in any discussion of land and other work. This is that many men do not have one job that they do all their lives. They show great flexibility, and it was common when a man was first asked what he did, for him to answer 'I've done every kind of job'. A man with a sizeable land holding is a farmer for a number of years; then he may buy a truck, which he drives when free from his agricultural work, and rents to another man when he is busy. Later still, he might pay a man to drive the truck. Another typical process involves opening a coffee shop or tavern for a year or two, and then stopping. There are also numbers of men who have served apprenticeships as builders, shoemakers, carpenters and so forth but were not practising their trades or crafts in 1968-69. Such flexibility partly explains why some men with sizeable holdings - of 26 donums or more - are classified in Table 8 as having mixed occupations.

(ii) General Status Factors in Work

When the villagers are talking about differences in work, status or life style within the village they are likely to make indirect reference to one or several of the

following factors: whether a man works entirely for himself or for others; how much freedom in practical economic terms he has to refuse paid work; the same factors regarding the women of his household; whether or not he has a regular income and to what extent he performs manual work to get it; how much skill or education he has; and the extent to which his work is rural or urban.

It is generally accepted that a man with little land and many children is under pressure to accept paid labouring work most of the time. This will be particularly so if he has many unmarried daughters, and no sons of age to earn wages. If a man with seven young children and only ten donums of land is asked to go and irrigate a field for a land-rich villager or white-collar worker and thus earn himself £3 or £5 (or even more if the field is large) other men would be surprised if he answered curtly in the manner of a man with no economic burdens 'en paō - "I'm not going". If he is very sick, or has just worked many hours at a stretch or has a pressing crop of his own to tend he is likely to say so as an explanation to bystanders for his apparent unwillingness to earn good money⁽³⁾. In Kallo today very few men under 35 live by agricultural labouring, still less by the totally unskilled Public Works labouring on roads. The younger men who work manually have nearly all managed to become apprentices to builders, mechanics, carpenters and so on. The lowest occupation for most young Kallotes is labouring at either the Citcop Packing Plant at Market Town or the Box Factory. But older men who are land-poor do a

variety of labouring jobs in and out of the village which include irrigation of fields, maintenance of irrigation channels, well-digging and occasionally labour on a house-building site.

Working for others is less menial if one uses a machine to do so. There are at least twenty tractors in the village - about one for every fifteen households - and as many heavy trucks. A new tractor costs £1,200 or more, and a new truck several thousand pounds. Men who buy such heavy machines may do so because they have enough land, or in the case of produce merchants, enough business to keep the machine fully used. But more often the machines are bought by men with moderate holdings only, to avoid paying others for the services they provide, and with the hope that by selling the services of the machine with oneself as operator, enough money will be made to pay off the hire-purchase cost of the machine quickly; and when this is paid off, to make money. Such use of tractors and trucks is often described by the villages as via epichyrisin "for business". Consequently, although the owner-operator works for others, he is in no sense equated with a labourer. For he has both a skill in the operation of the machine, and a capital investment, and thus his dependence on others for custom is tempered by his ability through skill, hard work and good management to turn his enterprise into profit.

The land-rich, however, often possess tractors or trucks which they do not in general use to work for others. People do not ask the land-rich to go and plough their fields for them because they are fairly sure that the answer will be "I'm too busy with my own land to do yours". In the village

if a man asks another to do something and is refused he may be said to have lost a point in the eyes of onlookers. If in addition he has been reminded that the other man is rich in land while he is not rich enough to have his own tractor, he has lost another point. It is not my suggestion that the phrase 'lose a point' directly translates a Cypriot Greek expression, or even that the villagers would be immediately or usually conscious during such an exchange of the potential for profit and loss in terms of social credit. However, observation of many conversational exchanges and the informal comments of informants convince me that this view is correct. The land-rich not only avoid working for others both because the size of their own holdings keep them busy and provide them with sufficient economic independence to make such activities unnecessary; but also they are likely to employ the labour of others. A man with many donums of land may be busy enough with one aspect of cultivation to need to regularly employ another man at some less skilled aspect. For instance, a man with 20 donums of citrus trees may regularly employ another to irrigate for him. Such arrangements are rarely formal, and are more often habitual, verbal, informal contracts. In addition to the land-rich, the teachers and other white-collar workers are likely to enter into such informal arrangements; but where a land-rich farmer would do his own ploughing, planting, pruning and so forth and only employ extra labour for certain limited activities, the teacher is more likely to contract for a variety of different agricultural activities. He may or may not use a close kinsman in such work; in any

case, whoever he asks to work for him will need to be paid the going rate for the job.

It is highly valued for men to be independent where possible in the sense of not having to work for others. This is even reflected in attitudes to people outside the village: for instance, it is widely assumed that government doctors are medically inferior to those in private practise; why, the villagers ask, would a man who was any good be working for the government on a limited salary if he was good enough to open his own clinic and make a lot of money? However, it is accepted as a fact of life for which a man is not responsible that he may have started life with no land and no education, and that some form of dependence on others will be necessary for his survival. But the question of his women working for others has different implications.

(iii) Status Factors in Women's Work

Village women do not like to be seen doing nothing; when a woman has finished her household tasks, if she sits down she is very likely to do some embroidering or something similar. All village women do their own housework, and in traditional times the wives and daughters of the largest landowners worked in their own fields alongside poorer women who were working for wages. Recently, though, the wives and daughters of larger farmers avoid work outside the house, as do those of civil servants and teachers. They add a new feature to social differentiation in the village.

At the lower end of the social scale are unmarried girls and wives who do agricultural labour, or work in the nearby Cooperative factories for daily wages. It is something a man would much rather his women did not have to do, and in his own eyes, as well as in those of his fellow villagers, reflects poorly on his success as a provider. It is a source of pride for a man of limited means that his women do not work for pay. This view is also shared by women too, although probably from a slightly different viewpoint. A girl who does not have to do paid work may say of others less fortunate "I'm sorry for that poor Maria. She's a good girl and she has to go cutting oranges all day for a few shillings..." The word "poor" here has the same double meaning that it does in English.

The problem about when a woman works and when she doesn't is not simple. There are many Cypriot proverbs which express the idea that there is no shame in work, that it is an offering to God, and so forth. Thus, for a woman to be working alongside her husband on their own land is perfectly acceptable and indeed natural. The reasons that the wives of teachers and white-collar workers do not do such work are partly to do with the fact that the husbands themselves no longer do such manual work and thus it is appropriate for the wives to follow suit; and also because a white-collar worker usually has land under citrus cultivation only, and this leaves little else of a directly agricultural nature for his wife to do⁽⁴⁾. Why then should the question of women working for pay be of such concern to villagers?

There are at least two reasons. One is the matter

of the woman's role as a housekeeper and organiser of domestic life. If a woman must be out every day for eight or ten hours working for pay, she will by definition not be home running the house, and when she is at home she will have less energy to spare for such duties; in addition, there is an obvious sense in which she usurps the husband's role of provider by herself providing in the same idiom of wage labour.

The other factor is somewhat different. There is a cultural value in rural Cyprus which reflects the honour-and-shame complex of the Mediterranean in stressing that women should be virgins at marriage (nowadays this is sometimes stretched to mean at engagement) and that adultery by a woman is an act which creates the greatest social humiliation for her husband. This can be summed up by saying that with the exception of widows who remarry (and there are today few in rural Cyprus who do so) all women should know sexually one and only one man in their lives. Any social contact between a woman and unrelated men has implicit in it possible infringements of this value, since the villagers often speak as if they believe that to know a woman 'socially' leads very easily - given suitable time and place - to knowing her sexually; they also speak as if the powers of women to resist the advances of men are very limited. This belief is associated with the complex of beliefs about male sexual potency but this is not the place to discuss them. It is enough to say that in the context of work it is always better that one's women do not work away from the supervision of those who are directly concerned with their behaviour - kinsmen and kinswomen. Most

men insist their own women are 'honourable'. It is other inhabitants of the community who are unwilling to allow a person the benefit of the doubt when there is a chance to cast aspersions. It is primarily to avoid giving occasion for malicious gossip that men are so concerned with the facts of where, how and for whom their womenfolk work.

The wife of a land-rich farmer does not labour for pay, but she is ready to give labour to kin and neighbours on an exchange basis, for the tending of certain crops. (The weeding of carrots, and the cutting of oranges being the most common situations where it is useful for a family to rally a large labour supply.) When a woman and her husband decide that their oranges are to be cut she goes to her neighbours and kinswomen and says to them 'Will you come and cut my oranges tomorrow? You help me and I'll help you.' The understanding here is that one day of labour picking oranges will later on be returned by another day's labour at the same work. The work should not be returned in another medium of exchange, such as cash, produce, or labour on another crop since this would lead to complications of accounting, the women say; particularly it would be insulting to offer cash in place of one's labour after the agreement had been made to exchange labour because the implication would be that the recipient is the sort of woman who needs to do wage-labour. Such working parties often contain both women performing exchange labour and others who are working for cash, from among the group in the village of poor families where the women are said to "go labouring" or be "labouring women". But in the minds of the

actors the conditions of work are very important and not to be confused.

The values implied in whether or not a woman undertakes paid work are illustrated in the following case. Anthoulla, wife of Sklyros, has never in her eighteen years of marriage done paid work for anyone, except at the Carrot Union, which is regarded as a special situation. One day she was invited to go on a working party, to her koummara's. The understanding was that it was exchange labour, expressed in the idiom, 'I'll help you and you help me?'. A few days after the group had done their work, Anthoulla was astonished when her koummara came to her house, placed 12/6 on the table and said "Here you are, koummara." Anthoulla said "Koummara, I don't want your money. We said, I'd help you and then you'd help me..." "Yes, but you take the money now, and if I get a chance I will help you, and then you can help me back again..." Anthoulla was extremely angry, but because the woman was her koummara (and should never be quarrelled with) she did not allow her anger to show but held it in. But the anger persisted, because she had been cheated, made a laughing-stock of. Her husband, who was listening to the story added "It's a question of pride and self-respect. People could say, Anthoulla is doing wage-labour for Karpis."

There are, however, occasions and situations when the distinctions become blurred: for instance, the village has a Cooperative Packing House for the handling of the carrot crop. The carrot harvest (from the end of April to early June) is a rushed affair, since carrots spoil easily in the

fields, and everyone wants to get his carrots out, washed, packed and shipped as quickly as possible. It is a time of great labour scarcity in the village, and only the women of a few land-rich men are not to be found working away from the home at this time. When a woman has harvested her own carrots with the aid of exchange and paid labour groups she will probably go to work at the Packing House. Here there will be at the same time several hundred Kallo women all working in large groups. The plant is only half a mile from the centre of the village, the work light and easy, and under cover. The women point this out, as well as the fact that they can chat and gossip together in much larger groups than usual and 'hear all the news of the village' ⁽⁵⁾. A further advantage is that the women can come and go as they like - doing perhaps only three or four hours before going home. All these factors combined mean that the women are keen to do the carrot handling and women who never do any other paid work turn out for this. From the point of view of the village labour pool this is an advantage although it is not suggested that any such consciously public-spirited motive affects the villagers. Indeed, the labour scarcity is such that it is still often necessary for the village committee to hire extra female labour from poorer villages. Girls arrive in buses after anything from half an hour to ten hours journey. Gossip with such outsiders is an additional attraction to village women, who also express pity for these female labourers. For they must do the work under economic compulsion and must travel long hours to do it and put in a full day on arrival. The presence of these strangers

of their own villages, there is a clear sense in which a girl at work in the factories is morally at risk, however slightly.

The importance of women's labour has been stressed and the extent to which the need for women to do paid work for others is seen as exposing them morally to danger or insult. It should be noted that even insult is dangerous, for a man whose woman has been insulted should avenge the insult by violence. This is dangerous to him physically - a fact no villager would acknowledge - and may well endanger his dependents by leaving them without a provider and thus exposing them to further insult and danger. It has also been clear from this discussion that there is an obvious relation between the economic position of a family and the likelihood of such moral exposure. For this and other reasons, honour costs the poor more than the rich, and in its most subtle forms is a luxury.

(iv) Status Implications of Regular Income and Skill

There are, however, other important dimensions of occupation and status in the village. One of these is the relative regularity of income. It is reasonable enough that in an agricultural community of unpredictably variable climate, dependent on outside market factors and with the recent memory of crippling debt and foreclosure the farmers should pay attention not only to the size of a man's income but its regularity. Thus, when villagers talk about the teachers and certain other white-collar workers they stress several factors together but always that "the salary keeps coming". Where the income of the farmer is not only unpredictable but seasonal,

and is sandwiched between long periods when there is no money coming in, the white-collar worker is seen as a person enviably free from the pressures of the farmer's life. From the point of view of the farmers a steady income allows one to calculate, to plan for the future, to undertake certain debts of expansion secure in the knowledge that return payments are assured.

Obviously a regular wage is not found only with white-collar jobs. There are men in the village with a variety of regular skilled manual jobs, such as the men who drive bulldozers for the Cyprus Mines Corporation, or those who drive heavy tractors for the Agricultural Department. There are a few men who are regular truck-drivers for the produce merchants. Another occupation in the regular category is being a cook. It is not necessary to mention every such occupation; the important point is that a wage of £10 a week is a most valuable supplement to a small holding of say 10 donums. This does something to explain the popularity of jobs such as policeman and fireman with the villagers.

There is a point at which the regularity of employment and the size of a land-holding may come into conflict, and this often involves yet another dimension of occupation and status in the village; for it a man has a holding which requires frequent work, and yet his salaried or wage-paying job leaves him too little time to attend to his holding, he must get someone else to do the agricultural work for him. If the man is in a job which requires some education (let us say the leaving-certificate of the gymnasium) then he is unlikely to be willing to perform heavy manual work on his

holding. A teacher or other white-collar worker will employ someone to plough and to irrigate his citrus trees. He may himself do such light work as pruning, or if the holding is small he may spread chemical fertilizer. However, the sort of man who drives a bulldozer sees no reason why he should not also irrigate his own land, if he has the energy. Irrigation requires standing for hours in water up to one's knees and working with a long-handled shovel to open and close mud dams. Since few men who own tractors are prepared to lend them to any but their closest kin or friends, ploughing is usually done by an owner-operator, and must be paid for. It is in any case a specialised activity, for an inexperienced driver may well strike the growing citrus trees with the plough causing damage. If a man needs some ploughing done he will usually see if he has a close friend or relative who wants work before considering a man who is completely unrelated to him. But the job must be done, and rather than leave it undone for too long, he will send any man who is willing to go. Tractor-ploughing is more a consequence of specialisation of labour than of status considerations.

Villagers consider not only the regularity of income, but whether work is skilled or not, and whether it is manual or not. White-collar jobs are valued simply because they do not involve hard manual labour. Young men who have finished gymnasium, and expect to get little land, may seek a clerical job paying £25 or £30 a month; but the sons of larger farmers do not take such jobs, since farming with adequate land offers better money. The Greek word ypallilos literally means 'under

another', although it is translated, employee. The implied subordination can be detected when villagers add of someone mikri i thesisi tou, his position is a small one.

Skill is acknowledged when a man who has finished his apprenticeship is addressed as a mastoras, or is referred to as a technitis, a man with a skill. Builders, carpenters, electricians, well-drillers, mechanics and a number of other jobs carry such overtones.

These factors do not form neat clusters: a skilled man may have an irregular income, because of seasonal demands, a good wage when he works. A white-collar worker may have a low, steady income, in an unimportant job. To these complications, the question of whether work is rural or urban must be added.

The Greek word politismenos which I translate as refined, suggests, as does the English word urbane, the influence of the city. Villagers often describe themselves as illiterate and uneducated, and add "We are not refined". Since until the turn of the century few villages had schools, and literacy was rare, the association of village with uncouthness and town with refinement had some basis in fact. Although the situation today is more complex, villagers still speak as if the contrast were almost absolute.

(v) Education

All householders pay what is known as the School Tax, which in 1968 ranged from 10/- a year for the poorest household, to £8 for the richest⁽⁶⁾. The tax is paid regardless

of whether the household has children at the village Primary School (Demotiko) or not. Secondary education was paid for until 1970. It ranged from £18 a year fees for the first year, to £30 a year for the last of six years. On top of this there were books and the labour lost when a child goes to school. It has been common since the 1930's for men to send their sons to gymnasium 'to see if they take to learning' and if they didn't, to remove them from the school after a year or two. The gymnasium at Market Town is so close that there is little hardship in such experiments.

Often a boy may complete four or five years successfully and then fail the final examinations two or three times. If a boy or girl obtains the certificate of completion with good marks they become eligible for a variety of white-collar jobs, including minor civil service grades. However, a popular choice at this point would be a further two years' study at the Pedagogical Academy to qualify for being a teacher in the primary school system on a starting salary of about £40 a month. This offers certain advantages since the teachers' trade union has a loan fund from which loans can be raised for buying houses, or for aiding younger siblings to complete their education.

Should the family decide to send a child to university in Greece the cost moves up to a minimum of £30 a month for girls and a little more for boys since they often smoke cigarettes and go out a little⁽⁷⁾. Most university courses in Greece take four or five years to complete, and more if the student does poorly in examinations. However, on successful completion of a degree course the rewards are commensurate:

a student with a B.A. degree from a Greek university may obtain employment as a Gymnasium teacher in Cyprus at a starting salary of £80 a month. Medical, legal or scientific qualifications obviously lead to a variety of career possibilities. In addition, there are other educational possibilities, such as a diploma or certificate in one of the trade skills, in agriculture, business, hotel management, and so forth. All these choices have been taken in recent years by various villagers, and usually after a great deal of investigation in the form of questioning anyone who might know anything about the situation, plus continuous discussion within the family.

However, no amount of investigation has enabled the villagers to foresee certain changes in the national economy and their effects. One example will suffice: until ten years ago a highly desirable career for a young person was to become a teacher of philology in Gymnasium, where over a third of the curriculum hours are normally devoted to some aspect of the Greek language and its literature. The prestige of philology was also high because of its traditional association with Greek nationalism and with the transmission of Greek cultural ideals. Furthermore, in the minds of the older people full, fluent literacy was a great achievement. Thus, until the late 1950's the role of teacher carried great status, and this was expressed in the custom whereby everyone, young and old alike, stood up when a teacher, even if a young man, entered the village coffee shop.

But in the last fifteen years the status of the teacher has been somewhat lowered. First, not all young people who are qualified teachers now find jobs as soon as they want them. At the time of my fieldwork, the daughter of a prosperous farmer had returned from five years university studies in Greece with a degree in Philology (Greek language and letters). But there were not enough vacancies in the schools, and she remained unemployed at home for a year, 'sitting' in the idiom of the village. This caused intense concern among villagers who had been thinking of Philology as a suitable career for their children. There were at least two other girls studying the subject in Athens at the time, both of poor families. While my fieldwork was going on Domestic Science joined Philology as a subject for which there were few, if any, vacancies in the schools for teachers.

But the erosion of the teachers' status is not only a consequence of this limited unemployment. Children of the village at university in Athens said to me "It doesn't mean a thing to be a Gymnasium teacher in Cyprus today, let alone a primary school teacher." A proverb, probably of recent vintage, was often quoted to me laughingly by farmers: "Nowadays there are more schoolteachers around than there are donkeys in Asschia village". The fact that Asschia village is famous for having donkeys is part of the joke; perhaps another part is the juxtaposition of teachers, who should be clever, with donkeys, who are not. The joke compresses a number of changes in the last seventy years: the vast increase in popular education means that villages have ceased to be

places where illiteracy is the norm, to places where - for people under fifty at any rate - illiteracy is a more or less shameful deviation. At the time of my fieldwork there were more than fifteen assorted teachers who were children of the village, and normally lived there, though teaching nearby. Before 1930 there seems only to have been one or two at a time. Inevitably, when nearly everyone can read and write, and when simultaneously the number of teachers has greatly increased, the individual teacher can no longer command as much respect as before. It is rare today for men of any age to rise in the coffee shop for a teacher, and it is usually an old, illiterate farmer who does so. With fifteen teachers in the village moving through the coffee shops, the villagers would be jumping to their feet every few minutes if the old custom prevailed.

These, then, are the factors which the villagers use to distinguish between different occupations; my intention has been to explore the complexities of occupational distinctions. When villagers are asked what they do, they answer with the names of occupational roles, which in fact may simplify rather complex activities. "I'm a farmer... a shepherd... a builder... a policeman... a clerk... a secondary school teacher." Such answers convey to other villagers relatively precise implications about security of income, skill, arduousness of work, level of formal education and so forth, and it is these, rather than any absolute ranking between the roles, with which I have been concerned.

(vi) Citrus Cultivation: Economic and Status Factors

Over the last fifteen years citrus cultivation has played a dominant part in the interests of the villagers. The problems, imagery and benefits of citrus cultivation are constant topics of conversation. This is partly to be explained, as I shall show, by the potential for high profit which citrus trees afford; but also, citrus cultivation differs in certain ways from other common agricultural activities. It seems likely, though this is difficult to show convincingly, that villagers over-estimate the profit to be had from citrus, and that owning trees has come to have a symbolic meaning in its own right, a meaning which suggests prosperity and success. Two possible signs of this are, first, that poor men for whom the ownership of a few trees is not obviously a wise use of scarce resources, often nevertheless put part of their tiny holdings under trees; and, secondly, that it is becoming almost a formal element in a girl's dowry that she will have a small piece of land planted with saplings, in addition to her house.

The symbolic and status elements in citrus ownership are further suggested by the tendency for some men to reply to the question "What do you do?", "Íme pervoláris" "I am an orchard-owner". The Greek word literally suggests "someone associated with orchards", and does not specify actual ownership; but it is now used to stress ownership. More important perhaps, it is used to differentiate the speaker from the more general category of farmer. In comparison with many other jobs, the care of trees is relatively unexacting

physically, and relies more for success on skill and judgement than on the sheer drudgery of carrot or potato cultivation. Unlike many other crops, the standing trees are almost permanent, having a lifetime of thirty or forty years. The farmer is an all-rounder, trying crop after crop from season to season, and using his labour above all to make a profit. The citrus cultivator can be seen as a specialist, handling a long-term investment.

Most of the citrus trees in Kallo fields have been planted since 1955. But a small number of men, not more than twenty, had already planted citrus in the 1920's and 1930's, following the example of the people of Market Town. The first planting of citrus in Kallo for which I have data was in 1926, when one of the largest landowners in the village planted 300 trees. Seven years later he dug them up again because he was not able to sell fruit profitably. Other pioneer citrus growers found that their water supplies failed, or the depression in citrus prices during the 1939-45 war was enough to discourage them. Some dug up their trees, and others merely failed to look after them and planted other crops among them. But in 1968 there were several orchards over thirty years old, producing fruit and income. Those who had kept their trees have not had cause to regret it.

From my main census of 191 households, 16 householders had planted citrus before 1955. Of these, 6 had planted before 1940, another 3 in 1941 and 1950, 4 in 1952, one in 1953 and 4 in 1954. It is instructive to examine their maximum land holdings, in Table 9.

TABLE 9LAND HOLDINGS AT MAXIMUM OF 16 PIONEERCITRUS GROWERS

Under 10 <u>donums</u>	0
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11 - 15	1
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16 - 25	3
---------	---

26 - 50	8
---------	---

50+	4
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16

In addition, it is worth note that only 3 out of the 16 were not primarily full-time farmers. The pioneers were confined, with few exceptions, to the largest land owners in the village. The reason is not far to seek, for citrus trees need a minimum of seven years cultivation and investment before yielding a profit. Only men with land to spare would have been prepared to risk scarce resources before the definite profitability of citrus as a cash crop had been clearly established.

Between 1955 and 1960 a further 54 Kallotes from my main sample had planted citrus. If the 39 men in the main sample who married after 1960 (and would not normally have been in possession of land to plant) are ignored, this means that by 1960, a total of 70 men (54 + 16) had planted citrus from a possible 151 sampled. That is, by 1960 about 45% of the sampled men had gone into citrus cultivation.

The land-holding picture for the 'second wave' of citrus growers - those who planted between 1955 and 1960 is shown in Table 10. The distribution in this Table suggests that the size of land holding was still one factor in several which made a man more or less likely to be among the second wave of citrus planters. 'Land at marriage' has been used here because the greater likelihood that these groups contain numbers of men who have not yet reached the maximum of their land holdings, and who indeed will probably use the revenue from citrus cultivation to increase their holdings.

The choice of 1955 or 1966 as markers for 'waves' is arbitrary. The object is to discover the pattern of planting.

TABLE 10

SECOND WAVE (1955-60) CITRUS GROWERS AND
NON-GROWERS, BY LAND AT MARRIAGE

<u>Donums</u>	<u>Growers</u>		<u>Non-Growers</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Under 10	9	16.6	28	34.5
11 - 15	9	16.6	24	29.6
16 - 25	21	38.8	15	18.6
26 - 50	13	24.0	11	13.2
50+	2	3.7	3	3.7
<hr/>				
	54	99.7	81	99.6
<hr/>				

is usually planted with 50 saplings, of a wild strain. After some 18 months, these wild saplings are grafted with cultivated stocks, obtained either from mature trees in the village, or, in the case of certain new strains, from commercial growers of trees for sale, or from government farms.

Saplings need irrigation during the rainless period, May to October. Roughly every 20 days, either the trees themselves must be sprinkled with water or, more commonly, the whole field will be flooded for a short period. The water used is always from underground sources, brought to the surface by diesel pump, and conducted through concrete or earthen channels (avlátchi, plural avlátchia) to particular fields.

Trees also need cultivation by tractor, both to keep down weeds which would otherwise compete with them for nourishment, and which inevitably grow rapidly in the irrigated fertilised soil; the breaking of the soil surface by tractor-ploughing also serves to conserve water, since it fills in the cracks and fissures in the soil through which, in summer, the irrigation water would otherwise rapidly run off. The newly ploughed earth keeps water near the surface of the soil for a longer period, and thus enables the tree roots to use it. Ideally, tractor-ploughing would benefit the trees before each watering, but for reasons of economy, and because they fear to damage the tree roots by excessive ploughing, most farmers only have their fields ploughed every six weeks or two months.

In addition to ploughing by tractor and irrigation, trees need fertilisers, regular pruning, spraying with various pesticides, and if the trees are not protected at the edges

of the fields, some form of wind break, which is often of light cane, planted in strips. Heavy winds, or hailstorms, can cause serious damage to crops, either at the flowering stage or when the flowers have dropped and the first tiny fruit have formed. At the time of my fieldwork no one in Kallo had yet taken out any form of insurance against such natural hazards.

About the fourth year after planting, trees bear from about a dozen to 50 or 60 fruit. These fruit are fully mature and good to eat. From the fourth year to the tenth or twelfth, depending on type of tree and other conditions, the number of fruit produced increases. A Valencia strain (the commonest tree in the area) will, when ten or twelve years old, produce an average of 500 fruit. Exceptionally high-yielding trees can produce over 1,000 fruit. Jaffa strains tend to produce far fewer fruit, though they are normally much larger, have a milder, sweeter flavour and are much easier to peel. However, the Valencia strain has dominated Kallo, for the chief reason that fruit are normally sold by the thousand, and without regard either for weight or size⁽⁸⁾. Even though the price for Jaffa per 1,000 is usually higher by several pounds sterling than that for Valencia, nevertheless the lower yields per tree make Valencia more profitable. Jaffa are also more prone to a number of diseases, and to vary their yield from year to year, after maturity.

In 1968-69 the cost of cultivation was usually estimated in the village at 10/- per tree per year, after three years of age, and slightly more before then. But by late 1969 some

farmers had recalculated the costs and were working on a figure of 12/- a tree. These calculations were made by men who needed to know precise figures, or men who either because they were white-collar workers, or because they lacked water, a tractor or some other essential, needed to work out how much money they would need to have for raising their trees. Many men, and in particular the full-time farmers, do not need to calculate in this way, since they have all the things they need for cultivation. These men think much more in terms of ad hoc expenses, such as a bill of £40 for repair of a tractor, or of lump sum debts, that they owe a total to all sources, of £1,500.

Different people will have to pay in cash different amounts towards the care of trees. A white-collar worker who is unwilling to do even the lightest manual work to his trees must pay labourers and specialists for all stages of cultivation. A full-time farmer will do as much as he can himself, and only employ someone else for some highly specialised job, such as the one-off task of grafting cultivated strains onto wild stocks. Between these extremes are a range of possibilities. Men who do not own tractors must pay men who do to plough their orchards. Men with tractors but no water of their own must buy the water. Salaried men who do not mind spreading fertiliser, or driving a relative's tractor, may avoid cash payment for these services. The hardest job, and that which educated men are least willing to do, is irrigation, for this may involve many hours working up to the knees in water channels, handling a heavy, long-handled shovel (dialect, pthkiari) which opens and closes the water channels. But even in this attitudes

change and individuals differ: at the time of my fieldwork, a young man recently returned with a degree in Mathematics from Athens, positively delighted in irrigating his own fields. This was partly because he liked doing it and partly because his self-consciously progressive views suggested to him that it was a job worth doing.

In general, however, it is obvious the less a man does for himself in caring for his trees the less profitable to him will they be. But in spite of this, trees have still been attractive enough for a number of town-dwellers to go into citrus cultivation, including some high government officials, as well as sons of the village who have inherited land there. This economic interest in land within the confines of the village is one factor which adds to the sum of transactions between village and town, and which maintains in an active state ties between kinsmen otherwise separated by distance.

The services I have described can all be had on credit, although everyone in the village seeks cash payment if possible. But since many men are seeking to increase their holdings, and since the whole village is possessed to some extent with a 'boom' mentality, many services are supplied for credit, and a man may go several years without paying for water he has used, for tractor-ploughing or for fertiliser from the Credit Cooperative. Villagers who supplement their income through providing citrus-related services must therefore take a great interest in the credit-worthiness of their co-villagers. The passionate interest in the small change of

daily life, gossip about tiny details of personal behaviour, is not gratuitous, but meets certain needs in the village as a whole⁽⁹⁾.

The widespread use of credit does not suggest that credit may readily be had by all, and the issue of granting, withholding or terminating credit is a lively source of disputes. In this as in many other things the poorer men are at a big disadvantage. A man with land, and growing trees, can be seen to have a possible future source of repayment. A man without these things has only his labour to use. The chief factor which stops the poorer men from increasing their holdings, or from getting in on the citrus boom is the problem of credit, or capital formation. For since trees do not begin to cover their cumulative costs until they are six or seven years old, the poorer man has greater difficulty in carrying his debts over this period of time than the man for whom citrus is a profitable sideline, and not the main source of income.

When villagers talk about growing trees they say "After six years you just start getting your expenses back." They do not mean getting back the full investment up to that point; they mean getting back that year's overheads. In any case, their statements usually take it for granted that a man has paid nothing to acquire his land.

(vii) Conclusion

Kallo as a community depends on profitable cash-cropping, supplemented by a number of other occupations. Although land is not and never has been equally distributed

among village families, it is clearly a community in which distribution avoids the sharp contrasts described in many other Mediterranean and Latin American ethnographies. There are no latifundists in Kallo, no titled people who own land but do not work it. Nor is there a large proportion of villagers who are landless, perennially unemployed, or close to starvation. This does not mean the village is a community of economic equals, however, and the trend to more complex social differentiation has been suggested, as higher education and white-collar jobs become more common. The social tensions caused by this increasing complexity is the subject of political conflicts described in later chapters.

From the five case histories given at the start of this chapter, and from other material which will be discussed in the next one, it will be clear that most of the things which give a person high status - land, education, family honour - are partly provided by his family of birth and endorsed by his marriage. In contrast to some other Mediterranean communities Kallo also allows for individual mobility through successful marriages. There are enough cases of upward mobility both of men who worked hard and saved to buy land, and of poor men who succeeded because of their personal qualities of strength, good looks or good reputation, to suggest that the villagers should not see their lives as determined by birth, and birth alone. In the context of the constantly improving economic conditions of the post-war period, intensified by the cultivation of citrus, and the increasing provision of supplementary jobs by the larger society, the

villagers would have to be exceedingly obtuse not to see the village as a place where at the very least they can exist, and where most of them can live better than they could elsewhere. This view of their community provides the material basis for village solidarity in matters political.

Footnotes to Chapter 2

- (1) At least since 1930, my material suggests that about four out of five children born in Kallo have found marriage partners within the village. Calculation of the pre-1930 situation is hazardous, but I estimate that even then at least three out of every five children born in the village married a co-villager.
- (2) These divisions have been chosen because they make reasonable places to draw a line, and not because they correspond to any stated category used by villagers. Other divisions could have been drawn, and the matrix presentation allows the reader to do this for himself. However, the logical extension of this approach is not to make divisions such as 16-25 donums at all, but to give each holding individually.
It may help the reader to know that in 1968-9 a donum of good irrigated land would fetch between £350 and £500. A child receiving 10 donums of land in Kallo at marriage today is considered to be very lucky; and a 5 donum holding is respectable. The actual meaning of such a marriage portion depends, as I shall show in later sections, on what the other marriage partner gets, what job is done by the man and, in some cases, by the woman too.
- (3) Lison-Tolosana (1966:) describes similar attitudes in Belmonte.
- (4) These young women are ambivalent about their life style, for their mothers all did agricultural work, yet they themselves live a life like that of townswomen, within the village. Such a fact is both mildly embarrassing in a tradition of ever-occupied women, while also conferring prestige.

- (5) Men often commented that women heard village news more quickly and are often better informed on certain matters because they tend to work in groups, both in the fields and around the houses, whereas men more often work by themselves. Boissevain (1965) makes this point for Maltese villages.
- (6) The assessment of this tax is the job of the muktar assisted by the azades. These offices are discussed in Chapter 5.
- (7) "Going out for enjoyment" sometimes carries the implication of visiting prostitutes, and is widely considered to be a normal part of a young man's occasional expenses, by the younger men, at least.
- (8) By 1970 there were moves, particularly in the citrus cooperative, to start selling fruit by weight, rather than simply by numbers. More attention is likely to be paid in the future to quality of fruit, as international competition gets tougher.
- (9) This point is well made by Davis (1969:74) and I am generally sympathetic to his interpretation of honour as a system of establishing the credit-worthiness of others in both the literal and metaphorical senses.

CHAPTER 3

KINSHIP AND AFFINITY

Kinship and affinity, as institutional frameworks, are critical constraints on individual behaviour; the nature and extent of their influence must be examined before any perspective can be given to the behaviour of villagers in politics. The bilateral organisation of kinship, the particular character of the developmental cycle of the domestic group, which produces a system of property transfer at marriage, are critical factors influencing the behaviour of any villager. Certain kinship roles are more important than others in this respect, and those between parents and children, between siblings, between first cousins, and between second cousins, need to be examined in detail, for each type of relationship carries the expectations of different rights and duties, and thus has different costs and benefits for the individual.

Affinal relations are in many ways critical indices of the achievements of individuals and families in the village. Social prestige is the object of strong competition, which appears in the values and practices surrounding the arrangement of marriage. This is not a matter for individual choice, but much more a corporate decision. Villagers are preoccupied with retaining land, wealth and marriage partners within the village, and this common interest underpins the fact of the village as an inward-looking solidary and moral community,

in spite of its demonstrated relations with the wider society.

The villagers are strongly committed to certain kinship and affinal obligations, but these do not exhaust or completely determine their choices. The sphere of economic relations makes clear that villagers have a range of options within their kindred and affinal relations, as well as with non-related persons. In both economic and political relations, then, the Kallotes represent a mixed, intermediate situation; and this can be better understood through detailed examination of data on cooperation and conflict within a range of social relations.

(i) Bilateral Kinship and the Domestic Group

The reckoning of kinship in the village is bilateral, and the only exception to this is in the inheritance of names, for children of both sexes take as their second name the genitive form of their father's first name, or patronymic.

The terminology may be described as Eskimo, for it stresses generational distinctions, and terms used for members of the nuclear family are not used for persons outside it. Here I am speaking of kinship terms used by villagers among themselves. Andromedas (1959) has noted the tendency of Greeks of all backgrounds to give 'correct' terms when asked. Cypriot Greeks tend to do the same, and here it is worth stressing that there are at least three levels of language which may be distinguished - first village dialect; second Demotiki, the language of educated speech, and third

Katharevousa, a language used for varied purposes but not normally spoken, in daily conversation. To give but one example, villagers used the word anepsios to mean cousin - a classical usage - whereas the Demotiki word is exadelfos, and anepsios in Demotiki means sibling's child. For this last sense, Cypriot villagers use yet another term, anepsióteknon.

The word used for consanguinity is synghénia; villagers count the relationship between siblings as the first link, and count as consanguines all persons within five links of a given ego. Consanguines may not marry. Beyond this they add the qualification exomakrysen i synghenia mas 'our consanguinity has gone far out'. By this reckoning the first non-relative who is also marriageable is the child of a person's second cousin, and to describe such a marriage villagers say "Marriage was only just permitted". Third cousins are scarcely thought of as being related in any meaningful way, and people who wish to ridicule someone's claim to be related in this way may add "Third cousins? Fourth, fifth, sixth cousins!" If they are being polite, they can say phtánoumen liin synghénian, we have a distant consanguinity.

The word used to describe the nuclear family, which is also normally the domestic group, is the Demotiki word ikoghénia; which combines two roots, that for house, and that for birth. But the villagers use two words for actual living units - ta spítia (singular, to spiti) to describe the complex of dwelling units, and i avli, the courtyard in

which they stand. Traditionally the courtyard needed to be large enough for small stock, several outhouses, agricultural implements, and so forth. In the last twenty years, the decline in mixed farming and small stock keeping, as well as the general scarcity of land near the centre of the village for plots, has led to much simpler arrangements - usually a single brick house is built, with a thin strip of land around it, and no walled courtyard at all.

Villagers feel strongly that at marriage a child should have its own dwelling unit - although this may be in the same courtyard as its parents, its own land to work if possible, and a separate domestic unit, in terms of use of cash, and decisions about work. Before 1930 it was more common for the family of the groom to provide a dwelling for the couple at marriage, and thereafter it became increasingly more common for the bride's family to do so; this change is shown in Table 11⁽¹⁾.

To illustrate the numerical data, I take first the case of a man (G.1) who was born in 1898 in the village. He was the third child, the first two being girls. He married in 1920, and his father gave him a house plot, and built a house on it for him. He also received about 6 donums of land. His wife came from the neighbouring village, and had 5 donums, which she later exchanged with a man from her own village who had land in Kallo. After him there were three younger brothers. The next youngest received the parental house and 5 donums, and at the age of 24 he married a Kallo woman. When this son took over his parents' house

TABLE 11

MARRIAGES IN KALLO BY RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF
BRIDE OR GROOM'S FAMILY TO THE COUPLE'S HOUSE

<u>Period</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Marriages</u>	<u>Groom built</u> ⁽¹⁾ <u>and mixed</u>	<u>Bride built</u>
Before 1930	20	15	5
1931 - 40	37	27	10
1941 - 50	45	19	26
1951 - 60	44	10	34
1961 - 69	44	10	34
	190 ⁽²⁾	81	109

Note (1) The column 'groom built' includes those cases where the groom's family contributed up to one third of the value of the house; the column 'bride built' includes all cases where the bride's family contributed more than two thirds of the value of the house. No account is taken of agricultural land transferred to either side.

(2) 5 cases where data were inadequate for classification have been excluded.

they and the two young sons went to live in the house of a woman whose husband had died, and who had remarried into a village some 10 miles away, by the sea. She had no siblings in the village. The two younger sons married in 1930 and 1938 respectively, and both received houses from their father. In 1968 the first son had his youngest daughter, married to an educated man from another village, living downstairs in his two storey house.

This case illustrates the range of solutions which can be adopted to residence at marriage, as well as showing the change in pattern. The situation typical at the time of my fieldwork is shown in the following example:

In 1944 Xanthos, a poor man from another village, was engaged to a Kallo woman, Agathi. Both were aged 20 at the time. They had a full formal engagement ceremony, and a property agreement was signed in which the girl's father promised to give the couple 3 donums of land, a courtyard with some old dwellings on it, and that he would fix these up to a reasonable standard. A penalty clause was included, that if either side wished to break the engagement they would pay the other £100, and that the marriage would take place within a year. Xanthos himself brought no property to the marriage. His wife had already been engaged to a Kallo man in 1938, but she had insisted she did not want to marry him, and had broken off the engagement at the Ecclesiastical Court. Her family had paid a fine of £2. 10. 0., and she had then waited nearly 5 years before getting engaged to Xanthos. Her former fiancé, incidentally, married a woman with a house and 9 donums in the village.

The fact that broken engagements took place in these examples should not be taken as by any means typical. They were, and still are, frowned on. But they bring out clearly the notions implicit in the arrangement of marriage

and provision of house and land in the village. Traditionally, the ideal situation was to have enough land to give each child at marriage some land, and to give sons a house as well. If land or house plots were scarce, the other solutions were to partition a courtyard; to vacate one's own house and live in a rented one (although there were normally very few houses available for rent); or to find a bride for one's son who for some reason, such as being an only child, a widow, or a woman with some social blemish such as a previous engagement, who would thus provide a house. By 1968 the whole issue centred on building houses for one's daughters. Sons were expected to marry girls who would have houses.

Rights to property in the village may properly be regarded as held by adult married persons only; it is extremely rare for property to be titled on a single person or for such a person to have use of land independently of his or her natal family. Unmarried men, unless highly educated, are not regarded as full social persons in the village, and this is indicated by the use of the term kopelouí 'kid', which is applied to a boy up until the time he gets engaged; after this he will be teasingly reminded that he is no longer a kid. For the purposes of village taxation, election to committees, the general councils of the village, drinking cliques and coffeehouse discussions, men who are neither married nor engaged are virtually ignored⁽²⁾, unless they are highly educated.

Thus, the acquisition of property, economic and

domestic independence and full adulthood all occur through marriage, for children of both sexes. This must be considered in the light of practices concerning marriage order for siblings: these practices can be reduced to three rules: i) all children should marry as young as is practical; ii) children should marry in strict seniority; iii) but a younger girl takes precedence over her older brother. A person's position in a sibling group by virtue of sex and birth order may profoundly affect his or her future⁽³⁾.

Informants make two different kinds of statement about the sort of share of property a child should expect. They sometimes say, and aspects of the inheritance laws of Cyprus support this, that each child should get equal shares of the parental estate; but it is also said that what a child gets is "whatever the parents choose to give it". People making this second kind of remark often add "Is it possible that a parent would wish to do its child an injustice?" However, it can be argued that these two different sorts of statement properly refer to different situations. The 'equal shares' view correctly applies to post mortem transfer, where any property belonging to a deceased parent must by law be equally divided among the children of the dead person, with a smaller share being set aside for the surviving spouse. However if, as is usually the case, property is being transferred in the lifetime of both parents, the rule that 'whatever the parent decides' holds force for a complex of reasons, the most important

of which is that it is quite impossible to calculate equal shares in such a way as fully and permanently to satisfy the recipients.

At marriage each child of the sibling group expects to draw a share of its parents' estate, but the fortunes of a given nuclear family change over time. The property holding of the natal family is geared in certain ways to other aspects of the domestic cycle; it is not stable. Its productiveness and thus its hypothetical yield to its shareholders and managers in strict economic terms are a function of the number of persons it must support for a given period, the amount of labour each member has put into the holding, and the different consumption or extraction demands of each individual.

When a married couple start life together they have property, but no dependents. The early years of childbearing are a period when it is possible for them by dint of hard work, restricted consumption and good luck to increase their land holdings. As the older children reach an age where their labour becomes useful to the domestic group (in the case of small-stock tending this might start when a boy is ten or twelve) the domestic group enters a phase where there is extra manpower without any appreciable rise in consumption needs. Indeed, unless a decision is taken to start educating the older children, there need be no drain on the joint resources of the domestic group until the marriage of the first child. If this is deliberately postponed, the domestic group may have enjoyed a period of fifteen or twenty years during which labour input was steadily increasing, and this

will normally be the period when the land holding grows.

The marriage of the first child alters the picture, for it will normally be the first major property extraction; after this point the holding will normally continue to shrink until either all property has been transferred, or all children have been married; in some cases these two events coincide; in those cases where the parents have either had a large holding or have kept strictly to a pre-arranged plan in transferring shares to their children, they may end up with a small holding on which to support themselves, known as the ysteriná 'the later things'. If the parents reach a point at which they can no longer care for themselves, they may either decide to stay in the avli of each of their married children in turn, or they may decide to stay with one child until death. The distribution of the ysteriná will either be between all the children or to the one child who had care of the parents in their last years. But since such agreements are usually verbal and hedged with qualifications, they are not as clear-cut as they might appear.

Even if parents plan at a given point in time to give each child a fixed share, they cannot foresee all probabilities. For instance, although they believe that they have finished childbearing, they may produce one or more unexpected children; they may have a serious and costly illness in the family which will bite into the land holding; there may be a cycle of drought years and consequent debt, so that they mortgage property; they may contract a prestigious but unexpectedly costly marriage; a rise in the

expected standard of houses for daughters may force an extra outlay for a later child; the possibilities are not endless but they are sufficient to make perfect rationality in the advance planning of property shares extremely difficult.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that above or below a certain size land holding the profitability of agriculture changes sharply. Twenty donums is considerably more profitable than two holdings of ten donums each. Certain economies of scale occur; a tractor is more economical on the larger holding; the yields from mature citrus trees may be enough to make the outright purchase of additional land possible, whereas with a smaller holding the gross cash may be enough to make a downpayment only - the additional money being borrowed at at least 9% per annum interest. If a child marries, and so reduces the holding of its parental group by a sizeable share, the impact of this extraction on the remaining children and the viability of the holding may be out of proportion to the actual share extracted.

These then are some of the factors which make it likely the mature members of a sibling group will feel they have received shares of different value. In a period of rapid change, dowry houses may be a particular source of friction between sisters. A woman married in 1956. Her house cost £400, and her family built it themselves with their own labour. It was made of mud bricks, plastered over. There was a bare concrete floor, and running water; an outside pit lavatory and no bathroom. Her sister married in 1969, also to a poor man from outside the village, but

her house (for which her father went into considerable debt) cost about £2,000, which in spite of changes in the cost of living provided a house built of solid bricks, tiled throughout, with flushing indoor lavatory, a bathroom with water heater, and a gas stove. It is finished throughout to a much higher standard than the elder sister's house. Such differences can be forgotten if relations between the sisters are otherwise good; if they are not, then they can become the occasion of fierce disagreements.

I have been indirectly approaching the central issue in the lives of most parents - the wish to provide well for their children. In village values, the true social position a man achieves is decided when he has married off his last child, when all his children's marriages can be weighed up. This is shown in the way old men reply, when asked how many children they have, "I have married off seven" or "We have one child to marry and then we'll have a breather". Since the custom is also to give children at marriage the major part of the property they will get, the way in which marriage focuses, in a dramatic way, the aspirations of parents for status is clear.

Transfer of property at marriage is not always accompanied by transfer of title; indeed, in only a half of the cases I examined was the title transferred at marriage. In the remainder of the cases the transfer was often delayed for several years, and in a number of cases ten or fifteen years. When I asked men how they felt about not having title to land they were working, a number replied "I have complete confidence in my father, and he'll give me the title any time

I ask for it". But such remarks often conceal real anxiety about the title; yet to ask for title in itself suggests a lack of trust, and this knowledge inhibits some children from pressing their parents.

In fact, the failure of parents to give children title often leads to disputes, not at the child's marriage, but many years later, when the grandchildren of the original couple are reaching the age for marriage, and the middle generation start to press the old people to distribute the ysterina, for house plots. The claims and counter claims can become very complicated and strident, as individuals remember that they were promised extra pieces of land at marriage, which they have never received; or when one child points out that another was given an extra two donums twenty years ago, and thus has no right to a claim in what remains.

The depth interviews showed that 22.5% of the 111 disputes recalled were to do with property transfer at marriage or later. This was an average of one such dispute for each informant, and the following case was one of these:

Andris (Census 146) came from a poor family; he smoked cigarettes and gambled in his 'teens and this, with the fact of his mother's serious illness and the family's poverty, made it hard for him to find a bride. As part of the inducement his father offered to give him a house and three donums of land. His fiancée's father insisted that title to both house and lands be transferred during engagement, and this was done. The girl has nine donums.

Anthea, the second sister, got engaged in 1947, aged twenty, and married in 1949, to a poor man from another village. She got a house and five donums; he brought nothing to the marriage. She was rather plain. In the dowry agreement (prikosynfonon) another field of three donums was also promised, but although title was given at marriage to the house and five donums, the

title to the extra three donums was not given.

When Andris' father thought he was dying he called in his children and reminded them that a field of three donums had been promised to Anthea and her husband and should go to them. But he spent his last years at the house of his oldest daughter, and while caring for him she persuaded him to give her title to the three donum field. She also told various people in the village that the dowry agreement held by Anthea was a forgery.

The two sisters and their husbands are not on speaking terms, and all five siblings are constantly at odds and have been for years. There are two issues: Andris got 'more' than his sisters, and the older sister got Anthea's field.

In 1969 Andris, then aged 54, was still pursuing a field which his mother had been promised by her father, but to which she had never received title. His mother's brother was refusing to recognise her pre mortem de facto share of a piece of land of six donums. Andris still hopes to obtain this piece of land. The same form of dispute is going on simultaneously in two generations.

If siblings are likely to have disagreements when their own children reach the age of marriage, when young and unmarried their relations are strongly supportive of each other. This is shown in the warmth, trust and genuine intimacy between them, and it is both expressed through and reinforced by the rules about who marries first, for the rules effectively limit competition for the resources of the household, and allow the domestic group to focus all its resources on the marriage of each child in turn.

Normally there is a three year interval between the birth of siblings - more if early death has intervened - and so a person in late adolescence knows that he will enjoy a period of several years when he can call on the cash, labour and other resources of parents and siblings. The effect of the rule of marriage order is to reduce

uncertainty about which sibling is next in line for marriage, and thus to give all younger children a vested interest in helping the older ones to marry as quickly as possible. It also reduces the likelihood of a situation in which two children are competing at the same time for the same resources.

When a person has married, he is no longer free to help his unmarried brothers and sisters, for his wife's family will complain that his resources should be kept for the children of his marriage. There is some leeway - a wedding gift in cash is acceptable, but if a large sum is involved this will be done secretly, so that his affines do not hear of it, 'and become jealous'.

The ability of the domestic group to focus its resources is important in another aspect of the developmental cycle: the process of setting up or educating the children when cash or land are scarce. Here the key factor is the willingness of the older children both to postpone their own marriages and to make continuous cash contributions to the education of the younger children. This may result in a situation when seen in the full perspective of time acts to the advantage of all concerned, but it nevertheless requires a good deal of self-discipline for the senior children, as is illustrated by the following case:

Fanos and his wife had almost no land and their income was £20 a month from his salary as secretary to the village Cooperative Credit Society. They had six children - three sons followed by two daughters, and a fourth son.

The first son finished Gymnasium and got a clerical job in the land registry office. He did not in fact help his parents very much over the education of the younger children, but at

TABLE 12 - THE CAREERS OF FANOS' CHILDREN

3/16

<u>Child</u>	<u>Age</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>Year</u> <u>Married</u>	<u>Age</u> <u>Married</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Job</u>	<u>Salary</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Boy	35	1961	30	Finished secondary	Junior civil servant	£860 p.a. (after about 15 years service)	His education cost about £150. He didn't help his parents.
Boy	32	1963	29	Finished secondary	middle level civil servant	£900 p.a. (after about 10 years service)	Education cost £150, but he helped his parents with the younger children on and off for seven years, with cash.
Boy	28	1970	30	Secondary plus 2 yrs. Teachers College	Primary school teacher	£600 p.a.	Took loan of £1,000 from Teachers Union Benevolent Fund to help costs of educating younger children and to study by post for a degree. Education cost £150.
Girl	25	1969	26	Secondary plus 2 yrs. Teachers College	Primary school teacher	£500 p.a.	From Teachers Union Fund she has borrowed £3000 to build her own dowry house. Education cost £150.
Girl	23	1970	25	Took degree Athens University	Secondary school teacher	£900 p.a. in first year.	Failed to get State teaching job, since no more jobs in her subject (Philology). Currently faces problem in finding money to build a house. Education cost about £2000 in all.
Boy	18	Single	---	Started studying medicine in Athens	Nil		Education will cost not less than £3000, from start of secondary school to medical qualification. Some of this will be met by his married siblings.

the very least his academic success and his good fortune in landing a reasonable job encouraged the old people. The second son then completed Gymnasium and also got a civil service job. He turned over most of his salary for the education of the younger children, for since there were now always three at Gymnasium the school bills came to about £60 a year. The third son went from Gymnasium to the Teachers Training College, and after two years there received his Diploma and started work as a primary school teacher. He too made over most of his salary towards the cost of educating the three younger children. About this time the oldest son got married.

The family now had a clear strategy for the problem of the remaining children. The fourth child, a girl, was also sent to the Teachers Training College, and when she graduated and started teaching there were several requests for her hand from men in the village. In spite of strong family pressure she vetoed several candidates; it was understood that in order to build a dowry house she would need to take a loan of £3,000 from the Benevolent Fund of the Schoolteachers Trade Union, and that any man marrying her would accept the necessity of her working for a number of years to pay off this sum. During this period the second son also got married, to a rather wealthy girl in the village. Like his older brother he was soon in debt in an effort to increase the citrus plantation his wife received from her parents at marriage.

The third brother had now also taken out a large loan of £1,000 from the Teachers' Benevolent Fund, in order to keep pace with the mounting costs of the two younger children. For the fifth child, another girl, had been sent to university in Greece for a five year course in Philology. This alone was costing more than £300 a year.

The girl teacher got engaged to a young clerical worker, and they started building the new house in the village. The girl was a little more prestige-conscious than was wise, and the house cost £3,500. Her sister finally completed the university course, and with some difficulty, which included important help from the husband of a first cousin, found a teaching job. She got engaged soon afterwards to a fellow teacher. Her unmarried older brother, at 28, was nearing the age when village opinion felt it was high time he married, when he met a girl - again a teacher - from a distant village and they got engaged. Now only the youngest child remains and the family have persuaded him after many councils to study

medicine in Greece. He will have his fees met if the worst comes to the worst by each of the married children contributing about £5 a month, even though all of them have substantial debts to pay either on their houses or their citrus.

In this account it is important to note that the younger children have tended to receive more education and so qualification for the higher status occupations. The difference in age between the oldest and youngest children of this set is at least fifteen years, and the chances are that the oldest brother will be preparing to marry off his daughter about the same time as the young doctor is ready to marry; since in this case there is no property left it cannot be the cause of dispute. In any case the prestige for the sibling set of having both a Gymnasium teacher and a doctor in the family will act as a powerful sanction in maintaining cooperation. It cannot be said that many other families in the village have succeeded in elevating so many children from such an inauspicious base; it is more common to find that several of the older children have taken up manual work of some kind; but the principal strategies are the same in such cases. The particular leverage the Fanos family obtained was in the ability of the children who took up teaching to obtain substantial loans through their trade union. In a later chapter this family is described as facing a serious crisis when the father was in danger of losing his job, which would have seriously disrupted the pattern described here.

So far the domestic group has been the focus of interest in this chapter, and it has been argued that it is a relationship with both high benefits and, at a later stage,

a potential for high costs in terms of competition and disputes. Since the expression 'high' can only gain any precision from a comparative context, the basis for comparison must now be made clear by examining the costs and benefits of two other types of relationship defined by the recognition of kinship ties in the village - that between first cousins, and later that between second cousins.

Genealogical examination of a sample of marriages over some seventy years showed that of people resident in Kallo, four out of five marriages were between two Kallo born partners⁽⁴⁾. One direct result of this is that a given person is likely to have very large numbers of kin living in the village. A group of informants questioned in detail on this subject had on average 32 first cousins, of whom on average 23 were living in the village. This would have meant that anything from 70 to 150 second cousins were also likely to be resident in the village, although I did not count them. These facts are important when considering the nature of the rights and duties between collateral kinsmen. (Table 13.)

The villagers say that the relationship between first cousins should be 'like brothers', by which they mean a relationship of full trust, warmth, avoiding all conflict, and so forth. In general, the ideology of the relationship receives support in actual behaviour, but it is clear that no such categorical demands are made of first cousins as are made of siblings. They have a solidary relationship - particularly in the face of outsiders; and a request for help from one to another would always have to be seriously

TABLE 13THE FIRST COUSINS OF 24 SELECTED INFORMANTS

<u>Informant</u>	<u>Total Cousins</u>	<u>Total in Village</u>	<u>Total Outside</u>
1	40	35	5
2	59	Informant married into Kallo	
3	7	Informant married into Kallo	
4	25	16	9
5	30	20	10
6	34	27	7
7	46	43	3
8	55	25	30
9	26	17	9
10	16	12	4
11	30	22	8
12	11	10	1
13	27	21	6
14	19	14	5
15	21	16	5
16	35	30	5
17	26	23	3
18	35	23	12
19	57	41	16
20	36	19	17
21	36	31	5
22	11	5	6
23	43	38	5
24	50	20	30
	<hr/> 775 <hr/>	<hr/> 508 <hr/>	

Average per informant: 32.4

Average in village: 23.09

considered on the grounds that the person asking was the child of a sibling of one's parent. This would never be a free gift of money or land, since closer relations would not permit it even if the parties themselves were agreeable. It could be a low-interest or interest-free loan, an unsecured loan, labour at a wedding, a job recommendation, or any suitable use of a personal network. The dividing line is between those forms of help which can obviously be said directly and permanently to deprive a person's closer kin, and those forms of help which are possible without anyone else losing anything. Clearly loans are in a grey area, since a finite sum of money can be loaned to only one person at a time; and people frequently complain that a kinsman has loaned money to someone else. Almost any form of aid can be interpreted as depriving someone else, when good will is lacking.

Unlike siblings, first cousins normally have no common interest in property. There is nothing in their relationship which would normally alter it over time; and since in any case, because a man has so many first cousins and cannot be expected to keep up sibling-like relationships with many of them, there is an optative quality to the exchanges between these relatives. Men use first cousinship as the base on which to build strong friendships. The potential in the relationship is activated by choice between the two parties rather than by categorical constraints. Women in particular lead more circumscribed lives than men: their close relationships are more likely to be restricted to close kinswomen and neighbours for, unlike men, they lack

the freedom of movement, to the coffee-shop in particular, which permits the formation of ties with people more remote than close kin and neighbours.

The relationship then does not have the divisive aspect of co-inheritance, while it does have an ideology of warmth and trust; it has a strong optative element if only for demographic reasons. In comparison with that between siblings it can be thought of as a relationship with a potential for high benefits but relatively low costs. The following case illustrates the kind of purposes to which the relationship can be put:

In 1968 Kounnis was charged by the police following a complaint by a woman neighbour that he had tried to assault her. The woman's reputation had been damaged, and in the scuffle Kounnis had slightly injured a young kinsman of hers with a knife.

Kounnis' wife was sister to Sklyros, one of the leftist leaders in the village. He was very angry with Kounnis, but at the same time his sister's reputation was at stake, and if Kounnis went to prison, as seemed likely, she and her children would be in difficulties.

Sklyros and his half-brothers went to a nearby village, and talked to a man who was their first cousin, and through his EOKA activities was locally influential. He agreed to help, and visited a friend of his, a senior policeman in Market Town, where the case was due to be heard.

On the day of the hearing he appeared in the courtroom, in his best clothes, although he would not normally have had cause to be there. During the hearing the police decided to alter the charge from one of indecent assault, to attempted indecent assault. This charge does not technically exist in Cyprus law, but the judge made no comment. Kounnis, after some uncertainty, pleaded guilty and was fined £40. He was thought to have got off very lightly.

This example was considered by those concerned to

have been a fairly important example of kin solidarity. The woman who Kounnis had been charged with assaulting had a doubtful reputation in the village, and came from a weak, small family. Kounnis, on the other hand, though a man of no account himself, was related by marriage to influential men, who were ready to help less for his sake than for their sister's. The half-brothers of Sklyros had long-standing EOKA connections with their first cousin, and with him were politically all clients of the same important urban politician. Their staunch support for this politician's party in the 1970 Legislative Assembly elections was one way of repaying the favour which was thought to have occurred over the police charge.

Had this issue arisen between second cousins there would have been no suggestion of a strong normative claim to assistance. This is the essential difference between the two types of cousins: no one suggests that the relationship between second cousins has any similarity to that between siblings, nor do second cousins readily make claims on each other. The expectations are minimal, and could perhaps be summed up in the statement that in recognition of their common blood they should show each other general consideration and not take the sort of advantage of each other that unrelated men might do. Since a man may have more than a hundred second cousins (and in the case of certain families, several hundreds) any notion of more precise categorical relationships is most unlikely.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the expectations between second cousins are essentially a requirement that

one refrain from normal behaviour - exploiting one's advantage - towards a category of people from whom one expects nothing except that they too will refrain from such normal behaviour. This must be considered in the light of the fact that the institution of friendship is recognised in the village⁽⁵⁾, and whereas a man might ask for and expect to receive the loan of £5 or £10 from a friend with money in his pocket, he would have no such automatic expectation of a first cousin unless they were already friends. Similarly, when one baptises a child, one invites siblings, friends and first cousins, but there is by no means an automatic invitation to second cousins, rather few of whom will be invited. At weddings the whole village is invited, and second cousins come along with everyone else.

So far the emphasis has been on the low benefits of the relationship. It can be seen also to entail high costs: since one may not marry one's second cousin, this means in a predominantly in-marrying village the number of young women automatically ruled out when a man is thinking of a bride may be rather large. This is not trivial in a situation where competition for suitable partners is strong, and the penalty for failure is to be unable to remain in one's natal village, as I shall explain later.

(11) Marriage

I mentioned in the first chapter how traditionally men shook hands and declared that they had agreed to the

marriage of their children, and to the amounts of property they would give them. Starting in the 1920's it became the custom to have a formal engagement ceremony, presided over by the priest, and known as Arravones, betrothal. In those cases the parents, under the guidance of the village priest, drew up a prikosynfonon, dowry agreement, in which each family specified exactly what it would give its child, with mention of particular fields and their boundaries, and in the case of a new house how many floors it would have. In some cases, a clause is included which says how much one side will pay the other if it breaks off the engagement, and also stipulates that the marriage will take place within a certain period, usually two years. Both Arravones and prikosynfonon are optional, rather than essential. About half the families in the census did not bother with either; some because they were unwilling to pay for the accompanying feasting, others because the girl was less than the legal sixteen years of age for engagement. Villagers believe that Arravones and prikosynfonon must go together, and the priest generally encourages them to think this, as he favours the written agreement since he believes it reduces the risk of subsequent disagreement. But some villagers say "Honest men don't need to write these things down, and a cheat will cheat you whether it's written down or not".

After the agreement has been signed, the ecclesiastical ceremony begins, and this starts with the priest asking the boy and the girl whether each wants the other. This is done often with several hundred people looking on, and sometimes, though very rarely, produces surprises, when one

of the two answers "No".

Before these ceremonial events occur, however, the more important aspects of the arrangement of marriage have already taken place - the search for a suitable partner, the collective discussion of the eligibles, the diplomatic approaches made to a family through intermediaries, bargaining over property, and the actual formal agreement between heads of families. Only when all these stages have taken place will the priest be called in, and invitations sent out.

Parents first, but indeed all close kin, wish to see a family member make a good marriage. The discussion of possible partners is carried on continuously, and all parties participate in a spirit of concern for the personal happiness and security of the person to be married. As long as everyone is applying the same criteria for selection, this situation is one of great solidarity; it is when a person tries to strike out for himself or herself, against the agreement of senior family members, that difficulties arise.

There is another important factor in the collective concern of the family. This is related to social differentiation in the village which has been touched on in the discussion of status and occupation. The creation of affinal ties between families also creates a new statement about their respective statuses. Logically, any new position must be either the same as before, higher or lower. There will not be complete consensus among all villagers about the meaning of a particular marriage, but the community looks

inwards on such issues, and there is a broad area of shared values.

In the absence of discrete strata in the village, how do the actors themselves make discriminations? They see both individuals and families as the centres of networks of varied ties in which cognatic and affinal ties are the most important. In addition to a man's personal wealth, education, achievements and character, are those of the people with whom he is most closely linked.

It has been continually stressed that the village has experienced great change during this century. In particular, it has experienced an important expansion of available occupational roles for village members. At the same time the size of the village population has been increasing rapidly. Taken together, these facts suggest that the villagers' views of the standing of different persons are subjected to certain strains which produce a degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty about the status of others sharpens the interest in the arrangement of marriage.

Each new marriage slightly alters the status organisation of the village: since the villagers prefer to find spouses within the village in most cases, each engagement takes a possibly desirable partner out of the range of those families directly competing, and redefines the relations of all participating families. Clearly, not all marriages are equally important in this way. Marriages between persons and families generally agreed to be 'equals' in all obvious respects cause less great interest. It is

those marriages which make the villagers re-examine their views of status relations, of equivalence and difference, which are most important to them.

Further clues to the meaning of marriage arrangement in the village are provided by the actual circumstances surrounding offers. First there is a definite season in which nearly all village engagements take place. This is during December and January, with a few rare extensions into February. This is by no means universal in Cyprus. This period is a slack time in the agricultural cycle, and in the religious cycle it is a period of permitted eating of all normal foods, immediately prior to the long fast which is the prelude to the Orthodox Easter. Since this period is perceived as the only proper time to negotiate engagements, and since nearly everyone sticks to the rule, the effect is analogous to the opening and closing of a Stock Exchange: because the period of time for trading is finite and known, people have in practise much better information than they would if the period never ended. The market mechanisms can operate more perfectly.

To illustrate this, consider the case of a family which has received an attractive offer, and yet feels it can do better, and is thinking in terms of two or three possible men who are ready to marry this year, and are not in status beyond its reach. On receiving the first offer, they answer with "We'll think about it for a while...". They can then wait a few days or weeks to see if any of the favoured men are interested. They can even drop very discreet hints through third parties, to let the men know

that now is the time to move. If this fails they are free to take up the original offer. The fact that everyone is thinking in terms of a decision-making period lasting only a few weeks makes decision much easier.

There are complications: one may be waiting for an answer from a family which is waiting in turn - a knock-on situation. Perhaps after having used the conventional polite method of refusal "We are not really ready this year - we've got a lot of expenses" a family then gets a fine offer. If the family is tough-minded, secure and not afraid to make enemies, it will accept the new offer and take the consequent ill-feeling from the rejected family. If, however, there is a strong wish to remain on good terms with the rejected family, the new bidder will be told "Look, we just told the So-and-sos that we're waiting till next year. But we really do want the marriage with you. If you will agree to wait, we'll give our word now secretly, and we'll be the first engagement of next season".

Since refusal is taken so seriously, it is not surprising that a slighted man may often get himself engaged within a few days of a refusal, and sometimes to a girl slightly 'lower' in the market than he is thought to be himself. Villagers are quite aware of the motives for such rapid moves, and explain that it is Zytima goitrou 'a question of prestige'.

In 1956 when he was nineteen Pavlos wanted to get married and his father agreed. He had completed Gymnasium, but his family was poor - both his father and his father's brothers were all shepherds, although later his father became a truck driver. Pavlos' first cousin (a man who had become rich

through his own efforts) tried to get him engaged to the daughter of a rich farmer. As it happened the girl had already set her heart on a young teacher, also from a fairly wealthy family, and she later married him. At this time, Pavlos was refused, and it was assumed that the reason was the family background. He came home and said "I'm going to get engaged - as soon as possible". Within a few days an engagement was arranged with the daughter of a substantial farmer. She was given twelve donums of land by her parents and a house was built.

Pavlos' sister, who told me the story, explained that his pride was hurt by the refusal, and he got engaged as quickly as possible to get over the slight. The same thing happened a few years later to his younger brother.

In addition to a season for offers, and conventions for making decisions and refusals, there is great emphasis on secrecy during the process, and the use of intermediaries. One reason for secrecy is to protect from insult those who may be refused, although details have a habit of leaking out. But the use of intermediaries coupled with the secrecy act as a safety valve, because a family which has been unsuccessful in an offer can deny that the offer was ever made. Normally formal offers only come from the man's family to that of the girl; informally, and very secretly, a girl's family may drop an obscure hint towards a particular young man that if he seeks the girl's hand he will be welcome. But should this fail to be taken up by the young man, the girl's family would totally deny that they had ever had such an intention, and dismiss the suggestion with the phrase phantasia tous 'Their imagination...'. .

Data about who sought whose hand proved the most difficult to collect in the village, especially from men. This is a further indication of the importance for the status

system of each bid. The biggest service a family can do for another is to keep the secret of a marriage-offer that it has rejected. However, since women talk more freely than men on sensitive subjects (possibly because they have less to fear from the dangers of a physical encounter with someone insulted by gossip) details may be given during the heat of a quarrel. One of the most serious women's quarrels to occur in the village during my fieldwork period was brought to a heightened level of hostility because one family suggested that a second 'had been nice to' a third family because they were hoping for a marriage-offer from the highly eligible son of the house.

Intermediaries are used for many different situations in Cyprus. They are used for buying and selling, for attempting to settle disputes, and nearly always for arranging marriages. It is preferable if they are close kin of both interested parties, but it is usually enough for them to be kin of the prospective groom, and men respected in the village as 'serious'. There is, however, some ambiguity in the role, for when the villagers are asked what makes a good mesitis they often laugh and say 'You have to be a good fibber, have the gift of the gab..". In fact, a mesitis extols the virtues of the man he is representing, and can also return to him with a softer answer in the case of rejection than may have actually been given by an intemperate family. There is honour to be gained, and ties may be strengthened by successfully representing a man in marriage negotiations; but a mesitis

may be blamed if the marriage turns out badly, or if it fails to take place at all. A mesitis often tries very hard to bring a match off by persuasion of the more doubtful side.

The customs which direct the arrangement of marriages indicate that they are the object of great concern in the social organisation of the village, and reasons have been given for this. It should not be thought, however, that cooperation and solidarity between affines is therefore an automatic outcome. Many marriages represent a compromise for the contracting families - they may have hoped for something better but have settled for less. Engagement, with the attendant difficulty of house-building for the bride's family, is a period of strain for many families, since both sides in their anxiety not to be taken advantage of economically may be vigilant to the point of conflict.

The crucial relations on which future affinal cooperation are likely to be based are between a man and his wife's father, the man and his wife's brother, between the man's wife and his mother, between his sister and his wife. Some of these relationships are given a certain impetus by a custom which seems to have evolved relatively recently, but the foundations for which must always have been present: after engagement in the village the groom is expected to dine as many nights as possible at the house of his fiancée's parents. Since engagement commonly lasts two years, this provides ample time for the man to get to know his new relations well. The villagers give

a number of reasons for this custom. It is a chance, they say, for the couple to get to know each other, in the right circumstances. Since the girl's father is expected to provide slightly better than usual food for these meals, some villagers add "The father must feed the groom, to keep him happy". Implicit in this comment is the danger that a young man might change his mind, an event which will hurt the girl's family more than his own. This is especially delicate when the groom is from another village, and has been sleeping in the same house as his fiancée; it is then commonly assumed that he will have made love to her.

To show the different forms which cooperation between affines may take, as well as the type of difficulties which can occur, I now present in detail some cases⁽⁶⁾.

Sklyros has been married to Ploutis' sister for twenty years, during which time Ploutis has become very wealthy. Sklyros uses his tractor to cultivate Ploutis' citrus groves, and Ploutis is content with this arrangement, for his trees get good attention, while the money he pays is of direct benefit to his sister's family.

Sklyros has debts of several thousand pounds; in 1969 he was thinking of starting a pig farm and went to the Market Town Bank for a loan. The manager would not normally have been willing to consider this, because Sklyros has mortgaged all available land, and is financially over-extended. But since Ploutis had agreed to guarantee the loan, the manager was ready to make it. If Sklyros fails to repay it, Ploutis will be liable.

This case shows the ambiguity at the heart of much affinal cooperation, that by helping a brother-in-law

a man is also helping his sister. The villagers often point this out. However, in some cases it is possible to find help being given for more general notions of solidarity rather than simply 'to help the sister'.

Andreas had a younger brother, Yiannis. Yiannis' friend was involved in a serious court case, and to help him out Yiannis gave false evidence. This was discovered by the prosecution, who decided to proceed against Yiannis. This would have cost him his white-collar job and a gaol sentence.

Andreas heard of his brother's difficulties, and went to his wife's brother Petros, a professional man in a town. Petros is married to the daughter of a wealthy merchant, who regularly goes drinking with a high government official. This man was persuaded to use his influence to get the case dropped.

The links involved were friend/friend; brother/brother; brother/wife's brother; son-in-law/father-in-law; father-in-law/friend; friend/friend; and a final unknown link.

(iii) Cooperation and Dispute Between Kin and Affines

I propose now to examine certain data which will put the notions about kinship and affinity so far discussed into better perspective.

I collected data from 24 informants on the share-cropping⁽⁷⁾ and other partnership arrangements they had made at any time. Included were those situations regarded by informants as a form of 'going-halves' in which one side put up land, labour, cash or seed, and the other side put in something as required. Some cases where trucks or tractors were jointly owned were included. Situations where an unmarried son was labouring on his father's land were not included. The 24 informants yielded 68 instances

of share-cropping. Of these 15 were between consanguines - particularly, a man's own siblings, his parents' siblings, and his cousins; 23 instances were between affines - a man with his wife's siblings, his wife's father, or some other affine. The remaining 30 instances were with people who were either koumbari - 4; not in any way related - 24; or vague, distant kin - 2. These data are too few to do more than suggest that in share-cropping arrangements affines are chosen roughly as frequently as consanguines. My interpretation of the fact that people share-crop with non-kin as often as with kin requires the qualification that my own estimates suggest that for an average man non-kin are about five times more numerous in the village than close kin⁽⁸⁾, and it makes sense to argue therefore that the true meaning of the numbers of kin involved is that kin are actively preferred over non-kin.

It is possible to compare these data with those provided by a survey of ten agricultural work groups called by particular women, to get work done in February and March 1969, and involving a total of 80 woman-woman relationships. 23 of these relationships were between consanguines. 20 were between close affines. The remainder included koummares, neighbours, and other persons in no way related to the caller of the working party, and included people who were working for cash, others who were working to be repaid by an equal amount of work at a later date, and a few who were helping 'freely' out of close obligation. Again, affines were called about as often as blood kin, although the figures are not

large enough to be more than suggestive.

When discussing such situations informants were usually careful to say that economic cooperation with someone who was a second cousin, or related at a similar distance, was for reasons other than kinship. For instance, a woman was explaining why she had gone to a working party on the 28th February 1969, in which 17 women cut oranges. She was a second cousin of the caller, but the reason she went was that the women are neighbours, and thus knew each other. The point was the simple exchange of labour, in a mutually convenient manner, not the kinship tie.

Informants distinguish between reasonable economic cooperation with kin, and that which would be unreasonable, because counter to one's own self-interest. As a norm, this would be phrased "Assist kin by economic cooperation whenever you can, without materially losing by it". Clearly, this sort of norm allows endless scope for disagreement about rights and duties. There were at various times in the village three, and sometimes four, butchers. These were ordinary villagers who, in addition to their land, did butchering one or two days a week. Each one wanted as much custom as he could get, and although serious disputes were rare, there were a number of minor disputes about why individuals were going to one rather than another.

One informant, Kandis⁽⁹⁾, used to patronise Vounos, the butcher who was his wife's mother's brother 'because I support my relatives always'. But later another butcher, Charis, started to use water from Kandis' pump, and over time came to owe him money for this water. Kandis started

to take his meat from Charis, thus avoiding paying cash out of his own pocket for meat, and at the same time insuring that he was getting paid by Charis, in kind if not in cash. "Why pay cash to Vounos when I can take it from Charis?" he told me. In due course, Vounos complained to Kandis that he was no longer buying his meat from him, but Kandis (whose nickname means Wild man and who is appropriately tough, with a quick temper and aggressive way of speaking) gave his reasons in a forceful manner. Vounos said "There's no need to get angry - I was only joking". Kandis commented to me that Vounos was always 'like that', but added, "If I stopped my give-and-take situation with Charis, I'd go back to my relative Vounos, rather than to Kallis who is not related to me. Not that I've anything against Kallis".

At the time he told me this Kandis had just bought a tractor in partnership with an unmarried brother of his wife's, which was causing one of her married brothers, who had wanted to be Kandis' partner, a little jealousy. He had previously carried out the exchange of his water supply, with the tractoring of his land, with several affines. He had done this with his sister's husband, Phillis, and with his wife's older married brother. Now he would not need to have other people tractor his land. I should point out - although Kandis did not - that his strategy of taking the tractor in partnership with his wife's unmarried brother is a good strategy, because it will protect him from the charge of breaking his reciprocity with her older married brother, for he is still supporting his affines.

The system of exchanging water for tractor work, or water for meat which Kandis was using here, is a common one in the village. It has the mutual advantages mentioned: one man avoids using hard-to-get cash, the other at least can be sure that he is collecting on what he is owed. If both men start even, then both avoid the cash problem; the flexibility which is available by not letting one side build up too big a lead in the exchange situation is to the benefit of both sides. It can also lead to disputes, if one person thinks the other now owes too much, and tries to reduce the gap.

In the following case, the kinship relation is not very close, but close enough to allow the manipulation of norms:

Phillis is related to only one of the butchers - Vounos, who is his father's first cousin. They would normally use the general term 'relative' (syghenis) to each other. For five years Phillis bought his meat from Vounos. One day he bought from someone else. Vounos asked him why, and he replied "I've had a tractor now for two years; you've only asked me to work for you once, but I haven't got angry". "You owe me £17 for meat", said Vounos. "I'll pay you now", replied Phillis and did so, but hasn't bought meat from him since.

The two men don't agree about which one is cold, psychros. Phillis says he isn't cold with Vounos, but that since he has no need of contact with him, it is not deliberate avoidance on his part.

But from the butcher's point of view, it is Phillis who is cold, because he doesn't buy meat from his relative, and is thus deviating from what is 'natural'.

The villagers are in many cases so highly inter-married that a man may have several conflicting claims on

his custom⁽¹⁰⁾. In 1968 there were four villagers who acted as middlemen for the merchants buying oranges. Most villagers with oranges sold to one of these middlemen, rather than middlemen in other villages, or in Market Town. One informant was related to three of the middlemen. He was a second cousin of A's wife - a negligible relationship. But his brother had married a sister of the middleman B. He had done business with B for thirty years, and got on well with him. He was used to take small loans from him. In 1963, 1964 and again in 1965 he sold his oranges to him. But in these years another middleman started buying oranges, his koumbaros C. My informant had baptised C's second son some twenty years previously. Now, as he explained to me, he would have to share his oranges between the two men, and in 1966, 1967 and 1968 he sold his oranges to C. In 1968, when he needed money for the wedding of his daughter, C persuaded his employer, a Famagusta merchant, to lend the man £300⁽¹¹⁾.

There are, then, a range of situations in which kin may have an opportunity to cooperate. But these very opportunities, as well as the structural situations which arise in property transfer, provide many of the instances of conflict between kin or affines. In the depth interviews, the 24 informants were asked to describe any outstanding disputes, and any which had taken place in the last twenty years⁽¹²⁾. The interviews gave a total of 111 cases of some substance, which gave an average of some 4.5 per informant. I have information on a number

of other disputes, but here my remarks are limited to these particular 111 cases. (Table 14.)

The 111 cases can immediately be broken down into those between kin and affines, on the one hand, about two-thirds, and one-third where there was no known kinship or affinal link. But the previous caveat on the ratio of kin to strangers in the village applies here too: if on average a man recognises close relationships of kinship or affinity to about one-sixth of the adults in the village, then the actual rate of dispute should be thought of in the perspective of the probability of dispute with any person in the village. Thus, a ratio of two-thirds suggests, therefore, that the statistical probability of quarrelling with someone to whom one is closely related is about ten times greater than of quarrelling with someone not closely related. This is, of course, only a heavy-handed way of saying what anthropologists have always known - that dispute is more likely between those who have close social relationships or common economic interests.

TABLE 14

111 DISPUTES BETWEEN SELECTED INFORMANTS
BY CAUSE OF DISPUTE AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Kin and Affines</u> (1)	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
Politics	2	3	5
Land boundaries, animal trespass	4	4	8
Property transfer (dowry, inheritance)	24	0	24
Other economic, debt	24	23	47
Insults, various and drinking situations	16	20	36
			<hr/> 120(2) <hr/>

Note (1) Persons were classed as affines from the time of engagement.

(2) 9 cases have been classified by several causes, since it was misleading to stress a single cause only.

(iv) Solidarity and Political Alignment among Kin

During the Emergency a shopkeeper in another village reported Tangos' younger brother to the police for breaking into his shop. Since Tangos' brother was in EOKA, the matter could have exposed him. The police came to look for him, and he hid in the fields for three days. Tangos then went and beat up the shopkeeper, and when the shopkeeper's father tried to intervene, beat him too.

Villagers expect members of the domestic group to behave in a solidary manner in disputes. To insult a man is likely to bring his father or brothers into the issue, although it does not do so on small matters of debt or trespass. If there is a general rough-house, other close relatives may join in, but such events are rare, and bystanders usually try to separate men fighting in the coffee-shops or at weddings. This solidarity between brothers, whether married or unmarried, normally applies in any serious matter, and cuts across their individual political allegiances, as the following case suggests:

In 1963 Vakis, a leftist, was a committee member for the village Cooperative Store. The village militia, dominated by rightists, was collecting money to buy guns. Vakis gave them £20, as did his older brother Anemos. But the collectors also took from the Cooperative Store a box of shotgun cartridges, without asking. This annoyed Vakis, who told a friend of his, a civil servant, about it, and later some official inquiries were made.

The village militia leader was Moustachas. He and Anemos are sighambri, men married to sisters, but their good relations had deteriorated because of an unsuccessful co-ownership of a tractor. However, both men were clients of right-wing urban politicians.

When Moustachas heard that Vakis had complained about the cartridges he told Anemos "Your brother needs shooting for doing a thing like that", by which he meant bringing the village militia into disrepute with powerful outsiders, and his anger was double because Vakis was a leftist.

Anemos shouted back at him "You better not lay a finger on my brother", and for four years after that the two men were cold towards each other. In public they concealed their coldness, and Anemos continued to behave normally to his wife's sister and the children. Anemos' readiness to oppose Moustachas to begin with is the more impressive because the militia leader is considered a dangerous man to offend.

Although married brothers are expected to support each other in issues of serious danger, as in the case just described, at the same time they have the right to form whatever political alliances they wish. The pragmatic need to protect the interests of one's own dependents is clearly recognised; but at the same time, such alliances should not stand in the way of the norms of close kinship solidarity. In later chapters material will be given in which these pragmatic and normative principles come into sharp conflict.

I examined the political loyalties of a number of sibling groups in the village, considering only the expressed loyalties of brothers to the major political parties which existed in 1969. Nine groups of brothers had roughly the same loyalties, four groups were too ambiguous to classify, and some ten sets of brothers had obviously diverse loyalties. But if the loyalties of sisters' husbands in these groups


were added, then the number of sets with diverse loyalties would increase. If, in addition, these brothers' wives' brothers are added, normally loyalties become still more diverse. Some indication of this is given in Table 15. The senior generation, whose ages range from about fifty to seventy, show a variety of ties. Most are simply Nationalists, but one woman married a Communist, and one of her brothers was once a Communist, but switched to the Nationalists about twenty years ago, probably under pressure from his elder brother. The second generation contain two sibling sets which are unified, two which are diverse. Since the second generation are all first cousins, it is clear they span the political spectrum offered by the five parties.

Only full siblings share the same kindred; but each sibling has closer obligations to his spouse's siblings, than his own siblings have. This results in a situation where every adult has a unique set of loyalties derived from the marriage tie. Since a man may also choose from among his first cousins those with whom he wishes specially close relations, then it is clear that in the matter of economic cooperation and political alignment outside the nuclear family, each man has his own set of special ties, which need not closely overlap with those of his own close kin or affines.

(v) Conclusion

Kinship and affinity are, with land and work, critical constraints on villagers, for they set certain goals, and specify the rights and duties which go with these goals.

Table 15 political alignments in two generations



- 1 Akel
- 2 Edek
- 3 United
- 4 Progressive party
- 5 Dek
- N Nationalist (without party)
- ? Undecided or unknown

* ex 1, now N
** ex 2, now 4

The bilateral nature of kinship, the cultural stress on the economic autonomy of the nuclear family, and the villager's attitudes to the marriage order of children produce a situation where unmarried siblings cooperate closely to marry off successive members of their sibling group.

Because the domestic group's resources change over time, the portion of family resources available to each child at marriage tends to differ from that received by its brothers and sisters, and since a general notion of 'equal shares' is current this makes for disputes later in life. The developmental cycle of the domestic group leads, in later life, to declining solidarity between married siblings.

The fact that the village is essentially an in-marrying community means that normally a man has a large number of consanguines present in the same village. Expectations are different between siblings, first cousins and second cousins, and ^Isuggested that although first cousins were highly valued, second cousins were almost a liability within the village.

The disadvantages of second cousin relationships lead naturally to a discussion of marriage. The increasing formality of the betrothal ceremony and property arrangements were mentioned; but more important, a man's social status is in question until the marriage of his last child has been arranged. The arrangement of marriage is thus the critical situation in which villagers receive some confirmation or denial of their own view of themselves. Families strive to make marriages for their children with those whose wealth,

honour and general family status is the equal of or better than their own. Competition for likely partners is intense, with a great deal of attendant secrecy and formality.

While the successful marriage of a child is a key factor in the status of its parents, it is the newly married child who enters into important economic relations with affines. A man may cooperate with his wife's father or wife's brother during engagement or the early years of marriage, and there is a tendency for the young man to shift his main energies from his natal domestic group to the family of his wife.

Relations of economic cooperation are common between both consanguines and affines, whether in the form of share-cropping, other forms of partnership, or types of exchange of labour for goods in which both sides seek to avoid the use of scarce cash. But such cooperation also produces opportunity for dispute. The data examined made it clear that although both cooperation and dispute are more common between related persons, unrelated persons are also used for important types of cooperation. Wallo villagers use kinship and affinity in many ways, but they are perfectly ready to enter into cooperative relations with unrelated people.

This was further reflected in discussing solidarity and political alignments, for while kinship and affinity cause men to support each other when threats, insults or serious difficulties occur, there is no general expectation that these institutions should prevent a mature individual

from forming his own political alignments. These alignments, as well as the general conditions of life, involve men in relations and transactions outside the spheres of kinship and affinity.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

- (1) I have dealt with the problem of why this change took place elsewhere (Loizos and Langford, unpublished paper). Briefly, the argument is that houses 'switched' from being a burden on grooms to being a burden on brides as a consequence, among other things, of a change in number of men and women available at age of marriage. Other factors are also considered, such as the declining need for agricultural land as an essential factor for household viability.
- (2) The government takes a different view, for it conscripts young men of eighteen, and treats them as adult in a number of other ways.
- (3) Exceptions to these rules occur in two situations: if a child is receiving higher education at university, it may marry 'later' than its position in the sibling group would normally require; also, when a family has no property at all, a boy sometimes gets engaged by himself, while his sisters are unmarried. This is likely to cause a serious break in his relations with his parents.
- (4) Genealogies were taken from the 30 oldest men and women in Kallo who were fairly lucid. They were asked about the marriages of their parents, brothers and sisters. To these data were added the results of the main census. It is possible that the genealogical data overstate the degree of marriage within the village, for elderly informants would be quite likely to forget those of their parents' siblings who had married out of the village, and broken all contact; also, members of small kin groups which have died out, or all of whose close members left the village would have been omitted.
- (5) Friendship will be discussed in the next chapter.

- (6) I have deliberately chosen to use material about Skilyros in a number of places in the early chapters, since he features prominently in later political cases.
- (7) Share-cropping is not particularly common in Kallo. Christodoulou (1959:217) gives data on a sample of villages intensively surveyed, from the entire range of Cypriot land-use areas. Kallo was included in this survey, and ranked twentieth out of the 22 villages for which data were given on land leased and share-cropped as a percentage of land used. Kallo had only 5% of its land in this category; the range of the sample is from 1% to 69%; the average for all Cyprus was 16%.
- (8) To calculate the number of adult close kin and affines a man should have in an average family in the village, assuming all people to be married, with living spouses, was to allow the man five siblings, five father's siblings, five mother's siblings, and 30 first cousins. To this 45 are added a further 45 spouses, giving 90. To this figure are added 30 close affines, for a total of 120 adults. There were 740 registered voters in the village in 1970, so the man should have roughly five times as many distant kin and unrelated persons as he has close kin.
- (9) This man was described in Chapter 2, page 2/5.
- (10) 23 informants questioned in detail about their relations with the four Kallo middlemen who buy citrus fruit showed that six had no ties to any middleman; two had one tie only; five had two ties; six had three ties; and four had four ties. These ties included consanguinity, up to and including second cousins, affinity, koumbaria, and, in three cases, friends or neighbours. Thus, there were 46 recognised ties between 23 persons, an average of two each. 17 of these ties were, however, between second cousins, and thus on the margins of importance.
- (11) The Famagusta merchant did not ask for the guarantee that the oranges of this man would be sold to him, but the man's comment on this was "He's very clever - it's a trick to get your oranges out of you".
- (12) The questions about disputes came after a number of less threatening topics had been discussed, and all informants had been interviewed before on other topics. Furthermore, in most cases I had already asked a very good informant for any material he knew of on disputes these people had been involved in. If they denied ever having disputes, or failed to mention those I knew about, they were prompted. Situations likely to trigger memory, such as court-cases, debt, trespass, land boundaries and so forth were also used to aid their recall.

CHAPTER 4

EXTRA-FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS

AND VILLAGE SOLIDARITY

Work, land tenure, kinship and affinity all serve to constrain villagers, and in their different ways circumscribe many village social relations. But the villagers are involved in other relationships, both inside the village and outside it. Those relations which spring from wedding sponsorship or godparenthood (koumbaria), village notions friendship, relations based in membership of the village itself, are all used by villagers to further their interests, both in regard to their family obligations and, less directly, in relation to the village political arena, and that of the nation. Extra-familial social relationships, and the notion of village solidarity, will both be essential for the understanding of political processes to be analysed in later chapters.

(i) Koumbaria

The marriage and baptismal sacraments of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus give rise to the relationship of koumbaria; while the institution has a complex history within the Church, the discussion here will be concerned chiefly with its social meaning in village life. Traditionally, at the wedding ceremony the groom invited a man to be his wedding sponsor, koumbaros, and the bride a woman

to be her sponsor, koummara. It was usual for these two sponsors to become the baptismal sponsors for the children of the marriage, although it was permissible for a person to be a baptismal sponsor who had not been a wedding sponsor. But in the 1930's, without any impetus from the Church, a change in village custom occurred, and the numbers of wedding sponsors began slowly to increase. At first couples had two sponsors of each sex, later three, four and five, until at the time of my fieldwork many couples had fifteen or twenty, and some boasted a hundred. Accompanying this increase, but only at the level of village custom, arose the notion of a rank order of sponsors, such that the first koumbaros expected to baptise the first child born, the first koummara the second, the second koumbaros the third child, the second koummara the fourth, and so on. Since normally only the first three or four koumbari of either sex could reasonably expect to baptise children, there has been a tendency in the villagers' minds to stop thinking of the koumbari in ranked terms after about the fifth pair. There is also a tendency for the relationship to be relatively lightly regarded in the lower positions, and it is generally the case that today the relationship only has its full force in terms of expectations, rights and duties for the highest ranking koumbari and those who have baptised a child of the marriage. In what follows I shall disregard the low-ranking and non-baptising sponsors.

This change in the pattern of wedding sponsorship took place in different places at different rates, at different times. Villagers believe the change to have reached the

village from the towns; certain bishops have tried to discourage it, and highly educated townsmen tend nowadays to have few sponsors. Villagers explain the adoption of the change as being a device "to help the couple with the rising costs of getting married", and since each sponsor is expected to make a gift of cash to the couple, this at first sight seems plausible. But during the same period that the number of sponsors increased, the numbers of wedding guests also increased, and they also make cash gifts. I cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for the change, beyond observing that the period in which it takes place is also a period when villagers are being increasingly drawn into contact with the larger society. This in itself does not explain the specificity of the change in custom.

The sponsorship of a marrying couple creates a number of new roles. A koumbaros is so addressed and regarded by both bride and groom, as is a koummara. Furthermore, the spouse of a sponsor becomes addressed by the term for sponsor, even when not technically a sponsor. A person may not marry anyone baptised by his or her godparent, nor the child of his godparent, whom he addresses as kalledelfos, 'spiritual sibling'.

A couple and their wedding sponsors always use the reciprocal term koumbaros in reference or address, and should show mutual trust, generosity and respect. To a person who has baptised one's child an additional respect is due, which in traditional times went as far as the obligation to rise to one's feet if one's baptismal koumbaros approached. Baptismal koumbari should strictly avoid quarrels or dissension

of any kind, and systematic data which I collected on this problem suggest that indeed the rate of open dispute between baptismal koumbari is proportionately lower than that between consanguines, affines or friends. Only four out of 111 cases of dispute reported were between koumbari, but some under-reporting is likely since the shame involved is so strong.

My data on choice of godparents suggest that over half of all persons selected are kin or affines of one or the other spouse. But although nearly a half are not related by kinship or affinity to the parents of the child, they are still co-villagers. Less than 15% of godparents were not residents of the village, and less than 10% of godparents are persons of a markedly different status. By this I mean persons whose wealth or education would normally require the use of deference terms, such as the second person plural form of verbs by the lower status person.

Since the relationship of koumbaria may in some cases be used to establish or cement a patron-client relationship⁽¹⁾, it is worth considering why so few villagers appear to put it to this use. The general explanation may be that the village is relatively prosperous, relatively near the capital, and relatively well served by the machinery of state. Thus, the gap between the villagers and those they may wish to contact is not as wide as in some societies. In addition, the fact that many villagers have kin employed in government and the professions somewhat reduces the need to use koumbaria in this way. But a further reason is suggested by the comments of one informant. Six of his seven children had godparents resident in the village, and of the same general

status as himself. The seventh was a physician, resident in the capital, who has land in the village which he waters from the informant's diesel pump. The villager, when questioned about the quality of relationship with the doctor, cursed him, saying "He never comes to see the child. Once he sent a piece of clothing, nothing since. My kid says 'Who's my godfather?'. It would have been better to have a villager baptise him, then the kid would have got to know him, and if he got a shilling or two now and then, it would have been fine. The godfather should be a second father to the child...". This informant, as a leftist, was less concerned with the theological than the social relationship which koumbaria should establish. His complaint was about the failure of the relationship to have any content at all. Yet he was well aware of the instrumental uses to which it could be put, for he suggested that a highly placed koumbaros could, and usually would, show preferential behaviour to a man whose child he had baptised. From the point of view of the villager, the problem is one of prediction. A friend or relative within the village is known, and the probable return on the relationship calculable. But to ask a high status person, resident outside the village, to baptise one's child is a gamble. At worst one risks wasting an institutionalised relationship, and looking a fool; for villagers are quick to ridicule such a mistake. The relatively small numbers of markedly asymmetrical baptismal ties are then partly the result of a calculation on the lines of "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush".

The norms implicit in the baptismal relationship

suggest why it is most commonly instituted between persons who are already friends, and may or may not be related. In general, it is the ambition of every adult to become a godparent, and very few fail to achieve this ambition: those who do fail are often possessed of some strong social disability - severe mental or physical illness, alcoholism, and so forth. To be asked to baptise a child is an honour; to ask to baptise a child is a serious request which the child's parents will consider carefully, for it amounts to an overture of friendship and can only be refused through a face-saving excuse that the child has already been promised to someone else.

The godparent undertakes the costs of the ceremony, both those incurred by the sacrament, and those incurred by the appropriate festivities afterwards. These involved in the village providing a substantial meal and alcohol for between fifteen and fifty persons. It would be impossible to agree to baptise a child without being ready for an outlay of £20, and since the rate for a day's unskilled labour is £1. 10. 0. for men and 12/- for women (depending on seasonal demands) the godparent deserves respect for material as well as spiritual reasons. Many adults refuse requests to become godparents by openly admitting that they haven't the money free.

When koumbaria exists in a situation where people are already kin, are friends, or are people of unequal status, there is a sense in which it becomes the dominant relationship. For instance Pontikkos, a poor man, has had a child baptised by Vourros, a wealthy, educated landowner. Were they not

koumbari Pontikkos would address Vourros as kyrie, mister (but with more deferential overtones); as it is he always addresses and refers to him as "My koumbaros Vourros..."⁽²⁾. That this is only an idiom of equality, rather than creating actual equality, is inferred from the rareness with which Vourros seeks Pontikkos' company, or refers to his existence, whereas the poor man often reminds people that the rich one is his koumbaros. But such an idiom, from the point of view of the poorer man, is better than no idiom at all.

Koumbaria, then, is the most strongly institution-alised relationship formed by villagers, after affinity. Like kinship and affinity, it is morally charged and subject to ceremonies and sanctions of the church. It lacks structural conflicts which arise through transfer of property in kinship and affinity, yet it enjoins cooperative relations between sets of persons in two related generations. Unlike kinship but like affinity it is for koumbari themselves an achieved relationship, and calculation of possible gains or losses is made before a person enters into it. When entered into by people markedly unequal in wealth, power or status it may disguise or initiate patron-client relationships, but relatively few villagers use it in this way. The ones who do are often those most active in political relations with people outside the community, but this need not be the case. A similar potential either for affirming equality or bridging inequality is present in other relationships the villagers term 'friendship', to a discussion of which I now turn.

(ii) Friendship

The word philos, friend, is used just as loosely as the word koumbaros, but it presents much greater analytic problems, as Paine (1969) has reminded us. The villagers use the word to denote a relationship between two people of the same sex, usually of the same age, freely entered into but having its roots in childhood or adolescence; as they use the word it does not suggest an opposition or contrast to kin, and close friends often turn out to be, on investigation, close kin. In conversation, a man would always refer to a friend who was a close kinsman as a kinsman and, in this sense, the kinship role is dominant; and when a man wishes to describe the quality of his friendship with another, he is likely to say, without any hint of irony, "We get along like brothers". Implicit is the notion that friends should help each other when possible, but there are no precise boundaries to this notion - it can only be explored in a specific context. There is also present the idea that the basis of true friendship is a love of one person for another, which is reciprocated; this love is thought to be the product of two individual personalities, when genuine, and not to result from a calculation of possible advantages. Men say freely in describing their close friends, "I love him as I love my brother" - aghapó tón opos ton alfón mou. The other words commonly used about a friend is ektimó, I esteem, or sevomai, I respect. But true friendship always has at its core the notion of aghápe, the non-sexual love which should exist between close kin⁽³⁾.

At first sight it might appear that the expectations of true friendship are likely to create jealousies from among close kin, who will see in the relationship the diverting of resources and loyalties properly due to them. When I was conducting my census of household heads I was at first puzzled to note that, whereas men readily admitted to owing large sums of money, sometimes as much as £5,000, they were most reluctant to tell me the names of those who had loaned to them even sums as small as £20. They often gave as a reason for secrecy, "His relatives might be angry and jealous if they found out...". Consistent with this attitude is the frequency with which kin warn a person of the danger of being exploited or cheated by an unrelated person.

This inherent tension in friendship is counteracted and contained in several ways. First, since villagers are highly conscious of the problem, they tend to conduct delicate matters with a degree of secrecy. Secondly, in general people avoid making requests of their friends which will obviously clash with prior kinship loyalties. They may ask friends for small, short-term loans, or for practical assistance which does not markedly diminish resources, such as personal introductions, the use of a piece of machinery or an opinion on a course of action. But for large sums of money they prefer to approach a wealthy man with whom they are less friendly.

Giving advice is not the simple matter it might seem at first sight. One of the commonest reasons for not doing something in the village is "People will laugh", and this fear of ridicule means that a man will only discuss a difficult

problem with someone he trusts. A close kinsman with the requisite expertise is useful here, but the expertise is not always to be had from close kin. On certain problems, involving one's kin, the advice of a friend may be more valuable because disinterested. Many of my informants, when discussing friendship, described a true friend as "Someone I can tell my deepest secrets to, who won't repeat them...".

Friendship may develop from childhood or youth, but in older people it may arise from the simple fact of commensality. A common idiom used to describe or account for the development of a friendship is "We ate and drank together and became friends...". In the very simplicity of the expression can be seen a major problem of village friendship. For it suggests that all and any commensality should produce enduring ties: if you have given food to a man he should recognise a special relationship with you from then on. A villager went into a shop in Nicosia to get the sights on his son's air-rifle repaired. The shop-keeper said that his agency with the manufacturers had lapsed, and so he would not undertake the work. "And he pretended he didn't know who I was, that he didn't recognise me. Now a few years ago when I was buying a diesel pump from him, that man sat and ate and drank with me. So now how can he pretend not to know me? Is it possible to forget someone you've eaten and drank with?"

The villager didn't consider that the urban shop-keeper may meet a dozen new people each day, or that he himself had grown older and his appearance changed. A villager, inevitably meeting fewer people, sees commensality as memorable.

This is partly because in the village eating and drinking outside the home are ritualised. First, a meal may take several hours - one does not simply eat and leave; nor does one eat quickly. Also, there will be a number of ceremonial invitations by the host in the form kálos orísate, "You are welcome", to which the guest will give the rhyming reply kalós sas ivrame, "It is well we find you", with the double meaning of 'you are receiving us well' and 'well for us that we have found you'. This formula may be repeated several times during the meal. Then, as I shall describe below, there is the tendency for all drinking to be the collective drinking of toasts. Finally, there is the tendency for the conversational style of a meal - whether at home or in a tavern - to be relaxed, cooperative, compromising and non-competitive, in contrast to the aggressive, individualistic tone of coffee-house conversations.

If the circumstances of commensality produce friendship they also serve to express it. A man from a distant village may be invited home by a friend, to eat and sleep. They reach home late at night, the host wakes his wife and she prepares a meal. In the honour-and-shame values of the villagers, the elements of home, women, night and sleeping, all combined in one sequence and underlined by the giving of food, symbolically express trust. Friendship involves the display of trust, but paradoxically it can only develop to a point where trust is justified by the calculated risk of extending trust.

Friendships are maintained through drinking sessions. A man will meet a friend, and suggest to him that they 'go and

have one' (pame na pioume kanena?). They then sit down in a corner of one of the village coffee shops and drink a bottle of brandy, costing 6/-(4), and eat small dishes of cheese, fruit, vegetables and meat. If they see other close friends passing by, they call out to them to join in. The drinking goes on for several hours, until everyone has had enough to drink, or every man has drunk a bottle of brandy, whichever comes first. The bill is then paid by one man, the man who suggested the evening, or by him and his first guest. It is more normal for one man to pay, and I never saw an occasion where the bill was divided between several men.

There is prestige to be gained from being the man who pays, and this reflects the individualistic and competitive aspect of village values. But this is concealed in layers of ambiguity. First, certain men have a reputation for stinginess, for never paying. These men are not called to join in drinking. This implies that in other situations, where the stated norms deny calculation, calculation must take place. Yet there is rarely, between friends, open discussion of the balance of reciprocities. The commonest mention takes the form of saying to the man who is attempting to pay the bill "What - do you insist on paying every time?", where the underlying suggestion is that the man seeking to pay is also seeking to put himself above his friends; but such a remark can easily backfire, for the man seeking to pay may pretend to think that his actual generosity is in question, that he is trying merely to appear a generous person (chouvar'tás). He can then redouble his efforts to pay and expect to succeed. It is quite normal in these situations

for men to appear to be very angry, to insist that what they are doing is right, and for the whole conversation to be pitched at a level of total seriousness. Hospitality and generosity are not to be taken lightly.

Although I did not collect numerical data on village drinking groups, I observed a sufficient number to be sure that the reciprocity involved is not immediate and specific, but diffuse and delayed. Because the composition of the groups is fluid, and because the cost of a session varies both as a function of the number of men involved and the place involved (Market Town costs more than the villages, and the Capital costs more than Market Town), it is very unlikely that B can precisely reciprocate to A the same cash value as A gave to B previously. There are further complications. Any man in a group may call out to a close friend to join the group, even though (and perhaps sometimes precisely because) he knows he will not be paying himself. This allows the creation of a double obligation on the part of the new guest - both to the man who invited him and to the man who paid. The host, of course, has now doubled his hospitality to his original guest. If the new arrival is a friend of both host and first guest, the situation is a little different. In such situations, too scrupulous a system of accounting would not work. Instead, the participants hold somewhat general notions about the balance between them.

Villagers make a number of differentiations of friendship, in which they are concerned to separate out the motives of those involved. Genuine, or true, friends, gnisii

phíli, have a relationship based on fellow-feeling, sympáthia. Especially in youth, they speak of themselves as achóristi, inseparable. In later years a man describing this sort of friendship says "We were always together. It was essential for me to be with him all the time, to see him every day to be happy". He may add "He grew up in my house; we slept in the same bed". Other ways to describe this type of relationship are phíli pollá, very great friends, or kardiakí phíli, friends of the heart.

Other usages suggest a shading off towards mere acquaintanceship, and people say carefully "I cannot say we are friends - we know each other, that's all".

There is a way of describing that friendship which is not genuine. Pséftiki phíli are persons whose apparent friendship really masks cold self-interest. This description is often given by third parties, to characterise a relationship between persons of unequal power, or status. A number of people in the village boast of their 'friendships' with government ministers, former EOKA fighters, wealthy merchants, doctors, lawyers or civil servants. Such claims may be described by others as 'lies' or characterised as 'false friendship'. No other form of words in the village mouth can better express the analytic notion of patron-client relations.

To the villagers it is obvious what distinguishes true friendship from the false friendship of the client and patron. True friends meet as equals, as often as they can, and take obvious pleasure in each other's company. A client may only rarely see his patron unless one or the other needs

something, and when he does he will go on using respect language, including the plural verb form, and the term 'Kyrie' to address his patron. He will often present his patron with gifts of fruit or other village produce. The patron does not make similar return gifts.

A certain man in the village, Yiannos, often speaks of himself as a great friend of a government minister who bought a citrus plantation with a water pump in the village. Yiannos, who first met the minister during the Emergency when he acted as a minor courier for EOKA, looks after his trees for a monthly wage. Inevitably this involves a limited amount of contact between the two men. Some people are impressed by Yiannos' claim to 'friendship' with the minister, but many others are scornful behind his back and add that the minister very rarely visits his 'friend', and is dissatisfied with the way his interests are looked after and would change Yiannos if he could. It is widely believed that Yiannos sees it as part of his job to carry tales to the minister about people in the village who may be hostile to him. Since during my fieldwork the minister resigned his post and became a leading figure in a political party, the value of Yiannos as a source of information to him did not lessen.

One reason why some people in the village were hostile to the minister was to do with his water pump. Yiannos was his representative in selling water in the village, and in collecting payment. The minister's pump thus came directly into competition with those of various villagers; also, he did tend to press for payment rather quickly. Since ready cash is difficult to find when their trees are young, it is

common for a man to owe for water used for several years. There was also some resentment of the relish with which Yiannos tried to carry out his debt-collecting duties for his master. At one point in these events certain pipes bearing water from the minister's machine were found to be damaged. There were at least three versions of how this came about. One was that the pipes broke 'by themselves'. A second was that Yiannos himself had damaged the pipes, so that he could discover the damage, report it and his suspicions to the minister and thus gain credit with him for vigilance. A third version suggested that certain man in the village who had been pressed for money were seeking to teach the minister a lesson about the need for delicacy in credit relations.

Yiannos' relation with the minister is often referred to in the village, and it makes him, whether people like him or not, someone to take note of, as the following incident suggests: Yiannos quarrelled with his former friend, Sklyros, over a share-cropping venture they had undertaken. Later, Sklyros' uncle, a poor man with many children, sought to get certain benefits from a ministry department in the capital. But he found his application unsuccessful, and he told me that he believed this was because Yiannos, out of his wish to be avenged on Sklyros, had gone to his minister and pointed out that the uncle was not technically eligible for the benefits in question. While this interpretation may be somewhat fanciful, it is a very characteristic example of the way villagers talk about such relationships, and the uses to which

they might be put. On a number of other occasions Yiannos introduced villagers who wanted some favour to the minister, and such people are more ready to support his claim that the minister is his true friend.

Friendship then is less strongly institutionalised than koumbaria, but it is recognised by villagers as a viable and legitimate type of relationship. It is not necessarily opposed to kinship, although kin may be suspicious of a man with too many unrelated friends. True friendship between equals is a relationship freely entered into, which has an expectation of trust, but will be terminated in the event of real or imagined failures of reciprocity; but the very ease with which the term is used, and the relationship said to spring from such simple events as eating and drinking together, suggest that it is liable to be unstable.

When there is a marked inequality between friends, others are quick to suggest that they are guided by calculation of self-interest rather than personal liking.

(iii) Other Bases for Association

Koumbaria and true friendship are institutionalised relations though in different degrees. There are a number of other relations which the villagers are involved in, which must be distinguished sociologically. I shall now examine other bases for association, starting with the use of the village coffee-shops.

The social life of men is largely a public life, in the several coffee-shops at the centre of the village.

There were never less than four, centrally located, during my fieldwork and sometimes, depending on the whims of certain individuals, five or six. Men commonly visit a coffee-shop at least once a day, and for many men, when not eating, sleeping or in the fields, the coffee-shop is the natural and proper place to be. This is so much a part of the proper male role that a man who doesn't put in enough time in this public world is likely to have said behind his back "What sort of man is he? He prefers hanging about the house with the women!"

From 5 a.m. till about 8 a.m., and again in the evening from 5 to 8 p.m., the coffeeshops are an important clearing house for information, and men deliberately come to them to seek others, to find work or workers, to get a lift to Market Town or the Capital, to do any one of a number of things which need other people. Normally men prefer to find others in the coffee-shop than to go to their houses - unless they live close by it will be easier, and visits to houses may always give occasion for gossip⁽⁵⁾.

Men come into the coffee-shop area, where others are sitting at ease, and ask "Have you seen X?" "He hasn't come yet." "He's over there at Y's place." "He's already left for Nicosia." "He's watering that big field of his down by the river." "He's sick at home." Any man will answer who knows; and the question is often asked of all who are seated in general, since the speaker is less interested in who answers than in getting a useful answer. This need which each man has for a degree of civility and information from others is complemented both by the public, common and open

nature of the coffee-shops - they are open to all - and by a particular custom associated with them: put in its baldest terms, this is that if a man B arrives and sits down near another man A, then A will normally order and pay for a coffee for the newcomer, without there being an especially close relationship between them. Major differences of age, wealth or education may allow the second man B some scope for saying "It isn't done...", but as a general rule common civility between co-villagers requires A at least to attempt to treat B to refreshment, and B can only refuse to accept by stressing a social difference between himself and A, since the grounds for the gesture is the common membership in the category, co-villager, chorianós. (The meaning of offering refreshment changes with the structural distance between the persons involved: it means something quite different when the persons are strangers, for instance.)

Although coffee-shops support a minimal cooperation between co-villagers, there is no lack of dispute, tension, conflict or competition between villagers; nor in any sense are adult men 'randomly' undertaking social relationships.

Another basis for association in the village is through neighbourhood, both in the sense of those whose houses, and those whose fields, are close. "Mia porta" - one door - is the way men describe having adjacent houses, and when they do so they rub the outside edges of their two index fingers along each other, in the same gesture they use to describe the relation between siblings. Since a man has his fields scattered in many places around the village, the idea of neighbourhood through fields is more diffuse, but suggests,

as with the house situation, relations in which casual contact, the borrowing and lending of implements, help raising a heavy load, or the exchange of gossip or agricultural information may all take place. Women make even more use of house-neighbourhood than men. Men typically work alone most of the time. They also have access to coffee-shops, where they are free to select people to talk to. Women are generally working in the house area, both for reasons of domestic duties and the honour-and-shame values already discussed. If a woman needs to recruit a cooperative labour group for weeding, picking oranges, pulling carrots or lifting potatoes, she will often have neighbours along with her kinswomen. Women also form neighbourhood-based informal associations, known as parea, a company (in the sense of companions). A number of women who wish to produce the cheese known as halloumi agree that, on successive days, all women will bring so much milk to one woman in turn. Thus, each woman gets sufficient milk to make enough cheese on one day to last for several weeks.

Age is another basis for association. I was struck by the certainty with which old men stated each other's ages. "I'm 63, I'm one year older than him, so he's about 62...". The reason is simple enough. The old men have been at primary school together, many years ago; the school and progress through it make for awareness of age differences for those persons who were there at the same time. Through childhood these groups of children played together, in adolescence they had adventures together, and in later life they retain a view of themselves as specially linked. Age-differences

are also made formal by terms of address: the proper form of address to any man fifteen to twenty years one's senior is thkie, uncle (Demotiki: thios, vocative, thie). To men older than the speaker, but not old enough to be addressed as thkie, the appropriate mode is to use the speaker's first name, in a mildly deferential tone. To those of one's own age it is enough to call out 'Re, Yiannis..', 'Hey, Yiannis..' if they are social equals. If they are of markedly greater education and not co-villagers, the 're...' would be considered rude. Between co-villagers of unequal education the use of 're' depends entirely on the degree of intimacy between the men.

Being of the same age is an available basis for association on terms of equality, and can be used to override other differences agreeable to both parties. This flexibility in social distinction is particularly important because recent tendencies in secondary education are adding to the probability that men of the same age will have had different levels of education.

Common occupation is another basis for association, and is particularly striking among the teachers. Men with common activities and common skills have certain obvious reasons to seek each other out, for the exchange of relevant information. For example, farmers ask other farmers about problems of cultivation; they would not normally ask policemen or white-collar workers. Farmers are also likely to meet around the village at odd times of the day, when other men may be working away from the village. But the teachers are the only category in the village who show signs of developing

a distinctive life-style. They make less use of the coffee-shops than other villagers, and tend to hold themselves back from what they see as the rougher side of coffee-shop behaviour: drinking, spitting, swearing and gambling. They are often heard to complain about these habits, and to lament the 'dirtiness' of the coffee-shops, the crudeness of village manners, and so forth. Their unwillingness to join in drinking groups is particularly important, since this aloofness is not shared by most of the civil servants, and nearly every visitor to the village on official business can be persuaded to sit down and eat and drink in public with the farmers.

The ordinary villagers, and sometimes also the civil servants, complain behind their backs that the teachers are snobbish, lazy and take no interest in village affairs. They point out that teachers have good salaries, short hours, and this they see as the community paying for certain fortunate individuals to avoid the tribulations of manual work⁽⁶⁾. Teachers, they argue, could improve the standard of village administration, help with the book-keeping, and even give improving talks to the villagers. Since the villagers themselves in other contexts defer to education, their complaints that the teachers "put themselves above the rest of us" appear paradoxical. However, the meaning of the complaint is that the institutionalisation of social differences is disruptive for the village. I shall have more to say about this in chapter eight, when village factionalism is analysed.

(iv) Relationships Outside the Village

Although till now the weight of my discussion has been concerned with relationships within the village, and much of the data has emphasised the importance of the village as a basic unit of analysis, this is by no means the whole story, and I now briefly mention some of the means by which villagers come into relationship with people and agencies of the larger society. It is clear that kinship, koumbaria, friendship and common occupation are not logically or empirically restricted to the village itself, although they tend to cluster within the village. Although there is little useful comparative data available to me from earlier periods, all the indications are that the crude volume of transactions which draw villagers across the boundaries of the village have been increasing throughout this century. To take one of the more obvious examples, where until the mid 1940's oxen were the main form of traction in agriculture, they have been gradually replaced by tractors. Today, no oxen are used. But the tractors are sold and serviced in Market Town; and most buyers of tractors need some contact with a bank in order to secure terms of purchase. Thus, the change to tractors inevitably involved villagers in new and wider contacts. The use of buses, cars and trucks complements and parallels the use of tractors, in terms of consequences for the villagers; increases in access to secondary education also take villagers outside the village, for the nearest secondary schools are in Market Town, and some of the better ones are in the Capital. Medical care, like education, is not to be had in the village (except in the marginal case of the government-licensed midwife)

the villagers use Market Town for emergency medical care or trivial problems, since there are several undistinguished physicians and a cheap government clinic there. But for anything in the least serious, for pre-natal care, specialists and operations, they go to the capital.

Links with the outside are also apparent from the occupational histories of village household heads. An analysis of the first 100 informants in my census shows that 72% had some history of prolonged work outside the village. Only 28% had always worked only within the village. Of those who had worked outside at some time, over half were working regularly outside the village, or had done so until they stopped work altogether - 39% of the whole category.

There are also links through specific relationships to people in power positions. In 1968 there were close relations between particular villagers to the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Justice, the Commissioner of Cooperatives, the Cyprus Army Commander and the senior civil servants for Nicosia district. There were also links with well placed civil servants in the Land Registry Office, the Forestry Service and the Ministry of Education. The village boasted of having produced two doctors and a dentist, all Nicosia residents, and a newly qualified young lawyer, who was to set up practise and live in Market Town. There were known to me ten primary school teachers and seven secondary school teachers who were usually village residents. A son of the village also held posts in the Cooperative Bank. This list is not exhaustive.

TABLE 16

VILLAGE LINKS TO HIGHLY-PLACED PERSONS 1968-69

<u>Person/Office</u>	<u>Main link to village</u>
Minister of Interior (1960-68)	Patron/client ties, from EOKA relationships.
Minister of Labour	Mainly patron/client ties based on land owned by minister in the village, which his client cares for.
Minister of Justice	'Friendship' based on fact that a young villager works in a government legal office.
Public Prosecutor	<u>Koumbaria</u> (baptismal)
Minister of Agriculture	Mixed ties: Minister from nearby Market Town, and organised the district militia in 1963/4, thus coming into contact with village militia.
Army Commander	Mixed, but basically patron/client ties based on fact that one young villager is an Army Officer.
District Commissioner	The previous <u>mukhtar</u> knew the commissioner well when he was a junior civil servant.
Ministry of Education	Kinship: one villager has a high post in the Ministry.
Forestry Department	As above.
Commissioner of Cooperatives	One villager works for the Commissioner's office, and is essentially his client.
2 doctors 1 dentist 1 lawyer	Kinship; born in village.
Political Party Leader A	<u>Koumbaria</u> , 'friendship' and clientage.
Political Party Leader B	The same.
AKEL (Communist Party)	Formal membership by a few villagers over at least 20 years.

These highly placed persons are not a free resource, available on demand to all villagers. They are the patrons, friends, relatives or employers of particular villagers who therefore have the special power of access to them. This power is not to be diluted by over-generous use, for to do so would dilute both the value of that power, and strain the highly-placed persons. Moreover, in many areas of social relations the villagers are in competition with each other, and such links or contacts offer the owners tactical advantages.

During the 1954-59 period, those young people who were active in EOKA were inevitably involved in relationships which ranged far beyond the village, even though EOKA units were organised on a local basis. After Independence, when there was not only no longer the need for secrecy about EOKA membership but also much to be gained from claiming to have been active, men came to know others from other areas who had served in the organisation, and such knowledge was intensified by political meetings of ex-fighters in the capital. After Independence the introduction of military service insured that young men were brought out of their villages and into contact with other young men from all over the island, whether they were educated or not.

The small scale of the island, as well as good roads, cars and buses, make towns easy to visit; they are entertaining places, and townsmen as well as town life enjoy high prestige. In spite of these facts, the village has not lost its importance to its residents, even though they are involved in many relations with the town. The opinion of fellow-villagers continues to

be a critical point of reference for all who live there.

(v) Membership of the Village

There is one important kind of relationship which is of outstanding importance in any analysis of social and political organisation of the village, and this is common membership in the village itself. For the villagers are constantly affirming the value of common membership, and invoking it as a reason for doing or not doing certain things in relation to others. It is, therefore, important to know how membership is acquired and defined. The problem can best be approached by saying that membership is elastic and contextual. This is true for a number of persons. The vast majority of Kallotes are members of the village in the fullest sense and would be so acknowledged by all other full members. They present no problem. They are all those residents of the village who were born there of a Kallo-born parent. They are recognised as members whether or not they have any property. The recognition of their membership would be shown in the use of the word chorianós (which is Demotic Greek and must be rendered as 'co-villager' or 'fellow-villager') and in the consideration which this common membership would require.

However, other forms of membership can be said to exist in a number of contexts. These memberships would be available to any person married to a person born in the village, whether resident or not; and in some cases to persons born to a Kallo-born parent outside the village, whether resident or not. And if such persons take up residence in the village and have property there, they can for almost all purposes be

regarded as full members of the village. For example, they would be eligible to join the village Co-operative Retail Store, or the village branch of the Agricultural Credit Co-operative. As landowners they would have to pay village taxes and would be eligible to vote for the committees of the two Co-ops and the various other committees of the village - the Irrigation Committee, the Carrot Packing Plant (if regular carrot growers) and the Church Committee. These are the most important formal activities which define village membership. There are, however, other less formal activities and these are sometimes also open to persons with an effective claim but who are no longer residents. For example, there are occasional meetings in the coffee-shop of all adult men for the discussion of current village problems. There is no formal check on who is present or absent, but the presence of any person with no claim to be there would be immediately noticed. On one occasion at such a meeting a man who has not been resident in the village for at least twenty years was present and was invited to comment freely on the course of the discussion. The man who was chairing the meeting was neither a full-time resident in the village nor born there, although his wife is Kallo-born. Both these men are highly educated and considered by the villagers to be influential men whose opinion was worth noting. Both are landowners in the village.

There are, however, ways in which some element of recognition may be withheld from such persons in other contexts. For instance, the ethics of coffee-shop behaviour would demand that any full-time resident of the village should try to

pay for the coffee of the two men just described. This would be at the same time a duty of the resident and an indication of the difference between the men. This payment could be resisted by the non-resident, and by resisting he would in a sense be claiming fullest membership. He could use the implications of this claim to prevent the other man paying, for it would be rude in such a situation to re-emphasise that his membership claim was limited.

The importance of common membership in the village lies in the strong moral value on limiting the scope of conflict between individuals and groups. This is shown most dramatically by the fact that whenever fighting starts between two men in a coffee-shop, bystanders whether related or not to the participants, will separate them. It is also shown in various cases where individuals have been considering violent action against others and this has produced attempts to mediate and dampen the hostility by third parties. It does not mean that persons do not have disputes with co-villagers - they do. But these disputes in the main exhibit certain regularities, including conscious attempts to limit the scope of conflict⁽⁷⁾.

There are many ways in which common membership of the village is stressed. One of the most common and effective is by comparing the behaviour of Kallotes collectively with that of other neighbouring villagers. The people of Kallo describe themselves as lovers of feasting, men who avoid strict accounting, who do not allow political fanaticism to separate them, and who in a crisis all help each other. A favourite example they give is the need of a villager for blood would send all the men of the village in cars to the

hospital 'whether they were related or not, friends and enemies, right and left... Now in Kammari they aren't like that'! The nearest neighbour is Kammari. The people of Kammari are commonly described as proud, strict in their accounts, stiff and formal, and prone to take politics too seriously.

Kammarites have of course their own view of the matter, and it differs in emphasis from that of the Kallotes. Certain things which sound in one village like virtues are seen as taken to extremes and therefore as vices. The Kallo love of feasting and pleasure becomes a proneness to get drunk, quarrelsome and to go around bawling with one's shirt hanging out. The lack of formality the Kallotes pride themselves on becomes a lack of concern for social niceties. The lack of strict accounting which in Kallo is supposed to mean trust between good fellows is seen as a fiscal sloppiness which leads to broken agreements and quarrels.

The emphasis on differences is all the more striking because the villages are only half a mile from each other at their nearest points, and a mile from each other at their centres. Moreover, a number of people in each village have relatives in the other village. But this emphasis on difference has at least a tenuous basis in minor observable differences. For instance, on the occasions that I visited Kammari with or without committee members of Kallo I was struck by the fact that in the coffee-shops several people would tell the waiter to present us with small packets of turkish delight called loukoum. This is a gesture of hospitality. A man may have his coffee paid for by one member of the village and not

wish to drink a second coffee in a short space of time; but he can accept the sweetmeats and put them in his pocket to take away. This custom allows several different people to show both respect and hospitality to visitors at the same time. I have never seen it practised in Kallo. There are even a series of remarks which the Kammari people use to sum up differences, such as "Kammari people value relatives over friends, whilst Kallo people value friends over relatives", and while I did not try to check this, Kallo people have told me that in Kammari there is a tendency to extend affinal terms laterally, and to use certain affinal terms in a formal way which is not found in Kallo.

Since Kammari is nearest to Kallo it is natural that the most detailed comparisons are made with it. But other surrounding villages also have their characteristics. The men of one village, for example, are supposed by Kallotes to be free to the point of dishonour with their remarks about women. They will see a girl walking down the street who may be the cousin of the man standing next to them and still they'll say "What a lovely bbouti (vagina)". They are also represented as being a pack of crooks and thieves. (Kammarites love to point out that a number of men in Kallo have served prison sentences in recent years for theft.) I once asked an informant about a case of incest reported from another village, and his comment was "Yes, they go in for that sort of thing there". Kallotes repeat to outsiders with great readiness that one of the distinctions between Kallo and other villages is that the women of Kallo are all virtuous and the men too, and that there are no cases of adultery. If anyone

has the temerity to mention in hushed tones one of the examples known to everyone in the village over the age of fifteen which involve adultery, he will be told that this was truly the only case known and completely exceptional, whereas in other villages such things are almost a daily occurrence. This attitude was summed up by one elderly man who was reminiscing about the days before the police had cars and motor cycles, when it took an hour at least to get to the village. "I told the police sergeant in Market Town that if he heard a report from Kallo that there was a fight going on, he should send every man he has in the station; because it will be a terrible affair; but that if he hears a report that someone has done something (sexually) dishonourable, don't bother to send anyone at all because it will turn out to be a false report."

This attitude, which Loudon (1970:301) has aptly called an export-model of the speaker's values and behaviour, serves to stress the value of membership in the village. By denying to outsiders that certain kinds of events go on, villagers present a united front. Each is the guardian of the secrets of the others. It is clear that on one level villagers choose to forget or ignore memories of past disputes and do not wish to be reminded of them, particularly by outsiders. This is both because certain disputes have the potential for re-activating conflict, and because by continuing to ignore them one affirms and strengthens existing social relations. In fact, when two people start to quarrel bitterly they may reach (particularly if they are women) a point-of-no-return at which they say to each other 'things which should

not be said and cannot be forgiven', which are usually items of gossip about the sexual behaviour of the antagonist's family. Villagers deny to outsiders that certain kinds of things happen; and they also avoid mentioning these things among themselves. Both these actions, in their different ways, stress the solidarity of co-villagers⁽⁸⁾.

If the village keeps its gossip to itself, this solidarity also implies the power of social control. One of the commonest reasons for not doing something is that if one does it 'they will laugh'. The word yelo means I laugh, or I cheat. The passive yelioumai means, I am taken in, deceived. Villagers are continually wary of doing things which might make people laugh at them, because they are unorthodox. This might include planting a new crop, wearing different clothes, going for a walk with one's fiance, going sea-bathing. It is the very unpredictability of public response which makes people cautious. Yet often the thing which last year was the subject of mirth, this year or next year is the object of fashionable pursuit. Sexual transgressions are the subject most likely to produce mockery; and one man told me how he had refused a large sum of money offered by a man he surprised with the wife of another rather than forego the pleasure of telling the story in the coffee-shops. But anything which causes another person to look a fool will be round the village in a few hours. The knowledge of 'how they will laugh' is one of the surest forms of social control, but it also implies that the actor cares for the opinions of the community⁽⁹⁾. When the matter is trivial, the idea of gossip as social control is elusive. When the matter is

serious, gossip as a sanction must be considered as on the same scale with forms of violence, to which in fact it sometimes leads. Words, unlike other missiles, simply cannot be avoided.

Nicknames play a part in both solidarity and social control. The patronymic system of naming children means that many villagers have the same first name⁽¹⁰⁾. For example, there are at least 18 landowners called Andreas in Kallo; there are at least 30 landowners called Yiórgios; 18 called Yiánnis; 8 called Dimitris; 21 called Charalambos; 14 called Christodoulos. Thus, if anyone calls out "Where's Yiannis?" the answer is almost always "Which Yiannis?", and it is at this point that a nickname will be used. More normally the nickname is used at first instance - Where's The Bat? The Cheese-eater? The Fat Man? The Russian? Gandi? Blackis? The Deceased?. Now it would be possible to answer when asked "Which Yiannis?" by giving the name of Yiannis' father, and replying "Yiannis to (of) Mikali" and indeed this is sometimes done. The problem with using this as a standard procedure is that there are several Mikalis, and several may have sons called Yiannis, so yet another question and answer would be needed if a nickname was not used. Furthermore, the Mikalis in question is probably not thought of as Mikalis, but by his nickname. So an answer using a father's name is more likely to use the nickname or other distinctive name rather than the 'correct' form which would be used in a legal document. A patronymic system employing nicknames has a logic of its own which, once in operation, continues to stress the need for nicknames⁽¹¹⁾.

This analysis of the relation between patronymics and nicknames is supported by two other pieces of evidence. Some men do not have nicknames as such, but their first name is used in a variant form which is understood in the village to apply only to them. For example, the name Andreas is also used in the village in the form Andrákas, but this designates one man only. The name Pávlos is also used in the form Pavláras for one man, Pavlís for another. The name Kyriákos is used in the form Jirýkos for one man, Jýrkos for another. The name Yiánnis appears as Yiannís, Yiannáras, Yannakós, Yiannákis; and the men who bear such variant first names in the village do not generally have nicknames⁽¹²⁾. Similarly, men with extremely distinctive first names often don't have nicknames: there are two Kallo men called Thomás, and context usually suggests which one is being referred to. One of them has a little-used nickname, but the name of his father is also highly distinctive, as is that of the other Thomas. People's occupations often allow them to be distinctively named: Pavlos the Teacher and Pavlos the Lawyer being two examples.

Nicknames sometimes refer to supposed moral qualities of persons. A hard-working man is called Satanás (Satan), because like the Devil he is everywhere at once. He is also called by a nickname dating from the time when people thought of him as a tailor, Velonás, the Needleman. He is almost never referred to by his legal first name, although occasionally by the genitive form of his father's distinctive second name. Rarely is a nickname so sharply defining that it is

considered offensive to use it in the owner's presence. In the main nicknames are freely used by status equals, by high status people to low ones, and if the name is thoroughly harmless by low to high status people. Many nicknames seem to mean nothing at all, to be almost nonsense words, and when asked why they are so called villagers often reply that their playmates give them the name in childhood sometimes because they mispronounced a word in a certain way.

In most situations in the village then people use the nicknames of their fellow villagers; this applies even to women who are often known by the feminine form of their husbands' nicknames. However, if an outsider, especially an official, arrives in the village he will certainly ask for a villager by his formal name, since this will be the only name he has to go by. I have seen many instances where the people the official first met did not recognise the formal name: "Yiannis Mikail? Who's that?" they asked each other. The same thing often happens when the telephone operator is asking for someone. Someone calls out from the kiosk: "They want Yiannis Mikail. Who is it?" "The Rat", someone else shouts back. But when villagers are sitting down in formal committee on matters of some weight, or are debating an issue in the coffee-shop in front of strangers they are very prone to use formal names and make no use at all of nicknames. This seems to be because committee discussions are situations with inherent tension - as will be argued later - and are thus treated with as much formality as possible to act as a buffer in the case of possible disputes. They are also situations in which a set of formal administrative roles are exercised.

Villagers tell a story which is a very good illustration of their own idea about one value of nicknames in defining villagers as against outsiders. I am not at all sure that the story has any basis in actual events; but at the very least it suggests an event the villagers would have liked to occur, and is another useful indicator of their 'export model' of village solidarity. During the Emergency the British soldiers used to come to search the villages. Somehow the British had heard from somewhere that the head of the Kallo Eoka unit was called Moustachas, which means 'man with a moustache' in Demotiki. One day they surrounded the village, and sent in a unit to conduct a house-to-house search. In the coffee-shop they lined everyone up, and said "Where is Moustachas?" Everyone acted dumb; "Moustachas?" they said. "But tell us which Moustachas you mean, for we have many here. Look, there's one over there, and there's another...". And so, the story goes, the EOKA leader was not discovered. "For", people add "there were no traitors in Kallo".

If an outsider comes to the village and asks for someone by his nickname this suggests a degree of familiarity with that person which serves immediately to break the ice. Knowledge of the nickname acts as a visa, giving the user a qualified protected status for a short time, in addition to that which he must inevitably have on entering the village as a stranger; for the same word which is rendered guest in English is also used to render the meaning stranger - xenos.

There is a sense in which common membership of the village comes to mean more on occasions outside the village than inside, and this is complemented by aspects of kinship

behaviour. The issue is the relative scarcity of resources. In the village, a man on good terms with married sisters who needed a meal would not feel free to eat in the house of a female first cousin. If he had no sisters his aunts would be next in order of natural preference, and the accepted rights and duties. In the unlikely event of his having no closer female relative he could eat in the house of a female second cousin, or female first cousin of his parents. However, away from the village close relatives may be scarce or distant. It therefore becomes reasonable to activate more distant relationships. In precisely the same way, if two persons from the same village come into contact away from the village their relationship takes on an additional moral quality, a limited obligation to mutual help in the face of whatever common problems a hostile or at best neutral environment provides. To put this in more concrete terms, all Kallotes know that in the town of Limassol, some two hours drive from the village, there is a man born in the village who is a police sergeant. Anyone from the village who found himself in difficulties in Limassol would, if he had no closer contact who would be likely to help him with his problem, turn to the sergeant for help. This holds for each major town in Cyprus, for Athens and for Saloniki where there are students from the village studying; and for London and the U.K. in general. The existence of co-villagers does not assure help for any particular person at a particular time. But a request for help could not be totally ignored in good conscience, whereas the same request between the same persons in the village might be regarded as eccentric.

The villagers frequently use certain Demotic Greek words which suggest membership in a common category. One is the word synonomatos, meaning 'having the same name as'; another is symmathitis, 'schoolfellow'; the dialect word synotcheros⁽¹³⁾ means 'the same age as'; syntopothitis, 'coming from the same place as'; and synadelfos is the standard word for 'colleague'. I do not think it is fanciful to suggest that the villagers' fondness for such words expresses a wish to bridge the gaps between individual speakers, by stressing similarity.

(vi) The Practical Uses of Village Solidarity

The notion of loyalty to the village, the wish to limit conflict between co-villagers, the stress on membership of the village, considered together, are analytically described as village solidarity. This solidarity is not a free-floating value: it is grounded in other values and interests of the villagers. They believe that land, cash and their children should all be kept within the village, and they usually are. To this extent, then, villagers look inwards, to each other, for the measure of their success and failure. That is to say, in spite of the dependence of the village on processes and institutions of the larger society, and in spite of the continual social change which reduces the isolation of the village, the concern of people^{is} for cooperation with and the good opinion of their fellows continues, and is most sharply at issue in the arrangement of marriage.

I have stressed earlier that the village has continued

to be a place in which most people born also expect to find their marriage partners; the worst social failure is to be unacceptable in the village as a marriage partner with those one regards as social equals. Since most land is transferred at marriage, and people avoid the sale of land as much as they can, most village land stays in village hands. Of 387 holders or former holders of land in the village in 1968, 66 were not village residents or children of the village. But of these 66, 63 were from villages within a five mile radius of Kallo. Only three landowners were neither related to the village, nor from the adjacent villages I have listed. In the 1969-70 tax list, this figure of 66 had dropped to 57; out of the 4,529 donums of irrigated land in the village confines, these outsiders held a total of 278 donums, of 6%.

When Sklyros sold land to a government minister (one of the three persons just mentioned) he was criticised in the village for selling land to an outsider, even though the village might arguably have been gaining a useful connection through the sale.

Marriage partners are sometimes talked of in the same way as land - as resources which while staying within the village are potentially available to all, but lost are lost forever. A Kallo boy tried to marry an attractive Kallo girl. He was one of at least six Kallo boys who asked for her that season, and since he was handsome, with a good white-collar job, he should have stood a good chance. But her father was in debt, and could not afford to build his daughter the normal dowry house. Thus he gave his daughter to a Nicosia man who was wealthy and could afford to build

the house himself. The Kallo suitor a few days later got engaged to a girl in Kammari, the next village, and the birth-place of his mother.

The morning after his engagement I was talking with a respected Kallo man in the coffee-shop. He was very bitter. He swore hard about the engagement. The reason he gave was the loss to Kallo of a good young man. "And there is a shortage of men in our village, so now someone's daughter who could have married Karaolis will have to marry some penniless fellow from the mountains." Often when villagers are talking about such matters as not selling land to outsiders, they take the situation further several generations: "Suppose I sell you a piece of land one day when I'm hard up. Then years later we become affines when my son marries your daughter. Then the land comes back to my children and grandchildren."

Children and land are not the only resources which should be kept in the village - labour and cash and the potential for profit should also be kept in the village as much as possible. Thus, a man building a house finds it convenient to have another villager do some of the building work, and to use a third villager for trucking the materials. Obviously such relations can become subject to strain when one side feels it is being exploited, and in such situations people break off relations. However, there is a strong feeling that if a reliable village man is around and able to perform the service needed it is better to employ him than an outsider. Once again people use future marriage as a rationalisation for this: "Even if he gets rich, perhaps one day a child of mine will marry a child of his". This statement is

made when villagers are pressed to explain why in the context of their competitive individualism they choose to 'help' unrelated co-villagers. The other justification for the action is that greater trust exists between co-villagers than between strangers and better chances of reciprocity. In the matter of selling their oranges most villagers choose one of the four Kallo middle-men to sell to, although they could use middle-men in Market Town or from one of the other nearby villages. Often they are dissatisfied with the bargain they strike, and complain that all the middle-men are crooks. But they do not seek outsiders next year. If all middle-men are crooks, then outsiders are likely to be bigger crooks than those who have to go on living in the same village as the people they cheat. The coin that has solidarity on one face has social control upon the other.

The emphasis on keeping exchanges within the village can be seen in many situations to pay off handsomely. To take one example: during the carrot harvest Kallo imports poor women to work, who arrive from many miles away in buses. During this period Kallo women work, but there is no time of the year when Kallo women travel in buses to work in the villages of others. The furthest a few of them ever go is five miles away to the CITCOP Packing Plant, or the nearby Box Factory. The poorer women of the village are able to work in or near their own village partially because of the prosperity of others in the village. The manager of the Box Factory was for a time a Kallo man and he was always careful to give as many of the available jobs to Kallo men and women as he could, even though the factory was sited in another

village whose people complained about his favouritism.

Another example: in poorer districts of Cyprus men and women who have no land or skill work on the roads or other public works; this work is rough, poorly paid and requires travel, as well as being under the supervision of a foreman. In Kallo few people undertake such work because there is better paid, easier work available within the village, on the land of those white-collar villagers with citrus holdings.

Although the villagers do not think in terms of the cases just outlined, they are aware of their easier position in comparison with other villages. The poor do not enjoy being poor in Kallo, but they see that in certain ways it is better to be poor in Kallo than in the mountains⁽¹⁴⁾. To the observer it is clear that the village, while increasing in population, has also increased in organisational complexity, and the villagers now experience greater economic interdependence than in the period of traditional agriculture. Although agricultural prosperity has produced by imported machines and products - tractors, cars, trucks, diesel pumps - fertilisers, for many other economic transactions the villagers still turn to each other. They buy meat from village butchers; have clothes made by village tailors; sell oranges to village middle-men; employ fellow villagers to work their land; buy and sell land among themselves, and finally expect to marry their children to those of their co-villagers.

(vii) Conclusion

Kinship and affinity, while undoubtedly the main constraints on the actions of individuals, by no means exhaust

the bases for social relationships. Koumbaria, an achieved relationship, in which choice and calculation then led to a strongly institutionalised situation, has marked similarities with aspects of both kinship and affinity, but lacked the divisive potential of competition for property. Koumbari have a low rate of dispute. While for most villagers the relationship is formed between persons of equal status, it can lend itself also to bridging gaps in status relations, and was thus a form of patron-client relation; this is important because koumbaria links certain villagers active in politics to urban politicians or civil servants.

Friendship is not as strongly institutionalised as koumbaria, and it is not in any important way conceptually opposed to kinship, although kin sometimes become jealous or critical of favoured friends who are otherwise unrelated to a person. Villagers recognise and approve of friendship but the ease with which the term is used, loosely covering a wide range of relationships, some of which start from little more than a shared meal, suggest its instability. Like koumbaria, it can exist between equals, and have its basis in mutual trust and reciprocity of like for like; or it can be between those who are not equal, in which case there is thought to be less trust, more calculation, and the exchange of unlike things. Such a form of friendship is called by the villagers 'false friendship', but as with koumbaria between unequals, the moral attitude to it is contextual. The accusation that a man keeps up a relationship not because of liking but in the hope of gain is easily rebutted by the man, who can sincerely say that he loves his friend because his friend is a truly

generous and benevolent person.

The minimal but significant civility of meeting in the coffee-shop, being neighbours, being involved in a work group, being of the same age, being in the same job, all have consequences, either because they bring villagers naturally together or because they present a basis ready to hand for social selection.

The flow of transactions across the boundary of the village has been increasing since traditional times, and although the discussion has so far concentrated on the village, it is essential to recognise that just as kinship and affinity extend outside the village, and link villagers to the towns, so do some instances of koumbaria, friendship, and acquaintanceship from work, school and army service. The Emergency, and the success of EOKA, also added to contacts beyond the village.

From certain points of view - the right to vote, the duty to pay taxes, and generally as a unit of local government - the village is a jural community. But it is also a solidary community: its members are concerned to limit conflict within it, and oppose it conceptually to other communities and to towns. There is an idea that co-villagers have certain common characteristics, and that they are morally superior to people from other villages. This solidarity is both enhanced and exemplified by the use of nicknames in the village, which contrast with the dependence of an outsider on legal names when dealing with villagers.

Solidarity is for something - it has practical uses, and is linked to other values and interests. Villagers wish

to retain land, cash and their children within the village, and they do this quite consciously. The unpredictability of future social relations is often put by the phrase "Suppose I had a son and you had a daughter and we wanted to marry them?". While parents go on being concerned with what other co-villagers think of them and their children, the community looks inwards, in spite of its evident integration with a larger society. Yet the villagers are neither autonomous nor self-sufficient. The resulting tension between inwardness and solidarity on one hand, and dependence on external figures and forces on the other, is the strongest theme in village politics. (15)

Footnotes to Chapter 4

- (1) The instrumental, or asymmetrical, use of koumbaria between villagers and townsmen, was noted by Magda Ohnefalsch Richter (1913:227) and she associates this with share-cropping. She further suggests that certain urban elite families with surnames (as opposed to simple patronymics) had traditional and continuing koumbaria relations with particular peasant families. I came across no instances of this in my fieldwork, but the institution would readily lend itself to such practices.
- (2) Vourros, when necessary, also properly refers to Pontikkos as his koumbaros; but he doesn't find it necessary very often. Wealthy or powerful persons who baptise the children of the poor simply say in explanation "I like to help unfortunate people".
- (3) Some village-born people with university education now use the word for friend about persons of the opposite sex, but this is still open to misunderstanding by villagers.
- (4) In 1968 a labourer doing work on government road repair earned 25/- a day. For eight or ten hours irrigation labour in the village - semi-skilled work - he earned £2 or £3.

- (5) A man forced to go to the house of another in an emergency will stand at the door and shout very loudly for him. This makes it clear that there is nothing surreptitious about his visit.
- (6) Manual work is seen by older men as different from other work, burdensome, distasteful and a mark of low status. Yet the fact that one does it is something to be proud of too: a man is not shamed by working with his hands for his family. A somewhat similar ambivalence is described by Cutileiro (1971:60-63) to the Portuguese word trabalho.
- (7) Spiro (1968:418-420) has tried to produce a formal scheme for discussing the nature of factional conflict, and one variable he uses is 'factional scope'.
- (8) In Frankenberg's (1957) account of a Welsh village, the refusal to share gossip with people defined as outsiders was one of the strongest signs of village solidarity.
- (9) For an extended examination of the moral community as an agent of social control, see Bailey (1971).
- (10) Greek cultural practices in the naming of children have been discussed, among others, by Tavuchis (unpublished paper) and Margaret Kenna (1971). Briefly, in Kallo practices are similar: a couple in turn try to name their children after each of their parents. Children may also be named commonly after their grandparents' siblings; it is very rare to give a child the same first name as the first name of its parent.
- (11) Boissevain (1969) gives a somewhat similar interpretation to data from Malta.
- (12) The aras ending to a name suggests plumpness or bigness; the akis ending suggests being small.
- (13) This is not a dialect form of the word for a partner, synetairos, to which villagers give the standard pronunciation. Rather, I suspect, it comes from kairos, time, year.
- (14) When they ignore the positions of people outside, and compare themselves only with co-villagers, they feel the intense discontent that one would expect.
- (15) In some small communities there is a misleading notion fostered by members of the community that they are in fact highly independent of the larger society, in the face of all contrary facts. This is the theme of the study by Vidich and Bensman (1958).

CHAPTER 5

POWER AND LEADERSHIP

(1) Introduction

To understand the nature of power and leadership in the village, the possibilities offered by formal offices must be examined, and the social characteristics of the men who hold office. Experience in administration of village affairs coincides with being a party political representative. Certain types of men - full-time farmers - tend to dominate village administration, but this does not mean that they monopolise all forms of power. A number of other men exercise power, and sometimes authority, both in the conduct of village affairs and in external matters, who do not hold formal office. One basis for such power and informal leadership is education, which equips a man with certain skills in relation to bureaucratic procedures and contact with government; another basis is through contact with powerful people outside the village - this can arise in any number of ways; a third is through the uses of wealth; and a fourth is through the control of force. Any particular individual may enjoy several such bases of personal power, one, or none. Power is diffused among many villagers. It is not highly concentrated in the hands of any particular kin group, faction, category or political grouping. But nor is it freely and equally available to all men indiscriminately⁽¹⁾.

(ii) Formal Offices

A number of administrative offices exist for the conduct of village affairs; their powers and duties are formally defined by a body of laws, and are thus part of the governmental framework. Some of the officers are elected, others appointed. There are a small number of paid posts, which are attractive for this reason, but rather more posts are unpaid, although travel expenses may in certain cases be recovered. The power resulting from the authority of office is in most cases highly specific and limited. Following M.G. Smith (1956:50) I use power to mean the ability to secure performance of social actions. Village office gives little opportunity in Kallo for direct personal advantage; in a community where gossip and criticism of third parties is always lively, there were few occasions where office holders were accused of furthering their own material ends; one of these is described in chapter 8. Later in this chapter, when the social characteristics of committeemen are discussed, I shall explain the main reason why men take office is that it confers prestige, through the notion of giving service to the village.

The muktar is appointed by the Ministry of the Interior; he is a junior government officer, present in the village, and always a village resident. His main duties are the registration of births and deaths, and the collection with the help of the paid Rural Constable of a number of taxes, a land tax, irrigation tax, slaughter-house tax and school tax⁽²⁾. His signature is needed on a number of documents

required by villagers to certify that they are of a certain age, residential status, wealth category, that they have a certain number of dependents, and that they follow certain occupations. The mukhtar is sought out by visiting officials and dignitaries, and should normally be present if any matter of communal interest is to be discussed. He is paid by a fixed percentage on the volume of cash he collects through legal taxes. It is clear that in a society where literacy and knowledge of civil rights are only now becoming widespread, some muktars are able to use their powers in an arbitrary manner. This certainly occurs in many villages. The mukhtar of Kallo had held the post since 1958, having been assistant to the previous mukhtar. He is widely regarded as honest in his conduct of affairs. But even were he not so, the presence of large numbers of villagers with secondary education would seriously limit his ability to abuse his office.

The mukhtar is assisted by a dimarchos (village functionary), a paid post with specific duties regarding the cleaning of the village streets, the maintenance of lighting, and the supervision of the slaughterhouse used by the village butchers. The mukhtar is also assisted by four azades (singular, azas) and together mukhtar and azades are formally known as the horikeh archeh, the village authorities. The mukhtar has the right to choose his azades, but the government has the right to refuse a man so selected, though it rarely does so. The azades have a general duty to consult with and advise the mukhtar on matters of communal interest, and he may call them when he wishes. In Kallo this proved to be not more frequently than twice a year. The commonest reason for calling on the

azades is the occasion when the mukhtar must revise tax lists. Certain taxes, particularly the school tax, are assessed kata dynamin, according to a man's economic position. To reach their assessment, the village authorities take into account land owned, other sources of income, number and age of dependents, and may take into account exceptional circumstances such as the costs of marrying a daughter or educating a child. The range of school tax payments was from 10/- to £8, most household heads being assessed at about £3, and certain destitute old people being excused. It is obviously an advantage for the mukhtar not to make these decisions alone, since there are always some complaints and requests for reassessment.

The office of mukhtar in most other villages I visited seemed to be held by the wealthier and more articulate villagers, and often they are shown a considerable degree of formal respect by other villagers. In Kallo, most villagers were polite to the mukhtar, and went so far as to address him as "Mr President", but he was not looked on as a powerful man or a particularly dynamic one (except by some of the poorest villagers for whom the smallest administrative act appears to be a major undertaking). He came from a poor family, and had never himself amassed money or land. His predecessor had been wealthy, articulate and widely known outside the village, and was held responsible for having brought certain benefits to the village and to have helped a number of villagers get government posts. This suggests that the qualities of the incumbent are at least as important as the rights and duties of the office.

The Church Committee consisted of five men, elected at three-yearly intervals, who had charge of the small sums of money raised by the Church through the sale of wax tapers during services, and the sums payable to the priest for officiating at services. It was not the subject of any discernible interest among the villagers, and one man had been re-elected without interruption for forty years. There seems to have been no competition for office on this committee at the most recent elections, which took place after I left the village, but complaints reached me from committee members that only a handful of villagers had attended the elections. It would seem, particularly from the conflict over the voting rights of communists discussed in the opening chapter, that at earlier periods the Church committee had attracted more interest.

The Cooperative Store Committee runs the affairs of the store, which was set up in 1954. Householders became members, paying 10/- per share; at that time there were 223 shareholders, who held 679 shares between them. This share capital formed the basis for the store, and the only other resource available to it is credit from merchants. In 1969 the store employed three full-time sales staff, and a full-time secretary responsible to the committee for the overall management of the store. It owned one large modern building, rented another space, and was handling a turnover of some £50,000 a year. Shareholders receive fluctuating dividends of between 2% and 2½% on their annual purchases, and elect the committee members every three years.

The store is then, by village standards, a major enterprise, and all but a handful of household heads are shareholders. Its activities are controlled by a special body of Cooperative Laws, and there are regular audits carried out by employees of the Cooperative Commissioner's office. The Secretary travels twice a week to Nicosia in the store's pick-up van to purchase stock, and the store carries gas stoves, refrigerators, diesel fuel, as well as all kinds of clothes and foodstuffs. The main activities of the committee in their weekly meetings are to carry villagers' comments on stocks and prices to the Secretary, to oversee the general management, and to discuss and decide on new appointments, as well as the salaries of existing employees. The committee, acting on information supplied by the Secretary, also agrees on the annual dividend, and new investment.

The Credit Cooperative has a paid secretary, and a four man management committee. On page in the first chapter I discussed the rise in membership from its inception in 1923. Its main functions are to act as a low-interest source of short-term loans for agricultural activities, and it also supplies bulk fertiliser to villagers at prices competitive with those of private merchants. Its third activity is to act as a local savings bank for villagers with spare cash, and village girls who take paid work, saving for their dowries, have started to use it for this purpose. They now receive 6% on deposits, although five years ago it was only 4%.

The main work of the committee is to meet, normally every week, to decide on applications for new loans, and to check on outstanding loans to see that they are being paid

off in time. The limits on unsecured loans are set by the Cooperative Credit Bank, which is the higher administrative unit for the village branches. The Bank decides on a limit by estimating the return on agricultural production in a particular village. In 1968 in some poor villages the limit was £150, but at this time in Kallo it was £500, which in 1970 rose to £750, which gives an idea of the relative economic standing of the village. The rate of interest on unsecured loans in 1968 was 7%. In 1970 there were 465 members; the reason that there were half again as many members as household heads is that married women who legally own land may join, thus increasing the borrowing power of their households.

In making its decisions the committee tries to foresee the difficulties a man might have in repaying a loan. The rationale given by members for their activities is that they must protect individuals from themselves, and the organisation from exploitation. Since, they argue, in the village everyone knows a good deal about everyone else's business, they are in a good position to know what a man should and should not be able to take on. They argue that the problems faced by the head of a household are fairly similar, and that they all have experience of meeting them. Everyone is aware that occasionally a man seeks a loan ostensibly for agricultural purposes, which he intends to use for building a dowry house for his daughter. I saw such cases come up in meetings. The decision tended to go on whether the man involved would be able to keep out of financial difficulties. No one on the committee was bothered by the building of a dowry house, since it was a problem they could all imagine facing. In their work

the committee are in fact continually making assessments of their co-villagers, and this assessment differs from that made by the horikeh archeh about tax ratings, for it involves some measure of prediction, whereas the tax rating is current or retrospective.

The Carrot and Potato Association was set up in 1960 as a producers' cooperative which organises the local washing, packing and, through its national administrative unit, the marketing of members' produce. It is village-based, and in 1964 the villagers built - at a cost of £3,000 - a packing house. The union has two committees of villagers, who are elected by members; one committee is the executive, and the other a supervisory committee which meets less frequently. The task of the executive is to manage the packing house, which includes the fixing of hourly wage rates for those women who work there during the short but hectic period when carrots and potatoes are harvested (April - June), and the drawing up of schedules to determine the order in which members' produce can be handled. This last item is the occasional cause of friction since members are extremely anxious about the speed with which carrots can deteriorate in the fields, and there is great pressure to get produce washed, packed and trucked to the port as quickly as possible. In such an atmosphere, charges of favouritism or minor injustice are sometimes made, and here the committee need a good deal of tact and authority to deal with such crises. As with the other committees mentioned, while the actual work calls for responsibility in decisions over one's fellow villagers' affairs, there seems relatively little scope for personal gain, and there were very

few adverse comments made about the way committee members handled their duties which survived the day of the particular occurrence. In chapter eight I deal at length with events accompanying election to the committees of the Carrot Union, but here it is enough to note that the elections were contested on party political grounds, rather than on previous performance in office or personal conduct.

The Irrigation Committee has been in existence since before 1940 and its main duty is the use of the tax money paid by the villagers at the rate in 1968 of 10/- per donum on the 4,529 donums of irrigated land within the village area. This yields an annual budget of around £2,500, which is currently spent in two ways. Existing irrigation channels must be cleaned out twice a year and this is done by paid labour from among the poorer or older men in the village. Secondly, under a system of matching grants from the government, new irrigation channels are being built, of concrete. Concrete channels save water loss by seepage and by evaporation, both serious problems with the slower earth channels. But the concrete channels are expensive and there is a large area of village land still without concrete channels. The Committee also has the duty of representing the village's interest in any dispute over water use or rights with other villages, towns or the government. During my fieldwork the Committee, and those of several neighbouring villages, became involved in some special activities regarding the representation of village interests to the central government, and these are the object of extended analysis in chapter nine.

This description of formal office in the village raises the question of why should men seek office at all. They stand to gain little or nothing financially; the authority of office is limited, and does not ramify outwards into other affairs, except in the case of the few men who hold several offices, when a notion arises that they are good people to ask the opinions of on a range of subjects. The chief reason why men accept office - few show active signs of seeking it - is that it is a mark of general village approval. In a competitive, individualistic community, where it is standard practise to cast doubt on the motives of others, election to village office shows a qualified trust. I do not wish to make too much of this, because the low turn-out at the elections I saw weakens such an interpretation: it could equally well be argued that men are elected through the apathy of the village at large, and the sycophancy of their particular cronies. I reject this explanation on the simple grounds that it goes against what I saw. Some honour can be had by holding office; that it can also be lost serves to dignify the holders who succeed.

(iii) The Characteristics of Office-Holders

In this section I shall consider the social characteristics of the persons who hold office in village economic organisations. The simplest facts about them are that they do not include women, unmarried men or illiterates. Furthermore, Tables 17 and 18 suggest that men whose main occupation is farming dominate the committees and these have already been shown to be men with substantial land holdings. Since, among married household heads alone there are over 300 men who could

TABLE 17

OVERLAPPING LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE VILLAGE

<u>Sklyros</u>	i)	Carrot Association Committee
	ii)	Secretary, Co-op Store
	iii)	Irrigation Committee (resigned 1968)
	iv)	Co-ordinating Committee
	v)	Village representative on 1964 School Committee, Market Town
	vi)	AKEL village committee
	vii)	Credit Co-op Committee
<u>Patris</u>	i)	<u>Azas</u> (appointed)
	ii)	Co-op Store Committee
	iii)	Carrot Association Committee
	iv)	Irrigation Committee
	v)	PEK village representative
	vi)	Credit Co-op Committee
<u>Vourros</u>	i)	Attempted to organise Graduates Club, 1962
	ii)	Co-ordinating Committee (1964)
	iii)	Co-op Store Committee (1969)
	iv)	CITCOP Committee (1969)
	v)	Advisory Committee (1969)
(f)	i)	Church Committee
	ii)	Co-op Store Committee
	iii)	Credit Co-op Committee
(g)	i)	Church Committee
	ii)	Irrigation Committee
(h)	i)	<u>Azas</u> (appointed)
	ii)	Co-op Store Committee
(i)	i)	<u>Azas</u> (appointed)
	ii)	Irrigation Committee
(j)	i)	Irrigation Committee
	ii)	Carrot Association Committee
(k)	i)	Irrigation Committee
	ii)	Credit Co-op Committee

TABLE 18

KALLO COMMITTEEMEN 1968-1969

- 1) Irrigation Committee 1967/68 Irrigation Committee 1968/69

Old Sklyros - farmer	Patris - farmer
Sklyros - farmer	Glykis - farmer
Tangos - farmer	Yirgios - farmer
Kirkos - farmer	Kirkos - farmer
Kanellos - farmer	Mangaras - farmer

- 2) Cooperative Retail Shop 1968

Secretary: Sklyros - farmer (paid)

Tsingounis - farmer

Patris - farmer

Kitistis - farmer

Akis - bulldozer driver

- 3) Cooperative Credit Society 1968

Secretary: G. Fanos - ex-shoemaker (paid)

Patris - farmer

Sklyros - farmer

Borris - farmer

Kirnos - farmer

Akis - bulldozer driver

- 4) Horikeh Arkeh (Village Leadership) 1968

azas: Glykis - farmer

azas: Patris - farmer

azas: Akros - farmer

azas: Tsingounis - farmer

- 5) Carrot & Potato Union (re-elected uncontested for 3rd time, 1969)
Executive Committee

Patris - farmer
Tsingounis - farmer
Kanellos - farmer
Tangos - farmer
Sklyros - farmer

stand for office in most cases, the reasons why a few full-time farmers dominate the committees must be examined.

The landless men and those with little land do not obtain office for a number of reasons. They need all their time and energy to support their families. But, more important, they are inhibited by their own view of their status as low from seeking acceptance in the form of office which, they rightly suspect, will be denied them. For in the values of the village, administrative competence begins at home, with the management of the affairs of the domestic group. If a man has not succeeded in securing his family's positions through the acquisition of land, or a well-paid job, then he is unlikely to be much use in the handling of village affairs.

Government teachers and civil servants might be expected to take office, but they do not. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the existence of laws which, while meant to apply to party politics, are widely interpreted to apply to village administration as well, which appear to prohibit both these categories of people. Secondly, work on these committees, as currently composed, requires close contact and cooperation with farmers, which to some extent cuts across the notions of superior status which men with secondary education hold. Thirdly, there is the possibility that farmers themselves will be unwilling to trust management of those committees chiefly concerned with farming to non-farmers. In later chapters I discuss a number of situations in which the relation of a person's education to his qualification for office became lively issues. Here, I wish to do no more than stress the ambiguous social position of educated men in village

affairs - they hold values which distance them from farmers, they often comment on the 'backwardness' of villagers, but do not participate in the main in village administration.

A third possible category of persons who might seek office are merchants and middle-men, of whom there are five full-time resident in the village. Not one had served in recent years on village committees; they rarely attended elections, nor were they proposed for office. The only occasion on which a merchant was entrusted with village business - the purchase of arms for a village militia (see chapter eight) it turned out badly. To some extent the explanation for their not holding office must lie in the notion villagers have that all merchants are klephtes 'crooks' (literally thieves). But another reason, which applies to the merchants, the white-collar workers and landless men and craftsmen is that all these categories tend to spend much of the day away from the village, whereas the full-time farmers, while often out in the fields, are available, and come in sometimes for meals. This is only a partial explanation since committee meetings take place often on Sunday mornings; but the activities of members are not confined to such meetings. The general availability of committee men to hear complaints, or merely to keep an eye on things, means that the full-time farmers are from this point of view most suitable.

I have pointed out that full-time farmers hold most of the administrative offices in the village, and have given reasons why other categories do not do so; I have not meant to suggest that the farmers as a group seek either to monopolise these posts, or to run the affairs of the village after their

own interests. It can be argued that in the traditional village, land ownership was the chief concern of the village, and that prestige within the village still continues to go with those activities which are directly related to the central activity of the village. The farmers continue to see such offices as the appropriate forum for achieving prestige. That the teachers and white-collar workers remain, for a number of reasons, aloof from these committees only serves to emphasise the extent to which they face two ways - they are more involved in a system of evaluation which has its roots in the larger society. But, as will be clear in later chapters, the values implicit in the attitudes of teachers to village administration were undergoing some change.

There are a number of other characteristics normally possessed by most committeemen. These include the ability to speak well in public, a reputation for honesty or responsibility, and a proven ability to use physical force. Since these qualities are also those normally associated with powerful or important men in general, and with political party leaders in the village in general, I shall consider them in a little more detail.

Speaking well has several aspects. One is speaking forcefully and persuasively. The villagers use the Demotiki word syzito which means 'I discuss' in a way which means 'I have an argument with'; they use the abstract noun syzitis to mean argument verging on serious disagreement. The ethos of debate in the village is well expressed in this assimilation of the moderate meaning to the more harsh one. Committeemen need to be able to argue forcefully in the free-for-all exchanges

of coffee-shop debate, to put across their point of view, and to silence others by persuasion or sheer energy.

However, another aspect to speaking well involves mastery of a more educated form of Greek than village dialect, horkadica (Demotiki, horiadika), for this is considered appropriate when dealing with officials, even though the officials themselves know how to use village dialect. On this point it must be stressed that not all the words now needed to conduct village business exist in dialect, but this is not the whole problem - it is not simply a matter of knowing Demotiki words, but a whole speaking style which is at issue. In addition, the ability to speak and understand Demotiki must be matched by some ability to read it, and to handle official documents.

The third side of speaking well involves the restraint appropriate to behaviour in committee. Here, or with officials, the bold, declamatory and aggressive way of coffee-shop debate is not appropriate. A fellow committeeman should not be interrupted or shouted down, but allowed to have his say. His points should then be taken up politely and discussed. It is not appropriate to use nicknames in committee, or to swear. One does not even say Ma ise pellos, 'are you mad?' to express disagreement⁽³⁾.

A reputation for honesty is hard to maintain. I mentioned in the last chapter that the village word for to cheat is synonymous with the word to laugh at - yelo. In the main, villagers seem to admire cunning and sharp practice, at a distance. Yet, as has been observed elsewhere (Davis: 1969),

accompanying suspicion and admiration for the man without scruples is a readiness to make verbal agreements with reliable men to which resources are committed. Within the village, each adult has what is in effect a credit rating for reliability: if he gives his word, to what extent can he be relied on? Men who are reliable in this respect are known as tímios, honest; sovarós, serious; or varetós, weighty (as opposed to light-weights). No man is expected to be reliable to the point of being palavós, gullible; for there are circumstances in which any honest man may break his word. I shall try to give the measure of this problem with a single example: the secretary of the Coop Store found at the end of the year that he was entitled to the highest dividend, since he had bought more at the store than anyone else; this was not surprising, since as founder of the store and a man ideologically committed to the Cooperative movement, he does all his buying there whenever possible. However, he explained to me that he would reduce the amount of dividend due to him "Because some people in the village are bound to say, without a doubt the secretary must be stealing from the till, or else how could he obtain such a high dividend?" In order to preserve his reputation for honesty, he was claiming less than his due, to give no grounds for gossip. In the face of the suspicion accompanying all acts in the public domain, and the opportunistic gossip of enemies, a man with an eye to his good name must keep his wits about him.

The third characteristic of committeemen is confined to a few of them, the most prominent ones. This is that they have been seen to employ force effectively. It so happens

that the two men who have been acknowledged as leaders of the right and left wing in the village over the last twenty years have both on several occasions beaten up other men. Patris has on three occasions beaten up men for having spoken to his wife and daughters, or otherwise annoyed them. Sklyros has had one similar episode, as well as several fights with men over personal insults and economic disagreements. There is little doubt that since they are known to be ready to defend themselves, other men less willing or able to do so treat them with deference.

One illustration will help to show the role of force in the administration of the village. During the intercommunal disturbances of 1964 the village formed a militia to guard against a surprise attack by Turkish forces. One night a militia man fired a gun for no reason, and thus alarmed the village. He was called before the special Coordinating Committee which the village had formed to deal with problems arising from militia duty (discussed more fully in chapter 8). Vourros, a schoolteacher on this committee, was lecturing the man who had fired, on his lack of responsibility, but he truculently questioned the teacher's right to criticise him at all. At this point Tangos, another committeeman, one of the leading leftists and known to be of proven toughness (see page 42, chapter 3) leaned across and said to the unrepentant militia man "Do what he tells you and treat him with respect or I'll deal with you". This was enough to produce instant compliance. Vourros himself who told me this story deplored this aspect of village life, even though he was one of the few educated men in the village who was respected by the villagers for

interest in public affairs. He believed for a long time - or claimed to believe - that the villagers respected physical toughness more than education.

(iv) Other Bases of Power

These, then, are the main opportunities provided by formal office for individuals to take positions of leadership in village affairs; such office in itself is the basis for only limited and specific power. There are other bases for power which do not depend on holding formal office. Each has already been introduced in preceding material, so here I shall briefly indicate the extent to which education, wealth, personal contacts with powerful people, and readiness to use force produce power in the village. Empirically, a person may possess several such bases together, but for the sake of clarity they will be discussed separately.

Education was discussed in chapter 2; its importance for the analysis of power is that highly educated men have automatic high status. Doctors, lawyers and senior civil servants enjoy the most prestige, and villagers assume them to be rich unless proved not to be. Such professional men have power because of their status, but also because of contacts they made at earlier stages of their education and careers. These contacts with other high status and powerful persons in the capital, as well as the command of bureaucratic skills which their advanced education gives are important in dealing with the urban elite on an equal footing, and for securing all kinds of favours through personal intervention in decision-making. A doctor, for example, need show deference to very

few people in Cyprus, and most people defer to him. Because of this he can get many things done, and this means that villagers are prepared to become his clients or dependents. A doctor or a lawyer can waive fees as a favour; a civil servant can waive 'red tape' or normal regulations. Among its sons the village currently boasts one doctor, one dentist, one lawyer, and two very senior civil servants, all urban residents but all with land and kin in the village.

Wealth also acts as a basis for power. Rich men can acquire friends and dependents in many ways: by gifts, personal loans, the guarantee of a bank loan, or ostentatious use of their wealth in entertainment. In the village a common idiom used to describe how a man influences others is to say taizi tous 'he is feeding them'. An old man described to me how he thought the murderers of his brother had managed to escape punishment in the 1920's. "They fed the policemen, who destroyed the evidence and covered up for them...". There is no need of a vulgar Freudianism to see how in traditional peasant societies the notion of feeding someone expressed the creating of dependence. Scarcity of food gave force to the image. Today most men are not hungry yet the word still has force for what is now at stake is not nourishment but luxury. Rich men today do not merely feed people, they feast them. During my fieldwork the muktar of a neighbouring village invited a powerful minister to baptise his grandson. He gave a feast for over a hundred people at which his clients roasted the meat and served the food and drink, which included whisky. This feast cost several hundred pounds, but the muktar is rich.

He and the minister belong to the same political party, and the muktar's office depends on the will of the minister, who could not have helped noticing the numbers of people at the feast capable of voting. It is not that a meal buys a vote (votes where bought cost a good deal more than a meal) but rather that large feasts create, for those who give them, an atmosphere of power, generosity and the ability to patronise.

The rich are powerful for other reasons; economic independence is the goal of all household heads, and is firmly supported by the strong awareness of the difference between being one's own man, and being dependent on another. But wealth carries other overtones: the rich can behave unpredictably, in a dangerous sense. For a man's death can be bought by paying £300 or £500 to someone ready to kill him. In one case which came to my attention from another village, a man's daughter was seduced and led into prostitution. The man wished to be revenged on her seducer and paid money to someone from Kallo who shot him. In general, villagers are very careful not to make enemies of the rich. For example, the richest man in Kallo made his money through selling vehicles. His father was a shepherd, and he himself when young had a flock. He has had little education, no refinement, and swears heavily in normal conversation. He brings his little son to the coffee-shop, and the son calls adult men poushtis (passive homosexual), conduct which would get any other village child at least a boxed ear. But this child is tolerated, and his father often called kyrie (a title not usually accorded to men unless they have finished Gymnasium). Behind his back he is called less pleasant things, but few people are willing

openly to antagonise him.

Contact with powerful people is in itself a basis of power, as the last example suggests. Villagers assume the ties between the mukhtar and the minister give the mukhtar a certain power to achieve his goals. In an earlier example (see Ch. 3, page 22) I related how some villagers related to another mukhtar persuaded him to intervene on their behalf in a police prosecution. The range of contacts available to Kallo villagers by their known links to highly placed persons was discussed in the last chapter and need not be repeated here. The point of interest is that where a relation of kinship, friendship or clientage already exists or can be created a villager may get power from interaction with powerful men. Power is almost contagious. This does not depend on the villager's wealth or education, but more on his individual skill as a social entrepreneur, or simply on the opportunities afforded by his work. One powerful man in the village, a political activist, is a truck-driver but also an excellent conversationalist; this combination allows him to keep up an important relationship with a national political leader in the capital, who although not in the civil service or political office, intervened to help the driver get an import licence for a second-hand truck, when this request had already been ignored by a powerful minister. Later the driver became the district political agent for this politician, and I describe his vigorous activity on his patron's behalf during an electoral campaign in chapter 11.

Lastly, readiness to use force is a basis for power, not only in the case of office-holders - who in a broad sense

might be thought of as acting legitimately - but in the case of any individual who chooses to do so and take the consequences. The example of the man who avenged his daughter is extreme, but it is such rare and dramatic events which are the keystone of the honour-and-shame values concerning female chastity. Men known as ready to use force - fists, chairs, knives or guns - when opposed or insulted, are treated with considerable caution, and it is enough for a man to have violent friends to win him some measure of deference from his fellows.

Force, like contact with powerful men, is to some extent a free-floating basis of power, not specifically linked to positions, wealth or other attributes⁽⁴⁾. This is particularly likely to be the case in a period when armed insurrection has assumed the important propaganda position that it did in the Independence Struggle. Traditionally, when law was uncertain it was perhaps essential to be able to give a good account of oneself if rights were to be protected; now, the law is less uncertain but still not certain enough. Unpunished killings have occurred sufficiently frequently in recent memory to be a possible threat. On top of this, villagers believe that a killer with good connections can arrange matters with high police officials so that he gets off.

In closing this section, I present a case which shows how power is available to those with good connections and the wits to use them. The interest in this situation is less in what actually happened, but the way those involved went about getting what they wanted.

D. Fanou graduated from Gymnasium and went to work for a business firm in the capital; later he changed jobs and went to work for the Department of Cooperatives. He travelled the island and met people. He came to the attention of the editor of a pro-government newspaper, Koshis, who saw in him a useful contact, and asked Fanou to arrange the distribution of his paper in the village. Fanou did this, by getting a poor man to sell the paper on commission.

Some time later, Ploutis, a wealthy merchant in the village, came under police suspicion for black market with the Turks, in their enclaves. Ploutis became anxious at the line of inquiry and came to Fanou for help. Fanou duly went to see Koshis, who was a close friend of the Minister of the Interior, and told him that his friend Fanou had strongly supported EOKA in a number of ways, and that he was influential in the village, from a large family with many friends, and able to muster 'fifty votes'. Koshis said he would speak to the Minister about the case. No further action was taken against Fanou. It is in the nature of such cases that I cannot be sure the case was dropped through Koshis' intercession. Certainly that is what Fanou wished Ploutis to believe.

The behaviour here of Ploutis is thoroughly characteristic of villagers in dealing with agents of the larger society. If faced with a problem, their initial response is invariably to seek out someone known to have a personal relationship with a person relevant to solution of the problem.

(v) Summary

The formal leadership roles presented by a number of administrative committees present limited opportunities for the exercise of power and authority. Men who hold office through election have achieved a limited sign of trust from others in the community. They cannot normally turn office into wealth, or through it control the behaviour of others in areas unrelated to the office. However, a few men hold several

offices either concurrently or serially. These men may develop a social reputation for being well-informed and influential and, through their contacts and knowledge, achieve greater general power and authority.

Office-holders are nearly all full-time farmers, or men with solid land holdings. No unskilled labourers or civil servants are office holders, only one (private) teacher, and no merchants or business men. Office-holders are also able to speak well, that is, persuasively, with some mastery of Demotiki, and a measure of self-restraint; they should have a reputation for honesty and seriousness; and they have used force effectively (though whether this is consciously appreciated by other villagers or not I do not know); however, in general men able to stand up for themselves physically are respected on this account.

Other bases of power in the village include education, wealth, personal links with powerful people, and readiness to use force may all be bases of the exercise of power independently of any formal office held. When several of these bases co-exist in the same person, power tends to increase.

Although full-time farmers have a near monopoly of elective office in the village, this does not mean that they become any kind of power elite. Power is held by other categories of people in the village, and influence and authority are similarly dispersed. Because of their access to powerful people in towns, white collar workers and others who work outside the village have a special role to play, in intervening in administrative or other actions on behalf of their fellow villagers.

I have deliberately limited illustrations of the general points made here because some material has been cited in earlier chapters, and later chapters will contain ample illustrations.

Footnotes to Chapter 5

- (1) Drooglegver Fortuijn (unpublished paper) comes to a somewhat similar conclusion about power in the village he studied near Thessaloniki, and I have benefitted from his analysis. He also concludes that aspirations for leadership are difficult to explain in terms of direct benefits, and that there was little misuse of community funds.
- (2) He should also report any illegal acts to the police, and call on them when needed to maintain law and order in the village.
- (3) In a later chapter I describe the ironic situation in which the successful nationalist political leader Sampson, who gives speeches the villagers often find both moving and meaningful, is nevertheless said 'not to know how to speak'. This seems to have two reasons. One is that he uses a form of Demotiki which also includes Cypriot pronunciation and dialect words. This is considered ill-educated, and although he finished Gymnasium, and his mother was a poet, he is often called illiterate by villagers. The other point is that when speaking he gets emotional, sometimes weeps or falters, and speaks in an impromptu, unstructured way. This apparent lack of self-control - in sharp contrast to the marbled prose of the paper speeches his rivals produce - is the other thing which causes villagers and townsmen alike to downgrade him. Populism cannot express itself in ordinary speech and succeed; but perhaps this is not only true for Cypriot villagers.
- (4) It is perhaps for similar reasons that a pistol among members of the American underworld was sometimes called an 'equaliser' - because its power is unrelated to any other social attribute than the will to use it, thus putting the rich or strong on the same level as the poor and weak.

CHAPTER 6

THE SCOPE OF POLITICS IN THE VILLAGE

(i) Introduction

Having discussed the bases for leadership and power in the village in general, and indicated the nature of village administration, I wish now to consider the scope of politics in the village. This is a different matter from 'village politics', a phrase which begs precisely the questions I wish to raise here. One approach pioneered by F.G. Bailey (1963, 1969) identifies two different forms of political contest, a village contest and a national contest, with different prizes and rules but overlapping personnel. While this distinction is valuable, and corresponds to certain empirical situations, the relation between the two contests is one for empirical investigation and it is incorrect to assume a priori that they are analytically discrete.

The issue is best posed by the problem of how far are the labels 'left' and 'right' used by villagers linked to either national ideologies or institutions which can be seen to influence village behaviour? I shall not come to any very weighty conclusions about this, except to say that while the problem is not solved here, it is set out in such a way that it can be seen to be substantive, and not trivial. Holding values about politics, and about the way the world should be governed, need not analytically be opposed to seeking concrete benefits for oneself and one's dependents, for the two activities often go together. The problem can be made to disappear by using the

neutral term 'alignment' to describe those people in the village who seem to hold views about politics, and act by these views. But the disappearance is more apparent than real.

It will be helpful to distinguish at the outset between those villagers who are leaders, those who are followers, and those who most of the time are little more than spectators. Leaders tend to take dominant positions not only in the administrative committees but also in party politics. They are the men most likely to be active, outspoken, and to use developed arguments about government, politics and society in their arguments and justifications.

Followers sometimes take positions of loyalty to a leader, local or national, or to a party; but they may conceal their views. Followers are more likely to change positions over time and, among the nationalists, tend to express their loyalties more in terms of individuals than of ideas, parties or programmes. They are ready, on occasions, to act on the instructions of leaders.

Spectators are those who avoid participation and the expression of open views. They may be persuaded at certain times, such as elections, to declare themselves for someone, but they may prefer to keep this quiet. They tend to insist that they have no political views, or that they 'follow their self-interest'. They are thought of by leaders as 'indifferent' or 'backward', but also they are thought of as people who can be brought politically into line by favours, by appeals to ties of kinship or friendship, or by the manipulation of greed or fear.

(ii) The Values of Right and Left

Those men who describe themselves as rightists, or nationalists, normally claim to be church-going Christians who believe in God, who are as Greeks ready to die for their fatherland, who are in some measure anti-communist, and who wish Enosis with Greece. A few have more developed ideas to do with the right to private property and individual initiative. They also have developed ideas about the left, whom they lump together fairly indiscriminately as communists. They charge the left with being atheists, with caring more for the USSR than for Greece, and being ready to put that country's interests first. In debate the main resource that the right claim is to speak for the nation and for all nationalists, and to be the grouping of those who truly love their country and have, through EOKA's struggle, made sacrifices for it. They go further and charge the left with being dishonest and, potentially or actually, traitors. No leftist, they argue, can be a good Greek nationalist. They are often able to give accounts of major crises in the history of the USSR, but in simplified form, to the discredit of communism.

The left claim to be the party of ordinary working people and use the word laos, people, and its derivatives to express this claim. They also claim to be progressive, in the sense of accepting new ideas in education, technology, agriculture. They rarely make any remarks about belief in God, but they are prone to criticise the Church for having much property, for using it to support the unproductive priesthood and for being against progress. In passing, it

is worth remarking that to my knowledge no leftists in the village, and very few in Cyprus, fail to perform the church ceremonies for baptism, marriage and burial. Leftists are heavily critical of the USA and strong verbal supporters of the USSR. They support the cooperative movement in its various manifestations, and some speak wistfully about agricultural collectives, but apart from a few experimental collectives started in the late 1940's there have been no attempts by leftists to collectivise land in Cyprus.

The left attempt to monopolise the resource of speaking for The Masses, in the same way that the right try to monopolise The Nation, to ethnos⁽¹⁾. Leftists often assert that they are as good nationalists as the right, and rightists that they have the interests of ordinary people as much at heart as the left. Leftists try to rebut the charge of atheism by asserting that many rightists are insincere Christians. They explain many aspects of social life by broad concepts of the influence of the environment. For example, Sklyros, whose father 'taught him to gamble', and who in his youth was a keen gambler, was furious when his son started to gamble. Although such behaviour in the village is commonly explained by reference to hereditary factors, Sklyros, while asking listeners if they thought this was possible, was firm in his own belief that an environment which tolerated gambling and even approved it was the main reason his own son gambled. He argued that heredity couldn't be a satisfactory explanation of why he himself had once gambled - for he had managed to overcome the habit! Leftists often speak of the 'backwardness' of the village and appear to think that as social development takes place their party

will get stronger. This gives some of the point to the label they give the right of 'reactionary'. The other favourite pair of oppositions used by the left is to describe themselves as democrats, the rightists as fascists.

These basic values are expressed in coffee-shop debate, and reinforced through reading newspapers. Leaders and active supporters subscribe to newspapers and even take them home for their families' benefit; they are willing to weigh in during public discussion. Support can also be expressed by trade union membership, since both left and right have their own unions, by support for national sports teams, and even in consumption patterns and business relationships. Certain villages - though not Kallo - have two soccer teams, one left and one right, and coffee-shops at which only the supporters of one party are welcome, and the walls of which are festooned with the symbols of party loyalty.

Some examples of political preference in consumption are worth remarking. Keen leftists try to support leftist cooperatives and buy their products. They will drink the range of brandy produced by LOEL, the left-wing cooperative in preference to HajiPavlou, Peristiany, or other private enterprise brands. The Co-op Store stocks a tinned pork from the Chinese People's Republic, as well as brands from non-communist European countries and the Commonwealth. Tinned pork is a favourite lunch dish in the village, and I have heard the leftist leader tell one of his children "Go to the Co-op and get a tin of pork - you know, the Chinese one". This sort of preference is not a very serious matter, nor is the joking which goes on when a group of men sit down to order brandy, and

one will suggest they drink 'a socialist' one. Russian 'Lyto' brand condensed milk is bought by some leftists, although their wives insist that for young babies the Cypriot 'Gala Vlachas' is healthier, and they get their way. It is, after all, the same condensed milk their mothers used. Sklyros, in a spirit of fun, pointed out to me that analysis of the Russian brand, as shown on its label, gave higher values for sugar, fat and vitamins than the Cypriot brand. But at least he had taken the trouble to look.

The first Kallo soccer team was started in the 1920's, and was not political in tone. It lapsed. In the late 1940's there was another team in the village, and this was leftist; this was the high-water mark of leftist influence in the village and in the island. The nationalist right tried to form a rival team, but found the left had got most of the good players, so that they couldn't field a good enough team, so they stopped. The leftist team seems to have lapsed about the time of the start of EOKA's campaign. In 1968 there was another team in Kallo which seemed to be without political complexion, and had young men of both persuasions in it. There was no left-wing youth club in evidence in the village at this time; the nationalist club, THOI, seemed to admit to its clubroom the sons of leftists quite readily, although on one occasion a strongly nationalist schoolteacher, on the club's supervisory committee, started rebuking the son of a leftist for smoking in it, and said 'If your father wasn't a communist you wouldn't behave so badly'. But this did not start any general move to restrict the sons of leftists, and other young men laughed at the teacher behind his back.

My data are not adequate to decide if there is a statistically significant tendency for the firm rightists and leftists to prevent their children marrying. The problem of collecting and classification of such data is complicated by the following issues: some young men do not take a political position until after marriage, if at all; others conceal their views (leftists particularly) for fear that their military service will be more unpleasant if they are known as very strong nationalists or leftists; yet others are in process of changing their positions. There is also the problem of the relation between a father's position, and that of his son. Many villagers speak as if families are politically solidary, and some indeed are, but just as many are not. The EOKA campaign in particular made the nationalist cause more attractive to young men, and leftists sometimes complain that their sons have 'gone over to the rightists because of EOKA'. Lastly in this list of complications, it is not entirely clear if the critical relationship would be father/son, or wife's father/daughter's husband, or even that between the two fathers.

The villagers themselves usually denied that politics would be decisive in arranging a match, except between 'fanatics'. This view is supported by a few striking cases which came to my attention. During my fieldwork, a daughter of Old Tsingounis, for many years a leading right-wing nationalist, an azas, a Co-op Shop Committeeman, and linked by marriage to several important rightists, was engaged to a son of a neighbour who is considered one of the firm and 'ideological' communists. The two fathers have in common

that they are among the largest landowners in the village. No one seemed to think this match was remarkable.

Another example: Borris is a man who has represented the left on several committees, and in 1969 was on the committee of the Credit Society. Left leaders, of whom he is virtually one, regard him as politically reliable. He allowed his daughter, the second of seven children, to get engaged to a young farmer of strong nationalist views, and quite clearly associated with what at the national level is the anti-communist right wing⁽²⁾.

A third example may show some of the complexities of the problem. The second most respected leftist in the village, Tangos, is married to another daughter of Old Tsingounis. I asked him if his father-in-law had known at the time of his engagement what his son-in-law's political views were? He thought for a while, and then said he remembered clearly arguing with his father-in-law while still engaged. "But if you ask a number of the other older men in the village today if the son of Old Tangos is a communist, they'll tell you, no, it isn't possible. They just don't understand..."

In the absence of more substantial data, it is worth suggesting that a family or individual's politics, if any, are for most people one more factor to be taken into account, along with wealth, family honour, personal talents, education, connections and so forth, when planning a match. If an issue is in the balance, a political factor could be decisive. Otherwise, it would simply be calculated along with the others. One old man in the 1940's after his army service abroad called himself a leftist; later he had been suspected of selling his

vote in a critical election to the nationalists, and in the 1960's always declared himself a rightwinger. He had five daughters. Two are married to leftists, two to nationalists. His two sons are strong rightists. I do not know what his family knew or thought about the two young leftist grooms they acquired, or how far these men were then known leftists. But the father who is poor and struggling hard to marry off the youngest girl said to me when I tried to get at this information, "Do you think that if a decent young man came and asked me if he could marry Sophoulla I'd refuse him because he was a communist?" The same man, in another mood, used to curse the leftists as dishonourable atheists.

(iii) The Costs and Benefits of Alignment

There are a number of tangible advantages and disadvantages to being an open supporter of the left or the nationalist right; to discuss them is not to suggest that some form of ideology plays no part in village politics: a personal commitment to a position does not exclude receiving benefits from it. It is also worth stressing that tangible benefits are in short supply, usually available only to those who have held leadership positions or have shown firm support for a long period, but the risks of open support are more evenly spread.

The possible benefits for leftists include scholarship for their children to study in Eastern European countries. One young man from the village went to study in Czechoslovakia in 1969, and several other children of prominent leftists hope for similar scholarships. Occasionally, these countries

also offer free or subsidised medical treatment for difficult cases which cannot be accommodated in Cyprus. Several Kallo leftists have been on visits to socialist countries in Eastern Europe with most of their expenses paid as delegates of the agricultural organisation of the left, EKA⁽³⁾. EKA also organises cheap air charter flights to Britain at Christmas and Easter, through which students in the UK can visit their families, or relatives visit emigrants living in the UK. There are also the normal benefits of trade union membership for those villagers enrolled in PEO, the leftist federation of unions, which include the fruits of collective bargaining, subsidised medical attention and pension schemes. Finally, since the left organisations have a number of paid administrative posts, there is the possibility of steady employment for a few individuals, although in the village during my fieldwork no one from Kallo held such a post.

There are serious disadvantages to being a known leftist. These include the difficulty of getting certain jobs, the police force being particularly opposed to taking leftists, and in teaching, a profession which discourages them. It is also said to be much harder for a known leftist to either enter or be promoted in many other branches of government service⁽⁴⁾. The sons of leftists are often said to get posted relatively far from home during military service, and to get more than their fair share of fatigues, punishments and hardship. It is even said, and widely believed, that they are sent to special camps for surveillance. Finally, intermittently since 1954 there have been a number of acts of violence against leftists, which include beatings, occasional

murders, and attacks on the buildings of left organisations with bombs which usually fail to find victims. Since the communists lost the civil war in Greece, and strongly anti-communist governments have been in power there since 1949 culminating in a military dictatorship since April 21st 1967, as a known communist a Cypriot visiting Greece may feel at the very least less than officially welcome.

An example will make some of these points clearer.

In 1968 at a wedding in the village, a group of young villagers who were in Athens studying were strong in their support for the military government. Later several villagers mentioned to me that one of them had previously been a strong leftist. A leading leftist told me that the boy had wanted a scholarship to an Eastern European socialist country but had failed to get it, and out of pique had turned to a nationalist politician who had perhaps got him a scholarship. I told this man I'd heard that the boy was still a leftist at heart but hiding it, because of the danger from the Greek government. "No. A leftist is always a leftist and never hides it." I said this was a little hard, given the difficulties for leftists in Greece. He agreed, but added that the boy had not been 'ideologically committed'.

Later the boy himself gave the following account. He had once been 'a fanatic leftist'. In Greece, before the military coup, he had seen the extent of political conflict, and the extent of political surveillance and favouritism, even by the Papandreou government. He was sure the Papandreou authorities had opened a file on him. Once the junta came to power he certainly wasn't going to stick his neck out after all

his family's sacrifices. "Did you hear any boy from the village speak against the Junta? You do realise there are spies in the village?" He described his own position as centre left. He denied having a scholarship, but said he knew of a boy from the village who had got a scholarship through the support of a nationalist politician.

To be a strong nationalist has certain advantages, some of which complement those of the left. The right wing trade and farmer's unions, though much smaller, exercise similar functions to those of the left. They also organise visits to foreign countries, and charter flights to the UK. Since their organisations tend to be more weakly institutionalised, there are fewer jobs available in this area, but this is more than matched by the much better prospects a moderate nationalist enjoys when seeking jobs in the police, teaching or any branch of the civil service⁽⁵⁾. There are scholarships for study in Greece made available through nationalist channels, and for the few opportunities to study in the USA, nationalists stand a much greater chance than leftists.

Perhaps the greatest single benefit to being a nationalist is the least tangible. It can be summed up by saying that the nationalist under normal circumstances appears in a completely legitimate light, as the upholder of Greek cultural values, which are strongly bound up with the profession of the Orthodox faith. In a society where traditionally under Turkish rule the Church was the political representative of the Greek people, and where an Archbishop is the popularly-elected head of state, the nationalist usually can place himself - in argument at least - in the mainstream of the society's values. The leftist is permanently upstaged, both by the ambiguity of

his position over religious belief, and the problem of the relationship between the communist party and the USSR. The exclusion of the left from EOKA was both symptomatic of this political weakness, and further contributed to it.

It makes good commonsense to suppose that for those leaders and active supporters of both left and right organisations certain other benefits exist, harder to specify, but by no means negligible. I have stressed the extent to which the nuclear family is a basic structural unit in village society, and to what degree the notion of synféron, self-interest covering the whole nuclear family, is the touchstone of morality. The climate of competitive individualism which accompanies this type of family and value system is to some extent offset by strong commitment to left or nationalist positions. I am arguing that political alignment provides some additional identity for the actor, which both gives an extra degree of cognitive structure and emotional support to him in his social encounters.

Without wishing to pursue this notion of social identity any further, it is worth pointing out that the left offers a strong organisational framework for the individual, and tends to have a view of change as both having a direction and involving progress; the important difficulty in Greek culture is that of religious position. The nationalists are weaker in organisation and have a less developed set of answers to problems posed by social change, but are most closely linked to traditional Greek culture.

... by the availability of hard contests between the two main groups. The administrative committee elections, which take

(iv) Right and Left Cleavage in Village Life

I now consider what importance is to be attached to the opposed political identities of leftist and nationalist as they arise in village affairs. The problem presents itself in two forms. First, the labels are in frequent use, and people in the village continually refer to each other, and address each other, through these identities. Secondly, the statements of national leaders and newspaper editorials are often so violent in tone (particularly those of the right) that the problem is raised, how can the use of such national labels exist in the village without producing greater conflict; if only between the small numbers of leaders and active supporters? (6)

Since 1955 the island's Greek leaders have been pre-occupied first with the British rulers, then with the Turkish minority. The response of the left has been in the main to give firm support to Makarios, to call for unity of all Greek political groups, and generally to appear as a party of order. Since Makarios^{is} so generally popular, and since the left has much to lose from any taint of illegality, this tactic has served to protect it from harrassment from extreme anti-communists. The right also supports the call for unity, while still keeping up a hostile tone towards the left. This, then, is the framework of Greek communal unity which surrounds any particular event.

In the village this general situation has been reproduced by the avoidance of hard contests between the two main groups. The administrative committee elections, which take

place every three years, have not been matters which mobilised all possible support in the village. A turn-out at these elections of between 30 and 50 people was typical in the elections I attended, and this seems to have been normal, from informants' comments. The possible number of voters varied from 300 or more for the Co-op Store Committee, to 450 for the Credit Co-op. In fact, through the 1960's there has been a long-standing implicit agreement among village leaders not fully to contest these committees, but to have agreement of rough parity between right and left representatives. This still leaves some scope for manoeuvre, as I shall describe in chapter 8; but such informal precedents have been continued, and the result is that most villagers - who are in any case more or less indifferent to these elections so long as their affairs are handled both reasonably fairly and efficiently - are not involved in them. A full-scale contest would mean that both sides would attempt to use all kinship, friendship, ideological and other ties to line up their supporters, and the cross-cutting ties which involve most leaders, and indeed most villagers, would be strained and tested.

The fact that hard contest was avoided does not mean that right and left as political categories were irrelevant to, or not invoked in, these situations. It means instead that explicit recognition was given to their importance by agreeing parity of representation. The fact that there is something called 'the left' which must be given two positions on any committee cannot be ignored. There is no need to give up two seats to something which doesn't exist.

However, this control of contest is made easier by another conscious activity of village leaders: they define these committees as "not political" in their purposes, but solely concerned with "village business". "We don't want to allow party politics to get mixed up in village business" was a statement made on many occasions, and specifically made to prevent political contest. The easiest way of doing this, since neither group of leaders will stand by and let the others dominate anything in the village, is to agree tacitly or openly on a division of committee jobs in advance⁽⁷⁾.

If political identities of the left/right order were of no importance in village affairs, one would surely expect individuals regarded in other contexts as spokesmen for these positions to be able to stand as 'independents' on village committees, or to be able to show their ability to segregate their loyalties to an institution outside the village, from their conduct of village affairs, by reciting some suitable formula. As it is, the efforts to control the extent of political contest suggests that no simpler means is available, and even the device of defining areas of activity as out of the scope of politics showed signs of a breakdown on a number of occasions. These incidents will be made the subject of extended discussion later.

A further factor which has limited the conflict between left and right is again related to the national system. In short, for the period 1960-70 the developing lines of most intense political cleavage in Cypriot society have been between two groupings in the nationalist camp, which became in 1969

openly institutionalised when political parties were formed. In their inception, these events are related to a struggle between certain national leaders. One result in Kallo was that the intensity of conflict between the leaders of left and right was modified, since the right were often too busy with their internal differences, and the left were careful not to unite them by obvious provocation. This was a village level counterpart of the AKEL National Leadership's policy since 1960. I shall have more to say about this in the next chapter.

(v) Groups

No discussion of the scope of political action in the village can be complete without some consideration of omadhes (singular, omas) groups, or, in a military context, units. In one sense the formation of EOKA units was the start of such groups in Cypriot politics, but there is a long oral tradition in which politicians were accompanied by more or less violent and organised followers. EOKA units were special in that they were bound by oath, membership was secret, and the organisation was island-wide, and the aims insurrectionary⁽⁸⁾. But contact between units was apparently limited. Later, in the 1963-4 disturbances, the village formed a militia unit fairly openly, which was under the Market Town district command.

In its simplest form the group is merely a number of supporters of a political leader, with some minimum degree of organisational coherence, in that all members in one village or town district know who the other members are, who are ready to act on the orders of that leader. In the Cypriot press and

Legislative Assembly these groups are referred to as 'private armies'. They are by their very nature invisible, uncountable and sometimes more talked about than real. They have been linked particularly to the names of three opposed nationalist leaders - the former Minister of the Interior, P. Yorgadjis; V. Lyssarides, the leftist nationalist physician of the President; and N. Sampson, a former EOKA hero turned newspaper proprietor. Arguments continue about the relative legitimacy of these groups, but I shall not discuss these except to say that they were formed during the early period of inter-communal conflict, and that it is widely believed that President Makarios encouraged both Lyssarides and Sampson to form their groups not only as a defense measure against the Turks, but also as a counterweight to the growing power of Yorgadjis.

Other groups or illegal organisations have also existed between 1960-70, including the Ethnikon Metopon, National Front, which was responsible for a number of raids against government officials in 1969 and 1970 but ended with the arrest of seventy men, and the trial of some twenty of these. The Greek Army was also suggested as the source of yet other groups, and this was explicitly linked to the Ethnikon Metopon, when General Yerakimis was sent back to Greece at the request of the Makarios Government. However, it is impossible to know for sure what was the relationship between the General and the Ethnikon Metopon.

The problem posed by groups for village solidarity is that they represent an extreme form of commitment to individuals or institutions outside the village, and that

they suggest a capacity for action considerably more powerful than that arising from ordinary ties between individual clients and their patrons. A basic distinction in Cyprus is between dhikos mas, our man, and xenos, the stranger, or unrelated man. In the context of groups, anthropos tou Yorgadji, Yorgadjis' man, implies a man who will do Yorgadjis' bidding. Just what that bidding is depends on the leader's whims and the national situation. EOKA units went on missions against the British, and suspected traitors. The village militia of 1963-64 trained in the Pendedactylos Mountains, and fought against Turkish units near Kokkina, as well as taking part in an assault on a Turkish village ten miles from Kallo. These are known activities of a concrete nature. But groups which have existed at other times have been involved perhaps merely in the notion of group membership carried about in members' heads, plus a certain amount of surveillance, alertness and general intelligence work.

National leaders, whether public politicians or more or less covert figures in army, civil service or private life wish to be kept informed about the movements of and support for their opponents. Village activists, linked to such leaders, wish to show their loyalty and vigilance. Thus, there appears to be a continual flow of traffic in information between village and urban leaders. Sometimes this has curious results, when the information is of low grade. A young schoolteacher of cautious disposition and no known political position was surprised to find himself transferred to a distant village in a poor region; since he had done nothing that he knew of to displease his superiors, he asked a close kinsman with good

government connections to find out why. His kinsman went to a trusted government official high up in the security services. This man told him that his kinsman the teacher was a member of an illegal political group. The evidence was that he had been seen one night at a petrol station with a police uniform in his car. When challenged with this 'evidence' the young man admitted to having had the uniform, not to impersonate a policeman but because he was taking part in a school play.

Another example from the EOKA period: the teacher Vourros was told by a close kinsman that he was suspected of having contact with the British security forces, and thus being a traitor. He was badly frightened, and asked his kinsman to find out what the evidence was against him. The answer came back, that he had been seen going into an army building in Nicosia. The army building was in fact the Ministry of Education, which had British soldiers stationed outside it, as did all government offices during the Emergency. But the villager who had reported Vourros' 'activities' did not know this.

An example of a more serious nature will show how villagers are inevitably unsure of the purpose and direction of some groups. Dhaskalos had been active in a village EOKA shotgun group, but had had some personal differences with its leader. Later, in 1964 he was working as a teacher in a village fifty miles from Kallo when one night he heard in the dark the voice of a Greek mainlander giving weapons instruction. Next time he went to Kallo he made inquiries, and learned that a village group of about 35 men had been formed and was drilling. He was angry because he had not, in spite of his EOKA experience,

been called on to join this group. He went to see a powerful EOKA leader in a nearby village⁽⁹⁾, and asked what was going on. This man was hesitant, and said nothing. "Don't take me for a fool" said Dhaskalos. He was then told that a group was being organised through the Nicosia MP, Koshis, a close friend of the Minister of the Interior, Yorgadjis. Dhaskalos then went to Nikos Sampson, who was by this time a critic of Yorgadjis, and asked him if he knew about these activities. Sampson said that he did but had authorisation from the President to form groups of his own, and that if Dhaskalos wanted guns for such a group he could have them.

It is difficult to know what the status of such groups was in either law or the eyes of government officials. In the village, the existence of such a group is seen as a centre of power and, whatever its ostensible purpose, it is potentially threatening to rival political supporters. In chapter 8 I shall discuss the consequences of one such group being formed in the village. Here it is enough to say that the existence, real or imagined, of such groups seems to have produced a further degree of tension and sometimes sharpened cleavage in village relationships; and that whatever the combination of tangible benefits, personal loyalties or values bring villagers to join groups, the origin of the groups lies in political competition in the national arena. Groups are the stuff that coups are made of; some of the events in recent Cypriot politics involving assassination attempts, and rumours of planned coups, sent reactions through the villages where segments of supporters existed who saw themselves as directly affected. When for example, during my fieldwork, a senior

police official was shot a few miles from the village, a number of villagers were arrested because it was thought they belonged to a group hostile to the Minister of the Interior. Later, when the Ethnikon Metopon was launched, the village was thought by some to be a hotbed of supporters for this illegal organisation, and was again the scene of arrests and full-scale searches.

(vi) The Scope of Politics: Favours and Obligations

The accounts given by old men of two national elections to the Legislative Assembly, between 1920 and 1930, make it clear that vote-buying was common, although even then a few villagers actually had views of the candidates and their positions which were apparently decisive. Accounts of municipal elections in the 1940's told of men being abducted to prevent them voting. In 1970 there was to my knowledge no vote buying in Kallo. But a number of people echoed the words of one informant "Don't look for ideology in the village. People are stubborn and oppose each other wilfully. I can be left and you right, but I'll support capitalism, the opposite of my true beliefs, just because you are opposing it. Pure personal stubbornness". The disappearance of vote-buying, and the comments of this sophisticated villager, pose the problem, why and how do villagers use their votes in national elections? I have already emphasised the scant experience of representative government that the villagers have enjoyed. But I have also, in this chapter, dwelt on factors which have overtones of ideology, even though it has been stressed that

holding a political position strongly does not exclude simultaneously receiving benefits. These benefits are scarce, and leaders and strong supporters far more likely to get them than weaker supporters or the uncommitted.

The informant I have just quoted has two things to say. One is that villagers have personal relationships which may dominate or swamp their other values; but he is also saying, quite clearly, that villagers (some, not all) have other beliefs. He in fact mentions the categories I have just discussed. His caution is against seeing village political behaviour as primarily ideological. Since my argument has been that village leaders are playing a quiet and restricted game between themselves, and do not mind that most villagers are merely spectators of this game, it is clear that I think his analysis correct. For the rest of this section I wish to stress the mixed, or intermediate, nature of the villagers' response to the problem set them by elections. This mixed response was greatly aided by the electoral system used in 1970. Each voter in Nicosia district could make twelve choices, since the district elected twelve Representatives to the House. But he could distribute twelve choices in any way he wished among the candidates of the various parties on the ballot slip. In the end, the ballot paper consisted of two parties each fielding twelve candidates, one party with ten, one with six, and one with two. A voter could vote all twelve candidates of one party, or cast one, two or more votes for any individual or party of his choice. In the event, a number of informants told me that they had voted for several candidates from the tickets of several parties.

Sometimes this was because they liked individuals but were less enthusiastic for their parties, or running mates; sometimes it was because they felt a party 'deserved' some support although their main loyalty lay elsewhere. Sometimes it was because their party was under instructions to use some of its votes for another party.

An electoral canvass by active supporters of the Progressive Party in June 1970 worked through the 740 registered voters of the village and marked down some 400 as adiaphori, indifferent. This did not simply represent women voters, since during the canvass a large number of women were assigned positions, due to the known positions of their husbands, or some other close relative. During this canvass, the principles which the activists used to reach their conclusions were these: old people, the very poor, the illiterate were assumed to be directly influenced by their closest kin, particularly their sons. If there were several sons with different loyalties, it was worth trying to persuade such voters to use a few of their votes for each of the parties their sons supported. Secondly, anyone holding a government job was thought likely to support the United Party, unless a powerful man of some other party had got him the job, or his department head or man responsible for his promotion was known to be aligned with some other party than United. Since the Government and Civil Service contain numbers of men who are not the political clients, friends or supporters of Yorgadjis and Clerides, there was always the chance that a person would be working for one such man, and thus have dual loyalties. Thirdly,

party leaders, or those who were the close friends, koumbari, of powerful politicians, were assumed would vote exclusively for their own party. During this canvass it was clear that certain individuals were regarded as totally committed to a party, others to be hiding their positions but secretly committed, others to be vacillating, others to be open to persuasion. Since most people I asked said they believed the ballot to be secret, there was clearly scope for people to say one thing and do another. But against this, the voting system made this almost unnecessary in many cases, except where a man was promising all the votes of his kin to someone, when he knew that in fact he would vote otherwise.

Villagers told me that they felt an obligation to vote for a kinsman or co-villager who was a candidate, even if they did not particularly like his party. This was apparent in the 1970 election, where a candidate from the village polled 396 out of a possible 740 votes, which was 55 votes more than his own nationally-known party leader. This was also the case with two candidates in a neighbouring village. One village candidate polled 426 votes, whereas his party leader (one of the best known politicians in Cyprus) polled 280; another polled 472, his party leader 318. The Kammari candidate polled 124 votes in Kallo, which hardly differs from the performance of those of his running mates not supported by AKEL. The other Kammari candidate did no better in Kallo than other United candidates - with 205. The Kallo candidate, however, did well in Kammari, and this is explained in chapters 9 and 12; basically he had been active on an issue

which affected Kammarrri's future water supply.

Village leaders complain that ideology does not sufficiently guide how people vote, but from the perspective of village values the notion of reciprocity explains the behaviour of many household heads, and their dependents. The village definition of friendship suggests mutual help; a failure to keep one's part of this bargain justifies dissolving the relationship. Thus, a man who helped one's son get a job is a friend, and must be helped when he needs help in turn. The only constraint on this is a conflict of loyalties, which normally can be settled by intelligent compromise. This compromise was made easy in 1970 by the electoral system. But reciprocity is not always hostile to ideology.

In the following example, a basic ideological view sets the background for choice, but the actual choice is finally made from mixed motives. Yannaros once had an Army job, but resigned. Later he wanted his old job again. His wife's brother was a police sergeant with a good record of EOKA service, and took him to the Minister of the Interior. Yannaros waited outside while his wife's brother went in to see the Minister. Nothing came of this meeting.

Later the muktar of Yannaros' village went to see the Minister with him, and the Minister promised him that either he would get an Army job or some other government job. Nothing happened. A third time, Yannaros went alone to the Minister, and again was promised help. Nothing happened.

Two years later, in February 1969, organised parties began, and since he was anti-communist Yannaros thought about the several nationalist parties. He wondered about Sampson's

party, but when he remembered how Sampson in his newspaper had criticised the conduct of the Army unit in which Yannaros had fought against the Turks, in Omorphita, 1963/4, he couldn't bring himself to vote for Sampson's party. So he decided that although Yorgadjis had three times failed to help him, he would still vote for the United Party.

In this account, the informant explicitly sought a benefit, and it is implicit that had he received it, he would have been committed to the United Party. His anti-communism is a constraint which should be seen as ideological; but his reason for not supporting Sampson is, within Cypriot culture, almost equally ideological, for Sampson has tried to monopolise the political ground of speaking for 'true' nationalists, and ex-EOKA fighters. Since Yannaros felt his commander and unit had fought well, he could not stomach Sampson's 'unjust' criticism.

(vii) Conclusion

Bailey's contribution to our understanding of differences between national and village politics has been considerable; here I have been at pains to suggest that the villagers do not all respond in the same manner to the symbols and institutions of national politics. The Kallo situation is not one of two discrete worlds, with sharply different values, mediated by a few professional brokers, who are hated and mistrusted by villagers. Many Kallo villagers have been aligned with various national political figures or parties ever since they can remember. While some villagers remain unaligned spectators, others are followers and a few are active

leaders in relation to national political groupings. There are costs and benefits to alignment, and villagers seek to limit the extent of political competition by ruling certain village activities as 'not political'. Yet there is the constant threat posed by committed alignment through membership in 'groups', clandestine sets of followers loyal to a person or cause. In a situation where strong political competition is considered inimical to village interests, this element of secrecy is perhaps enjoined or made structurally inevitable.

Most villagers expect that the rewards of political alignment will be in favours, jobs, intercessions in external processes to the village, and other benefits. This does not mean that for the leaders and activists alignment is unrelated to values about the way society should be ordered. But it serves to stress the intermediate nature of Kallo politics, and the extent of the villagers' involvement with the larger society. This is particularly obvious when the reasons people vote for particular parties are examined, for here they can, through the peculiar form of the electoral system, at the same time express friendship, repay debts, discharge obligations, and make more expressive statements about the value implicit in parties or persons.

Footnotes to Chapter 6

- (1) But whereas 'masses' excludes a section of the population, 'nation' implicitly includes everyone, except perhaps those regarded as National Traitors (Leftists).
- (2) Nor is the young farmer a quietist politically: in chapter 11 I shall describe how, during an election campaign, he took the bold step of harshly interrogating an inspector of education who was a candidate for a rival nationalist party.
- (3) Throughout Cyprus, to have travelled abroad confers much prestige; to have travelled at someone else's expense is even more prestigious; the Russians also invited representatives of PEK, the right-wing nationalist farmers union, to join EKA representatives in visiting the USSR. Patris from Kallio went on such a visit.
- (4) The extreme right frequently complain that there are many 'hidden' communists in the civil service. To my knowledge a number of now prominent Cypriot civil servants and politicians were once leftish in their youth, but now take respectably nationalist positions. This would seem to be the objective situation which prompts the extreme right's suspicions, and since they are prone to believe in the conspiratorial bent of the left, they find it easy to believe that ex-leftists are crypto-leftists.
- (5) Fanatic nationalists, of the pro-Grivas Enosis-at-any-price variety, complain that they are discriminated against by the more moderate nationalists, and that if they get civil service jobs at all, their promotion is held back. I shall have more to say about the relations between Makarios' supporters and Grivas in the next chapter. The complaint is almost certainly justified.
- (6) Boissevain (1965) has examined this issue in his monograph, for the Maltese situation. Lison-Tolosana (1966) has valuable material on the consequences of open political conflict for the village he studied.
- (7) Bailey (1969:30) has pointed out that such an effort to control the scope of politics is highly significant: "Yet exclusion from politics can be a mark of objective importance: some roles are too important to allow them to become fouled and confused by political competition." Not only do villagers seek to limit the costs of political competition in village administration, but this principle has been employed both in their attempts to persuade the government to build them a dam, and in the administration of the citrus

cooperative. These situations are the subjects of extended description and analysis in chapters 9 and 10 respectively.

- (8) It is not easy to decide if the EOKA campaign was a rebellion or a revolution. Insofar as it merely sought to replace British rule by Greek-Cypriot rule, it could be called a rebellion. But since its goal of Union with Greece would have involved new structural relations for the island, it might be better regarded as revolutionary. It may still be argued that it was rebellious in seeking only to put Athens into the seat occupied by London. While there was little in the way of social reform expressed in the EOKA campaign, there was a millenarian fervour about the demand for Enosis. The militants must have believed that life would be different with Enosis, or why would they have bothered?
- (9) This is the same man who assisted (chapter 3, page 22) in the case of Sklyros' sister's husband. He also takes some part in the election campaign (chapter 11, page 40) where he showed the strength of his support for the United Party by coming to the rescue of a United candidate under heavy attack in Kallo from supporters of the Progressive party, a more militant and populist nationalist party.

CHAPTER 7AN OUTLINE OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS,
1878-1970(i) Introduction

Later chapters are concerned with the detailed discussion of politics in the village over the first decade of Cypriot independence, and it will therefore be necessary briefly to review the events and processes which led up, in 1959, to the granting of independence. Throughout the period of British rule the dominant symbol and issue for the Greek Cypriot political elite was the demand for Enosis (Union with Greece), and even those who might have wished to ignore it found it difficult to do so. Until 1954, the pursuit of Enosis relied in the main on traditional elite political methods - petitions, newspaper articles, speeches, abstention in and boycott of the Legislative Assembly; but 1931 was a notable exception which is remembered as The Uprising, in which a brief and apparently unplanned demonstration turned into a riot, quickly repressed by the government.

To these methods in 1954 armed insurrection was added under the military leadership of George Grivas, and, through his creation, EOKA. The early years of independence saw a power struggle between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, which became violent in 1963, and resulted in a de facto patchwork partition of the island.

Independence has been marked by a less dramatic power struggle within the ranks of Greek Cypriot nationalist leaders. On the one hand, many persons have sought rewards for the part they played in the independence struggle; on the other hand, there has been a continual disagreement between Makarios and Grivas, as well as their respective followers, about the future of the island and the issue of Enosis. Makarios seems to favour a unitary state, a negotiated settlement with the Turkish minority and a policy of Enosis - Eventually. Grivas has favoured the tough-minded pursuit of Enosis - Soonest, the rejection of the unitary independent state, and a readiness to seek encounters with the Turks. To civil war has been added the danger of international conflict, when Turkey twice came very close to invasion of the island.

In this chapter economic and social development, which have gone on in spite of the inter-communal disturbances, are ignored. The result is an emphasis on tension, crisis and conflict, which is slightly misleading. It is clear that while villagers have prospered economically, on the political level they have, since 1878, experienced a wide variety of political situations⁽¹⁾ but have enjoyed a paucity of opportunities to express their political views through the key institutions of representative politics - elections to national office. Perhaps this discrepancy between political instability, and economic ^{and} social improvement partly explains why the political culture of the village rules so many things 'out of politics'.

(ii) A Sketch of Cypriot History 1878-1959⁽²⁾

Cyprus was occupied by many rulers throughout her history. The Turks held the island from 1573 to 1878, whereupon the British acquired it. At this time the ethnic composition was roughly 75% Greek Cypriots and 25% Turkish Cypriots, who had arrived on the island during Turkey's period of rule. Under the Turks the leaders of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church in the island were also the political spokesmen, and from the first days of British occupation until 1931 made regular requests for the political union (Enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish community leaders with equal and complementary regularity voiced their opposition to this. The British Government took no notice of requests for Enosis until the 1914-18 war, and Greece never pressed the point. Occasionally British politicians made sympathetic mention of the Greek Cypriots' claim, and the Greek Representatives in the Legislative Assembly continually tried to pressure the Governor in the 1910-1930 periods by threatened or actual non-co-operation over budgetary matters. Usually the British, in alliance with the Turkish Representatives, could get around these obstructions.

In 1931 there was a short and apparently spontaneous outbreak of violence by Greek Cypriots in favour of Enosis, which was firmly put down. From then on until 1945 the Legislative Assembly was suspended, the Governor ruling by degree, and village headmen being appointed, not elected.

In 1924 a Communist Party was formed which attracted some teachers, and began trade union organisation. It seems to have played little part in the events of 1931, but was

nevertheless banned in 1933. It reformed in 1941 when parties were again allowed, and in 1946 won municipal elections in four out of the island's six major towns. At the same time the Church and other right-wing nationalist elements began to back the formation of nationalist, anti-communist trade unions and farmers' associations. There were at this time a number of other national and Orthodox Christian political associations, such as OHEN, which were to prove an important focus for later militancy.

AKEL, as the reformed communist party was named, was in the early 1940's probably at the height of its strength in the island. But when on the mainland of Greece a civil war raged in three rounds between 1947 and 1949, AKEL, unwilling to commit itself to Enosis while the future of the left in Greece was in the balance, produced instead a line demanding independence and self-government. There was a moment in May 1948 when the British Government, through the proposed Winster Constitution, came close to getting the left representatives to cooperate in a limited measure of self-government, but the moment passed, the left switched from a line demanding self-government to join with the right in demanding Enosis. However, this vacillation about Enosis did the Cypriot left a great deal of harm for it allowed the right to portray them as opportunists, and insincere in their stand on Enosis.

Grivas, fresh from organising an anti-communist militia in Greece, started to organise EOKA in the early 1950's (from which he scrupulously excluded all leftists). On April 1st 1955 he opened the campaign for Enosis by terrorism; from then until 1959, with several truces, Grivas waged a hit-and-

run war against the British which culminated not in the desired Enosis but in the Zurich Agreements, whereby the island became an independent republic, guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain, with 70% of civil service jobs going to the Greeks and 30% to the Turks, in an overall federal structure. During the Emergency of 1954-59 the Turks had been encouraged by British diplomacy to voice their opposition to Enosis more and more energetically, and finally bloody clashes took place between the Greeks and Turks of the island; but leaders of both communities attempted to rally their followers to enter upon Independence in a spirit of restraint and compromise.

(iii) The Meaning of Enosis

Enosis literally means union in Greek; but in Cypriot politics it means the union of Cyprus with mainland ("mother") Greece. The usual implication is that this will be a form of total political integration. The 1954-59 EOKA struggle was fought not for national independence, but for Enosis. An anti-colonial movement in which 18% of the population - the Turks - were corporately opposed to the stated goal, and 30% (Greek Cypriot leftists) excluded from participation, is hard to classify. But when that goal involves a form of integration into a unit 500 miles away the problems of understanding are compounded. The Zurich-London Agreements (1959) specifically ruled out both Enosis and partition as solution to ethnic conflicts in the island.

In 1878, when the British arrived in Cyprus, they were greeted by Church leaders with requests for Enosis. How

long a section of Greek Cypriots had their eyes on this goal is not clear, but at least since 1830. The vital information is missing: how did the people we now call 'Greek Cypriots' see themselves in, let us say, 1800? Of what identification were they aware? To what identities were they committed? Village dialect was a mixture of French, Venetian, Turkish and Arabic loan words in a demotic Greek base. The result was apparently not understood straight away by mainland Greeks, although they recognised it as a form of Greek. The church services were in Byzantine Greek with a mainland pronunciation. Most villagers and many priests were illiterate. Few had ever been outside the island. The townsmen had a greater consciousness of a relationship to Greece, greater literacy and mobility. But the gap between town and country was huge.

It has been suggested⁽³⁾ that the intensity of the Church's support for Enosis results partly from the threat to its power created by the arrival of the British. Under Turkish rule the Church had been both religious and political representative of all Greek Cypriots. Taxation and administration were partly organised through Church officials. After the British came, this relationship changed. The new government refused to allow its officials to help the church collect ecclesiastical taxes. It approved a Legislative Assembly with popularly elected secular representatives. It supported popular education and, after a trial period, relieved the Church of direct responsibility for the appointment of teachers. Finally, in the 1920's, the British allowed (but did not encourage) the rise of left-inspired trade unions.

Faced with these threats to its traditional monopoly of national leadership, the Church reacted with intensified support for a 'sacred' cause - Enosis. Support for Enosis became a moral touchstone: all 'good Greeks' were practising Orthodox Christians, who acknowledged the traditional authority of the Church and were passionately committed to Enosis. So went the syllogism, 'Bad Greeks' were those lacking in one or more of these qualities.

The second group with a strong interest in Enosis were the schoolteachers, for in the huge expansion of popular education 1878-1930 the teachers were the gatekeepers of both social mobility and ethnic identity. The role of teachers in mobility needs little comment. To pass from village to town was possible by sweat alone. But to pass from villager to townsmen, politismenos (civilised, civis, polis, urbane, etc.), one had to pass through the gate kept by the schoolteacher. The same was true for ethnic identity too: teachers knew and propagated the story of the glories of Greece, and particularly the Greek War of Independence, 1821. From teachers, Greek Cypriot villagers learned that they were part of a noble tradition, and no longer needed to see themselves as Voos Kypraios, Cypriot Ox, for by learning to speak and write good mainland Greek, and by affirming their belief in Enosis, they could participate in a new and exciting identity. This opportunity was being held out in a period of rapid social and economic change - improved communication, booms and slumps in agriculture, and increased popular participation in politics.

Enosis, then, was a slogan which asserted membership in a nation of Greeks, and it became a slogan for use against

both colonial rulers and the Turkish minority⁽⁴⁾. Since I have argued that some groups of Cypriots were more immediately concerned with achieving it than others, the question can be asked, what price did most individuals in the population feel was worth paying to turn this latent, long-term membership into an immediate, active membership? Such a rational question runs counter to the rhetoric of nationalism, which portrays Enosis as an all-or-nothing affair, and insists it cannot be bargained into compromise formulae; one cannot adopt the methods of industrial relations, and agree on a 7% increase in Enosis.

Here it must be noted that in many senses cultural integration of Cypriots with Greece and Turkey has been proceeding throughout this century. School curricula, rights to enter and work in the respective mainland countries, and a general heightened consciousness of the relationships between the islanders and the mainlanders all suggest that in many ways, significant steps have been taken. This argument cuts no ice with ardent nationalists, who see only total political integration as acceptable and worthwhile. When asked how life will actually be altered by Enosis they are sometimes at a loss for words, unless they repeat such sacred formulas as "Whatever else, we will be at last reunited with Mother Greece", but they give a strong impression that in some important, if elusive, way life will be different.

(iv) The Importance of EOKA

Grivas organised EOKA by first distributing arms to members of two nationalist youth movements, OHEN and PEON

(Stephens, 1966:134). The first plans were worked out in October 1952. The organisation had several different kinds of smaller units. There were never more than 300 full-time guerillas, operating in the two mountain ranges of the island. There were execution squads in the towns, and in the villages there were what Grivas called shotgun commandos, who were in fact villagers by day, and minor, part-time guerillas at night. These groups appear to have acted in a limited way and, for obvious reasons, opportunistically. They recruited extremely cautiously, by approaching young men who were known to be tough, nationalists and anti-communist. The youth organisations tended to have a few members in any particular village which served as the springboard for recruitment. As far as I can ascertain, the village shotgun commandos did not aim to recruit large numbers of men. If they had half a dozen men, with arms, this was enough. The rest of the villagers, who could scarcely fail to learn something of the nocturnal comings and goings the activity demanded, were required to keep silence about what they knew, and occasionally to do things they didn't entirely understand, without asking questions, because it was 'for the organisation'.

One activity in which village groups proved useful was in hiding wanted men, those on whose heads the British had put a price. These men were sometimes from the urban groups, sometimes from the mountain guerillas. They were hidden in village houses, or out in the fields. In this way, particular villagers came to form close ties with men from other parts of the island, some of whom in the Independence period came to enjoy positions of power in which they did not

forget those villagers who had risked their lives to protect them. Internment camps threw men together in a similar way.

EOKA is important in the understanding of Cypriot politics at both local and national levels, because former membership in it is the basis for many relationships through which flow favours and political support. Also, in national politics factions between former EOKA leaders are reflected in village groupings. Finally, EOKA leaders still have a near monopoly on that inexhaustible resource in Greek Cypriot political encounters - the claim to be the only true fighters for Enosis.

In its original organisation, EOKA had a military side, under Grivas, an experienced Army officer, and a political side, PEKA, which seems to have been more closely linked to Makarios and senior Churchmen⁽⁵⁾. It is probable that the military/political division also reflected to some extent certain cleavages in Cypriot society, between village and town, uneducated and educated, but there is to my knowledge no systematic material to decide this point. My own analysis of the backgrounds of 86 official EOKA fighters killed in action or captivity shows only six of them to have been urban-born, and only a handful to have had characteristics which would have placed them in any plausible elite. There is a useful sense in which EOKA was an organisation for people who had never belonged to an organisation before, and perhaps the novelty and attraction of this experience contributed something to the persistence of the organisation after Independence, in the form of local and national 'ex-fighters' associations. (See Appendix 2.)

But the importance after Independence of having been in EOKA must be explained by several other factors. First, many members were recruited while still at school, where a large part of the curriculum had been glowing accounts of the deeds of the 1821 Greek War of Independence, and where there had been a continual and strident emphasis on the Greekness of Greek-Cypriots and the glory of the Enosis struggle. To enter EOKA involved a secret oath of dedication to the cause and of obedience to the leader. Membership also included an idea of blood-brotherhood, and in EOKA literature the moral solidarity of all Greeks was continually stressed. These factors, as well as danger, clandestine assignments and the experience of comradeship under arms, produced lasting loyalties and rivalries. In addition to these factors, both during and after the Independence, membership in EOKA was the basis for the creation of many new relationships throughout the island. Members moved, if they wished, along a series of pathways introduced and recommended by members to members.

But the reason any EOKA man would himself give for the continued existence of the ex-fighters' associations would be quite different from all of these: it would be that since the 1954-59 struggle had failed to achieve Enosis, there could be no question of abandoning the struggle, even though it must at certain times take peaceful form within the constitution of a state whose pre-conditions rule it out.

I have suggested that many of the recruits to the active military side of EOKA were rural youngsters, far from the urban elite. But membership in EOKA is difficult to speak of precisely, since on paper at least it was a complex organisation, and

undoubtedly relied on support of many people in a very informal way. After Independence, for obvious reasons, many people said they had been members. On one level, the ideology of the independence struggle was 'we were all in the Organisation', but since those families who suffered hardship could later claim important benefits - scholarships to Greece for their children, medical assistance, jobs, etc., it became necessary to differentiate between those who had offered more or less. Grivas himself handed out a number of certificates, which stated that individuals had in fact served in or helped the Organisation, and of course membership in the ex-fighters' association became an important indicator. The fact that Makarios included in his first cabinet four young men under 30, who had all been prominent in one or another branch of EOKA, was a sign of its political importance in the new republic. At lower levels of organisation, it appears that prominent EOKA men acted for the first two or three years of Independence as an informal duplicate civil service, overseeing and intervening in many administrative decisions, especially those related to job appointments, import licences, building and development permissions, and scholarships. This was a kind of EOKA honeymoon, during which people sought for themselves and their dependents rewards to which they saw themselves as eminently entitled. If it was sometimes objected in certain quarters that the EOKA people lacked formal qualifications for some of the benefits they sought, there was an immediate and morally compelling defence - these men had endangered their lives during the struggle, while others had from positions of security and privilege been pursuing for their own self-interest

those very qualifications.

Since 1959 an important cleavage in Greek-Cypriot society has been between categories (and sometimes groups) of persons in which the main moral resources have been references to dedication and self-sacrifice during the 1954-59 and 1963-4 nationalist activities on the one hand, and the formal, legalistic, bureaucratic values of qualifications and technical competence on the other. To have served one's country in EOKA may, for a tough and courageous young village boy, have needed no academic ability, school fees, command of English or familiarity with city ways. However, as members of the urban elite never tire of pointing out, other qualities than the ability to use a gun are needed to run a modern state.

Inevitably, a reaction set in against the EOKA honeymoon, but even if it had not done so, so many people stepped forward to claim the rewards of service to the nation that many were bound to have been disappointed. A wealthy country could have passed a GI Bill of Rights and socially enfranchised all comers. A poor country must pick and choose. To do this is to create dissatisfaction.

(v) 1960-1970 : Independence, Inter-Communal Conflict, and Stalemate

August 16, 1960, marked the independence of the island, which had been preceded two weeks earlier by national elections to the House of Representatives, in which AKEL, the communist party under an electoral pact with Makarios, was returned unopposed in five out of the 35 Greek seats, the other 30 seats going to a loose nationalist coalition, called the Patriotic

Front⁽⁶⁾. Fifteen seats, and the post of Vice-President of the Republic with important veto powers, went to the Turkish National Party.

The next three years saw two important developments: first was open breach between Makarios and Grivas over the issue of Enosis and relations with the Turkish community. This inevitably involved their supporters. The second development was a struggle between the Greeks and Turks over the implementation of the constitution. Many Greeks were dissatisfied with the notion that the Turkish 18% of the island should be guaranteed 30% of civil service jobs, to be applied in every grade, and other benefits. These tensions came to a head in a constitutional crisis over budget approvals, and in December 1963 the first fighting broke out between the two ethnic communities.

In 1964 sporadic fighting continued at different points in the island. Among the Greeks volunteer militias formed in many villages, often based on experienced EOKA members, including Kallo. It is not clear what was the legal status of these militias, or how much clandestine support from Greek political figures had prepared the way for their formation. Grivas, who, owing to his differences with Makarios, had 'retired' to the Greek mainland, returned to Cyprus in June 1964, expressly to form a disciplined National Guard, to replace the volunteer militias. This step seems to have been most necessary, since irregular units, owing to problems of poor discipline and communication, had created serious political difficulties for the Makarios government.

The return of Grivas, and the formation of the National Guard, were not only moves by the Greek Cypriots to further their ends against the Turks. Several writers agree that they had implications both for the difficult relations between the Greek government and Makarios at this time, and also for Makarios' personal position. Campbell, for example (Campbell and Sherrard, 1968:270), suggests that the Americans persuaded the Greek government to allow Grivas to return to Cyprus in June 1964 as a move to control the increasingly independent policies of Makarios. Legg seems to confirm this, for he writes (Legg, 1969:223) of subsequent developments in 1965:

"Archbishop Makarios, who differed from General Grivas over the future course of Cyprus toward union with Greece, found that control of the Cypriot armed forces rested not with his government, but with Grivas. In an effort to counter this, Makarios was attempting to build up the gendarmerie as an alternative force. Supposedly, the Aspida plot, at first intended only to undermine Grivas, began with a visit of Andreas Papandreou to Makarios."

This would appear to be the origins of the fierce disputes between Yorgadjis, Minister of the Interior and responsible for the police (which Legg calls the gendarmerie) and Grivas, as Commander of the newly-formed National Guard.

One consequence of this period of fighting and militia formation seems to have been that rivalries between Greek political leaders became more open. Since a number of different individuals formed their own militias, small centres of power arose which also had different political colourings. There appear to have been at least the following groupings in the 1964-5 period: i) a Grivas grouping, of strong right-wing

anti-communists, also bent on fierce opposition to the Turks; ii) a group following the former EOKA fighter Nikos Sampson, a man who had been somewhat fluid in his political opinions but who remained nominally both a supporter of Makarios and a critic of the Zurich-London Agreements. He led a group in the Nicosia fighting of 1963-64; iii) Vassos Lyssarides, Makarios' personal physician, a nationalist, but far and away the most left-wing political leader in the nationalist camp.. He also formed a volunteer militia group in this period, which so distinguished itself in an assault on St Hilarion that Lyssarides managed to disarm much nationalist mistrust of his left-wing views. He also acted as Makarios' Hermes to the Third World, and was the man responsible for bringing in weapons from various socialist countries, during the early part of the crisis. iv) The Makarios group, which included a number of ministers and politicians, but particularly Clerides, Yorgadjis and Papadopoulos; according to a series of articles published in April 1966 in the extreme nationalist PATRIS newspaper, these men had overall responsibility for a military organisation to be ready in the event of difficulties with the Turkish community, and which would carry out necessary measures to achieve Enosis.

The period of 1964-5 was one of continual unrest, rumours of planned coups against Makarios, and growing rivalry among nationalist politicians. The communists continued to support Makarios, and avoid provoking (and thus uniting) the nationalists. In March 1964 the first UN contingents came to Cyprus, and they are still there at time of writing. Since

1964 there has been occasional limited fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities, with a period in winter 1967 when the mainland Turkish army came very close to invading the island, following the death of some Turkish Cypriots in Kophinno u village. During the last three years, Constitutional Talks have gone on between Glavkos Clerides for the Greeks, and Raouf Denktash for the Turks. Thus, since December 1963, there has been virtual stalemate in intercommunal relations, with a de facto patchwork partition of the island.

In March 1968 Archbishop Makarios was overwhelmingly re-elected President of the Republic by the Greek community. Since then the two most important events were the political impetus he gave to the formation of political parties among the Greeks, in February 1969, and the successful completion of elections in the Greek community, May-June 1970. These elections for the Legislative Assembly were the first to be held for ten years, but for the two years immediately preceding them, in the degree of unrest it sometimes looked doubtful if they would be held at all.

This was because of the birth of a new political organisation in the island, the Ethnikon Metopon, or National Front. This was an underground organisation, which apparently had units all over the island, which first made its presence felt by distributing leaflets attacking various government ministers for corruption, betrayal of the national interest, and a general failure more vigorously to prosecute the cause of Enosis. In 1969 and early 1970 there were a number of violent attacks on high officials, usually involving shootings, or the bombing of homes. There were also seizures of arms

and explosives from police stations and mining camps. There was a general atmosphere of tension, the newspapers were again full of stories of coups being planned, and when I returned to the village for three weeks in December 1969, I was immediately warned by villagers not to ask questions about the Ethnikon Metopon.

In March 1970 there was an assassination attempt on President Makarios, and a few days later former Interior Minister Yorgadjis was shot to death outside Nicosia by persons unknown. Yorgadjis had resigned his ministry a year earlier after rumour had implicated him in an assassination attempt on Papadopoulos, the leader of the mainland Greek junta. At the time Yorgadjis and Makarios were said to have quarrelled bitterly, and Makarios to have forced Yorgadjis' resignation. When Yorgadjis was killed, popular opinion was that he had been behind the attempt on Makarios' life, and this was supported by the identity of some of the men arrested for that attempt, and later tried and imprisoned.

In May 1970, the island had not recovered from these incidents when some seventy armed men took over the central police station in Limassol, the second largest town of the island, held it for an hour, and made off with a large haul of weapons. They were soon caught and identified as the Ieros Lochos, Holy Brigade, an offshoot of the Ethnikon Metopon. They claimed to have expected their action to be supported all over the island and the proclamation of Enosis to follow immediately. Their arrest was followed by major purges and reorganisations of the police force, and a lengthy public trial of some twenty of those caught; many others were pardoned, others published declarations of loyalty to President Makarios.

Those tried were in the main artisans and junior white-collar workers.

These incidents (particularly the assumed involvement of Yorgadjis in the attempt on Makarios' life) caused great unease in the island, particularly since Yorgadjis, as minister over the police, had been responsible for giving to many people the jobs they held. The man who had in February 1969 founded the United Party with Yorgadjis, Glavkos Clerides, was left with the unenviable political legacy of his association with the dead man; his problem was effectively to dissociate himself and his party from the mud that was happily flung from all sides at Yorgadjis' name, but aimed also at the survivors.

Once again, Cypriot politics became the scene of universal attempts to monopolise the legitimacy of Archbishop Makarios, who was - if popular accounts are to be believed - giving tacit support to all parties from AKEL through to the more respectable right-nationalist groups. Only Evdokas and the Grivas faction failed to claim secret Presidential favour.

I have given this particular kind of material from the independence period because it supports and clarifies the material I shall now consider from the village fieldwork. If I have appeared to dwell unduly on instability, rivalry, tension and the naked exercise of power, this perhaps reflects the view of my predominantly village informants. But although the stridency of the Cypriot press often lend the magnifying and distorting qualities of an echo chamber to the smallest political messages, I believe that an impartial and well-informed observer in the capital would have produced similar

observations and emphases. A full account of the government programmes of the period would have to review the considerable social and economic progress made by the Greek community, and a number of achievements in the areas of social welfare and agricultural development. Such progress was not nearly so marked for the Turkish community, restricted by their own rebellion within enclaves and usually ^{to}/infertile land.

(vi) Political Change and Representation

One of the more striking facts to emerge from this discussion has been the discontinuity of political representation over the last forty years. As I noted in the first chapter, before 1931 villagers were able to exercise some choice in the selection of village muktars, and there was an electoral system for the Members of the Legislative Assembly. At time of writing, muktars continue to be appointed by government. From 1931-1959 there were no elections to the Legislative Assembly, and politically most of this period was marked by opposition to British rule. Elections to the Assembly were held in 1959, postponed for 1964 due to the intercommunal unrest, and only held again in 1970.

Two other types of national elections were open to villagers in this period - for Archbishop, and for President of the Republic since 1959. Since 1945 there have in fact been two elections for Archbishop and two for President. In all these cases there have been two candidates each time, and each time the organised left has been formally supporting one; however, it is worth noting too that Archbishop Makarios III, the successful winner of the second Archiepiscopal election,

has also been the favourite and winner in both Presidential elections.

I have performed the prosaic task of counting these electoral opportunities, and hinting at the restrictions on representation implicit in them. Two archbishops, two presidents, and two Legislative Assemblies (over forty years) do not amount to a great deal of political experience. When the predominance of Makarios in three of these elections, and the passivity of the left's electoral tactics in two of them are also considered, as well as the recent rash of contingencies and crises surrounding the electoral process which are the legacy of intercommunal strife, then the poverty of electoral experience is underlined. This is in sharp contrast to the continuity and relative progress in the economic and social sectors.

There are two other tendencies which must be noted. One is the obvious fact of transition from British to Cypriot rule. This has turned out to be ridden with difficulties. The second is a transition from an indigenous political process dominated entirely by elite leadership, trying to wrest benefits from a foreign government, to a situation where universal suffrage must lead to a responsiveness on the part of elected representatives to mass demands. In chapter 11 I shall describe how during the 1970 elections politicians of all parties wooed the wondering electorate with promises of social benefits - something of a novelty for their listeners. In this they were only carrying on the attempts of men like HajiPavlou, in the 1920's, to appeal on a populist platform to a suspicious peasantry. In this chapter the fact of a

discontinuity between the days of HajiPavlou and the campaign speeches of May 1970 has been presented. This discontinuity meant that everything that was done for villagers was done from above. The political instability of the period, contrasted with the parallel economic development may explain the villagers' ambivalence to representative politics, which in comparison with the fruits of personal labour, offer benefits more doubtful than certain.

Footnotes to Chapter 7

- (1) Davis (1969) points out that for somewhat different reasons the Picticcesi have had a wide variety of political experiences in this century, and still enjoy a broad range of opportunities for alignment.
- (2) My main sources for the background material in this chapter have been Hill (1952), Stephens (1966), Alastos (1955), Campbell & Sherrard (1968), Tsoucalas (1969), Foley (1964), Harbottle (1970), Adams (1971). However, there was little more substantial than newspaper articles to provide for the period from 1968 onwards, for obvious reasons. No definitive study of Greek Cypriot political history since 1931 exists, and most writers concentrate on intercommunal relations.
- (3) Kyriakos Markides, personal communication. At time of writing Markides is preparing his doctoral thesis for publication, but I have not been able to read it.
- (4) I do not think there had been a comparable movement among the Turkish minority. Anderson (1958) suggests that the spirit behind post-war legislative reform of Islamic law was one of intensified ethnic consciousness, in direct opposition to the Greeks. The Turkish minority began, under British stimulation, to counter demands for Enosis with their matching demand for Taksim, partition, in the late 1950's. More recently, the notion of Double Enosis has been widely discussed in both communities. By this is meant, partition of the island, with one section becoming part of the political community of Greece, and the other of Turkey.

- (5) In Grivas' memoirs (ed. Foley) he states that PEKA reported directly to him. The issue of co-ordination between the military struggle and the political campaign headed by Makarios is a matter of factional dispute between the two principals and their supporters.
- (6) Patriotikon Metopon. Not to be confused with the illegal organisation which first appeared in 1969, the Ethnikon Metopon, or National Front.

CHAPTER 8VILLAGE SOLIDARITY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS1963-70Introduction

In this chapter I present and analyse six cases of village politics during the first ten years of Independence, and assess their implications for the solidarity of the village, the rules, formal and informal of political competition in the village, and the differences in values of some major actors in the arena of the village. The first four cases are reconstructions of events, pieced together from accounts by several informants. The last two cases took place during my fieldwork, and I observed much of what was involved.

This chapter also marks a turning point in both aims and methods. Up till now the concern has been to describe the main structural and institutional facts necessary to understand the process of politics in the village. In effect, a number of building blocks have been assembled, and from here on, in changing the emphasis from structure to process, the concern is also to show the blocks as they appear in social situations, joined together. To do this I shall present in considerable narrative detail extended case histories which show a number of facets of politics in the village. It might be argued that the narrative detail is too great for the theoretical yield which is extracted. To this, my reply must be first, that the social anthropology of the Mediterranean area in particular, as well

as of the political process in developing countries are in their infancy. Arguably, the political process has been the area of Mediterranean ethnography least well served by existing monographs. Secondly, I maintain that there is no reason to retreat from one of the classic tasks of social anthropology - the presentation of rich ethnographic data - simply because we are also concerned to advance existing theory. Thirdly, that in analysis of a society midway between traditional peasantry, and a modern state of literate citizens description of the political culture will be of considerable theoretical interest. Political culture is necessarily a somewhat general notion, and here I mean it to stand for whatever is distinctive about the style, values and character of Cypriot politics. To reveal such features requires detailed attention to the behaviour of individuals in varied social situations. From here on I resort, then, to a focus on the behaviour of particular individuals, and do this at length.

The six cases of this chapter are all concerned with competition for prestige or power between villagers, and although outside resources are often employed, the main arena is the village, and the main protagonists the villagers themselves. In chapter nine, the focus shifts to relations between villagers and the larger society. In this case the main theme is the struggle of Kallo and several surrounding villages to speed up government construction of a dam, and the opposition of Market Town to this dam. Chapter ten shows the cleavage between Market Town and its satellite villages again operating (in time it co-exists with the issue of the dam) but this time in the

context of the administration of the citrus co-operative, in which many villagers and Market Townsmen are shareholders. Chapter eleven discusses the consequences for Kallo of the electoral campaigns of two main parties in 1970, and how this campaign tested the solidarity of leading Kallotes. Thus, each chapter focuses on a different organisational level of Kallo politics. In real life several series of events were going on simultaneously, and with the same personnel. For analytic purposes I have treated them separately, both for the sake of clarity, and for the insight they give into the complex inter-relation of the several political fields involved.

(1) The Case of the Graduates' Club

Vourros was born in the neighbouring village of Kammari, married the daughter of a Kallo muktar, and together they live in a large house in the capital. They have very large land holdings in the village, and a house. They are often there. Vourros has a university degree from Britain, and teaches in a private school. His views on village life stress the need for thrift, hard work, strict accounting; he deplores the drinking, swearing and spitting of the coffee-shops, the respect for physical toughness. He has fairly strong views on the need to 'develop' villages.

In 1962 he proposed to several other educated men in the village that they do what his own and several other villages had done - start a club for gymnasium graduates, a sylogos apophyton, in which villagers with secondary education could come together to chat, read newspapers, play chess, drink coffee, and perhaps occasionally discuss problems of the village. They might even invite outside speakers to address them. The

club would, he hastened to add, be non-political.

He found those with whom he discussed the idea quite enthusiastic. He continued with the idea until he had sounded out most of the eligible men in the village. They got as far as agreeing a date for meeting, to discuss a constitution.

In the event, nothing happened. Several people who had previously expressed enthusiasm approached Vourros and said on thinking it over they had decided that really the village was all right as it was, and they did not really need a club for those with secondary education. At first Vourros was puzzled, and when he pressed people, they became uncomfortable. Finally it came out that Moustachas, the leader of the village EOKA group in the 1950's, a farmer with substantial land and a small supplementary government job, had heard about the scheme, and said in his view it would be a bad thing for the village, because it would undoubtedly become political in tone. Having expressed himself strongly against it, and suggested to other people that they should see it his way, previous support for the scheme simply evaporated. Vourros tried a direct discussion with Moustachas on the subject, assuring him of the lack of political intention, but Moustachas, who had not enjoyed secondary education, would not change his view.

Privately Moustachas pointed out that several people interested in the club were leftists or left sympathisers, and he was sure they would try to take it over.

At this point Vourros might still have succeeded, because there was one man in the village who could have talked Moustachas round, or at least, acted as a counter-weight. This was the teacher Dhaskalos who was both a known right-wing

nationalist, with a record of EOKA service in the village as well as being an educated man. Dhaskalos insists that Vourros, believing him to be hostile to the notion anyway, failed to approach him at the right time. Thus Dhaskalos simply stood back and watched. He believed a club would be good for the village; he thought Moustachas' view was wrong (he had in any case some personal differences with him which dated from the period of EOKA leadership) but he was not prepared to support Vourros. He took the simple step of not turning up to the initial meeting that Vourros had tried to organise. He did nothing so direct as tell him either that he would not come, or why he would not come. Indeed he had told Vourros that he would come.

That was the end of the Graduate's Club, but Vourros continued to think about it, and built up a picture of the village as a place where education was rejected, and only the ability to use guns carried any weight.

Why should the proposed formation of the Graduates Club have produced Moustachas' determined opposition, and why should the event be regarded as in any way memorable by those involved? There are a number of reasons. First, Moustachas was undoubtedly sincere in his belief that the leftists might dominate such a club. For one thing it is part of the right's picture of the left that it is constantly engaged in a secret move to increase its power; secondly the right sees the left as working among ^{other} things through literacy, book-learning. Sklyros, for example, is known to do a lot of reading in his spare time, and so did the village's first two Communists. "They read a lot, those cuckolds" was a remark I heard on many occasions. So to Moustachas the idea of a leftist take-over of the Graduates Club

was plausible.

He also had something to gain by his action. To have taken action which could be reported in anti-communist circles as vigilance was useful, and at the same time, to have demonstrated his power in the village was part of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Since the days of the EOKA struggle there do not seem to have been many opportunities for Moustachas to have laid down the law in the village. Here was a chance and he took it.

The reasons given so far are to do with Moustachas' personal power and position, and make him sound extremely calculating. This by itself would be misleading. There are other aspects which must be considered which may have influenced him but of which he need not have been consciously aware. At this period Kallo was a homogenous^e community in the sense that there were no strongly institutionalized arrangements for social distinctions between members of the village. Although Vourros could not see it this way, his proposal to introduce a Graduates Club was a proposal to introduce emphatic and institutionalised inequality into the village. This is not to say that in a solidary community everyone mixes socially with everyone else on terms of absolute equality. I have already made it clear in my discussion of land, occupation, status, life styles and the arrangement of marriage that the villagers are well aware of social differences. This does not mean however that they are generally enthusiastic to have such differences institutionalised. Since the actual decision to oppose the Club came from a single man, who was quite widely feared in the village, it would be incorrect to take his views

as simply representing those of the village at large. Also, in other villages, such clubs have been accepted for many years. Some are political, others are not. It is important to note however, that whether or not the club would have become political in the way Moustachas said it would, it would have unambiguously symbolised a most important difference between villagers.

I have argued in chapter seven that during the early years of independence, there was a structural conflict in Cypriot society, expressed by individuals' statements that others were not entitled to benefits - jobs, scholarships etc. The individuals in question were members of certain categories, in broadest terms an uneducated rural mass with aroused expectations, and an educated urban elite.

The episode in the village over the formation of a club for Graduates has, as one of its several causes, the way in which Vourros and Moustachas represent the opposed values and characteristics of these categories. In this sense the dispute was a miniature version of a pervasive, general conflict within the larger society, which will become more sharply defined by the next case.

Before passing to it however, it is worth relating an interesting sequel to the events of 1963. In January 1970, a man in his middle twenties freshly returned from a university degree from Greece, and like Vourros a secondary school teacher from a wealthy farming family, tried to set up a Graduate's Club in the village. In a few words, his experiences turned out very much the same as Vourros'. Initially there was a lot of

verbal support which however soon faded. He discovered that certain people were blocking the club, the supporters in the main of a right-wing nationalist party. He himself was an open supporter of a left-wing nationalist party. The men who opposed him were mostly uneducated farmers with solid land holdings; but they were supported by a few young men with secondary education, who now face the difficulties of finding appropriate jobs in a shrinking market.

In 1971 a right-wing nationalist club was formed in the village, which no-one had the temerity to oppose. But in these situations, nationalism is usually defined as non-political and the club in theory is open to all.

The chief reason that Moustachas was able to get his way in the first place was because Vourros and the other educated men were afraid that he would use force if they persisted with their plans, and that his EOKA connections, and urban patrons among former EOKA fighters would support him in anything he chose to do. Vourros had already had one scare during the EOKA period⁽¹⁾ and he was not prepared to take the matter further. It is very likely that Moustachas would not have resorted to force in this issue; the critical fact was that others thought he might. Later events will make clear why they thought so.

(ii) The case of the Cretan guns

The fighting that broke out in December 1963 had its repercussions in the village. One of these was that in the first half of 1964 the EOKA group in Kallo decided to form a volunteer militia unit to protect the village in the event of a direct Turkish attack, and also to take part in fighting generally in defence of the Greek community in the island.

It must be stressed that information on such topics is hard to obtain, but the evidence suggests that the volunteer militia groups were those already planned by Yorgadjis and Koshis prior to the Turkish rebellion⁽²⁾. However until the return of General Grivas to Cyprus in June 1964, militia groups and "private armies" acted with a high degree of local autonomy. Several accounts agree that the Makarios government had a serious problem in trying to control the behaviour of such groups during the fighting.

Although Moustachas was the senior EOKA man in the village involved with the volunteer militia he seems to have shared the command of the militia unit with his wife's sister's son Vasilakis, who partly due to his uncle's intercession had been commissioned in the Cyprus Army. Several other prominent EOKA people were also in command positions in the unit, and some 50 or 60 village men volunteered as 'other ranks'. On this occasion, unlike the 1954-59 EOKA struggle, known leftists were admitted to the militia, the view being taken that the national threat from the Turks was such that even leftists could be relied on to fight wholeheartedly for their country.

The first job of the militia unit was to obtain guns. The government was very short of weapons at this period, so the Kallo unit organised a house-to-house collection to raise money for the guns. They used a system of assessment by the relative wealth of the family, with a large landowner being assessed at about £20 and a poor man at a pound or two. Even those who felt that perhaps the purchase of arms at this point was ill-advised

and that such matters should be left to the central government, were not inclined to resist the assessed contributions, since this would have appeared unpatriotic, and no-one wanted to argue with the EOKA men in the village. In the end about £1,000 was collected, and three men were sent to Crete via Athens to buy guns. In due course they returned with some guns. But some of the villagers felt that these guns were in poor condition, were few in number, and that even when the essential expenses of the trip were taken into account, there was rather little to show for the money. They also heard from people in other villages who had sent similar missions that the guns were given away free by the Cretans. There was therefore some ill-feeling about the Cretan guns, and years later people were saying quite openly in the coffee shops about the trip and the money epha'an ta 'they ate it'.

Faced with a loss of support, albeit probably of a muted nature, the EOKA group running the militia revived a device which had existed in the 1954-59 period, the formation of a special committee, the Co-ordinating Committee (Syntonistiki Epitropia). It is possible that the initiative for the formation of this committee did not come directly from the leaders of the militia unit but from other members of the village. However, the militia leaders accepted the idea and even agreed to the presence of several leftists on the committee. It is agreed by all parties in Kallo that the initiative for the committee did not come from the central government or any other official body, even though in some other villages similar committees emerged during these months.

The minutes kept by the committee - which I examined - begin by specifying who are recognised as the leaders of the militia unit, and go on to specify the members of the Committee. Of the ten men named⁽³⁾ one is the muktar, two are the two most prominent leftists, Sklyros and Tangos, the brother of one of the three men to go on the Cretan trip. No-one suggested to me that he would not be impartial. A fourth is Vourros. Patris and his brother were members and several other nationalists. The aims of the Committee were listed as concerning (I quote):

- (1) the agricultural and family problems of militia unit members
- (2) political and economic problems, such as relations with the Kallo Turks
- (3) general economic losses to the Turks
- (4) control of military activities, by liaison between the militia unit and the Committee. The teacher Dhaskalos was selected as the militia leader responsible for liaison
- (5) that militia unit members shall give 48 hours notice of agricultural work needed to be handled by the Committee
- (6) the Committee to have the final say on the actual payments by unit members
- (7) that good accounts are to be kept and audits allowed for all financial transactions
- (8) the volunteer militia unit to give account for the outstanding previously collected money (the Athens-Crete trip)
- (9) in the event of differences of opinion between the

Committee and the militia unit, the local district Legislative Assembly representative to be the arbitrator⁽⁴⁾.

Informants explained that one of the outstanding problems of the volunteer militia was that during the absences of the men for training or fighting (and it must be stressed that the Kallo unit was involved in heavy fighting on several occasions) the agricultural work involved in their landholdings needed attention. In the case of crops like potatoes and carrots, a day or two's delay at critical harvesting times can lead to complete destruction of the crop. For the village to handle such administrative problems it was essential to obtain money to pay other people to do the work, by taxing the village yet again. Clauses (6) and (7) are thus to be seen as attempts to prevent the sort of dissatisfaction that occurred over the Cretan guns. Clause (8) one informant insisted was inserted through the efforts of Vourros.

It should be noted that one of the issues that Vourros and some of the leftists in the village, such as Sklyros, felt was in danger of being mishandled was the treatment of the Kallo Turks. It seems that a few of the more excitable and extreme persons connected with the militia were anxious that the Kallo Turks possibly with the help of other Turks from outside, would try to harm the Greek community. Since the Kallo Turks were outnumbered 20 to 1 and since Kallo is strategically rather far away from a major Turkish concentration as well as being surrounded by exclusively Greek villages, their fears may be seen to have been groundless, but in the atmosphere of alarm and vigilance of the period, such views undoubtedly had

some effect. At one point a few persons were speaking of driving the Kallo Turks out of the village, and over this issue Vourros spoke very hard and critically of such views. Sklyros also used his baptismal koumbaros relationship with Moustachas to persuade him to go with him one evening when the militia was preparing to go into action against a distant Turkish village, and reassure the Kallo Turks, who were terrified, that not only did the Kallo Greeks mean them no harm but that in the event of outsiders coming to harm them, the Kallo Greeks would defend them. These episodes cast light on clauses (2), (3) and (4). However I am not able to say definitely if the concern and discussion about the Kallo Turks happened before the formation of the Committee, and directly produced the relevant clauses, although the evidence suggests this. Informants are not certain about sequences of events here.

Also at roughly this period there were undoubtedly certain personal animosities between Vourros and Vasilakis, the army officer. On one occasion Vasilakis said to Vourros "What you need is a bullet: not actually in your head, but just close enough to put some sense into it". In terms of the way most village people speak to Vourros, this was highly disrespectful, and confirmed all the reservations Vourros had about the tendency of the villagers to turn to violence or threats of violence at the least excuse.

In this period of approximately six months, January - June 1964, Vourros had been engaged, using his professional skills in preparing hand-grenades for the use of the Greek militia in Nicosia. Vasilakis on several occasions asked him to bring some grenades for the use of the Kallo militia unit, but this he

always refused to do on the grounds that he was acting under orders, and was accountable for all the grenades produced, and that these were under the direct control of the government.

I would have liked to place this series of events related to the Cretan guns trip and the formation of the Co-ordinating Committee in a precise time-sequence and to state the effect that each event had upon the others. This is not possible. To do so would be to transmute impressions - both mine and my informants - into the more weighty metal of certainty. In spite of this weakness it is clear that during this period a number of incidents took place connected with the formation of the militia, involving some of the more influential people in the village, and that these incidents reflected real and divisive differences of opinion about how village affairs should be conducted.

The first recorded minute of the Co-ordinating Committee is entered by Vourros, and it thanks Vasilakis, as officer in charge of the militia for having co-operated in presenting the accounts of the Cretan trip, but asks if he could further provide the actual list of names of villagers and amounts collected because the amounts set down do not tally.

The Committee decided to meet every Saturday evening regularly, and to have special meetings if needed. The next meeting noted that a list of tax-payers was being prepared, and that an association of tractor owners had put the money owed to it at the disposal of the committee. At the next meeting, among other things decided, were that one member should take responsibility for certain 'special losses' to the Turks of the village. These arose when some shepherds had turned

their flocks to graze in the Turks' croplands, and later, when another villager had taken 50 lorry loads of earth from a Turkish field without payment. Another item minuted was that the militia unit commander, Vasilakis, was requested to attend regular committee meetings as often as possible. The last item was a request that the accounts for the Cretan arms trip be presented "With the least delay possible, so that the unity of the village will not be broken". At the next meeting, neither Vasilakis nor his uncle Moustachas were present. It was decided that the shepherds should pay the Turks £5 for damage to their carrots, and the man who had taken 50 lorry loads of earth to pay £5 for them, which was only slightly under the market rate. This man was married to the half-sister of Sklyros the leftist leader, who is also at this point writing up the committee minutes.

At a later meeting, one committee man resigns in order to allow his place to be taken by 'an educated man'. Four names are put forward, in order of preference. All four are school-teachers.

In the end, Vourros signed the accounts for the Cretan trip, although he had great reservations about them. He saw himself as having no practical alternative. At one point, when a villager was refusing to co-operate with the Committee, Vourros asked some of the tougher members to deal with him, knowing that this might involve force; another act of the committee was to resolve to help the Turkish mukhtar of the village to find his wife, who had gone off (in the last stages of pregnancy) with a Red Cross medical team. At the last meeting minuted, it states that the future of the committee

was discussed, but no details are given.

The committee in fact lasted from March to November, 1964. There are two quite different explanations given for why it stopped. Some of the leftists claim that it became an efficient instrument for conducting village affairs, and was about to start looking into other matters of communal interest. They insist that when the rightists realised this they decided to have nothing more to do with it, and by continually staying away, effectively brought it to an end. Sklyros is a proponent of this view, and is particularly bitter about the issue, since he says that the right, by which he means the militia leaders, Moustachas and Vasilakis needed the leftists on the committee after the Cretan guns fiasco, to give it new legitimacy in the village. His theory is that the leftists had a reputation for honesty, and that this was the only way the militia could retain the confidence of the villagers. However, since they as rightists hated to see the left succeed in anything, when the committee became effective, they undermined it.

Moustachas' account is different. He stated that once Grivas returned to Cyprus, in June 1964, and set about organising through conscription a disciplined National Guard, the need for a volunteer militia acting on its own, diminished. The committee folded up because its work came to an end.

I have no way of deciding between these two versions. There is no reason why both may not be substantially true, and complementary. The committee was, as far as I can see, an ad hoc measure, taken on local rather than governmental initiatives, and specifically designed to create a unified authority, representing all shades of political opinion among

the Greeks of the village. The mukhtar and azades could not do this because they were all non-leftists, and thought to be easily influenced by the more vocal nationalists. Once the national situation had become more normal, and a National Guard had been formed the specific purpose of the committee would have come to an end. It would be galling for the right-wing leaders to either admit that they had depended on left support, or to go on co-operating with the left, so they effectively withdrew. The remaining members could not act by themselves for the village, having neither any legal status, nor any legal authority to speak for the village, if the nationalists stayed away.

The Cretan guns episode, the formation of the committee, the matters undertaken by the committee have a certain continuity with the issue of the Graduates' Club: Vourros is again involved. Moustachas is less prominent, but his nephew Vasilakis held very similar views politically. There are two sets of views and values, which I extrapolate from these events:

Vourros represents the question, quis custodiet ipsos custodies - who will protect the rest of the village from the vagaries of its volunteer guardians? He represents a legalistic, bureaucratic position, like that of a rate-payer who wants to see his money properly spent. Through the minutes, and the committee decisions, some control is exerted over the use of money, damage to Turkish property, the convenience of the militia. The notion that the committee needed more educated people on it underlines these issues.

The militia views are not recorded in the minutes, but from the way the events were described to me, there was a good

deal of resentment at the 'interference' of Vourros and other committee members, who were thought to be pre-occupied with trifling details, hampering those who due to their military experience, courage and patriotism were engaged in the serious issues of village and national defence.

Before leaving this case, it is worth noting some of the other consequences. Future collections for weapons were on a more genuinely voluntary basis. Vourros had enough of village politics for some time, and withdrew from them. He did not really take much further part in things until 1969. In 1968 he was owed for two years' water by Moustachas and was not pressing for payment, although he would have liked the money. The reason was that he was still nervous of Moustachas.

However, as I shall explain in the next chapter, in 1969 there was another opportunity for the village to throw up a special committee to meet a special crisis, and once again Vourros was prominent. Moustachas and Vasilakis however both stayed away from it.

(iii) The case of the Lyssarides group

Before discussing certain events which occurred in Kallo during 1965, a few words are needed about Dr Vassos Lyssarides. He is a medical doctor, trained in Athens, who for the last ten years at least has been Makarios' personal physician and close confidant. Lyssarides was in the 1940's a member of AKEL but withdrew. He seems to have had some connections with EOKA and certainly distinguished himself in the 1964 fighting by taking a group of men to storm a Turkish position on the Kyrenia range. He is a socialist, takes an anti-NATO pro-third world stance, including strong support for the Arab countries.

This raised the suggestion that he might be a pro-Makarios,

However he also strives to include himself within what is called "the nationalist camp" in Cyprus. Rightists who mistrust him for his leftism usually admit that by fighting he has proved himself an ardent nationalist. Lyssarides has also had two recurring themes in his political statements since 1964. One is that there are plots going on against Makarios, and the other is the theme of popular vigilance, suggesting that people's volunteer militias should be formed to protect the government and Makarios. In 1965 he was continually stressing both these themes and again in 1970. He implied that a coup was being planned by extreme right elements in the Cyprus Army, the police force, and among the Greek Army contingent.

During this period two young Kallo brothers, both gymnasium graduates, D. and L. Fanou, had come to know the doctor, and to be influenced by him. Since they worked in Nicosia they could easily visit him in his office where he always welcomed political supporters. They decided to form a small group in Kallo in support of him, and started to meet in various houses in the village. Among others involved was Patris, the father-in-law of D. Fanou, and his brother, Oligos, both of whom had been EOKA activists in the village. There was also a schoolteacher, who had been at gymnasium with Lyssarides and was his koumbaros. There were between 15 and 20 people meeting regularly in this group, several of whom had been active in EOKA and the militia, and one of whom was a 'spy' in that he was not there in good faith, but for the purpose of reporting what was going on to the teacher Dhaskalos.

Dhaskalos' version of the situation is that Lyssarides at this period was suggesting that he alone was truly pro-Makarios,

and that his supporters in the village believed this, and for this reason failed to invite either Dhaskalos himself, or the EOKA leader Moustachas to join the new group. They even suggested that Dhaskalos was not loyal to Makarios, which he regarded as a serious insult, and was angered. However, on his own admission, he - probably like many other thoughtful nationalists in the island - was in two minds over which to support - Makarios or Grivas. When asked by a friend at this time what he thought, he replied "We have to choose between a treasury and a pistol"; he meant that Makarios as controller of patronage, was the treasurer, and Grivas the pistol. He was at the time attracted to the pistol, but claims he was acting independently of Moustachas and Vasilakis.

There was another background issue which played a part, although a part difficult to judge precisely. A year or two previously, the Fanos family had been very friendly with Moustachas. He had often eaten and drunk in their house. They were undoubtedly hoping to obtain through him some form of scholarship for one of the younger children in the family, a girl, so that she could study at university in Greece more cheaply. Such scholarships were sometimes made available to the families of persons who had been closely involved in the EOKA struggle, and Moustachas' word as the senior EOKA man in the village might have carried a lot of weight. In the early years of the 1960's, Moustachas was consulted over the appointment of Kallio people to government jobs, especially on the all-important question of saying if they were communists or not. Eventually however it was his own daughter, a girl who, it was said, had done much less well at Gymnasium than old Fanos' girl,

who received a scholarship to Greece. After this relations between the Fanos family and Moustachas were colder.

There was another personal matter. When D. Fanou became interested in supporting Lyssarides, he started arguing with various people in the village. Among these was Moustachas' nephew Vasilakis. They had a serious political argument some time before the events I am about to describe. My informant suggested that since D. Fanou was also in the militia and nominally under the command of Vasilakis as the officer, he may have felt the need for a more powerful ally in a quarrel with a military superior and that this would have encouraged his stronger support for Lyssarides. The truth of such a view cannot be weighed; but the interpretation itself speaks powerfully of the political culture of the village.

Information on the alignments of individuals at this time is less reliable than most other data I present in this thesis, because since 1964 there have been major factional re-alignments both in the village and in the capital (which will be discussed more fully in chapter 11); because of this my informants were undoubtedly concerned to put themselves in the best possible light.

The militia group which was the subject of the last case was the creation of the Minister of the Interior, and the pro-Makarios group of politicians. However, when Grivas returned in mid-1964 a dispute broke out between him and the Minister, Yorgadjis, over control of the National Guard, and the armed forces generally. There was also growing hostility between Yorgadjis and another nationalist leader outside the government, Nikos Sampson. On the left, Yorgadjis was continually attacked

politically by Lyssarides. His power was feared, and he was believed to keep his rivals and their supporters under surveillance.

These rivalries and animosities among national leaders were probably reflected in village militias, and groups of supporting clients. However, in Kallo they were kept under control and kept quiet, partly because some village leaders were trying to keep their options open, and avoided openly committing themselves. Moustachas for example had a government job, which Yorgadjis, as Minister of the Interior, could have taken away from him, but he was also koumbaros of Sampson, who was becoming increasingly outspoken in his criticisms of Yorgadjis. Moustachas was also linked, through his wife's sister's son Vasilakis, to pro-Grivas elements in the Cyprus National Guard. In what follows I assume that the village militia leaders were reporting to the Ministry of the Interior; but there may also have been an active connection with other factions in the National Guard.

This, then, was the background: a number of members of the village militia were developing loyalties to different nationalist leaders and were watching each other, in an atmosphere of rumoured plots and planned coups in the capital.

One night the Lyssarides group called one of its secret meetings in the house of Patris. Members of the militia group claim that one of the subjects under discussion was of obtaining arms supplies, and that Patris' brother Oligos was appointed as the man in charge. However, the Lyssarides group probably had no weapons at this time. At some point during the meeting they heard a noise and on opening the door found several

young men of the militia group outside, apparently listening to their meeting. Angry words were exchanged, and scuffles. One of the Lyssarides group, the young teacher, L. Fanou, tugged at the coat of one of the militia group and saw a sten gun was concealed under it. During the scuffle someone shouted out "This is the last night you meet here".

The militia groups' version states firmly that no weapons were carried, and that the meaning or intention of the phrase "This is the last night ..." merely referred to the intention of the militia group to allow no more meetings of a furtive political nature in Kallo. The phrase is not supposed to contain any threat of violence. The Lyssarides' group version however is insistent that weapons were carried, and in one variant that the militia group were actually discussing throwing a grenade into the room.

The cluster of angry people finally dispersed from the house, but all the participants remained in a high state of tension. Among other things which had been said by the militia group was that the insults to Grivas must stop. This small detail perhaps explains some of what then occurred. The teacher L. Fanou went to Nicosia in the morning and reported the events of the previous night to Dr. Lyssarides, who was suitably angry at the way his supporters had been treated. Later L. Fanou wrote a small description of the event which with the help of another Lyssarides supporter he managed to get printed on the front page in one of the newspapers owned by Nikos Sampson. It stated briefly that an attempt had been made to threaten a group of pro-Makarios people having a peaceful democratic discussion in the village of Kallo and gave

the distinct impression that the militia group were anti-Makarios.

This move produced a very strong reaction from the militia group in the village. They were furious for several reasons. First, they were being described as anti-Makarios. This was both ideologically and practically undesirable: ideologically because Makarios has always held centre stage in recent Cypriot politics, and those who have strongly opposed him have been in weak positions: practically because several of the militia group held jobs which were within the government - Moustachas, his nephew Vasilakis, who had actually sent the militia group members to watch the house, and Dhaskalos the teacher. The possible threat of loss of job, loss of promotion or transfer to far-off places always hung over their heads.

Another reason for anger on the part of the militia group was that they and the village in general were being brought into disrepute with the outside world for high-handed methods. "An insult to the village" was a common line of their protest. In any event, night after night Moustachas sat drinking in the coffee shops saying that when he found out who had written the piece he would shoot him. Dhaskalos went to see his friend Nikos Sampson and said "What the hell do you mean by printing a thing like that in your paper? We support your newspaper, and this is what you do. Is this what you mean by friendship?" He also asked Sampson to clarify the rumour which one of the leaders of the Lyssarides group was spreading - that Sampson was forming a group which would co-operate with Lyssarides' group. Sampson denied this categorically, and told Dhaskalos that if this had been the case, then as the chief Sampson

supporter in the village he would have been the first to hear about it: and that he had not known about the newspaper story in advance, so was not directly to blame for it.

Because feeling was running so high in the village, various people made efforts to reconcile the two groups. Vourros was one of these. The District MP (who had been nominated as arbitrator in the relationship between the formal militia group and the Co-ordinating Committee) was approached. He was on good terms with leaders of both groups (5). There were a series of meetings involving different representatives of the two groups. One was in the house of the Kallo priest, at the suggestion of the MP. At this meeting two documents were produced. One written by Dhaskalos, described the newspaper report and the whole event as a 'misunderstanding' (parexygysis) and asserted that no threat had taken place. The other document, prepared by L. Fanou stuck to the original story in its main outlines, that is, that a threat had taken place. Since no agreement could be reached, both versions were taken to the MP to decide. Here once again versions differ. The militia group claim that he decided in favour of their version, but that the Lyssarides group would not accept the verdict. They for their part claim he did not decide one way or the other. Debate dragged on in the coffee shops for weeks and even months, about who was 'really' pro-Makarios and who was not, who had been in the right and who in the wrong. Some of those involved continued to be very angry and not speak to others for nearly a year.

Most of the versions of this episode also stress that at the several mediatory meetings Moustachas continued to complain that the people of the Lyssarides' group had been going behind

his back, and organising political actions without consulting him. The essence of his complaint was that his authority, rooted in his EOKA and militia activities, was being eroded. Insofar as he failed to get the newspaper item 'corrected' it could be said he failed to re-establish his position. Indeed the very fact that an issue which a few years before he might have settled with a few words in a few right ears, had now been referred outside the village in several different directions (to Lyssarides, to the MP, possibly to Yorgadjis), was a clear indication that Moustachas no longer 'did what he liked' in the village. At the same time there is some slight evidence that the main decisions in the episode were not taken by Moustachas, but by the younger and politically more sophisticated man, the teacher Dhaskalos. There was also some tension between Dhaskalos and Moustachas from earlier differences. There is a further complication: one member of the militia unit who actually went to the house to spy on the meeting was the younger brother of Vasilakis, the Cyprus Army officer. He argued that if he did not give his older brother full details of the meeting and the action taken, Vasilakis might get into trouble with his military superiors for failing to do his job properly. Later, it was argued by some members of the militia group that the officer Vasilakis had tried to take all the credit for the episode as if it were all his idea. This point makes it clear that in some circles at least there was an idea that something had occurred for which credit could be taken, a thought that might not immediately strike an outside observer.

From the point of view of the nationalist right, there

was something to take credit for, so Moustachas did not come out of the episode without some gains: the Lyssarides group episode had several other consequences. First, the group as an active organisation ceased to exist. One by one members dropped out. Only three or four of the original fifteen or more remained open supporters of the doctor. Among the most dramatic defectors was the leader, D. Fanou. His father-in-law Patris, and Patris' brother Oligos also dropped out, and are later in this story to be found as staunch supporters of other emergent and established political groupings of the nationalist right. This seems to have been the choice of most of the other members of the group. L. Fanou (the younger brother of D. Fanou) and the teacher who was Lyssarides classmate and koumbaros) both remained quietly loyal to the doctor, hampered by their roles as teachers from more active support. It is probably that they were only emboldened to support the Lyssarides group openly at the time because the action could have been defended as related to national defence and support for the government and thus not crudely "political". This was certainly the rhetoric of Lyssarides' position.

The case then was a turning point in the career of Moustachas and in the life of the Lyssarides' group in Kallo; both lost by it. For D. Fanou it was also a turning point but perhaps a more profitable one. He decided in effect to take a less active part in politics. Several years later he was sent on a six months trip for special training to the USA by his civil service boss, who is also closely connected with PEK, the nationalist farmer's party. It was for this party that D. Fanou, his wife's father Patris, and Patris' brother,

Oligos, worked in the spring of 1970 (see chapter 11).

In a more general way the episode, apart from affecting the positions of individuals and of factions, affected the whole village. It was an object lesson both to the activists and to the village at large of the dangers to village solidarity which arose from letting commitments to political leaders and values outside the village play too strong a role. Looking back on this period villagers said to me 'We were more fanatic then' (which is the same thing they say about the late 1940's, when right and left had frequent confrontations both in the island and the village). The fact that villagers remember the incident at all, and remember it as a kind of failure, shows how a conscious interest in keeping the peace of the village is a firm value.

Later in this account I shall describe how in June 1970 political leaders in Kallo continually faced the possibility of new breaches in village solidarity due to the intensity of political activity, and by what methods they sought to restrain their followers. It may well be that one of the factors which told most strongly against Moustachas in the Lyssarides' group affair was his open threat to use force against the writer of the newspaper piece. This was regarded in the village subsequently as having been a thoroughly ill-considered action.

One important point which emerges from the episode is the nature of the gap between events at the national and local levels⁽⁶⁾. When Lyssarides was making calls for vigilance against a possible right-wing coup, he undoubtedly did not intend that one direct result should be any loss of political support for himself.

Yet this was the result in Kallo, and there could possibly have been results even more detrimental to Lyssarides' position such as the killing of some of his supporters. This suggests that leaders often have poor perceptions of the effects of their actions both on their followers and on those of their opponents. I shall have more to say about this in other cases. Cypriot politicians have been to some extent affected by British ideas of parliamentary democracy, and particularly enjoy the cut-and-thrust tradition of political debate. They also indulge in violent personal attacks on each other, and a standard manoeuvre consists of hinting at dark plots and evil designs by unnamed opponents. In the capital, in newspaper or in the Legislative Chamber the costs of such actions to the politicians are low, and roughly speaking they understand the rules of this game. In the village however the same speeches and manoeuvres can have less predictable consequences. The costs of confrontation and encounter are potentially much higher and the rules of the game were designed to control indigenous home-made disputes, with home-made norms. They do not easily control norms and manoeuvres favoured by the elite, who in turn are looking abroad for their models, to Athens, London, Moscow and elsewhere. The fact that both groups in Kallo turned so quickly to mediation, and used the mediatory process as the means of seeking further advantage is in itself most important. But to what extent this was a purely village decision and to what extent outside leaders influenced it I unfortunately cannot say.

(iv) Carrot and potato Union Elections

In 1963 Kallo formed its branch of the Carrot and Potato

Association. The regulations for the administration stipulated that there should be two committees - one the administrative committee and the other the supervisory council⁽⁷⁾. The committees would have responsibility for all administrative matters arising out of the washing and packing of the village's carrot production.

At the elections for these two committees the leaders of the right and left agreed to share the posts. It is worth noting that at the national level in this period, all nationalists were still loosely allied and apart from a few supporters of General Grivas, nationalists were united in support of the government. Leftists were also fully supporting the government. The major cleavage among Greeks was between left and right; but this was being kept to a minimum in the interests of 'national solidarity' in the early years of the Republic. Furthermore, the struggle between Greeks and Turks over the implementation of the constitution was in full swing.

The agreement to share the committee posts in the village was then a reflection to some extent of national policies. But when it came to the actual nominations, the two Kallo groups could not agree over procedure. Patris asked Sklyros as they sat in the village school preparing to vote, 'will you let us have the President of the Committee?', Sklyros said "We would like it"; Patris continued to ask for it, and finally, Sklyros decided to back down. At this point both groups thought that the President of the Committee, as opposed to the President of the Council, was the key post. Both units were composed of a president and four ordinary members. The committee, the actual workhorse, ended up with Patris as President, two other rightists and two leftists, one of whom

was Sklyros. The President of the Council was a rich leftist farmer, two more leftists, and two rightists. Things were in complete balance, except for the slight primacy of the President of the Committee.

Having settled this quietly, they turned to the matter of the secretary of the Association. This post carried a small salary, and demanded a certain amount of general administrative and bookkeeping experience. It was also a position of trust. It was a non-voting position. Sklyros wanted it, partly for the salary and partly because he thought he would do it better than any rightist, and partly because ideologically he favoured any form of agricultural co-operative organisation. However, it now turned out that the rightists and Patris in particular wanted to appoint Arklos, a first cousin of Patris. Arklos is one of the largest landowners in the village and is consequently usually very busy. So Sklyros commented "Charon cannot find Arklos ..." that is, he is so busy that death (Charon) would not find him when his hour comes. The two sides were now in deadlock. Sklyros was not inclined to back down again. Patris would not change, so they decided to each stand, and put it to the vote. They each received five votes, and a new deadlock resulted. Finally they decided to toss a coin. Sklyros won, and they wrote to the Department of Co-operative Development describing the procedure and outcome. They received a letter back saying this was not the correct way to do things, and that they should try again.

To avoid further dispute Sklyros suggested as compromise that old Fanos be given the job. To Sklyros he is mother's sister's husband, and to Patris, daughter's husband's father,

so the ties were close to both rivals. Old Fanos had many years practical experience as secretary of the Co-operative Credit Society in the village. Although thought of as a nationalist, he was regarded as politically inactive, and an independent-minded man whose appointment could not really be construed as a victory for one side or the other. The only problem was that he was elderly and probably therefore a bit slow. When Sklyros suggested him, the right were pleased to accept. They again wrote to the Department of Co-operative Development and this time received a letter saying that old Fanos was not suitable for the job and that they should try again. Now they were again back in the deadlock position.

At this point versions of the case differ and details are confused. The rightists went off to see the Commissioner, since there seemed no way out of the deadlock. Sklyros looked up the rules of the Co-operative and discovered to his amazement that it was the Council, and not the Committee which had the casting vote in deadlock situations, and that therefore he could, if he wished, become secretary. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Co-operatives had also come to this conclusion and told the rightists "The left have stolen a march on you ...". The upshot of all this was that the Department changed its mind about old Fanos and accepted him for the post but at a lower salary than previously suggested. Sklyros claims that instead of pressing his claim he said nothing 'to avoid conflict'. Both sides remember the end of the affair as a small victory for the right.

Right and left were actively opposed to the extent that they were contesting the positions on the committee; but they

were co-operating in so far as they discussed in advance the allocation of positions between themselves. In this they were repeating, for example, the policy of the political leaders at the national level during the 1960 elections to the House of Representatives. Finally, they failed to agree over the precise working-out of the agreement and both sides tried to secure what they considered to be the critical posts for their own nominees. They referred the issue on several occasions outside the village, to the department of government responsible, and their own compromises were twice rejected by that department. Finally the right sought special access to the department and a decision resulted which favoured the right.

This last point needs explanation: Azinas, the Commissioner of Co-operatives, is a civil servant with very wide powers approaching those of a Minister, had earlier in his life been the General Secretary of PEK, the nationalist-rightist farmer's union. PEK in turn, had been closely implicated with the early phase of the EOKA movement, and Azinas had been sent to Athens as political liaison officer between Makarios and EOKA on one side, and the Athens Government on the other. Azinas is known to be strongly anti-communist - it is even said that a brother of his was killed by the communists in the Greek Civil War. It is common knowledge in Cyprus, though it never appears in print, that Azinas is still the guiding hand behind PEK. As a civil servant he may not openly take an interest in politics; he must have daily dealings with left-wing committeemen on a number of co-operatives in the island, and in general is believed to conduct his purely administrative work fairly, although he has been heard to

lament the dominance of the left in the co-operative movement. Both rightists and leftists in Kallo believe that Azinas acted partially in the case just described. They see nothing odd about this, rather it was a "natural" event, which the right insist the left would have duplicated given half a chance.

The remaining point to be made about this dispute is that in a sense no resources were committed to or depended on its outcome. I have never heard it said that there were any significant spoils attached to control of the committee⁽⁸⁾. Why then should the issue have been contested? There are several reasons: one is that all such contests are a trial of strength. To give the other side a walk-over looks as if one side is weak. A political group remains organisationally alert by continued contest, no matter how quietist the policy on the national level.

Secondly, although nothing depends on the committee when it is shared, if it were monopolised by one side, that side might find opportunities to exploit the situation. For example, it would be possible to make sure that rightists got their carrots washed first; this would of course be a provocation, and after a period of time (three years is the life-time of the committee) there would probably be an attempt by the disadvantaged side to rally support and change the entire committee. During times of co-operation, a mixed committee prevents such practices wordlessly. The mere presence of members of the other side prevents anyone trying anything blatantly partisan. In addition the atmosphere of co-operation prevents people wanting to do so.

Thirdly, as has been shown here, the basic agreement to co-operate over allocation of positions did not rule out a good

deal of manoeuvre. However, the intensity of the dispute was kept within tolerable limits, and informants remembered it with a certain amount of humour. The incident did not seem to them to have involved a serious breach of any kind. It was merely the normal cut-and-thrust of everyday opposition.

(v) Irrigation Committee Elections, 1968

During the period of my fieldwork the national policy of the Greek Cypriot left was still full co-operation with the government, and a conciliatory posture towards the nationalists. I do not have information about their instructions, if any, to village leaders on matters such as representation on irrigation committees. In the case to be described, my concern is more with the style of a village administrative election, and the undercurrents in it, then with trying to fill the gap in my information about the relation between national party policy, and local decisions.

The Irrigation Committee is re-elected every three years, but several members had been in office for nearly ten years without change. Sklyros was on bad terms with his half-sister's husband, Mangaras, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter. Mangaras had been made to pay the Turk whose earth he had removed, and Sklyros had been on the committee which made the decision. Mangaras had later made suggestions that Sklyros had been dishonest in administering the Co-operative Store, and Sklyros had replied with the charge that Mangaras had been involved in a series of robberies of Co-operatives in the area. On another occasion Mangaras had criticised the Irrigation Committee for not having done some of their work properly, and in this view had found some support in the village.

A normally staunch leftist friend of Sklyros had been heard to complain publicly.

Sklyros in anger said to Mangaras in public "I fuck the whole thing: I fuck your family, and I fuck your Irrigation Committee". In his own words, this was the same as resigning from the committee. There was another leftist leader on the committee, Tangos, an older brother of Mangaras, but he had already announced his intention to resign, and was in the USSR with a delegation of Cypriot farmers. He had served nine years on the committee. However, it was up to the left to replace these men if they decided to do so. The trouble was, their leaders were the men in difficulties, particularly Sklyros.

The first time the elections were due to take place, they had in fact to be postponed because of insufficient attendance. An official of the District Commissioner's office arrived on 1 July 1968 to supervise the second attempt. He called the roll; of some 400 persons eligible to vote since they owned irrigated land by legal title, and paid taxes on it, only 49 were present. The official called for nominations, and 13 people were proposed, and seconded. Two of these were leftists, the remainder either nationalists of various complexions. The results are set out below:

elected:	Patris	46 votes
	Glykis	46 votes
	Yiorgios	49 votes
	Kirkos	43 votes
	Mangaras	44 votes

not elected:	Old Sklyros	37
	Kanellos	39
	(a)	36 (left)
	(b)	30
	(c)	36

not elected:	(d)	32 (left)
	(e)	34
	(f)	38

The voting system allowed people to vote for more than five candidates, and this they clearly did, since 49 people cast 510 votes. Each person seems to have voted for 10 people. This is characteristic of village public behaviour, in that the main aim is to avoid antagonising people who expect one's vote for reasons of kinship, friendship and other ties.

The re-election of Kirkos and the relatively high vote for Kanellos and Old Sklyros would suggest that there was no strong intention among those present to reject the previous committee as a whole. But it is possible that even in the event of strong hostility, the desire to avoid making enemies would have produced a similar result.

Perhaps more instructive than the voting itself were the comments made about the election by some of the interested parties. Sklyros believed that his half-sister's husband, Mangaras had deliberately organised people to come to the election "to get out the leftists". Jokes were certainly made to this effect in the coffee shop. Sklyros was particularly bitter about this because his father Old Sklyros had not been re-elected. Now although Old Sklyros was an old man, and a strong rightist who had quarrelled with his son many times about politics, he was also an expert in irrigation matters, having for many years earned his living by digging underground chains of wells. Sklyros argued that Mangaras had nothing to offer the committee, and that to fail to elect his father-in-law was a piece of deliberate spite which would harm the village.

Two prominent village informal leaders - D. Fanou and

Vourros deliberately avoided going to the elections. Both explained to me that they did not like a situation where an open show of hands in voting was needed, since this was embarrassing. Vourros recalled an election at which he had not voted for someone and the man next to him had shouted loudly at him "Come on - up with your hand. Vote for him". "The Texans are not afraid of New Yorkers - they are only afraid of other Texans"⁽⁹⁾. By this he meant, it turned out, that the Kallo people were not in awe of him in any way - in spite of his education. He described himself as a "New Yorker" in one sense because he is from the neighbouring village; in another sense because his education, wealth and urban background set him apart. In any case he chose to stay away.

Patris denied to me that there was any 'organisation' or deliberate attempt to get out the leftists. Sklyros believed when he walked into the room and looked around that the people he saw there were evidence of organisation. He calculated that he would easily be out-voted. Both men were sure that they could remember who voted for particular individuals.

Sklyros, on seeing the odds against him, decided that he would not stand for office and would thus avoid giving the right, and particularly Mangarās, the pleasure of openly defeating him; he added however, that in view of the criticisms that had been made of the committee in the village, he had decided not to seek re-election. It is worth pointing out that in the 1962 Irrigation Committee elections, Patris had decided not to seek re-election, since he had been publicly criticised by a butcher that he had spent village money on

irrigating his own land. It happens that the butcher's brother is married to a sister of Sklyros but I am unable to say if this played any part. The butcher is known as an independent, not to say uncontrollable trouble-maker, as will appear in his remarks in another context (see chapter 11). My point here is to note that leading personalities in village administration seem remarkably sensitive to public criticism, and may drop out of office for a few years, only to re-appear later in the same job or another one.

There are several other points to be made about this election. First, the left leaders seem to have taken no effective steps to try to retain their position: they did not bring supporters or brief people to seek nomination; if they did, they did so in a manner well below their actual capability. Secondly, there was the belief of Sklyros that his half-sister's husband had organised a move to unseat him. The bad feeling between these men has been mentioned. Regardless of 'national policy' this election seems to have been conducted very much on personal lines for personal reasons, but the interest in getting an enemy out of office is all the sharper when he is also a 'natural' political opponent. The point here is not to reduce national politics to personal antagonisms, for one does not exclude the other. If Sklyros had chosen to rally leftist supporters and seriously contest the election, he could probably have done so. As has been earlier mentioned, this would have been the first step on a ladder of escalation which can end in a fully 'politicised' village, where left and right avoid each other.

If the national policy of the left had been other than the quietist one followed since 1959, Sklyros might have been called to task for his behaviour. Precisely because the national leadership adopt a 'low profile' over the issue of rights and representation, and continually accept less than their voting potential might suggest they deserve, Sklyros could afford to avoid a contest in the village, and still keep his prestige relatively intact. As it was, there were signs of mild dissatisfaction with his leadership during the period of my fieldwork. His increasing family responsibilities as his children approach the age of marriage, coupled with a heavy burden of debt, make it likely that younger, cooler-tempered men may step into his shoes in the near future.

(vi) 1969-70 Dispute over the Credit Co-operative Secretaryship

The last case was an account of a non-contest in formal political terms, in which all the tension took place off-stage, in the margins of the situation. Thus we have seen cases where the right and the left opposed each other energetically, and later a case where they appeared to ignore each other. However this account of disputes in the village would be seriously incomplete if it did not include the following case:

Old Fanos had for over thirty years been secretary of the Credit Co-operative. On its meagre wage he had successfully managed to educate his six children⁽¹⁰⁾. Now at the age of 67 he was very slow, and over the recent years a number of complaints had been made to the committee about this. However, the committee were in a very embarrassing situation. Sklyros is Old Fanos wife's sister's son and has always been on very close terms with Old Fanos' children; he is fully

aware of the fact that with one last child at university in Athens, and one unmarried daughter, Old Fanos needs every penny he can get. Patris is also a committeeman, but his situation is if anything worse, for his oldest daughter is married to the second son of Old Fanos, and the two men use the close affinal term 'sympetheros' to each other. Moreover, Patris has never had a son of his own, and his relationship with his son-in-law D. Fanou has always been very warm. Over several years on a number of occasions Patris has tactfully mentioned the problem of the old man's retirement to his son-in-law, but always the reply has been "Just let the old man keep his job for another year or two and then he'll retire. Just until my sister gets married and my youngest brother finishes in Athens".

By December 1969 Sklyros was asking the advice of Vourros, as an educated man, on the problem. In July 1970 after repeated discussions the committee acted by calling in Old Fanos and telling him that they were going to advertise his job. He seemed to take it quietly, but later his children said he was stunned. The announcement went up in the coffee shops the next day. Two sons of Fanos met Sklyros, and harsh words were exchanged. D. Fanou stopped talking to his wife's father, Patris. The whole Fanos family was united in fury against Sklyros and Patris. Another member of the committee, Akis, married to another sister of Fanos' wife, went and told the family that he had been against the decision and tried to talk the Committee out of it. A fourth committee man did the same.

The bitterness continued for a number of weeks, and several people tried to mediate. The dispute was referred to

the Department of Co-operatives, which refused to take action, arguing that it was for the village committee to decide.

In view of the close ties between D. Fanou and the Commissioner this was an impartial decision. When I left the field a compromise was being negotiated within the village: Old Fanos was to stay in his job, but was to take on an assistant, who was to be trained up to take over full responsibility in a short time.

The most striking thing about this dispute was the extent to which it cut across existing lines of political cleavage. Sklyros and Patris, who have been shown continuously opposed as left and right leaders, are here united, even at the cost of Patris' quarrel with his son-in-law D. Fanou. These two men had been very close both in politics and their personal relations for five years. Together they had moved from supporting Lyssarides to support Azinas; now they were seriously at odds. Akis, normally a staunch leftist who would support Sklyros, preferred to stress his kin ties to his wife's sister's family.

Kosmos had for years been regarded as a firm leftist and a supporter of Sklyros. But he is also the godchild of Old Fanos. During the 1970 election he had worked openly not for the left, but for the United Party, since he has become the political client of the powerful muktar of a nearby village who regularly employs him as bulldozer driver. Kosmos came to the Fanos household and promised them that he would get his patron, the muktar, to work on the problem, and that this man was so powerful that he could tell the powerful Commissioner of Co-operatives what to do and he would do it 'like a child'. He said that if necessary he would bring the muktar to the

village the next night. He said many hard things against both Sklyros and Patris, that they were both very bad as committeemen, had no humanity, and that he would personally work to see them thrown out of the committee at the next election. He stressed his close connections with the United Party, through the muktar. For him the dispute was a chance both to deny his old leftist loyalties, and publicly to demonstrate his new ones.

This case is important since it shows Sklyros and Patris taking a stand over an administrative principle. Clearly, the pay-off for them is that they get the villagers 'off their heads' and thus retain their position as committeemen. This however is not their main motive, for the positions in themselves are not worth the cost of dispute. They take their duties as committeemen seriously, and have an internalised set of values about how the Co-operative should be run. It was quite clear to them that it would be a very touchy issue to alter Old Fanos, but they had counted on more sympathy from his educated children, at least two of whom were experienced civil servants, and that in spite of the obvious conflict with the self-interest of the Fanos family, some kind of technical objectivity would influence his sons. In this they were bitterly disappointed. However, it was noticeable that in the course of the dispute the sons of Fanos very soon abandoned the claim that their father was still fully capable of doing the job, and instead sought to maintain that it was the method the committee had employed which was so deplorable and which had made them so angry. "They called our father in without warning, and told him they would

advertise his job. They threw him into the street like you'd throw a dog. After the thirty years service he'd given for a salary that was ... sheer exploitation". In this version they chose to ignore the many tactful overtures by Patris over several years in which he had tried to get them to act by themselves. Such is the rhetoric of disputes. Fanos' children saw they could not defend the issue of their father's technical ability, so they sought to turn it into one of 'common humanity' and presented a picture of the committee as ruthless technocrats.

The clash of norms here is instructive. One side is a united kin group, and such supporters as they can rally among other kin and friends. On the other side are two men who are recognised political and administrative leaders of the village, although both of whom have close ties to their opponents. One side charges a breach of kinship solidarity, but dresses this in the language of 'common humanity'. The other side insists that the issue is technical, that complaints in the village have reached a pitch which is unacceptable, and that even close kin must take heed of them. There can be no immediate reconciliation of these two views. Sklyrom in the middle of the crisis said he would not attend the next committee meeting to negotiate with old Fanos and possibly with his sons. He was under the influence of the harsh words that A. Fanos had said to him, which included the words 'ise atimos, 'you are without honour'; in addition he announced his intention of resigning from the committee. Patris who might under other circumstances have greeted his resignation with pleasure, said to him "If you do that, you are not up to much"

(dhen ise en daxi). He insisted in effect that he maintain solidarity with the rest of the committee, and that no easy way out for him as an individual was acceptable. For if Sklyros had resigned, it could have been interpreted as an action criticising the committee. Patris was afraid of being left as the apparent initiator of the move. For once in his life he badly needed Sklyros' support.

Conclusion

These six cases are not (in any rigorous sense) a sample of politics in the village. They are rather trouble cases, events which lay open salient features of political processes. Since during this same period the villagers have conducted numerous administrative meetings, elections, discussions and so forth without memorable dispute, the focus on these cases is slightly misleading, for it gives a picture of continuing strife. Anthropologists, like novelists, do not normally devote much space to describing or analysing calm and uneventful social life, and this is perhaps a serious criticism of their methods; but it might be argued with equal force that from the viewpoint of capital and nation, the events I have described are trivial, and scarcely worth mention. The fact that both these views can be put forward equally strongly against this approach, encourages me to think the approach may be fruitful.

It is worth noting that the first three cases all took place during the early years of independence, when the former EOKA activists were still highly influential throughout the island and when the issues raised by intercommunal violence were a matter of daily concern. These three cases all involved the implicit sanction of violence. In the first case a wealthy

educated city dweller is persuaded to give up his perfectly legal plans for a club to 'improve' the village, and lets the matter rest. In the second case the same man attempted to counter the autonomy of the self-appointed guardian of the village by bureaucratic control. They had felt the need of a broader base of support, since their authority had been slightly eroded. After the committee was formed the collection of money for arms was no longer sanctioned by the fear of force, nor did the use of the money go unsupervised by village representatives.

The third case, that of the Lyssarides group, again showed the threat of force as the final sanction. But this time, the threat was overt. The ensuing use of mediators, and the continuing struggle of each side to maintain its position during the mediation process show that the threat of force did not settle the issue or, in the short run, bring the active pursuit of political goals to a halt although the fact that the Lyssarides group lost support after this shows that most villagers set very definite limits to their participation. The threat of force however contributed to the decline in Moustachas' authority. Both sides lost from this encounter. The gap between the tactics of elite politicians and village supporters was clearly illustrated by this case, for Lyssarides' call for vigilance ended up by losing him supporters, which strongly suggests he did not understand what the consequences of his actions would be, in one village at least.

The first three cases were all to do with extraordinary facets of politics in the village - institutional innovation, emergency defence measures, and the clandestine organisation

of support for national political leaders; the other three cases are more run-of-the-mill matters. The Carrot Association elections were, it is true, the first elections for a new administrative unit in village affairs, but there was no novelty in the organisational principles involved. The critical feature of this case was the scope for manoeuvre within the overall framework of representational compromise between left and right. That case is settled by the selection of a compromised candidate, on one level, and by the introduction of new resources on the other. The new resources are both the closer examination of the regulations laid down for committee roles, and the partisan appeal to the Commissioner of Co-operatives.

The fifth case is superficially similar, but here I was able to show the extent to which private animosities between close affines, were carried forward in their public political roles; for the leftist leader this would have been costly, had not national policy justified an avoidance of confrontation. The case also showed the extent to which villagers avoid making choices which will displease others, as shown by their voting behaviour, as well as by the deliberate avoidance of the elections by two interested parties.

The last case showed certain protagonists usually at odds, now in alliance, to defend an administrative principle. The clash of norms - kinship obligations versus public service - produced an unusual dependence of rightist on leftist. Attempts to introduce powerful patrons did not succeed, and eventually, a compromise formula was found acceptable to all.

The Fanos family perhaps got a little more than their due, from the bureaucratic viewpoint; but what is more striking is

that two committeemen, (who could have avoided an uncomfortable confrontation by resigning from their unpaid jobs) should instead have chosen to brave the wrath of close kin. Perhaps their commitment to norms of public service stopped them from correctly predicting the storm they would raise. The children of Old Fanos, all gymnasium graduates or better, behaved in the more particularistic, traditionalist fashion, while the two committee men, older and less educated, behaved more as rational bureaucrats.

Footnotes to Chapter 8

- (1) The way in which Vourros had been suspected during the Emergency was described in chapter 6, page 20.
- (2) The ultra right-nationalist newspaper PATRIS in April 1966 carried a series of articles which revealed in detail (though not fully) the AKRITAS plan. This was a contingency plan worked out by the group of Greek Cypriot leaders then close to President Makarios (including particularly Clerides, Yorgadjis), for how to advance the cause of Enosis as well as to make the Greek Cypriot majority appear as the sole legitimate government in the event of intercommunal conflict. PATRIS, a spokesman of the Grivas faction, seems to have published the plan to show how ill-prepared were Makarios' group, and how lacking in devotion to the Enosis ideal. The Turkish Cypriots have reprinted the PATRIS articles, with a foreword claiming that the plan reveals the bad faith with which Makarios and his supporters entered the early years of the republic.
- (3) The Committee consisted of the following people: Sklyros; Tangos; the muktar, Vourros, Patris, Patris' brother and four other men, of whom three are farmers, and one a truckdriver. Thus the committee had two leftists, one educated man, and fulltime farmers are strongly represented, as was usual. Politically, it is a broad cross section of village opinion. It also represents mature married men. The average age was about 40.
- (4) The same man was both EOKA district commander during the emergency, and militia commander in 1964. He comes from Market Town, is a professional man, and was also a Legislative Assembly Member for the electoral district. He later became a Minister in the Makarios government. He is personally familiar to many villagers.
- (5) This is the same man cited in the Co-ordinating Committee rules, as the arbitrator in event of dispute.
- (6) This gap has been discussed by many writers, particularly Bailey (1963). For a good review of the issues and literature see Joan Vincent's paper 'Anthropology and Political Development' in (ed) Leys, C., Politics and Change in Developing Countries (1969).
- (7) The composition of these committees was shown in table 18, chapter 5, page 12.
- (8) The actual post of Secretary of the Association was valuable since it was noted, it carried a small salary. But the contest for this post came after the initial manoeuvres over the composition of the two committees.

- (9) Kallo is known in the region, jokingly, as 'Little Texas' because its people supposedly have the same characteristics as Big Texas - recent new wealth, a certain rowdiness and proneness to carry pistols, and a love of the flamboyant gesture. The more lively Kallotes seem to go out of their way to publicise both the nickname and the qualities that go with it.
- (10) I have set out in chapter three the characteristic education and achievements of Old Fanos' children.

CHAPTER 9THE VILLAGE AND THE LARGER SOCIETY:CAMPAIGN FOR A DAM1) Introduction

The main theme of this chapter is the attempts of certain Kallotes with men from the surrounding villages, to speed up the construction of a dam, and the ensuing opposition from Market Towners. The next chapter describes the attempts of some villagers to intervene in the administration of the citrus co-operative, which was dominated by Market Town. In both cases, then, villages and Market Town are in opposition, and in both cases, government representatives play important roles in the situations. Both chapters will be concerned with the style of elite leadership, the underlying reasons for the structural opposition between villages and town and a number of other issues. But the reason for anticipating the next chapter at this point is precisely because the two issues are not merely similar but each must lend intensity to the other⁽¹⁾. To make this clear, I shall sketch in the main issues of the two chapters in turn.


Five villages, including Kallote would benefit from the building of a recharge dam at Avla. Kallote would pay the lion's share from among the villages, but government funds would pay two thirds of the total cost in any case. The dam has been discussed since the early years of independence. At the time of my fieldwork the issue was a lively one, and the problem hinged on the attempts of Market Towners through their Irrigation Committee, to block the dam, which they saw as threatening their

own interests. During 1968 and 1969, the five villages through their own committees made a number of attempts to prod the government into favourable action, and prominent in all this was a Kallo-born lawyer who has large land holdings in the village, although he lives in the capital. Later it emerged that his active campaigning over the dam was prelude to his attempts in 1970 to get elected to the Legislative Assembly, and certain astute villagers foresaw this during his activity over the dam, during which he organised a demonstration in the capital of men from the five villages. This was a major political innovation, and was followed by the additional innovation in Kallo of a short-lived Advisory Committee, in which another urban elite man figured prominently. This material then, raises a number of problems - the nature and style of rivalry between the villages and Market Town; the methods used by villagers to put pressure on the government; the reasons for the willingness of villagers to allow individuals who have risen into the urban elite, to lead them in dealings with the government; the general question of relations between government and villagers, and how far these involve an awareness by villagers of their political rights.

To anticipate the material of chapter ten, Kallo is there again found in opposition to Market Town, over the affairs of CITCOP, the citrus marketing co-operative whose central committee was, at the time of my fieldwork, dominated by Market Towners. Kallo and Kammari, both parties to the dam issue (see diagram / .) are again in alliance. Again elite leaders are prominent in the conduct of village affairs and play on village fears of Market Town particularism, to get

DIAGRAM 1.

Common interests among the villages in two political issues with Market town



themselves into positions of power. For reasons which will become obvious it is not possible to say just how far the animosity over the dam issue enlivened the animosity of villagers in CITCOP to the Market Towners on the committee; but the fact that the two issues had been going on for seven years, involving the more sophisticated and active people in the villages and in Market Town, make it obvious that the two issues each fueled the other. Therefore, the material presented in chapter ten is not simply added to that in this chapter; it ought retrospectively to deepen the insights provided, and in my concluding analysis to that chapter I try to do this.

(ii) The importance of water in the region

The success of cash cropping in the Market Town region depends, as we have seen, on the supplies of underground water, which have been exploited more and more intensively since the 1920's. The 1950's saw the major development of water exploitation, and the concentration on citrus fruit, carrots, potatoes and melons. By sinking pump-shafts several hundred feet, and bringing up water with diesel pumps, perennial irrigation became possible. Drilling and installing a pump costs from £2,000 to £3,000, although when several shafts were sunk without success, costs increased. The water is then sold for 10s an hour to people with adjacent fields, and if the supply continues an owner can recover his £3,000 investment from these sales in about five years while himself enjoying 'free' water. Farmers need pumped water for six to eight months of the year. In recent years the government has stopped granting licences to individual owners, and encouraged villagers

to form companies, in which 15 or 20 shareholders jointly own a pump. There were two in the village in 1968 and several in formation.

In the region underground water supplies have for some years been decreasing because of over-pumping. There is the added danger that salt water may seep into the underground supplies, ruining the citrus trees, as happened in the Famagusta district. The government therefore attempts to control the amount of water being extracted. One such attempt was to make it necessary to obtain a licence before sinking a diesel-powered well. However, the region's farmers were so alive to the potential profits of irrigated cash-cropping, that many of them started 'illegal' pumps, that is, they proceeded to drill without licences. They argued that the government was showing partiality in the granting of licences and that it was giving them to persons who were not professional farmers while denying them to men without other means of support. The government was slow to act when the first illegal pumps were put down, so other people followed suit. Later the government took people to court, but often did not win its cases or the court imposed a modest penalty. However, slowly the sinking of illegal pumps stopped. In 1968 there were 27 pumps operating, of which at least 4 had been started illegally, in Kallo.

As part of the overall plan to conserve water the government also initiated a policy of encouraging villages to build concrete water channels⁽²⁾. In the region government pays a half of the cost and the village pays a half, which it raises by an irrigation tax of 10s per government donum of land.

irrigated. The other strand of the government's attack on water conservation is the construction of re-charge dams, to trap the winter runoff waters from the mountains which otherwise rush down into the sea. The recharge dams hold the runoff water until it seeps down into the underground water table. Several dams had already been built by the government in the Market Town region by 1968, but none which favoured the villages close to Kallo. The dams in fact which were in existence directly benefited the Market Town farmers; and, some people pointed out, certain government officials who had bought land in the Market Town region. This point need not be stressed for there is little doubt that the Market Town farmers even without such support were politically in a better position to assert their interests between 1959-1968 than were the surrounding villagers.

Between 1963 and 1968 a number of proposals were made to build a dam at a point on the Kari river near Avla village. This would be primarily a recharge dam, but would also provide some water for direct irrigation. Many of the proposals were made verbally, and because there were difficulties from the first stages, there were continual variations in what was actually proposed. The original proposals included four villages and Market Town, all of which would contribute to the costs of the dam, and would benefit both by recharge of the underground water available to them, and direct irrigation.

By the middle of 1968 the villages were prepared to agree to a wording of this clause which allowed the Market Town dams to be filled once a year from the first water of the winter before any water went into the Avla dam, but after this first

first filling, they insisted that the Avla dam should then be filled. The Market Town people replied that they wanted a wording in which their dams would always be filled first, at any time of the year regardless of the condition of the Avla dam. This was roughly the situation at the time my fieldwork started. The Market Town Irrigation Committee took a position which showed readiness to block the construction of the dam altogether. The five villages were considering what to do next.

In early October of 1968 I watched the Irrigation Committee of Kallo, Kammari and Posto meet to raise the problem. A Kammari committee man, Varetos had recently been to the relevant civil servant, Sterkos (a man known well to the inhabitants of the five villages since he had for many years been posted at the Market Town) who said the Market Town people had refused to sign the present form of agreement and the question was to be put into abeyance until the following March. The meeting of the three village committees was not satisfied with this position. They went over the ground again: that they had originally made a very important concession and a reasonable one by allowing Market Town to fill their own dam first, and now Market Town was trying to behave like the government of Cyprus. The money is ready, they said, and the government is supposed to be in favour of the dam, or why would they have found the money? Someone suggested they tell the government that they are ready to forego the Market Town contribution to the dam and find the extra money themselves. This point received no support and was not taken up. There was talk of contacting all the representatives in the Assembly and particularly the PEK MP, Andreas Yangou. It was agreed

that Patris from Kallo and Varetos from Kammari would try to get the Nicosia newspapers interested in the story. Just as the meeting was about to break up the Kammari man, Yialyias, pointed out that the meeting had not resolved anything. "All right" said his fellow-villager Varetos "we agree on a statement that we demand from the government an explanation for the delay" by which he meant the proposed delay until March for further consideration of the case.

A few months prior to this meeting, the old Kallo Irrigation Committee, which had the leftists Sklyros and Tangos on it⁽³⁾, had received a draft agreement from the government asking for their consent and Sklyros had drawn attention to the wording of Market Town's water rights, and whether their dams would always be filled before the Avla one, or simply once a year. He had suggested an alternative wording. Then as the dam question continued to drag on a Five Village Committee had been formed, which comprised the Irrigation Committees of the five villages concerned, with the Kallo-born lawyer, Aglas, as chairman. There is some doubt as to how the Five Village Committee came to be formed. In light of subsequent events many people were inclined to believe that lawyer Aglas had taken the initiative. Certainly the conversion of existing Irrigation Committees into the larger committee required nothing more than an afternoon's drive through the villages, each of which is within fifteen minutes' drive of the others, and a quick word with the committees concerned. Whoever took the first initiative, the urgency of the issue in the eyes of the Irrigation Committees was sufficient to produce rapid support as subsequent events soon showed.

About a week after this meeting, Varetos, Yialyias, from Kammari, with Patris and Aglas decided to see the Minister of Agriculture, a Market Town man⁽⁴⁾. The next morning they went to see him without an appointment. When they arrived at his office his secretary said "He is busy all day today and told me not to let him be disturbed". They told her to tell him - and here the initiative came from the lawyer - that they were outside^{if}, and that if he cannot see us, all right, we shall come back another day". She gave this message to the minister who accordingly decided to see them. He told them that even as a simple representative he had always been in favour of the building of this dam and that it would be built. But the government could not go ahead without the agreement of the Market Town people, because Market Town could take the government to court and hold up the whole project at least for several years. Rather than waste everyone's time and money, the government's policy was to try to open the eyes of Market Town to its own self-interest, which was to agree to the dam: He also said he knew some people were murmuring that because he was a Market Town man, he was holding up the dam, to help them fight off citrus competition from the villages. Everyone laughed⁽⁵⁾.

On October 13 several newspapers carried a simple news item which mentioned the visit of committee members to the minister and in which Aglas on behalf of the committee thanked the minister for his interest. When Patris heard of the newspaper piece, even though Aglas is his first cousin, he was most concerned that the wording should not imply that the initiatives were all coming from Aglas, but were a joint effort of the whole committee.

During December 1968 the heaviest winter rains for at least twenty years carried away a number of bridges over the Kari river, including those at Avla and Market Town. A lot of Kallo people who had trees planted along the river bank saw them uprooted and carried away. Most of the village men went to see the river in flood, and watched millions of gallons of potentially usable water flow away to the sea. This flooding and the way the villagers felt about it provided a dramatic impetus to the next phase of the Avla dam episode.

(iii) The Demonstration

It was decided to organise a demonstration at the Presidential Palace about the dam issue. The lawyer, Aglas, was very active the evening before the demonstration, going around the villages giving people instructions on the wording of posters, and the time and place to assemble. He was repeatedly careful to prevent people lettering posters with direct comments against Market Town, for some people had suggested posters saying "Who governs Cyprus - Market Town?" and "Do only the Market Town farmers deserve water?". Those who were aware that the lawyer had ambitions to be adopted as a candidate for MP by PEK suggested his caution was closely related to his desire to keep the Market Town people friendly, for they are in the same electoral district as the five villages. They made very sarcastic comments about the doctor's motives for becoming involved in the dam problem. "Obviously", they said, "his large land holdings in Kallo would justify his interest, but if he really wanted to help his village, he would tell the truth about the Market Town people. He wants to be representative, that's it".

The next morning buses from the five villages carried men into the capital. There had been some mild discussion of whether to bring women and children to make the event more dramatic but this idea had not been adopted although it might have been very effective. A column of farmers formed up near Metaxas Square; carrying posters which complained about the water flowing into the sea, and stating simply "Water is our life" started to march to the Presidential Palace. It is hard to say how many people went on to the march; my own estimate is about 300, but it could be low by 150. The column marched three abreast in a cheerful and orderly fashion, with a police escort, through the streets of Nicosia. The lawyer was in the front, and several representatives of PEK were also there by his side. There were no official representatives of EKA, the leftist farmer's association but a number of Kallo leftists took part. Retrospectively, some Kallo leftists argued that from the start it had been clear that the whole series of meetings about the dam were of an anti-government nature designed to further the candidacy of Aglas and to embarrass the government, and that since the left has a broad and steady policy of support for the government, it chose to overlook the demonstration. However, it seems equally likely that the left leadership in Nicosia did not know about the demonstration until it had practically finished, and that at the village level the left leaders saw that the initiative had come from the right and decided that rather than risk being snubbed if they made a formal offer to associate themselves with the march, they would ignore it officially, but participate quietly. Certainly for several

days after the demonstration I heard discussion in the coffee shops between leftists and rightists about the situation, but it was mostly at the level of jokes which went "You deliberately didn't ask us to come because you don't want us". "No, you deliberately stayed away because you were jealous that we had done something good". In any event the left were not formally represented on the demonstration and the right were, through PEK. As with many other political events in the villages, the most elusive facts were those concerned with where actions and policies originate.

When the column of march reached the Presidential Palace, it started to bunch up around the outer gate. The police guards shut the gates in an almost ceremonial way, leaving the marchers outside and the police inside. "All we'll get now is promises" someone grumbled. The lawyer and some of the committee men started to confer. An off-duty Kallo policeman wandered up to the gate, and was allowed inside where he stood chatting to his fellow policemen. Presently a Kallo man called out to him, "Hey, Yiorkos, you come out here or we'll cut your trees down. They need water too". A few minutes later he came out, even though the remark appeared to be a joke. The general mood of the marchers was amused, but uncertain. People kept making suggestions about what to do next. After a while, when a message had been sent up to the Presidential Palace, it was decided to admit the muktars of each village, and the Irrigation Committee members. The whole purpose of the march was to lay the problem of the dam at the feet of President Makarios. Many people said throughout the march that it was the only thing to do. The implication was that

Makarios was the only man above the personal ambitions and interests of the rest of the society: even though people well aware - or believed that they knew - of many examples of Makarios' particularism⁽⁶⁾.

After a while the committee came out again, but not before some of the marchers had started to drift off. Aglas started to address the now somewhat dispersed crowd. To those who could hear him, which could only have been a small fraction, he said "Today we have won a great victory ...". The meat of his statement was that he had not succeeded in seeing Makarios but had then insisted on seeing the Minister of Agriculture who happened to be in the Palace on business. The Minister had made a statement to the effect that when a few minor technical problems had been solved the dam would go ahead very quickly. Aglas emphasised that he had confidence in the word of the Minister and that as far as he was concerned the demonstration had succeeded.

At one point a Kallotis called out "We've come to see our father (priest) and not to see our cousin", which meant, "We've come to see Makarios, and not the Minister"⁽⁷⁾. The meeting now became rather confused, largely because there was no system of communication organised by the leaders of the march. People stood about in knots discussing what they had understood to have occurred, while Aglas rushed about from group to group, giving instructions, changing his mind, contradicting himself, and so forth. He had the impression that all that had to be done now was for the Irrigation Committee members to go and sign some papers in the office of the District Commissioner and the dam would practically be under

way. He seemed to be in some doubt as to what to do with the demonstrators. Finally, he decided to dismiss them, while the leaders would go and see about the papers. But one old Kammariis - Vialyias - shouted to him "All right, but if you've been cheated this time, don't think we'll come with you again on a demonstration". Vialyias was one of those who had wanted the demonstrators to stay outside the Palace 'hungry if necessary' until Makarios agreed to see them. The demonstration marched back through the city to the buses in an orderly column, with the doctor standing on the opposite side of the road, a few hundred yards below the Presidential Palace making dismissive signs with his arms reminiscent of a traffic policeman but undoubtedly meant more to convey the impression of a general taking a march past. I do not think that most of the marchers regarded themselves as being formally under his orders, but then again they were not under anyone else's, and no-one seemed seriously to be challenging the suggestion that they should disperse. On the way down the hill towards the centre of town, somebody had the bright idea of sticking the placard he was carrying in an empty house-site. As the other marchers passed his placard, they followed suit, so that further on the purpose of the returning march would have been quite invisible to any curious passer-by unless he took the trouble to ask. But on the empty house site, the marchers had left the details of their entire story.

On Sunday January 12 1969, Patris and I went to see Veretos in Kammari; it turned out that he had been several times since the demonstration to see Tambis, the senior civil

servant to whom the villagers referred on questions regarding the dam, when they were not dealing directly with ministers. The last time Varetos had been to see him, Tambis had told him that on Monday January 13 he would telephone the Minister of Agriculture and get the whole situation clarified. Patris and Varetos now decided that they would get together some other committee members and visit Tambis, in the morning. They suggested arriving at 9.30. At this point I made the suggestion (an unfortunate one as it turned out) that since there was no formal appointment it might be better to go early, when the office opened, rather than later, when the secretary might be in a stronger position to say that the civil servants' diary was full and it would be impossible to see him⁽⁸⁾.

The next morning, a Monday, two Kallo committee men, three from Kammari and myself arrived in Tambis' waiting room at 8 a.m. A few moment after we arrived, Tambis himself came and on seeing the room filled with waiting people turned on one, the Kammari man Yialyias and shouted loudly and angrily, "So you think you've come here early to check on me, to see if I'm doing my job ..." and disappeared into his office. The committee people were taken aback by this display and angry in turn. Patris suggested that it was completely improper for a civil servant to address village committee men in that way and that we should all leave the office and go either to the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Agriculture. Patris, like many other people, believed that Tambis was against the dam being built and favoured the Market Town people

The two men were with Tambis for about forty minutes.

over those of the villages. This view was even shared at times by people as sophisticated as Vourros who had had some recent dealings with Tambis and found him rude. However now the Kammari people told Patris we should not leave and that they knew the real reason for the outburst. At this point Sterkos, the assistant to Tambis came by having obviously heard a version of the outburst. "It's very early" he said in a remonstrative tone.

The secretary came out and said that Tambis would see two men from the Kammari committee. Varetos and Yialyias went in. Patris was a little put out by this, one reason being that Kallo often pays large sums of money for co-operative projects, and on the dam was certainly scheduled to pay the lion's share among the villages and should therefore be represented in any discussion of events. Now a uniformed porter arrived and offered us drinks. The remaining Kammari man and I ordered coffee. But Patris and the other Kallo committee man said firmly that they did not want anything. "You can't not have anything" said the porter, and then ran through a list of all the available drinks. When he got no response from them he said he would bring them lemonades, and off he went. When he was away they discussed whether perhaps he had a private arrangement with the man running the canteen and was not actually offering them hospitality on behalf of Tambis. They were quite explicit that after the treatment they had received from the senior civil servant they did not accept his hospitality. Evidently they decided the porter was acting on his own initiative for when he returned with the lemonade they drank it.

The two men were with Tambis for about forty minutes;

when they came out all three were smiling and Tambis said in a jocular voice loud enough for the rest to hear "And don't you come checking on me at 8 am again". As it turned out one of the two men had deliberately used the fact of an observer's presence to chide the civil servant, who was now making quite sure that the episode would appear in a new and more favourable light. "There was an educated man outside, who has been following village affairs for some time, and it must certainly have made a poor impression on him" Varetos had said. He had not of course discussed this tactic with me.

We left the office and the Kammari men explained what had happened. First they said, they had thrashed the whole thing out and had arranged another meeting with the civil servant for 11 a.m. Patris now complained that it was not right of Tambis to have seen only the Kammari people, but he was persuaded that in view of the new meeting, and certain additional facts, no harm had been done. The additional facts were that Yialyias had some months before sent him a letter which was probably libellous, about the running sore of the Kammari pump licence which the government continued to block⁽⁹⁾. In this letter he said among other things that Tambis viewed the villagers of Kammari san mavrous which means 'as blacks' or 'as slaves', people to whom he could do and say what he liked. In the eyes of the Kammari people this letter was the real explanation for the early-morning outburst. Patris was now somewhat mollified.

At 11 am all returned to the office, and once seated, some banter passed between Tambis and Yialyias. The civil

servant said "Why did you people go to all that trouble and expense to keep the pump issue going? You acted quite illegally into the bargain? ..." "Oh, yes, that we admit" said Yialyias "but we've had our water there for many years". The discussion continued, and during it ^{Tambis} referred to the offer the government had made of another licence in another site, and to the frequent charges made by the Kammari people that certain persons who shouldn't have done so, had received their licences, and why should not Kammari preserve its traditional water rights?

After these preliminaries, Tambis got down to business. He put in a call to the Minister of Agriculture. "We haven't yet spoken this year so allow me to wish you a Happy New Year, Minister. Now I have here in my office some of those gentlemen who were carrying placards outside the Presidential Palace the other day, and I wish to get it entirely clear, from you yourself, what you did and did not promise them". He then took down a statement in writing during which he repeatedly said "Yes ... I see ... ah, that's it ..." and as he wrote down the words of the statement he emphasised in repeating them out loud all the points which apparently the Minister now wished to stress. The statement stressed when when all the necessary technical obstacles had been removed, and when all other problems had been solved, then and only then would work begin on the dam. The statement sounded highly conditional. When he had finished taking down the statement he thanked the Minister and said goodbye. He made no attempt to keep the Minister on the telephone in case the committee people had anything to say. Both during the statement and after it the

villagers looked somewhat stunned and when the telephone finally clicked back into place, Yialyias said "What he said now and what he said the other day are as different as day and night" and the room hummed with agreement to this. I was not able to obtain copies of either the statement made at the Presidential Palace or the one made over the telephone. My impression was that the same words were used and that mere differences in spoken emphasis and tone were enough to change the perceived meaning from a highly optimistic 'the dam is practically under way ...' to the highly problematic 'as soon as the technical problems are solved the dam will be under way' (10).

Once the villagers had got over the initial shock, Tambis made a little speech. If they really wanted to argue with officials, then they must get things down in writing. In view of the Minister's statement, this was ironic, yet still practical advice. Perhaps Tambis was indirectly criticising the Minister. In contrast to the rather deferential tone he used to the Minister, he used a paternal manner with the villagers, and often emphasised his own white hairs, age, experience, how much he had seen of life. The problem was (i) the consent of Market Town (ii) some minor technical problems related to siting, compensation and so forth. Now if Market Town wished to block the government in the courts they could do so. Someone asked, what about the new law that people had been making so much of, which would allow the government to go ahead without the consent of Market Town? That law was not as clear as it might be, said Tambis, and might well have to go to the Attorney General for interpretation.

In the case of either the court or the Attorney General being involved, he hoped the gentlemen present appreciated that the delay could be years. "And if we go to court, who gains? No-one except the lawyers. I hope you are not studying law, not that I have any objection to lawyers, my own son is studying law, but in this case ... So the government's policy has been to try to persuade the to win them over. This would cost less time and money in the long run".

At this point the committeemen said that they understood more or less, but that he should understand the kind of things that were being said in the coffee-shops, and that just as he had them at his head over the question, so they had the men who had elected them in the villages at their heads. "And", added Varetos, "it's all very well telling us that if we clash with the government and are legally in the wrong, then we shall lose, but look at it this way: I am a father. If my daughters ask me for a few groschia to buy sweets and I refuse them, why naturally, they will turn to stealing. And that's the way it is with us in the villages ..."

The meeting ended on what from the villager's point of view was an inconclusive note. The civil servants were to arrange a new meeting with the Market Town people in the very near future to see if they would change their position. However, they were not prepared to give any kind of a timetable on results of this and of a general meeting of those government officials involved (which he set up in front of the villagers) or even of new information on the project. He warned them that these things move slowly. He was gentle but firm about

it and at this point no-one demurred.

It was clear the meeting was at an end. As the villagers rose to go one man said "We've gone back ten steps today" while old Yialyias said quite loudly enough for Tambis to hear "The word of a Market Towner ... " He left the sentence uncompleted but the implication was clear - the Minister was not to be relied on. The expression "The word of a Market Towner has almost the status of a proverb in the surrounding villages. Tambis ignored this. Instead he turned to me and said in English "I do not get angry easily but this gentleman" nodding at Yialyias "found the way to do it".

Outside the office there was a brief discussion of what to do next among the villagers. Someone suggested using the newspapers to convey the results of the morning's meeting; Varetos was keen on the idea of sending a telegram to the government on the day of the administrative meeting. They decided to go and see the lawyer, Aglas, and tell him what had happened. But when they got to his house he was out.

(iv) A new Committee

A few days after this meeting, events took a new turn in Kallo. Patris apparently suggested to a number of people, about twenty in all that some sort of a meeting on the various water problems would be in order. Now subsequently various people in the village, particularly Aglas, Sklyros and Vourros were all puzzled about where the real initiative for this meeting came from. Patris took the line that a meeting was advisable in the natural course of events, and that no outside person had suggested it to him. It is probable that

there was in fact no more to it than that. My point here is that several of the more politically alert people in the village were not willing to accept such a simple explanation, and were immediately looking for the hand of an organisation, outside instructions or long-term plans behind the simple suggestion of Patris that a meeting should be called.

Twenty of the more substantial and respected farmers, as well as several teachers, spanning all shades of political opinion, met for two hours, in the card-playing room of one of the coffee-shops. Several other people dropped in on realising that there was a meeting going on, and as is usual in such meetings where no formal committee is operating, virtually everyone who arrived was welcomed and sat down. Young unmarried men do not usually try to come in. People spoke in an impromptu way about a number of issues related to water. The rural constable said that if MPs and doctors kept getting licences to plant citrus trees or sink water pumps, then he would go ahead and plant trees anyway and if the government moved against him he would take the case to the Constitutional Court and fight for his rights. People discussed the new regulations about planting certain kinds of vegetables among citrus trees, and the rules about fitting meters to water pumps, and the number of hours one might water and the best methods of irrigation.

Patris gave a brief report to the meeting of how the meeting with Tambis had fared, and then suggested the possibility of a new demonstration on the date of the administrative meeting. This then opened up a general discussion of tactics regarding the dam problem and the need to put the problems

to a more general village meeting was stressed. I am not sure exactly who opened up this issue, but traditionally it is something the left and centre people always tend to support as an inherently good practice. At various times various people, particularly D. Fanou tried to get the meeting to follow an orderly procedure, with one person speaking at a time, and so forth, but this did not happen. Village meetings without a strong chairman often tend to comprise several smaller sub-meetings, with several people talking at once to their own immediate group of listeners. Among the main speakers at this meeting were Kellis, a teacher, Tangos and Dhaskalos, who made the point that the Irrigation Committee had not had an appointment when they went to see Tambis. The meeting also discussed at some length the new water regulations and the general atmosphere was a cheerful consensus that the rules were not acceptable in their present form, and the government was not going to find the law being obeyed. Some of the leftists, Tangos included, spoke clearly in support of the government's general policy of water control and conservation but emphasised that this particular plan was back-to-front and impractical. By this he meant that the norms of water consumption had been laid down before any provision had been made for meeting them.

This meeting was followed a week later on January 24 1969 by a much larger one to which in theory the whole village was invited. It was attended by between 150 and 200 men, which was a very large turn-out in village terms. There had been no formal programme except that a full village meeting would discuss the problems discussed by the smaller group in the

previous meeting. When Vourros arrived someone, probably the teacher Kellis, suggested he should take the chair and there was general agreement for this. Vourros then announced that if he took the chair he would want the meeting to follow an efficient pattern, that is that people should only speak one at a time, and that what everyone wanted was new ideas, not that people endlessly repeat the same thing that others had said.

There seemed to be a sort of speaker's desk around Vourros - one side of him sat Dhaskalos and on the other Kellis. All three men are teachers and between them span a wide political spectrum. This was not any kind of official grouping but proved symbolically important in view of later events. Vourros soon ran into difficulty with the rule of one person speaking at a time, and when one particular man interrupted several times and would not heed the chair, Vourros got irritated and said "If you won't keep order I shall leave the meeting". The farmer (who had been on several village committees because he is not identified strongly with either right or left and therefore gets elected not for his ability but for his moderation) was instantly repentant "Sorry, was I out of order in some way, Mr. Vourros?" "No, that's all right" Vourros replied.

This farmer went on to explain that in his view the relationship between the village and the government was like that between a child and its mother, "If the child doesn't cry, the mother doesn't feed it". This saying had been used by the lawyer Aglas in one of his meetings about the dam. The meeting now settled down to a discussion of the new water

regulations. The farmer continued: "The real mistake was to put the water meters on the pumps in the first place. The Market Town people should never have started putting them on". At this point a series of speakers all spoke in favour of putting on the meters, including Dhaskalos, Tangos and Vourros. They made points critical of the government's administration of the policy but stood by the point that this method of water control was both inevitable and necessary.

During this stage of the debate Vourros from the chair occasionally clarified a point for someone who had not understood. It would be quite obvious that people had not understood something, for after a point had been made the very next question might ask the substance of the last point. There was a tendency for the more frequent speakers to speak a modified form of Demotiki while occasional speakers making minor points used village dialect.

It is worth noting that Vourros had been invited to chair a meeting in Kallo although he was not either a full-time resident of the village or born in it. Another man who spoke on several occasions at the meeting was a senior civil servant. He had been born in Kallo but his career had taken him away from the village for many years and he was only rarely there. Nevertheless his presence at the meeting was regarded as both natural and desirable and no-one showed any sign of thinking that as a senior civil servant he might be representing the government in his views. He said at one point with reference to the Kammari dam that he firmly believed the government was sincere and wanted to see it built.

The discussion of water problems began to turn into a discussion of tactics. Vourros said he hoped the village would decide to have regular monthly family meetings. He chose the phrase quite deliberately. So when a little later the meeting started to discuss the advisability of producing a new committee, called an Advisory Committee, the ground had to some extent already been prepared by his suggestion. Those who thought the new committee a good idea argued that there were special problems facing the village at the moment, particularly to do with water, which the existing committees were probably too busy to handle by themselves. A teacher said he thought the committee was not a good idea because it would undoubtedly politicise the village. At this Vourros immediately called out from the chair "Is there likely to be a misunderstanding that this Advisory Committee would have a political colour?" at which a number of people said things like "No, we don't do things like that here". His point was carried.

Part of the debate became the question of whether the Advisory Committee would have any legal basis. The mukhtar, whom some people said was asleep for most of the meeting was asked what he thought he said he thought there was no need of such a committee even in a purely advisory capacity. He also was understood to express some anxiety about it producing tension between left and right. Sklyros also said he could see no need for such a committee. The civil servant then emphasised that there was no legal problem about a purely advisory committee. Another man said if the village was going to be organised properly it was essential the opinions of everyone should be

regularly heard, the opinion of the secondary school teacher, the primary school teacher, the shepherd and the camel-driver⁽¹¹⁾. A leftist called Spartos said that monthly meetings like this would keep the other village committees on their toes.

When it looked as if discussion of the need for the new committee would get bogged down, Vourros said that there was no reason why anything had to be decided today - it could all be put off for a month if need be. The civil servant said that while they could always elect a committee at the next meeting, it would be a pity not to take advantage of the present large turn-out to do something. There was some discussion of this. Some felt that the best thing was to call another meeting for the very next day but those who wanted the meeting called for a week's time, a Saturday again, carried the day. They argued that it would be better attended because better advertised by word-of-mouth and possibly a notice. It was said that there were not really enough men present to take any major decisions, and this argument had some force since on a number of occasions during the meeting people had made the point that in future village committees should not take major decisions like signing agreements with the government without a meeting and discussion with the whole village. The two outgoing leftist members of the Irrigation Committee had some time before been complaining that although this was their policy, the new committee had ignored it and gone ahead and signed a form of agreement over the Avla dam without consulting the village. The new committee, they claimed, influenced by Patris, had asked a few prominent

men in the village and left it at that. During this meeting people repeatedly used an expression which means "the whole village" (to horio oloklyro) and the way in which it was used had a moral force, endorsing the desirability of full consultation.

Vourros now tried a new tactic. He said the test of the need for the Advisory Committee was whether or not the Irrigation Committee thought it needed advice to carry out its work. He would put it to them. He asked the five members by name, around the room. They each said 'yes' and then Vourros said "So the Irrigation Committee itself agrees that an Advisory Committee would have some purpose." This move effectively stopped further discussion of whether or not the new Committee was needed.

The discussion now turned to composition of the new committee. Dhaskalos said it should be ten people. The civil servant said five, and it should be temporary only.

Finally the meeting broke up after having lasted over two hours. The owner of the coffee-shop seemed quite annoyed, possibly at the amount of business he felt he had lost, and went around telling people "It's all over now". People went on sitting around talking quite excitedly over some of the matters that come up. A group of young unmarried boys said among themselves "Nothing happened. Nothing will come of it" but this was not the general mood. Vourros in particular was very pleased with the way it had gone, and the promise it held for the future.

One week later the meeting took place. When Vourros arrived he found a certain vagueness about the programme,

and there seemed to be a certain hesitancy on the part of the people he asked to give him any details. He kept saying he would go if nothing was going to happen. It is probable that this atmosphere was created on the one hand by his nervousness, and on the other by his feeling that the meeting might in some way have been 'got at' in advance. However, people started to arrive until there were finally about 120 present, fewer than the week before but still a fair turn-out. Vourros took the chair and said "Dear fellow-villagers: let us talk about the dam first, and vote for the committee when more people get here". A right-wing teacher got up and said the Irrigation Committee was doing a good job but the issues of the dam and the meters required a separate committee. Vourros now stressed that an independent committee would have no government recognition, it would merely be an advisory one, helping the existing legal ones. The right-wing teacher then said that surely since the new committee would represent the whole community it would have a legal basis? Tangos said that since the Irrigation Committee had formally accepted the need for advice from this committee perhaps it would have a legal basis. Dhaskalos then made a short speech which bridged the apparent gap produced by the last two speeches. Vourros now stressed that the Advisory Committee was to be entirely without political colour. He viewed its functions as being to meet regularly and to seek and express the opinions of the villagers on current problems. Here Tangos added that it was in general a good thing to seek many opinions. Dhaskalos now said that the Advisory Committee

should handle both large and small problems. Sklyros and Tangos both disagreed and said for large problems only, and the latter said it should meet every three months, but more often if needed.

At this point Vourros emphasised that in doing business with the government it was quite essential to make written submissions and to seek written replies. He mentioned that one possible solution to the dam problem would be to by-pass Market Town by the villages themselves paying the share of costs that it would have paid for. He said that so far fourteen dams full of water had flowed into the sea. That he believed the government in the final analysis favoured the dam. Dhaskalos now said that there had been a number of committees, a number of meetings with the government and many conflicting answers and changes of policy. A farmer then said that ever since Aglas had been Chairman of the Five Villages Committee he had kept a written record of all the meetings, letters exchanged and so forth. Patris then pointed out that Aglas is chairman of the Five Villages Committee: Tangos said that the Advisory Committee should study Aglas' file and discuss it.

Vourros from the chair now asked what tactics should be adopted on the dam? A new demonstration? More telegrams? He suggested that they write a letter which would necessitate an answer. He thought the government wanted to build the dam but at the same time wanted to avoid conflict. Someone said "We should go and see our Papas" by which he meant Makarios. A discussion now started of a letter the government had sent to Aglas, in answer to his telegram, in which they made a

reply that the dam would be built, when conditions permitted. There was some discussion about exactly when this letter arrived, the day of the demonstration or before or after. Vourros then said that in any case the letter was ambiguous.

Now a leftist suggested among other things an interview with Makarios should be requested. Vourros added that the record of the interview should be sought in writing. Sklyros said that they should get the representatives to raise these questions in the House. Tangos asked, one particular MP? Dhaskalos said, no all of them. There was then some discussion of what the role of the mukhtar should be in these matters. He was in any case absent, which is often in the villages a sign of disapproval of an event. A leftist now said that both the left and right farmer's association MPs should be asked to take up the issue.

Vourros now raised the question of the committee's size, and suggested also a written ballot, to ensure secrecy. The general feeling in the room was against this. One man said "If we take three from here and two from there, there will be trouble", which meant, the right-left cleavage would become active. Without any vote being taken, the meeting bypassed the notion of a written ballot, and decided that five would be the right number of members. Vourros now made a major speech: he asked them to make some use of the educated men in the village. "You have plenty of educated men in the village. I myself am willing to help at any time. But of course I do not mean by this that you should overlook and under-estimate the uneducated men, for there are a lot of men here who have not had the chance to go to secondary school but still know how to

handle affairs ... but in the last analysis people who have had the chance of education should be ready to serve the community". He also stressed that the essential written work of such a committee needed at least one educated man to handle it.

Following on this speech, he was immediately nominated for the committee. He tried very hard to back out, but people quoted straight back to him the statements he had just been making. He then called out for D. Fanou to be nominated, who said "this will make a lot of trouble for me" because he was a civil servant, but Vourros went on urging him until he accepted. Then Vourros turned to a teacher and said "Are you ready to serve your community?" - a question to which it would have been extremely hard to answer no. Someone then nominated another teacher, Kellis, who tried extremely hard to get out of the nomination on the grounds of being a civil servant. A farmer said to him "But you ought to be on the Advisory Committee - you have a lot of land". Another farmer said "We should not force people who don't want to". Someone else said "The government doesn't check up on things like this" by which he meant that the Civil Service Law did not apply to things like the Advisory Committee.

At one point in this bout of nominations it seems that five names had been put forward: Vourros; D. Fanou; Tangos; Patris' brother Oligos; and Kellis, the teacher. Other names had been shouted out but had apparently not got the mysterious support of the meeting. (It is possible that whoever decided to recite the list of names put in or left out

those names they thought fit or unfit). However, when this list of five names was recited, Tangos said "We have two uneducated men on this committee, myself and Oligos" and suggested that this was not right. In the ensuing confusion of discussion several teacher's names were put forward to replace one of the uneducated men. The result was that Oligos was replaced by a teacher.

The five names were accepted by the meeting in an informal way. There was no show of hands and no-one suggested that any more formal method was needed. Once this was over the main meeting ended and the committee decided to meet. A member of the Irrigation Committee, Mangaras, also came along, which it turned out was his privilege under the current interpretation of the relation between the two committees. Kellis and D. Fanou discussed whether they were allowed to participate or not, under the civil service law. Kellis said he was there 'practically by force', and that his trade union on top of everything else had laid down limits to the sort of extra-curricular activities teachers should have to take part in, and if any of the meetings turned out to have a political aspect then he would just not turn up.

Tangos said only an educated man could follow the paperwork. Vourros said that one of the things this committee could do would be to look into the problem of the students in the village gambling. At this point Vasilakis came in, and was welcomed and asked to sit down and join in. What did he think were the village's problems? In his view the community problem was the problem of our young people. Then someone said

"What about people shooting off guns?" which referred to a recent incident where a drunken man had fired a pistol in one of the drinking shops. Vasilakis said this was undoubtedly wrong. Then someone said, what about the problem of the slaughter house. The next suggestion was for a club, but it was then suggested that a club would inevitably get coloured (politicised). Vourros said that a club such as they had in Market Town of orchard-cultivators (kypouron) would be all right but Vasilakis said that even this would get coloured too⁽¹²⁾. Someone pointed out that Kammari has a club and Mastia village has one in formation. Vasilakis now got up to go as a friend put his head in for him.

On this note the committee adjourned. Vourros said he would telephone the lawyer Aglas in the morning for a discussion. He went off to eat with Sklyros and myself. Both men discussed the possibility that the original initiative for the first pilot meeting had come from PEK, the right-wing farmer's union, for which Patris is the Kallo representative. However they were unable to make up their minds one way or another. Sklyros was asked why last week he had joined the muktar in saying that he did not think the village needed an Advisory Committee and he said that at that point he had been fairly certain the whole impetus was coming from PEK and had therefore opposed it. Part of his reason for being suspicious that it was a PEK manoeuvre was that he had heard that the village of Mastia, which has no interest in the dam was forming such a committee, and this would have made it appear part of a larger scheme, and not a local initiative⁽¹³⁾.

The next day the lawyer Aglas came to the village and sat in the coffee-shop and made a tape recording of some of the villager's complaints and problems, and among other things said "Vourros should not think that I am less interested than him in the problems of the village". People said that he made this remark with a good deal of heat and generally seemed both surprised and irritated by what he heard of the previous day's meeting.

As far as I can ascertain the Advisory Committee never met again. A month after the meeting at which the Committee were chosen, no meeting had been called, and at that time Kellis said "We exist to advise the Irrigation Committee. If they don't ask for our advice there is nothing we can do". They never asked, so we did nothing". When I returned to the village both in December 1969 and again in June 1970 I asked committee members if they had ever had another meeting and they said 'no'. When asked why, they said that the heat went out of the dam issue.

During my fieldwork there was one more piece of activity about the dam issue which is highly revealing. In late March 1969 the Kallo muktar told a member of the Kallo Irrigation Committee, to be ready to go to Nicosia the next day. He did not want to, but the muktar said it was essential he go. About twenty men from the five villages went, and he noticed that they were nearly all supporters of the man who had recently resigned as Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Yorgadjis. The group reached Yorgadjis' house where they were given coffee. Yorgadjis then telephoned the Minister of Agriculture, and explained that he had been visited by a group

of men who were concerned about the dam issue, and could they come and see him. A district representative, both a close friend of Yorgadjis, and well known to the Minister, now took them to the minister's office, where he promised that the dam would be built whether the Market Town people agreed or not. My informant was very certain that this whole meeting had been conducted in order to create political support for Yorgadjis, who a month beforehand had, in harness with Glafkos Clerides announced the formation of the United Party, the first party off the mark once Makarios had given his formal approval to the idea of parties and elections. I asked the Kallo muktar why the group of men had gone to Yorgadjis about the dam since he after all was no longer the Minister. The rural constable, who was sitting with the Muktar said "Well, he is and he isn't ... really there's a sense in which he still is ..." and a number of other remarks which added up to the idea that Yorgadjis was still very powerful⁽¹⁴⁾.

By June 1970 no work had been started on the dam, but some people in the village now believed it would be built in the next few years and that the government would go ahead no matter how much the Market Town people were against it. They also thought that the demonstration and the events which accompanied it were very closely related to the desire of lawyer Aglas to be adopted as a candidate by the PEK party. However, hindsight in such matters is always rather clearer than vision during the actual events. One must point out that Aglas' candidacy was a simple and satisfying explanation for

villagers, but it also had as a logical consequence the shifting of the responsibility for the failure or success of the demonstration from their own shoulders to that of the lawyer, Aglas. Furthermore, if they were correct then at the very least they accepted his leadership, and when a device was created - the Advisory Committee - which might have served as an alternative channel for the expression of their views, they did not make use of it.

By 1970 the government had decided to waive Market Town's contribution because of their objections, and the proposal became the following: the dam would cost £380,000 of which the government would pay two thirds, and lend the four remaining villages the remaining third, to be paid back at 4% over 15-20 years. The four villages were assessed according to the number of donums estimated to benefit from the dam, in the following way: Kallo, £85,000; Posto, £28,000; Avla, £13,000, Kammari, £9,000. Posto was trying to get its assessment reduced to £18,000. Parali, which cannot irrigate (but will benefit from enrichment) was not assessed.

(v) Discussion

The preceding material which has deliberately been presented in full, has been concerned with the behaviour of the villagers in relation to government. The villagers do not experience government agencies as impersonal institutions carrying out reasoned policies, nor do they in fact consciously see themselves as they are - an interest-group which can steadily and effectively exert pressure on the government. However, once having said this, it must be stressed that both tendencies are emerging, and the last ten years have seen a greatly increased experience of government by villagers.

The villagers cannot be expected to see the government as impersonal, since they have had many years experience of contact with some of the most prominent officials in the dam issue - particularly Tambis and Sterkos. They know for example ^e that Sterkos owns substantial citrus land in the Market Town area, and they often talk as if they think this explains his actions, which they interpret as favouring the Market Town people. I believe they are often wrong in their assessments but they are also - in other situations - often right about the ways in which personal interests affect the impartiality of official decisions. The information which cannot ever be available to the villagers - and indeed which is extremely hard to obtain under the best of circumstances - concerns exactly when a person or a policy is free of special considerations, and when not. The only evidence of impartiality which is at the present moment acceptable to villagers is in fact evidence of partiality towards and favouring policies desired by the village itself. That is, while government gives the village what it wants it may be seen as acting honestly, ^{as} impartial; when it fails to do so, the commonest explanation is that someone with powerful connections and self-interest opposed to the village is wielding influence in the situation. Thus when during the floods the bridge at Avla was swept away by the waters, the explanation most villagers favoured was not a technical one, such as a poor design, a miscalculation about the possible force of flood water, a decision that it was cheaper to build a cheap bridge every so often than an expensive one once. They chose as explanation the notion that the contractor

responsible for the bridge put less of the appropriate materials into it than he had been paid to do. I heard no actual evidence for this, so cannot even have an opinion as to whether they were right or not. However, I know of similar cases where such an explanation would have been correct.

The tendency to see issues in terms of persons and partiality is also reflected in the way village committees approach the government officials. They very rarely write or telephone for an appointment. They decide to go, and simply turn up. If the man they wish to see is not there, they either see his assistant or go away. They do not take notes or keep records of discussions, nor do they ask officials to send them a written account of the discussions which take place. The more educated men of the village - the teachers and civil servants - often tell them that the approach is wrong, and I have cited a situation where a senior civil servant reminded them of the need to have things in writing after the Minister's statement had been so ill received. It is significant in this context that one of the issues in the setting up of the Advisory Committee was the place of educated men; the initiative for this came from an educated man, Vourros, but there was wide acceptance of the idea from the floor. I have already discussed the reasons why most educated men are reluctant to take on administrative responsibilities but it is clear that this reluctance only slows down any possible change in the relations between village and government. I assume this is an unintended consequence of the relevant Civil Service Laws.

This last point is closely connected to the problem of the villager's need for and reliance on, leaders. The village puts its own best men forward for work on committees. But these men are usually substantial farmers, too busy and too unsophisticated to deal with government in anything but a frontal way. For more indirect approaches, the village committees call on those men who are born into or married into the village but are now resident in town. Vourros, Aglas and the Kammari inspector of Education, Kefiros, have all been involved in village encounters with government this way. (15) The villagers co-opt such men for at least two distinct kinds of reasons: firstly their level of education makes them able to see the legal complexities of government proposals, and suggest appropriate amendments. This is in fact something that a number of the villagers are quite capable of doing for themselves, but they feel happier when a more highly educated person has looked into it. Secondly, the men they co-opt are likely to have closer contact with members of the elite in normal city life, and who may thus obtain inside information about the governments' intentions, or may be able to exercise special pressure behind the scenes.

There is also a more hard-headed reason for the ordinary villagers to favour elite leadership. Quite simply, it is safer. To approach officials or politicians with requests or demands is regarded by many villagers as risky. Perhaps names will be taken, files opened, future benefits withheld. It is always safer to keep one's head down, to remain anonymous. The whole situation has been succinctly expressed by Michael Attalides when he writes (unpublished paper)

"In other words rights seem to be rather an obscure and arbitrarily granted phenomenon that are always linked to the bestower"

He explains that villagers and urban Cypriot's notions of citizenship rights are scarcely developed, and all relations with authority, suggest the need for personal propitiation. Such a view explains why in matters relating to external authorities, villagers are content to see educated men out in front, while they are less willing to accord them recognition in matters within the village, which involve no threatening authorities.

To have said that villagers favour or permit elite leadership is not to say that they are satisfied with it. But the choice is between doing little or nothing themselves, and allowing others to do something - however little - for them. The latter course is usually preferred.

Such reliance on urban elite leaders from their own village has certain consequences. It led for example to the situation in which Aglas could create or capture the Five Village Committee; a number of people in the village believed he was doing it for personal political reasons and were quietly hostile to him, but since there was no alternative person prepared to take action he won by a walk-over. When Vourros accepted a prominent place in the Advisory Committee it immediately aroused Aglas' antagonism, and revealed the extent to which the dam campaign was linked to his aspirations to become a Representative.

If Aglas manipulated the Dam Committee to suit his own ends, then this was at least obvious to a number of the villagers. However, when Vourros became Chairman of the

meeting to discuss formation of the Advisory Committee, his forms of manipulation were more subtle. For example, when it looked as if the very question of the Committee's formation was likely to be shelved, he successfully re-opened it by putting the question to the Irrigation Committee - did they feel in need of additional advice? Had they answered 'no' to this, they would have laid themselves open to several charges: one, that they thought they knew everything, which was obviously presumptuous since they had no educated men among them; two, that they had been too proud to put the welfare of the village first. There would in addition have been the implication that they were able to solve the problem of the dam by themselves. None of the committee were rash enough to answer that they did not need advice, so Vourros was simultaneously able to re-open the issue, and to have appeared to marshall considerable support from the Irrigation Committee itself. The technique he used was a rather subtle one. He has for many years been active in committees in the capital so he has had ample opportunity to pick up special skills. The villager's reliance on educated leadership lays them open to certain forms of manipulation.

However, the leaders themselves face two ways. There are a number of important cleavages in Cypriot society, the urban/rural, the educated/uneducated, the rich/poor; these may or may not overlap, and thus give rise to a number of possibilities for differences of status. The feature completely absent from Cyprus is that of a traditional titled aristocracy, based on a feudal estate system. Loyalty to the village of birth and one's kin there, cut across achievements

in education, wealth and urban residence. Such mobile people become special resources available to their natal village in encounters with government or the elite. The tie with the village is usually greatly reinforced by the likelihood that a man will own property there. Vourros and Aglas both have substantial property in their villages. In order to have this property successfully managed it is essential for them to keep up good relations with at least some villagers. It would be unfortunate in the extreme if they became seen as men who wished only to take things out of the village and not to put anything back ⁽¹⁶⁾. Furthermore, their ties are reinforced by the fact that their property gives them - in certain situations - common interests with the villagers.

It was clear at a number of points during the dam campaign that the villagers were anxious about the possible politicisation of the issue. On a number of occasions they said things which suggested that they wished to treat the dam as a simple problem of administration, and that issues of political alignment should be kept out, since they would inevitably break the solidarity of the villages. The villagers were only partly successful in this desire. For one thing, the left were not officially present on the demonstration to the Presidential Palace. While not sure of the reasons for this, I can say it is entirely consistent with the attitude of the left national leadership to avoid any action which might appear to be anti-governmental. The absence of the left, and the presence of the PEK leaders were both signs that national politics could not be kept out.

During the formation of the Advisory Committee the matter

of possible politicisation was again overtly raised, and nearly all those present rejected the idea that the new committee would be thought to have a political flavour. This expressed attitude, it will be readily seen, is a form of social control: by saying that something will not happen, one makes it less acceptable and less likely. Since the position (or lack of position) of all village leaders is known, there is a sense in which it is impossible for the village to put up a committee which is without a political complexion. The only thing to be done is to produce a committee and to put it on its honour to avoid behaving in a party political fashion. This, I suggest, was why the villagers were against Vourros' suggestion of the formal secret ballot for the committee. For if, as eventually happened, the new committee was produced in a fairly confused fashion but by acclamation, it would be nearly impossible for any single group to control the course of events, without being seen to be so doing. However, in a secret ballot all sorts of things could go on which would result in a political committee: a group could secretly vote for several people and afterwards deny that they had acted in an organised fashion. The 'secret ballot' which in another culture or situation would be a way of ensuring open selection, here had a quite different meaning, and Vourros did not show himself to be fully in touch with village thinking when he tried to press for it.

However in spite of the expressed wishes of the village to keep the dam issue non-political in the party sense, the ambitions of the lawyer, Aglas, were clear evidence that

this was impossible. Furthermore, the villagers saw themselves - realistically as it happened - as involved in a power struggle with the citizens of Market Town. They frequently asked each other "Do they think they are the Government of Cyprus?" and their considerable mistrust of the Minister was rooted in the thought that because of his origins he would be bound secretly to support the town. They announced their intention to make sure that at the next elections, he would be made to feel their wrath. This intention was thwarted since he did not stand for office in June 1970, having been guaranteed further government office, by the President.

The anxiety about politicisation of the issue was displayed by the behaviour of Sklyros. When he first attended a meeting to discuss the Advisory Committee he took the line - along with the mukhtar - that such a committee was not necessary. This he did because he did not know who was behind the idea, and was afraid it was a right-wing initiative. Later when he had convinced himself that there was no outside grouping behind the idea, he was prepared to support it. However,

Vourros was impressed by the atmosphere in the village at the time of the creation of the Advisory Committee. He then immediately re-opened one of his pet projects, the possibility of forming a club in the village. The man who opposed this, Vasilakis, was a man who had already been involved in disputes with Vourros before as I described in the previous chapter, and whose uncle had been instrumental in stopping his earlier attempts to start a club. Thus we see a continuity in the alignments and oppositions among the

village leaders over nearly ten years, and the same reason being used by the less educated to the more educated for rejecting a formal institution based on educational difference. "It would politicise the village". However, if there is continuity, there is also change. For Dhaskalos who had remained neutral over the Graduate's Club five years earlier, now stands openly with Vourros and well as with leftists like Tangos over the need to control water use and to form a new committee. This is in spite of the fact that he remains a passionate nationalist.

The Advisory Committee came to nothing in the end. Since in fact the Committee had no formal legal existence, and thus no teeth, it is not surprising that without explicit requests from the Irrigation Committee nothing came out of it. It is always possible that the Irrigation Committee deliberately avoided calling it. Some of the people on the Irrigation Committee - Patris for example - were supporting the candidacy of Aglas. They would thus have had a good reason to avoid calling a committee which threatened to take some of the steam out of Aglas' role as champion of the dam. However, for this view I have no evidence. But the fact that at roughly the same time, a new move to launch a Graduate's Club was again thwarted "to avoid politicising the village", throws the issue into sharper relief: for the Advisory Committee was once again a committee of educated men, and the Graduate's Club was also for the educated; their influence would have been considerable in internal village affairs, would have symbolically taken an institutional form, and would have threatened some of the prominent nationalists in the village.

It is one thing to allow educated men to take the lead in something as external, uncertain and hazardous as a demonstration; but it is quite another to allow them a permanent position of authority within the village itself.

Other reasons for the failure of the Advisory Committee must include the fact that such thorough-going participation seems to be the wrong style for village administration. Inertia is inevitable, unless there is a continual crisis or clear danger. In this sense the early readiness of the villagers to attend the first meetings can be seen as expressing their anxiety, and the act of choosing a committee released their tension. Having selected a committee, many of them saw their affairs as in safe hands. The memory of the flood water and the demonstration passed, and with them, the will of individual villagers to pursue the matter. These are not structural features of village life, but more cultural, and historical. One cannot ultimately explain the reluctance to make the committee work without mentioning the political culture of the village. There is no need to invoke such notions as 'amoral familism' to explain this behaviour; it is more parsimonious to say that the villagers are not used to keeping up constant pressure on their representatives, and it requires efforts they are generally unwilling to make. They do things in the mood of a moment that they will not do on a day-to-day basis.

Yet another reason for the demise of the committee was the climate of incipient elections, rife with party manoeuvre, meant that the committee was inevitably overtaken by politics, even though I shall argue in the concluding chapter that it

was also an attempt by villagers to control possible divisions produced by politics. The forces of the larger society, in this instance proved too strong. When a number of villagers, clients of powerful patrons, showed a readiness to work for the dam through these patrons the committee and such village-wide initiatives were doomed.

An historical note of some interest concerns the role of Moustachas. In none of the events described in this chapter did he appear to play any part at all. He did not turn up at Advisory Committee meetings, and no-one put forward his name. The days when he 'did what he liked in the village' had gone for good, although his nephew Vasilakis was still able to put his weight against the proposed citrus grower's club.

In the next chapter I discuss a number of villagers in conflict with a number of Market Town people over the conduct of CITCOP, the citrus co-operative; by the end of the discussion it should be clear that this issue and the dam issue which covered the same period of time were mutually intensifying.

Footnotes to Chapter 9

- (1) Dahrendorf (1959 : 213) has described what he calls the super-imposition of conflicts, in industrial society. Although he is specifically concerned with class conflict, the distinction is a useful one, which deserves wider currency.
- (2) The functions of irrigation committees in this respect was discussed in chapter five.
- (3) In the previous chapter I described how these two men came to lose their positions on this committee.
- (4) This man has already appeared, in the previous chapter, as the district militia commander to whom village militia problems were to be referred. As individuals advance through the structures of government, their value as people personally known to villagers increases.
- (5) Although they laughed, this was sheer politeness, and unease, for villagers had been saying - and showed every sign of believing - that the Minister was guilty of precisely this form of partiality.
- (6) Davis (1969) has spoken of the willingness of the Pistiocesi to become state clients. Something similar is going on when villagers claim that Makarios is 'above' particular interests. They say in other situations that they know he looks after his kin and co-villagers. They really mean that they hope he will show his impartiality by favouring them. They express their readiness to become his clients by saying that he is 'above' such things.
- (7) The statement has yet another level of meaning, or ambiguity: since the minister comes from Market Town, there is a real though improbable sense in which he literally is a cousin to some Kallotes. The sentence must then be rendered We've come to see our priest (remote and inaccessible) and not our cousin (close, related and available).
- (8) I was not usually in the habit of giving advice, for obvious reasons.
- (9) This was a case where the village of Kammari wished for a licence to turn a traditional well into a bore-hole. The government refused this, and the Kammarites went ahead anyway. They were taken to court by the government on a number of occasions. On one occasion I accompanied them on a visit to President Makarios, in which they asked him to intervene in their favour, claiming that others had been unjustly favoured, while their traditional rights were being ignored. A Water Department official described their case to me as 'a put-up job'.

- (10) The reader may care to try saying this last sentence over to himself with differing emphases.
- (11) The reference to camel-drivers in the case of Kallo is an anachronism. Less than a dozen camels existed in Cyprus at the time of my fieldwork, none in Kallo.
- (12) The resemblance of the positions taken here by Vourros and Vasilakis to those taken by Vourros and Moustachas over the Graduate's Club (chapter eight) is striking.
- (13) Sklyros' argument here was not sound, since Nastia had, like Kallo, also got the issue of meters for water pumps to deal with.
- (14) Later still in 1970 the dam became an openly party political matter, when the United and Progressive Parties both tried to monopolise the high-ground of agitating on the farmer's behalf for the dam. This explains in part the delegation to Yorgadjis' earlier.
- (15) A Water Department official, describing Kefiros' efforts to help his fellow villagers in their attempts to get their (illegal) pump licenced said to me "Kefiros used to come into my office from the Ministry of Education a hundred times a day about it. I always had him at my head". He did not suggest Kefiros was doing his duty to his fellow villagers. Kefiros also managed to get elected to the Legislative Assembly in July 1970, so his efforts were amply rewarded.
- (16) In Chapter three I described how an outsider who bought a water pump in the village, and tried to get villagers to pay their debts, suffered damage to his water pipes. Such sanctions could equally easily be employed against a fellow-villager who forgot to live up to his obligations. Vourros, at least, is very careful to make not enemies in the village if he can help it, and he refers to just such incidents as the reason for his caution.

CHAPTER 10

THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION: THE CITRUS COOPERATIVE

This chapter is mainly concerned with certain crises in the administration of CITCOP, the citrus wholesale cooperative whose plant is near Market Town. In 1968-70 only about thirty Kallotes were members of CITCOP, so it is necessary to offer some justification for what might seem a digression at first sight. The affairs of CITCOP involve certain leading figures from the Kallu political arena, and involve other actors and issues in the village's several political fields. The villagers are watching the progress of CITCOP closely. If in their eyes it seems to fail, they will feel they have been right not to join hastily; if it succeeds others will join it, or similar organisations. CITCOP will be a test case of the acceptance of future cooperative enterprises.

In terms of the more general arguments advanced here, there will be a further exploration of the prominence of elite personnel in village politics, revealing the nature of the political calculation which must be employed when conflict is muffled; it will show how individuals with conflicting loyalties attempt to avoid action which will antagonise friends, kin or allies.

In the last chapter it was argued that the CITCOP issues are to some extent superimposed on those of the dam

campaign, and that each fuels and intensifies the other. So here, the material presented should not only add new data, but retrospectively clarify the importance of the dam campaign.

Most of the material here comes from my observations at two CITCOP Annual General Meetings, and one Extraordinary General Meeting. The period covered is from January 1969 to June 1970. During this eighteen month period, I spent only eight months in Cyprus, which involved the end of my main fieldwork period, and two short later periods, each of which fortunately coincided with a major meeting of CITCOP.

A further characteristic of this material is that much of it follows the actions of Vourros; I had a large number of extremely detailed discussions with him about his behaviour at the CITCOP meetings. It would have been better if this material could be matched with equally rich material from other leading participants, particularly Azinas and some leading committee members. Since rightly or wrongly I interpreted the events described here as being of a sensitive nature, I held back from much direct contact with Azinas, in order not to jeopardise my continued access to the meeting of CITCOP. This is an obvious limitation, then, of these data. It suggests one other limitation: the absence of a 'national-level' view of the politics of CITCOP. This would have been highly desirable. But since the politics of the Cooperative were only one element of my study, I was constrained by the need for circumscription in selecting data. A full study of CITCOP and its politics would have to

include far fuller data both 'from above' and from the viewpoint of Market Town. My concern here was with themes more directly related to the village.

(i) Background Factors

CITCOP was founded in 1964, with 271 members. By 1969 it had just over 900 members, and handled about 50% of the district's citrus production. In 1969/70 CITCOP handled 150 million pieces of fruit worth £1,622,000. Three quarters of the members are from Market Town, and the rest from the surrounding villages - Kallo, Kammari, Mastia and Mené being the most important. Thus, in Kallo at least, a very large majority of those who had citrus trees producing fruit in 1969 were still selling through private merchants. Members of CITCOP had to put up £50 per donum share capital to enter the organisation. They were then bound by its rules to sell their entire citrus produce through the organisation. All members received the same price per 1,000 saleable fruit cut, and this was an average price, finally settled at the end of the season, based on an average price from all oranges sold throughout the season.

The features which attracted both Market Town and some village growers to join CITCOP were the safe and normally high average price; the ability to obtain loans in advance on their standing fruit; and the certainty that they would be paid on time. In contrast, those who sold through a private middleman could hold back their fruit until getting a favourable price, or could try to sell at the start of the

season, when the price was also high, but they were always gambling. Prices were unpredictable, and fluctuated widely during a season. If a man borrowed money from a merchant in advance, he would then be committed to selling his fruit to him, which made him feel vulnerable in a bargaining situation; finally, each season at least one of the five major merchants got into difficulties over payments, and farmers after signing a contract of sale were often kept waiting for their money for months, or even a year. Villagers with very small numbers of fruit to sell (either because they had little land, or because their trees were still very young) did not join CITCOP because the entry fee was simply too much to make it worth their while. Men heavily indebted also do not join, since they cannot raise the share capital.

There were of course other reasons for selling privately; those with close kin-ties to a middleman might be inclined to sell through him. My data are not adequate to decide these issues. Early in the course of fieldwork I collected some systematic data on the citrus sales of 23 men. Of these, only 5 were members of CITCOP, and three of these had joined with quantities of well under 100,000 fruit on their trees. There were also men with 200,000 fruit for sale who had not joined. I am unable therefore to say how far the villagers' practise is consistent with their statements about the circumstances in which people join, or do not join the Cooperative, but my limited data suggest there must be a number of factors in a complex relation. It is possible that those persons who favour Cooperatives will

tend to join while their produce is still relatively small, and those who do not greatly favour Cooperatives will remain outside even when their produce is large. But attitudes to Cooperatives are not a simple matter of party political views (which are in any case strongly held by relatively few villagers) but seen as a separate issue. Men who are strong right-wing nationalists, like the schoolteacher Dhaskalos, nevertheless favour Cooperatives. He joined in the 1966-67 season and in 1967 sold 120,000 fruit through CITCOP at an average price of £5.750 per 1,000. But Tangos, a strong leftist, was still selling privately in 1968, when he cut 160,000. He laughingly describes himself as 'a crook, since as a leftist I should believe in Cooperation but I'm not practising what I preach. I'm waiting to see how CITCOP goes, and until I have more fruit... At the moment I can do better outside'. Finally, as I shall later show, there has been some agreement to define the Cooperatives as 'outside' party politics, at least temporarily. Joining or not joining is not currently interpreted by villagers as an indicator of expressive political action.

At the time of my fieldwork one thing which seemed to deter a number of people from joining CITCOP was the idea that it was dominated by Market Towners, in which the interests of villagers would tend to come a poor second. Villagers pointed out that nearly all the twelve committee members were from the town, and that the Market Town people were "all inter-related". Thus, they argued, over a number of issues they would support their own kin and friends. Among

these issues was a grower's position in each of the schedules for first, second and third cutting of citrus during the season. This was important for two reasons. First, it is widely believed that if fruit stay late on the tree, they take from the tree nourishment needed for flowers and ultimately for the next year's crop of fruit⁽¹⁾. Secondly, the longer that ripe fruit stayed on the tree the greater the chance of large numbers being spoiled by disease, over-ripeness, weather damage, etc. Another issue which exercised the growers was the grading of fruit: if a man produced too many fruit which were graded by CITCOP's checkers as skarta (reject class), and thus not up to export standard, he would lose money. It was said that how one's fruit were graded sometimes depended on how well one was connected in Market Town. There were a number of other minor complaints about the way the Cooperative was run, and often these were expressed by villagers in terms of Market Town people running the organisation to their own advantage.

I do not wish to overstate the degree of hostility between the villagers and the townspeople. There are only three miles between them. Many villagers have relatives in the town, make frequent trips there, have friends there and business contacts. The town and the CITCOP plant provide a small number of jobs for villagers, particularly young women who work at the CITCOP factory packing fruit.

But on the debit side there were issues of economic rivalry, independent of the dam or CITCOP as such. For example, the Kallo Truck Drivers Association in 1968 held

the CITCOP contract to truck fruit to the coast port of Famagusta. But in 1969, under the competitive bidding system, Kallo drivers lost the contract, and it went to Mastia village drivers. A specific group of Kallotes were angry with the CITCOP officials over this.

There was no need for any articulate corporate policy in the village about CITCOP since relatively few villagers were members, on the one hand, and on the other, membership was a matter for private decision and in no way linked to other village memberships. But the general question of how CITCOP was running and whether or not it was worth joining was frequently debated in the coffee-shops, and since Kallotes inevitably come together more with each other, and are already prone to believe their interests are opposed to those of Market Towners, they tended to speak as if Kallotes ought to have a collective position on CITCOP.

Vourros had watched the proposals for the foundation of CITCOP, joined early in 1963, and his entry as one of the larger growers in the region as well as the second or third largest in Kallo was important, seen he is widely thought to be a progressive man. After the Committee's first three-year term of office was over in 1966, Vourros, like a number of other people, was not altogether happy about the way they were behaving. At the AGM, however, he listened to the speech made by the Commissioner of Cooperative Development, Andreas Azinas, who appealed for the committee to be given a second three-year term of office unopposed, both to give their experience a chance to work for the new organisation, and

since the general political climate of the island was unsettled and in the interests of keeping unity within the Greek community, elections of all kinds were being avoided. Vourros complied with the Commissioner's request, but by the end of 1968 he was openly dissatisfied.

(ii) January 1969 - AGM

On January 18th 1969 the AGM of CITCOP took place. Before the meeting Vourros spoke to a number of the Kallo members in the village coffee-house, and suggested to them they they put specific questions about the running of the Cooperative at the AGM. Most of them agreed to do so. When the actual meeting took place, the Kallo people tended to sit in a group in the large Market Town cinema hired for the purpose.

The AGM took over five hours to get through its business. There were a very large number of issues raised, only some of which will be mentioned here. Vourros played a prominent role, although it had been his intention to avoid this, and it was partly for this reason that he had tried to arrange for other people he knew to ask questions. He was careful to preface his first questions with a statement about the need for unity in the organisation, the need for the committee to understand that points raised in criticism were not meant as personal criticism, but were meant as criticism of the running of the organisation. He pointed out that all his personal estate was committed to the organisation so that in criticising its running he was not acting

in a spiteful spirit, but merely protecting his self-interest.

One issue he raised was the loss of 600 boxes of fruit which had gone bad in a deep freeze unit. This loss had not appeared in the accounts, and he had only found out about it by accident. One of his sources of information had been a Kallo truck driver, a member of the village Truckers Association, which had failed to get its contract with CITOOP renewed.

Another issue he raised was the question of the construction of a juice extraction plant. Vourros was highly critical of the committee for having asked for tenders from a number of European firms without having done proper background research on the desirability of the plant itself. Members of the committee had also been abroad on trips to inspect extraction plants. This, he implied, was not helpful, since the men who had gone on these trips did not have the expertise to come to any useful conclusions.

Soon after the start of the meeting he asked whether minutes were being taken, and when it appeared they were not being taken, requested that they should be. This was agreed by Azinas, but he said they would not be sent out to each member but would be available for inspection in the organisation's building⁽²⁾.

A Kallo teacher, Dhaskalos, raised a question about the costs of boxing the members' fruit, since he had heard that it could be done more cheaply privately. Were costs fully competitive? From the chair, Azinas said he would not release the actual figures in public, because there were

guests present and it would be inhospitable to ask them to leave (a reference to myself and a journalist), but he added there were no secrets in the Cooperative movement and the details could be released to members. It would not be in the Cooperative's interest, however, for the private merchants to learn the costs.

At one point a man got up who had the same surname as Vourros, and when he gave his name Azinas asked him if he were a brother of Vourros. "No, no relation..." the man replied. It is highly likely that the simple fact that members were asked to stand up and state their names when asking questions was sufficient to put some people off.

Later in the meeting some suggestions of minor irregularities were made from the floor, particularly involving allegations that some people managed to get fruit cut ahead of their strict position in the queue. Whereas people were ready to shout out 'yes' to the question 'Do some people put their own relatives first?', there was far less readiness to name names. For even though there were possibly seven or eight hundred people in the room, people would have been able to identify each other by means of only a few quick questions to their neighbours. If you can first locate the village a man is from, it is then an easy matter to find someone you know from that village and ask him "Who was it who asked the question about the bribes to the checkers from your village?"

The meeting continued and Vourros continued to play a prominent part in it. Since he had been thinking about the

affairs of the Cooperative systematically for some time, he had come to the meeting with a number of questions to raise. Although he had tried to get people he knew to raise some of these questions, he saw that as the meeting went on they were not speaking, so he raised some of them himself.

The teacher Dhaskalos was a man who during previous years in village affairs had often found himself on the opposite side to Vourros (see, for example, chapter 8 - the Case of the Graduates Club). Now he was one of the few villagers who consistently raised questions from the floor. For example, he asked whether the system of deciding cutting order could not be decentralised, and each village have a committee which would arrange the cutting order for its own members. In this way, since at the village level everyone knew the special needs and problems of the other, allowances could be made, and a watch could be kept on the just execution of the queue order. From the Chair, Azinas replied that he was against this proposal: "I cannot accept that - you'd all quarrel among yourselves."

Dhaskalos replied spiritedly "No, we wouldn't".

"Not in your village, perhaps" Azinas conceded, but he did not alter his rejection of the proposal.

The idea of village-level control arose also in a suggestion from Vourros, that each village have an Advisory Committee, which would function to keep the main CITCOP Committee informed of village-level complaints and problems. Azinas, from the Chair, showed himself against this too. Being a skilful chairman he was able to turn down certain

suggestions by the simple expression of an authoritative opinion. Since Vourros and Dhaskalos had not organised support in the meeting for such specific suggestions, and apparently had no appetite for turning them from the floor into substantive issues, they were forgotten as soon as Azinas had spoken against them. It would have taken a far greater investment of time and effort to bring such proposals to the level of issues to be formally voted on by the members of the Cooperative. Thus, the lack of conscious organisation kept the criticisms of the CITCOP management on the level of the ad hoc ventilation of grievances⁽³⁾.

The most difficult decision facing Vourros during the meeting was over the question of the accounts; the fact that 600 boxes of fruit had been lost, yet the loss not recorded in the accounts, troubled him. He at one point suggested that the meeting should not accept the accounts as rendered. Azinas quietly pointed out that never in the history of the Cooperative Movement had this happened, and it would create a very bad impression were it to happen now on the strangers (non-members) present⁽⁴⁾. Vourros asked if the Commissioner would appoint a committee of inquiry to examine the accounts, composed of qualified members but picked from members not on the main committee. Azinas agreed to appoint an investigative audit committee, and said he would make a note of Vourros' wishes on the composition of this committee, but did not promise to stand by them. Vourros felt, following Azinas' appeal and his readiness to appoint a committee, that he should not press the non-acceptance of

of the accounts. He also thought it unlikely he would obtain sufficient votes (51%) from among those present, since he believed the majority of members were from Market Town and would be inclined to vote against something they would interpret as an attack on 'their' committee. He had noticed that the several Market Town people he had asked to raise issues had refrained from doing so. In this way the accounts came to be approved.

The meeting, then, appeared to be dominated by Vourros and a number of other critics, most of whom were not from Market Town. The potentially critical issue - the approval of the accounts -- did not produce cleavage. Commissioner Azinas in his summing-up speech took up a number of the points raised from the floor and discussed them, which gave members the impression that their comments and grievances were taken seriously. He particularly asked the members to make use of his office, which cost the tax payers a large sum of money, to make their complaints felt. That, he insisted, was what he and his staff were there for, but little or no use had previously been made of them. The AGM was not the place to raise such issues; it was better to raise them as they occurred. They should also take matters to the manager of the organisation.

At the end of the meeting Vourros deliberately rushed up to the rostrum and shook hands one by one with each member of the Committee, to show them that his criticisms were in the interests of technical efficiency and not in the nature of personal attacks. Later he visited the Market Town Orchard

Owners Club and made a point of chatting with a number of prominent growers, to make the same point.

On some levels Vourros was disappointed with the way the meeting had gone. He had, for example, asked Patris to raise some questions, but although Patris had come to the meeting he had not opened his mouth. Vourros apparently did not understand this.

However, an analysis of some of the network relations between Patris and Azinas suggest why he failed to raise the issues. First, Patris' son-in-law, D Fanou, is related to Azinas in several ways. He is an employee in the Department of Cooperatives. In recent years (see chapter 8 - the Case of the Lyssarides Group) he has moved from active national political support for Dr. Lyssarides, to support for Azinas. Azinas, as is well known throughout the island, is the unofficial leader of PEK, the Nationalist Farmers Union. Thus, D. Fanou is both employee and political client of Commissioner Azinas.

But Patris is also linked to Azinas in other ways. First, he has for many years been a local representative of PEK, which although it has been somewhat quiescent in village affairs, was at the time of my fieldwork undergoing a revival. Secondly, Patris' wife's brother was at university with Azinas, and with a third man, Orphanos, who holds an important position in PEK. The close friendship of these three men and their common political views are well known to Patris. He thus has two links to Azinas through affines as well as his own formal political link.

Patris' relation to Vourros is one of relative warmth and friendship. But whereas Vourros is economically independent, Patris sees himself (in spite of his very large land holding) as a man with a limited range of options. His seven daughters are an ever-present burden; in his own view it would have been irresponsible of him to appear openly to criticise a man as powerful and well-disposed to him as Azinas.

To Vourros, criticism of the way CITCOP is run does not constitute either an attack on Azinas or disloyalty to him. Vourros' view of the norms of bureaucratic efficiency demand the use of open criticism. But to Patris the criticism was likely to be interpreted by Azinas as ingratitude. To the extent that Vourros failed to foresee the view Patris would take, he had misread the situation.

(iii) 1969 - Vourros' Campaign for Support

Three months after this meeting I left the island and did not return until December 1969. I was thus not able to see how far the villagers continued to be interested in or critical of the running of the Cooperative. However, from my inquiries on returning it did not appear that the affairs of CITCOP had been in the forefront of the villagers' minds, and this is not surprising since, as I have said earlier, relatively few of them are directly affected by it. In addition, the competing attractions of the continuing national political campaigns added an interest to life usually lacking. However, towards the end of 1969 Vourros had been elected to

the committee of the Kallo Cooperative Retail Shop, a responsibility he was taking up with some enthusiasm. It became apparent that his appetite was increasing for involvement in the affairs of the community in which so much of his economic interests were tied up. The Cooperative Shop has an annual turnover of £50,000 (an annual average household expenditure on consumption of nearly £170 a year) and thus requires skilful management.

Shortly after my return I attended a meeting of this committee, which Vourros was chairing. Also present on the committee was Patris, and during the course of the meeting Patris' son-in-law, D. Fanou, arrived and informally sat in on the meeting. This illustrates the extent to which in village affairs everyone is living in everyone else's pockets. Vourros knows that D. Fanou is an employee of Azinas, and that there thus exists a possible flow of information back to the Commissioner on the relative efficiency of Vourros on the Co-op Shop Committee. D. Fanou has no formal right to attend these meetings but the world of the village is not a formal world, and since D. Fanou is closely related to nearly every member of the committee by kinship, affinity or friendship, and is also an influential person in village affairs in his own right, it was extremely unlikely that anyone would have suggested he leave.

There had been a number of events during 1969 which, while they had not attracted much attention in Kallo, had involved Vourros. The most important of these was his realisation that in Market Town there was pronounced hostility

on the part of a number of large growers in the Market Town Citrus Growers Club to the idea of a Citrus Marketing Board. There are successful marketing boards for both potatoes and carrots, and in the view of certain experts the greatest weakness in citrus marketing in Cyprus is its failure to produce one, in contrast to most other major citrus producing countries. Vourros was aware of these views, and felt that the issue was not getting a proper hearing. It was clear that one consequence of such a Board would be greatly to diminish the personal power of Commissioner Azinas, as well as a number of people who regard themselves as his political clients. Vourros thought it likely that Azinas had organised or managed the criticisms of the Marketing Board proposal which were being voiced in Market Town.

Vourros tried to get the matter openly debated in an extraordinary general meeting; he easily obtained the 25 signatures he needed to call such a meeting, by visiting the villages, but only 150 people turned up to the meeting. Since constitutionally the meeting needed 25% of the 900 members to pass any resolutions binding on the members, Vourros was at least 100 people short of his target. The meeting did not even discuss the issue of a Marketing Board unofficially. Vourros' initiative was, then, a failure. It made it clear to Azinas that Vourros was likely to have strong views on the Marketing Board issue.

Of course the issues behind a decision to set up or not to set up such a Board are not normally decided on the village level. It is reasonable to suppose that the major

departments of government will have differing interests on such a proposal.

My information about higher levels of involvement is deficient on this issue. However, it is fairly obvious that the Board would have had far less chance of coming into existence if it could have been plausibly shown that a majority of citrus producers were themselves opposed to the idea.

The Minister of Commerce was certainly interested in the creation of such a Board. It was pointed out to him by Vourros in a chance meeting that a number of smaller producers had not understood the draft proposal for the Board that the Minister had tabled, and that they thought the Board was against small producers. It would thus be advisable for the Minister to send someone to explain the position. The Minister agreed with alacrity. He said he would send someone to the extraordinary general meeting called by Vourros. However, no one appeared from his Ministry, and it is possible that Azinas took administrative steps to insure that he was unavailable to give permission to the Commerce Ministry official to attend the meeting. This, at any rate, is Vourros' belief. However, he did not openly suggest to the Minister of Commerce that he thought Azinas was deliberately obstructing the creation of the Marketing Board, since he thought it unwise openly to antagonise a man as clever and powerful as Azinas. In my view, although Vourros did not himself say this, the other reason for his discretion over this issue was that he was now clear in his own mind that he wished to become a CITCOP committeeman. This, in any case, is the

position he had achieved by the end of 1970, and I shall discuss it in more detail later.

The other major issue in CITCOP during 1969 was the resignation from the Cooperative of a number of major producers. Some of these men were very large businessmen who have diverse interests, and thus do not depend on citrus. Others were more specialised. But it was estimated that some ten producers, between them producing some 8,000,000 fruit a year, had withdrawn from the Cooperative, on the general grounds that it was not being efficiently enough run to suit their interests. There was some discussion among other members, particularly in the village of Mastia, whether or not to do the same. One proposal was to form a series of smaller cooperatives, perhaps based on villages. Vourros in some moods saw the issue as having implications for the actual survival of CITCOP, for if enough people left the organisation would collapse. But at other times he saw it more as a question of shaking up the Committee.

The week before the December 1969 AGM he visited Mastia village. The village, large and prosperous, in the main Market Town-Nicosia road, has a Graduates Club. Here he stopped, to discuss the forthcoming meeting with various friends and acquaintances who were members of the Cooperative. In this discussion two themes evolved. One was of the hostility to a Market Town-dominated administration; the other, which was closely linked with it, was that more competent educated men were needed on any future committee. Vourros and another teacher, a Mastia man called Chilos, who

had been prominent on the floor in the previous AGM, were now fairly openly canvassing support. They agreed that it would be a good idea to divide up the key questions to be raised at the AGM, between the villages and between different individuals. The topics raised at this discussion included problems about sales; problems of favouritism and inefficiency in the packing factory; the issue of whether in the future fruit should be sold by weight or by numbers; the problem of inadequate technical research on problems such as the creation of the juice extraction plant; the problem of the resignation of important members; and the feeling of Market Town domination. This meeting broke up having agreed to have separate village meetings to plan tactics in a few days.

This informal discussion made it clear to me that Vourros was not by any means a lone voice in being critical of the CITROP administration, although he was a particularly articulate one. A number of other educated villagers had criticisms to make and they were prepared to organise informally to put across their point of view.

During the next week he mentioned the importance of attending the AGM to a number of Kallotes, and was active in the region generally. He was able to discuss details of the CITCOP accounts informally with D. Fanou, who had been promoted during 1969 in the Cooperative Development Department, and was one of the key persons to carry out the CITCOP audit on which the accounts were based.

Vourros had suggested a village meeting, and on the

day agreed a number of key persons were waiting in the coffee-shop for him to turn up. When he arrived, D. Fanou said to him jokingly, in his role as a CITCOP official, "You'll cut us into little bits, I'm afraid...". But no one suggested that D. Fanou might have a conflict of interest, and should be asked to leave. Vourros started to go through a list of Kallo people who could be relied on to ask crucial questions. Someone mentioned The Lion, a tough and fairly independent-minded farmer with a solid land holding. But he was ruled out, since he occasionally took temporary work as a checker for CITCOP, 'and he'd have to think about his future'. The Lute-Player was suggested, one of a number of leftish brothers. But he was ruled out for the same reason - he occasionally worked as a checker. Vourros started to get irritated. "I don't want it to be like last year, when several people said they would ask questions, and then didn't", he grumbled. D. Fanou had already said it was better for the questions to be spread, and not all to come from Vourros.

There were some 16 CITCOP members at this village meeting, most of whom were solid land holders. Vourros took the initiative, somewhat to the irritation of Dhaskalos, and started to bring up topics which should be raised. Vourros mentioned that a man who was a brother of a Committee member had managed to get all his fruit cut before April, and that this should be raised. D. Fanou made a mollifying remark, and then Vourros said to him "Don't mention this to the Committee, will you?"

D. Fanou said "Maybe I shouldn't be here now?" A number of people all said "No, no", meaning that it was perfectly acceptable for him to be there. The implication was that he was thoroughly trusted. "Well", D. Fanou added "I'll be at CITCOP tomorrow but I won't mention it...".

Vourros now made a little speech "We've got to break up the family alliances down there at CITCOP. We've got to show them we know they're running it as a family business...".

At this point D. Fanou got up and said "Look, I'm going for many reasons. You understand - I'm in a delicate position...". There were murmurs of assent on all sides. He left. The meeting went on. Vourros briefed people on a number of questions, but also on some issues, such as the desirability of adopting a shift system, instead of allowing women to work overtime up to a twelve hour stint, when their efficiency would be greatly reduced.

Then he started fishing for more ammunition to use against the committee. He himself cited the fact that when producers brought in quantities of reject fruit, to be sold very cheaply for juicing, they were not given receipts. This meant that there was an opportunity for sharp practice. He then turned to a man known to have done a lot of work for CITCOP and asked him to give other examples. "I haven't seen anything" he answered sheepishly. "Come off it", Vourros said. "Well, then, there was the case of Andreas...", he mentioned the name of a senior civil servant. "Ah ha, now you're talking" said Vourros. "There are lots of cases, come to think of it", he said. Vourros now told the meeting that if at the AGM people were asked to give examples of queue-

jumping or other favours, they should name names. D. Fanou's brother, A. Fanou, who was still present at the meeting, said "But Vourros, that's a bit hard since if someone told you something in confidence and then you use it, he will know." Vourros agreed that this was tricky, but said they could get a third party to supply the details in such cases. He continued to press the man for more details.

He asked a youngish, unsophisticated farmer to ask about the builder on the Committee who had received the contract to build the main factory. He wanted the farmer to ask about the fact that the building contract stipulated £700 of iron which was missing from the building. When it was objected that on a question like this source and evidence would certainly be asked for, Vourros said "Refer to me. I know that the architect in question resigned from CITCOP over this and is ready to go to court about it".

Now Vourros had been in possession of this information for a long time, and had not seen fit to raise it himself. Had it been raised, it would have caused a major uproar, and he was not unaware of this. The builder in fact had from the podium (where he sat with the other committeemen) blustered fiercely at Vourros at the last AGM, but later Azinas had made it clear to him that he had better control his tongue, since Vourros knew quite enough about his affairs to make life hot for him. How far Vourros had now considered the wisdom of asking a young farmer to raise this issue is not clear. In the event, the farmer did not ask this question, and it is not surprising that he didn't. But nor did Vourros.

(iv) 1970 AGM (Took place December 1969)

Before the AGM itself a number of small incidents took place which highlight the tension surrounding the administration of the Cooperative. The members were standing on the front steps outside the cinema where the meeting was to take place. Vourros approached Azinas and shook his hand. The committee men started to arrive, and one of them remembered me from the previous meeting. He said, "This man should not be allowed in to our meeting this year - last year he saw how we quarrelled among ourselves and must have left with bad impressions of us". I made remarks to the effect that some measure of conflict is natural and inevitable in all organisations, and that I had not taken away bad impressions, but rather good ones. The Manager of the Cooperative then approached and discussed with me the conditions under which he thought it was acceptable for me to come in to the meeting⁽⁵⁾. His position was difficult since he knew of my close relationship with several key figures, in particular Vourros.

By the time the meeting had settled down I counted seventeen Kallo members present in the audience, nearly all of whom had been present at Vourros' discussion the day before. In his opening speech Azinas stressed the unity and success of the Cooperative movement and of CITCOP itself, and said that although there were problems, these were always soluble by more cooperation. He then mentioned a series of issues which were before the meeting - the question of going over to a shift system in the packing plant; the question of whether

the region should have a juice extraction plant; the question of a Citrus Marketing Board; the question of whether to sell by weight or by numbers. He also mentioned some issues left over from the previous AGM - the oranges which had rotted in cold storage, and the problem of lemon prices in particular.

Early in the meeting Vourros was on his feet making a somewhat discursive speech in which he mentioned the late mailing of the accounts, the need for a more scientific basis for decisions, and the fact that the organisation needed to look both backwards and forwards since it had recently lost some important members. Azinas, from the chair, asked Vourros to come to the point. He said that he would. There was a brief further interchange between Azinas and Vourros, after which he sat down. He gave the impression of having got slightly harrassed and having decided to be quiet rather than to make a fool of himself.

However, other questions followed thick and fast from the floor; first, there were requests for further information about costs of selling, listed in the accounts, and detailed explanations were given. A colleague of Vourros, the Mastia teacher Chilos, asked what in connection with the proposed juice extraction plant had cost £801? "Finish your private discussion" he laughingly said to the committee on the podium, amidst general mirth in the hall, for the question caused an immediate spate of whispered exchanges. The answer was that the money had gone on travel expenses for a number of committee members to visit Sicily and see a plant in operation.

There were further questions about packing costs, a topic which Azinas had refused to give out details on at the previous AGM. He now supplied some details, showing that packing costs were lower this year than previously. The Kallo teacher Dhaskalos now was on his feet asking, in effect, why if this information had been withheld at the last AGM in the name of protecting the interests of the Cooperative, was it now being given out? When Azinas tried to answer, at first Dhaskalos interrupted him, and there was a brief and bad-tempered exchange before Azinas was able to explain that the Co-op manager had taken his, Azinas', point that there should be no secrets in the Cooperative Movement⁽⁶⁾. Thus, he was making the point - though indirectly - that the administration was directly responsive to members' criticisms and comments.

A little later a teacher from Kammari village made the point that it was an error for unqualified committee men to go off on the inspection of the juice plant. A committee man then answered that Azinas had told the committee to get on with the problem, and this had been their way of getting on. The teacher said he could not accept that reply, and Azinas then instructed that the question be minuted. This kind of point was directly relevant to Vourros and his professional training, as well as to the more general issues that the teachers value formal qualifications and feel CITCOP was being run by men of little technical knowledge.

The meeting proceeded to other issues, such as the problem of payment to members having been delayed. Azinas appeared to be surprised by the number of people on the floor

who shouted out that delays were unsatisfactorily long. One member on the floor suggested that members should be paid after each cutting. "Note that down", Azinas said.

A question came up about difficulties of doing business with the USSR. There was some feeling on the floor because the USSR had 'fined' CITCOP for a supposed breach of contract when some fruit arrived in poor condition. Here was an issue which would have allowed scope for party political cleavage, if the conditions had favoured it. Obviously, the behaviour of the Chairman would be critical, especially as Azinas is widely known in his private views to be strongly anti-communist. He made a major speech on this issue. "If you don't understand a machine," he said, "you're afraid of it. The problems of doing business with the USSR are immense. They have their own methods and systems, and we have to learn them, and do business within their terms. I think it would be wrong to cut our ties with this country. Wrong both for Cyprus and for orange producers."

Here a committeeman explained that the committee had asked the Russians for permission to go to Russia to examine the fruit which had allegedly arrived in poor condition but that permission had been denied, on grounds of the presence of military secrets in the relevant area. At this point different persons of right and left persuasions started shouting out various things. A rightist shouted out that they should stop doing business with the Russians. A leftist that the rightists only wanted to hear one side of the picture. Azinas managed to regain control of the meeting, and said

that there were methods to deal with the problem presented by the Russians, which would involve use of lawyers, visits to Moscow and so forth, and that the question of the Russian 'fine' was still an open one. Why, he asked of a vociferous rightist, do you insist on seeing bad faith everywhere?

"We've had bad experiences of that country", was the reply. A little later someone whistled, in a way which, in Cypriot culture, suggests strong disapproval. Azinas pounced on this and condemned it, since he wished to stop any further 'politicisation' of the issues.

Soon Vourros rose to his feet again. This time he was more in control of himself, and managed to joke with Azinas about whether or not he was on the point. Azinas equally skilfully joked back that he was on the borderline. The point Vourros finally wished to raise was that on a particular date in the U.K. in 1968 a British merchant was selling CITCOP fruit at well below the going price, at 4/- and 5/- a box below the market price, a very large difference which would have amounted to over £1 a 1,000 fruit. Vourros had very precise details on this issue, details he had managed to obtain (indeed gone out of his way to obtain) on a trip to the U.K. for other private purposes. After the manager had failed to give a very convincing answer Azinas took over, and frankly admitted that the organisation was baffled by the man's behaviour, and that he did, confusingly, appear to be selling at a loss on this occasion. He could not explain it. Vourros did not attempt to take the point further. It was, from any point of view, a superb demonstration of his

mastery of detail in the Cooperative's affairs. Merely to have raised such an anomaly would probably have been enough seriously to alarm anyone involved in sharp practice. But to have full names, dates, places and facts at his fingertips was overwhelming.

A little later Azinas asked if the meeting approved the accounts and got them through by acclamation. It was nearly 1.30 and people were starting to trail out. Vourros suggested a lunch break but Azinas vetoed this. The committee, however, were getting sandwiches up on the podium.

An attempt by lawyer Aglas to make a point on the running of the meeting drew from Azinas the jocular remark "Hey Lawyer⁽⁷⁾, I've got nine years experience in running this sort of meeting, let me get on with my job in my own way, will you?" At another point in the meeting the lawyer, while supposedly making a point about the running of the Co-op, made what most people present interpreted as a crude political speech, linked to his candidature in the Progressive party.

A discussion of selling citrus by weight proceeded. Azinas announced the results of a poll of members (52% in favour of members selling by weight; 32% against; 16% undecided) and suggested that one way of taking the matter further would be for members to come and see a demonstration of the two methods in operation, and the costs and benefits of each method. Vourros made a not very good speech on this issue, in which he seemed to have misjudged the level of awareness of the issue on the

floor for people seemed restless with his discussion of detail.

Azinas, sensing this, asked the members why they were restless. "We're hungry", they answered. It was now 2.35 and the meeting had been going on since 10. Many people there had not eaten since 7 or 8 in the morning; but the committee had had their sandwiches. Azinas said, only half jokingly, "I'm hungry too. I don't usually work on Sundays, and these are your oranges. Have patience for another 40 minutes."

Chilos (Vourros' Mastia ally) raised the question of the Citrus Marketing Board. The extraordinary general meeting to discuss this at the level of the members had been called for 4 p.m., a time when most white collar workers were not able to attend. Did the Committee by any chance think that the Cooperative didn't need the Government's help? Exactly why had the Committee taken this position on the Marketing Board?

A committee man answered that the matter had been very urgent because a meeting of the Council of Ministers was about to take place, at which a draft law to create a Marketing Board would have been put forward. The Committee felt that it was in the members' interests to stand out against the proposed Board, on which CITCOP would have had a very small voice. No producer's group in Cyprus was in support of the proposals.

When Vourros said that the objection was that no room had been allowed for the government to modify its plans, Azinas said he was obliged to intervene in support of the

Committee's decision. 'The law would have gone through into the Legislative Assembly, and no one could have foreseen how it would have emerged. The Committee had only three days in which to act. A committee ought to take initiatives. There were ways in which members could, in the final analysis, control a committee. A committee which never acts without instruction from the members would be a bad committee. He himself could not judge if the choice of time and day for the extraordinary meeting had been suitable...'

The meeting had now covered the formal business and went on to discuss individual members' complaints. There were a number of sharp exchanges, in which members claimed they had complained in writing about things to the manager, and that there had been no response or an inappropriate one. Azinas tended to take the line that there should have been earlier complaints to his office, if no satisfaction had been obtained through the CITCOP officers themselves, and that an AGM was not the proper place for some of the issues now being raised. His office would investigate issues, but they couldn't do it on the spot at an AGM.

In his summing-up speech the Commissioner made a number of points⁽⁸⁾. He stressed that in general terms he thought the progress of the organisation was satisfactory; that some members were impatient, but that the members were still learning about the organisation; that there was a tendency for members to focus criticism on small issues, while being unaware of large ones - he stressed, for example, that the Israelis collect comparative information on how citrus is exported in other countries, and have many facts

and figures at their fingertips, but this sort of knowledge is inadequate in CITCOP. He commented on several other issues. He understood that those members who had left had done so not because they were seriously dissatisfied but because they wished to try their luck elsewhere. CITCOP wished them luck. He saw people were liable to get upset over the exchanges of question and answer at the AGMs, but they were wrong, for criticism, self-criticism and the exchange of opinion were beneficial to the organisation. He stressed that his office had an obligation to investigate all complaints, whether those of a minority or of a majority. "What you hold inside yourselves for 360 days of the year you cannot expect to get adequately handled in a six hour AGM. Use my office - that's what it's there for...". He wished the members a happy new year, and hoped that 1970 would be a better year.

After the AGM finished, the committee, and a few notables, including Azinas, Vourros, Lawyer Aglas, went off to a meal in the CITCOP factory. I was also invited. The atmosphere was one of relief and relaxation, but with open joking about the AGM between Vourros and members of the committee. He told Azinas that he was shaytánis, the devil (very clever). He joked with the builder he believed to have cheated the organisation over the factory contract. He jokingly said to Lawyer Aglas, about his contribution to the AGM, "You probably picked up 20 votes there". The meal passed off in an apparently jocular mood, after the tensions of the AGM. Vourros who, at the previous AGM, had pointedly shaken hands with all the committee members, was still going

out of his way to reassure them that his criticisms were not 'personal', and that his real aim was the legitimate protection of his own economic interests and the well-being of the Cooperative.

After the meal, he expressed privately to me considerable satisfaction with the development of the AGM. Most of the questions he wanted raised had been asked but not very much had been seen to come from him. People were now more ready to get up on their hind legs and say what they thought. He admitted that he had put a lot of energy into organising critical comment and was slightly disappointed with his own poor showing; but he was basically satisfied with the meeting, as a whole.

A general feeling seemed to be, among those present, that the atmosphere of the meeting had been better than that of the previous one. Tempers had not run so high, yet people had been willing to speak. People said that in the first years of the organisation members had been unwilling to speak up. It is impossible to be sure how far such impressions are correct. It is clear, however, from the activities of Vourros that members needed to be encouraged to participate more actively, and rely on elite persons to take the initiative. Certain remarks of the Commissioner suggest that the wish to see members participate more fully, and in a more bureaucratically sophisticated fashion, is not a monopoly of the village school-teachers. However, it is not clear that Vourros, Azinas and other educated people fully understand why villagers find participation difficult. Vourros claimed

to be puzzled after this AGM that the question he had suggested to the young farmer about the builder had not been asked. He had in the same way been puzzled over Patris' failure to ask a question. But whereas Patris' failure could be explained not so much by the content of the question but by the act of questioning persons to whom he owes loyalty and support, in the case of the young farmer the content of the question in itself is reason enough. Villagers do not deliberately make enemies in such a public way. They do not separate the performance of a bureaucratic role from the person of the performer, and thus any attack is seen as a personal attack. Vourros himself, although he makes such distinctions, is still sufficiently cautious to avoid a direct confrontation either with Azinas or the CITCOP Committee over critical issues which privately, and on the verbal level, he feels very strongly about. He can be said to operate the same political culture from a position of greater personal security than the young farmer and with more subtlety. But it is still in its essence the same political culture and the same public cautiousness.

(v) Subsequent Developments: the Summer 1970 EGM and After

I was not in Cyprus from January to May, 1970. When I returned, it was to face a new development. An Extraordinary General Meeting had been called for June 27 to discuss serious losses which had taken place. Consignments of members' fruit had been sold in the U.K. at give-away prices, and an estimated loss of £120,000 on one consignment had occurred. More

members had withdrawn, feeling was running high, and once again Vourros was in doubt about what line he should take since he claimed to fear the imminent dissolution of the organisation.

Azinas opened the meeting by asking how many of those present were from the villages, as opposed to Market Town. On my impressionistic count, about three-quarters of those present were villagers. Azinas then proceeded to a somewhat edited statement of the circumstances of the major loss. These had been, in brief, that the sales representatives had taken a decision not to sell at 22/- a box, and thereafter the price had continued to fall. To gain time, the fruit already docked in London had been put at great expense into cold storage, where it had quickly rotted. It had then been sold at knock-down prices, and the bills for the cold storage had also had to be met. The result pleased no one.

Members started rapidly to fire questions at Azinas and the committee members. Vourros then rose to make a major speech in which he mentioned many themes from his speeches in previous meetings. He was interrupted a number of times by the committee from the platform, and in response he offered to give up the microphone. When he looked like being stopped there were shouts from all over the hall of as milisi (let him speak). Then a senior official said sarcastically from the podium "Perhaps Mr Vourros wishes to become an MP?", a remark which was thought by many people to be highly insulting. Vourros riposted and went on with his speech. The gist of this was that many mistakes had been made through over-

confidence, lack of attention to detail, to scientific and technical knowledge, and he included here an oblique reference to the lack of iron in the factory, but that now they were confronted with the seriousness of the mistakes it was the time for unity, for critical analysis, and a new course.

Later in the EGM a member called for the resignation of the committee. Vourros, however, rose to say that nothing would be served by demanding their resignation now. They only had four months to go, and they should stay till then. But later he pressed Azinas for the technical details of the elections for a new committee. Later still he strongly endorsed the idea that when the time came for new elections, some of the committee should remain since their experience would be valuable. He stressed, however, that the committee badly needed new blood of specialists, economists and scientists. "When I asked three years ago why we didn't have an economist on the committee and suggested that we get one, not one of these gentlemen" (here he indicated the committee above and behind him on the podium) "offered to resign in order to put in an economist. And I myself, a B.A. from London, would never have done what the committee did - start inviting bids for the juice extraction plant without having the relevant research done."

The four main speakers at the EGM were all teachers, including one from Market Town. A young man stated his own readiness as a trained economist to aid the committee in any way possible, and Commissioner Azinas made a note of his name. The leftists in the meeting were extremely

restrained in their criticism of the committee.

In the main the keynote of this meeting was the admission of serious errors, and the need for a change. The fact that the Manager was not present but still in the U.K. was taken by many people to mean that he was unable to face the criticism, the brunt of which would inevitably have been laid to his charge, and it appeared from his summing-up speech that Azinas took this view too. There was even a question from the floor about the health of the Manager, since there were numerous rumours during 1969 that he had a heart condition. This was strongly denied from the platform⁽⁹⁾.

The final event which must put this protracted narrative in some perspective occurred in the winter of 1970. Elections were held for the CITCOP committee, and after much behind-the-scenes manoeuvring on all sides, both Vourros and the Mastia teacher Chilos were elected to the important executive committee of CITCOP. They are both village-born university graduates, who are, as yet, trusted by villagers to represent village interests as well as for their efficiency. They replaced two Market Town farmers, each of whom had had primary education only. The election did not go to a vote, but was more a 'feeling of the meeting' approach. Azinas was heard to remark that now the teachers would 'eat' the organisation (meaning, would dominate it). He was probably not entirely serious in saying this, but word of it got back to Vourros who then and there threatened to resign; diplomatic mediation by D. Panou, on Azinas'

TABLE 19

CITCOP MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 1963-70: ORIGIN,
EDUCATION, JOB

Old executive committeeNew members, 1970

1) from Market Town
secondary education
white-collar

2) from Market Town
primary education
farmer

3) from Market Town
primary education
farmer

4) from Market Town
secondary education
white collar

5) from Market Town
secondary education
white collar

3) Vourros, from Kallo village
university degree
farmer

4) from Market Town
primary education
builder

5) Chilos, from Mastia village
university education
teacher

Old supervisory committee

6) from Market Town
secondary education
white collar

7) from Market Town
primary education
builder

8) from Market Town
primary education
farmer

9) from Nicosia
secondary education
farmer

10) from village
? education
white collar

6) from Market Town
secondary education
white collar

7) from Market Town
secondary education plus
retired teacher

8) from Market Town
secondary education plus
teacher

instructions, brought Vourros back into active cooperation; he had made his point at the start.

Before this election, Kallo opinion had been divided over the simple problem of whether or not Market Town people would be ready to vote an outsider man onto the committee, and whether they would support Vourros or not. Some people maintained that the townspeople would only vote for their own. Others said that after the mismanagement and losses in CITCOP, and after the public energy of Vourros on these matters, townspeople would vote him in just to get things run better. Although I was not present for the election and thus cannot be sure just what processes were at work, the outcome favours the view of those who thought that bureaucratic values and long-term self-interest would prevail over the more particularist ones and a shorter-term self-interest. In each case the growers were interested in the good management of their affairs. The issue was one of their perceptions and values about which method of committee selection would best satisfy their needs. One Kallo teacher put it in simple terms when he said "When Vourros first started criticising the CITCOP committee the townspeople used to get angry with him. Now they've understood him a bit better."

(vi) Conclusion

At the start of the previous chapter I looked forward to the CITCOP material, and suggested in a general way that the dam issue affected the cooperative issue, and vice versa. Now that ample detailed case material has been

presented on the persons and processes involved, it is time to make more explicit the points of comparison and relation between them.

In both situations there is a basic cleavage between Market Town and the interests of a number of villages. The villages are not the same in both cases since, for example, Mastia and Mené are not required to contribute to the proposed Dam, but they do provide a large number of CITCOP members. But Avla and Posto have little citrus produce, and hardly figure in the Cooperative's affairs. But both Kammari and Kallo are prominent and have important economic interests in both situations. Both CITCOP and the Dam have been issues since the early 1960s. The traditional rivalry of the villages with the town received a particular impetus from the dramatic economic boom enjoyed by the town through its entry into citrus production earlier and more intensively than the villages. Little Market Town land is now used for anything else but citrus, whereas the villages still have substantial land in less profitable activities. Many Town houses are strikingly more luxurious than most village houses. Market Town is not a village any longer, and has pretensions to urbanity. All these factors are present alongside the economic interests of CITCOP and the Dam, and they have been in continuous process for over seven years.

I have tried to make clear in both situations the extent to which ordinary villagers depend on more educated men to take initiatives and provide leadership in conflicts outside the village. For practical reasons this tends to have a basis in the superior abilities of men like Aglas

and Vourros to handle the details of bureaucracy - the interpretation of laws, constitutions, minutes; all the paraphernalia of literacy and administration in complex organisations. But although higher education often confers advantage in such matters, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for competence. A number of men of little formal education, such as Sklyros (and many leftists, who in the words of D. Fanou, 'read a lot') have mastered such matters. The other reason then that villagers are so dependent on elite leaders stems from the status values of the society, and its tendency to equate high status with power. To be a villager, in most situations, is not only to be less able in administration but also to be lower status and weaker in terms of power. Also, it is always safer for villagers if they are pushing educated men ahead of them, since this does not expose them as individuals to great risk.

The argument here is not entirely satisfactory. I did not hear villagers consciously discussing the desirability of themselves avoiding risk by sheltering behind educated, wealthy men, in their attempts to crack the nut of Market Town particularism. I have inferred their motives from a more general understanding of village values and behaviour. It is not necessary for the argument that individuals or groups consciously carry out a policy on these lines. It is rather a consequence of the villager's political culture.

Material from some societies, such as Bailey's several accounts of Indian villagers, suggests a great distance between villagers and elite members, and that the

way in which this gap is bridged (however ambiguously) is by brokers and middlemen; Bailey suggests that 'peasant conservatism' is directly related to this gap, to failure of modernising administrators to explain to peasants in comprehensible terms the advantages, real or supposed, of new policies.

My data are somewhat different. Both Aglas and Vourros, although urban residents, are 'sons of the village'. However high their status they are essentially village boys made good. Their families were both large landowners, but their fathers were both peasant farmers and thus manual workers, their mothers illiterate. They both have important land holdings in the village, and thus realistically present themselves as politically active not from any desire to run other people's affairs or get to positions of power, but because they literally have a stake in the issues. The readiness with which most villagers accept their leadership stems from a reservoir of trust accorded to 'sons of the village' in the external affairs of the village, to which is added an additional trust based on the obvious and acceptable activism of able men with economic interests to defend. I have already spoken of the value of synferon, self-interest, with which almost all actions in Cyprus must be ultimately justified. It is acceptable to villagers that Aglas and Vourros work hard at certain village affairs out of synferon.

This situation suggests, perhaps, why notions such as Banfield's 'amoral familism' add little to our understanding of peasant political behaviour. On the level of their

statements about values, Cypriot villagers with their perpetual appeals to synferon are as amoral familists as any to be found. Yet they enter into cooperative organisations, and take corporate action under the direction of their educated men, to further their interests. Self-interest may be pursued collectively, and leaders may be trusted, when self-interests are common to all. This will always be a matter of context and perceptions.

The fact that sons of the village start out with this much credit does not mean they are granted infinite licence. As soon as some of the sharp-eyed people in the village realised that Aglas was using the Dam Campaign as a political springboard, they withdrew some of their previous goodwill towards him. Also, when the CITCOP committee men interrupted Vourros' eloquence with the thought that perhaps he had his eye on the House of Representatives, this was a serious insult, and he in fact explicitly rejected it when he said "I am not trying to become an MP because I know I wouldn't be up to it". The substance of this charge is that of mixing oil and water, the national arena with local affairs, and hints at the possibility of the betrayal of primordial ties for 'outside' interests.

I have mentioned some of the similarities between the course of the Dam Campaign, and the course of CITCOP administration. But there are important differences. First, the issue of the Massari Dam is in an obvious way many-sided, to take even a narrow view. The parties are the villages, the town and the Civil Service Ministers, even the President.

In the later stages, when the political parties took up the Dam issue, the issue became more complex. Extraordinary political action, both the demonstration and the Advisory Committee, contributed elements of innovation in village politics, and even in national political life. The issue remained for many years outside the scope of national politics, but soon after the emergence of political parties the Dam became a party issue, and in my last visit to the area during the summer of 1970 two of the nationalist parties were competing to monopolise the issue: each tried to seem pre-eminent in putting pressure on the government.

To achieve their goal the villages must have specialist opinion of government experts on their side (or force their hand politically) and must also deal with problems of constitutional law if Market Town continues its obstruction. The Constitution thus becomes a resource which is more useful to one side than the other. But, in this case, it is balanced by the opinions of government experts, a resource which favours the villagers over the townspeople.

Aglas was unable to achieve his goal, since his electoral success was tied to the regional performance of his party. His election results in the immediate villages were excellent. But his aggregate results in the region were not strong enough to overcome the regional defeat of his party (although in theory he could have been elected however badly his party did). The rewards of being an MP are considerable - a salary of £200 a month; this is a vast gilt-edged security for even a professional man like the lawyer, as well as carrying high national status.

The Kallo CITCOP members had no more clearly defined corporate interest than their wish not to come second-best to the Town. This is a diffuse goal, which could be satisfied in a number of ways. On one level it was satisfied by getting up at CITCOP meetings and expressing general or particular dissatisfactions. In this they were following a cultural rule which suggests a man must not be taken advantage of by another without reacting. To accuse the committee of partiality is to show that one is alive to one's rights, and to shame and slightly dishonour those who seek to erode or trample on those rights. I do not mean to imply that the villagers have no interest in the material improvement of their situation, but to point to the similarity with the formation in the heat of the moment, of the Advisory Committee, which was then allowed to lapse, and the voicing of criticisms at the AGMs, while leaving the hard thinking and organising in each case to the educated. The meaning of voicing criticisms for ordinary villagers may be expressive of their view that Market Towners are no better than they themselves, and are nothing but jumped-up villagers whose impudence must be challenged or riposted. To men like Vourros, the same action is seen as an instrumental attack on an organisational problem. He is shrewd enough and at home enough in the village actively to employ the villagers feelings that the townspeople must not be allowed to "do what they like", but implicitly, the villagers are shrewd enough to let him take the major risks. There is some suggestion in my material that villagers are getting more inclined to stand up for

their rights; perhaps what started as a directed response may, in time with practise and self-confidence, become a habit and a reflex.

Footnotes to Chapter 10

- (1) Citrus fruit can remain on the trees while flowers bloom for the next season's crop. Old fruit may stay on a tree alongside new fruit.
- (2) Later when Vourros went to CITCOP offices and asked to see the minutes the manager said he would have to get special permission from the Commissioner.
- (3) At the end of the last chapter I suggested that this was one of the things the Kallo Advisory Committee had done; and that this release of tension may have served to insure that the Committee itself would do nothing, for in its formation was its true purpose.
- (4) I have already described in the last chapter how my presence with a village committee in the office of a civil servant was used by both sides in their manoeuvres against the other. This illustrates the conventional difficulty when the simple fact of the observer's presence modifies the situation he wishes to observe, but it also underlines the self-conscious political culture of Cypriot society and perhaps suggests why I have often adopted an oblique approach to dealings with higher officials and politicians.
- (5) These were basically that I would not use real names for any people discussed.
- (6) It is obvious that an organisation which discloses details of all its transactions to outsiders is at a disadvantage when competing with private enterprise, especially if prices and costs are involved.
- (7) In Cypriot society to use the expression 're' (hey) to anyone means you regard them as equals or inferiors. Only very powerful people call out to a lawyer or doctor 're'.

- (8) Under the cooperative law, the Commissioner has important powers of intervention, veto or final decision in the running of any cooperative. In the meetings described here, the CITCOP manager and the committee constantly deferred to the Commissioner, and he constantly interrupted them if he thought they were handling issues improperly or incompetently. In each meeting I attended he always ended with a summing-up speech, given with great clarity and authority. He constantly put people right on points of cooperative law, and just what they could and could not do in a meeting.
- (9) The manager died of a heart attack six months after this meeting.

CHAPTER 11THE LIMITS OF VILLAGE SOLIDARITY:the 1970 ElectionIntroduction

In July 1970 there took place the first elections for ten years to the Legislative Assembly. In Nicosia district the United Party (UP) polled on average three times more votes than its rival the Progressive Front (PF) but in Kallo village this result was reversed. During the final period before the elections a number of minor disputes occurred in the village triggered by the events of the elections. These disputes eventually passed off without doing more than seriously ruffle the calm of ordinary life, but at times the solidarity of the village in the face of intrusive party politics was stretched to the limit.

It is important to explain the difference between the local and district electoral results, and to see how both results can be explained. But my intention goes a little further than this limited aim, for I hope that in concentrating on the campaigns of two nationalist parties, and elucidating the appeals their speakers made, the symbols and issues they invoked, and the response of their listeners, some small progress will be made both in the analysis of Greek-Cypriot politics and of politics in the peasant communities of developing nations. The particular theme which is central to this chapter, and which should be of wide general interest, is a universal political theme, and involves the problem of how political appeals can be made which

are simultaneously in a moral idiom, yet concerned with material benefits? The concern, then, is to understand the context and implications of specific ideological appeals to an electorate, to see what an election campaign means in a prosperous village whose earlier political history has by now been explored in some detail.

(i) The Levendis affair and its role in support for
N. Sampson

The success of the PF in Kallo (see Tables ^{+ 22} 21) as opposed to its relative failure in the district as a whole, has two main causes. One is that a villager, lawyer Aglas, was one of its candidates, and his close kin worked hard for him and his party. The other is in the political resource available to one of the PF leaders, Nikos Sampson through the life and death of a Kallo villager, Levendis. In Sampson's handling of this issue, and the way the issue changed through its amplification in the arena of national politics, there is a measure of the close relation between village and nation. It is not the argument that this is a typical situation, for reasons which will be obvious; but it does require some re-consideration of the accepted notion that a wide gap necessarily exists between these two levels of politics.

During the EOKA struggle of 1954-59 one of several wanted men to be hidden in Kallo village with a price on his head was Nikos Sampson, a key man in Famagusta district EOKA. From this stay he came to know some of the villagers and later became a regular visitor to village weddings. He baptised several children in the village. One belonging to Moustachos, the EOKA leader, and one belonging to a nationalist prison

The 1970 Legislative Assembly Elections

KALLO VILLAGE	registered voters : 740		votes cast : 710		spoiled ballots : 36	
	AKEL	DEK	EDEK	ENTACH(UP)	PRODEFTIKI PARATAXIS	INDEPENDENTS
1) 238	1) 34	1) 208	1) 137	1) 339	1) 59	
2) 231	2) 20	2) 107	2) 125	2) 310	2) 13	
	3) 15	3) 93	3) 111	3) 284	3) 2	
	4) 13	4) 124	4) 121	4) 305	4) 2	
	5) 14	5) 91	5) 108	5) 305		
	6) 13	6) 103	6) 99	6) 287		
		7) 147	7) 103	7) 289		
		8) 156	8) 114	8) 282		
		9) 160	9) 99	9) 277		
		10) 166	10) 97	10) 396		
			11) 101	11) 266		
			12) 97	12) 264		
KAMMARI VILLAGE	registered voters : 776		votes cast : 732		spoiled ballots : 16	
	1) 227	1) 38	1) 318	1) 280	1) 55	
2) 221	2) 22	2) 159	2) 268	2) 148	2) 25	
	3) 19	3) 150	3) 196	3) 103	3) 3	
	4) 18	4) 472	4) 250	4) 123	4) 1	
	5) 19	5) 147	5) 225	5) 134		
	6) 17	6) 152	6) 212	6) 113		
		7) 195	7) 214	7) 112		
		8) 209	8) 426	8) 103		
		9) 230	9) 211	9) 110		
		10) 217	10) 201	10) 233		
			11) 271	11) 81		
			12) 189	12) 79		

Table 22

The 1970 Legislative Assembly Election : Returns for Nicosia District

registered voters : 96,820 votes cast : 72,617 spoiled ballots : 1,781

AKEL	DEK	EDEK	ENIAON	PRODEFTIKI PARATAXIS	INDEPENDENTS
1) 27,288	1) 10,862	1) 23,918	1) 27,982	1) 14,543	1) 9,290
2) 27,206	2) 7,210	2) 10,536	2) 26,394	2) 10,410	2) 1,372
	3) 6,979	3) 9,301	3) 24,939	3) 8,811	3) 2,197
	4) 6,710	4) 10,040	4) 24,638	4) 9,309	4) 1,449
	5) 6,443	5) 8,701	5) 24,075	5) 9,555	
	6) 6,174	6) 8,936	6) 22,643	6) 8,728	
		7) 16,001	7) 22,510	7) 9,004	
		8) 17,099	8) 22,785	8) 8,373	
		9) 19,672	9) 22,629	9) 8,043	
		10) 17,441	10) 22,036	10) 8,761	
			11) 22,080	11) 7,275	
			12) 21,739	12) 7,604	

NATIONAL RESULTS IN SEATS

AKEL	9
DEK	0
EDEK	2
ENIAON	15
PRODEFTIKI	7
INDEPENDENTS	2

Nationally registered voters : 263,857

Votes cast

200,141 = 75.8% turnout

officer¹; he also became friendly with several of the younger fighters, including Pavlos and Tangos' brother, nicknamed Levendis - The Handsome. This was a natural development from his gratitude at having been protected by the village. The younger men used to go into the capital and visit him in his newspaper office; sometimes they went drinking with Sampson and other EOKA leaders.

On May 20 1963 Levendis was shot and killed outside a night-club in Famagusta. A man was arrested and charged with two offences but later released after trial in the criminal court. When Levendis' family and friends first heard of his death they wanted to go into the capital with placards and banners, to hold a demonstration demanding that the killer of their brother be brought to justice. As the story is now told, they wished even then to bring certain accusations against the Minister of the Interior, Yorgadjis, who is also said to have heard of this and had the roads blocked by police units. In any case, Moustachas persuaded them not to do it, saying he was against it⁽²⁾.

There are now at least two conflicting accounts of the life and death of Levendis, current in the village; these accounts tend to reflect among other things the relationships of the speaker to the dead man, and/or to either Yorgadjis, his friends and the UP on one hand, or Sampson and the PF on the other.

The anti-Levendis version, which friends of Yorgadjis favour, is that although he was a courageous EOKA fighter, he was so praised that it tended to go to his head. His reputation attracted bad characters to him, and he became involved in robberies, and even killings for gain. He kept company with

bar-girls, from whom he took money. He was feared, rather than loved. He got too big for his boots, threw his weight about just once too often and got killed in a sordid row over a woman.

The pro-Levendis version, which his close kin and other supporters of Sampson and the PF tend to maintain is that he was a courageous fighter, who was loved and admired by all. He was a high-spirited, fun-loving young man, who in his friendship with other distinguished EOKA fighters enjoyed a drink or two. He was attractive to women, but never took money from them. Any part he played in robberies was not for gain but either for EOKA funds or to help his friends. If he was involved in killings, then it was the killing of scoundrels, and money was not involved.

The pro-Levendis version then describes his killing as an act of politics which arose in the following way. Not only was he friends with Sampson, but also with Yorgadjis. At first these two men were themselves on good terms, but with the growth of rivalries between the former EOKA leaders⁽³⁾ they grew increasingly hostile. Levendis tried to remain on good terms with both but it became impossible. The simplest version of this is almost a morality play, on the impossibility of serving two masters, or having friends at loggerheads. The more subtle version, told by close relations of the dead man is that Sampson was arrested for a killing in Kyrenia on the orders of Yorgadjis. At the time of the killing however he had been drinking in the village with Levendis, who immediately went to Yorgadjis and demanded the release of his innocent friend. Later he fired a pistol outside the home of Yorgadjis

and threatened him. This challenge was not ignored, and when an opportunity arose, a client of Yorgadjis took it.

There are many variants of these two versions. In one a pamphlet war went on between Sampson and Yorgadjis. In another the killer of Levendis acted for private reasons, but Yorgadjis was his friend, and so he got off because Yorgadjis was not displeased with the result. The story in its various forms is well known throughout the island.

There are some facts, however. Sampson, for example, gave the killing, the funeral, and the trial very full coverage in his tabloid newspaper, Niki. He attended the funeral himself, as the photographs in NIKI showed, weeping openly and calling the dead man 'my brother'. He ran an editorial in his paper demanding that the 'political killings' should stop, and calling for the trial and execution of the killer. On May 22 he printed a statement by the Minister of the Interior which criticised the paper for the assumption that the killing was political, when the matter was sub judice, to which Sampson replied. Whatever Sampson himself believed, he was far too aware of the laws of libel and other dangers to make any accusations against the Minister himself, and confined himself to calls for action by the police and justice departments.

Sampson's support in his paper for the dead man and his subsequent election speeches - which will be discussed later - made it a matter of honour for Levendis' close kin and friends to support Sampson in politics. Since 1963 this has meant that numbers of villagers who otherwise would have become or remained clients of Yorgadjis and his associates have either avoided open commitment, or have come over to Sampson. I cannot give numbers,

since in many cases positions in 1963 were unclear, and people are also concerned to cover their tracks. At the very least it has made it difficult for people who might out of inertia have supported the United Party (originally headed jointly by Yorgadjis and Clerides) to do so in a casual spirit; and has forced them either to keep their opinions quiet, or to take the line that Sampson's supporters are in the main youngsters, would-be tough guys, whose heads have been turned by stories about Leventis, EOKA and so forth. However, when the content of Sampson's election speeches is discussed, it will appear that there was a most convenient fit between his attacks on the United Party as monopolisers of patronage, and as betrayers of EOKA goals and Hellenic aspirations. His appeal was to those who felt themselves to be relatively powerless in the society, and so effective was this appeal that by the end of the campaign his followers believed they would win because their cause was just; the death of Leventis, the sins of the United Party and the moral rightness of the PP cause became interwoven symbols of intoxicating potency⁽⁴⁾.

(ii) Disturbances before the elections

I have already described how the two years preceding the 1970 elections were marked by instability, some terrorism, attempted coups and murders. These events had their counterparts in the village and the surrounding district, which must be briefly mentioned.

On March 1st 1969 a senior police official was shot and seriously hurt in an orange grove near Market Town. A number

of villagers were arrested and subsequently released without being charged. They were, it was asserted, all either supporters of Sampson, enemies of Yorgadjis, strong nationalists or some combination of these.

Later in 1969 two village boys were arrested for having been seen distributing leaflets in a nearby village for the Ethnikon Metopon (EM) the illegal organisation which had just appeared pledged to the speedy achievement of Enosis. I was told that some of the witnesses were intimidated, that a prominent mainland Greek Army officer interceded for the arrested youths, and after a few days in prison they were released.

A third incident involved the villagers. Still later in 1969, a group of masked men carrying sub-machine guns walked into a coffee shop in a nearby village and told everyone to put their hands up. They then gave the muktar of the village, an ex-EOKA fighter who had come out strongly for the United Party, a rather close haircut. Six men from Kallo village were arrested for this, some of whom had also been arrested at the time of shooting of the policeman. The police then virtually occupied the village for three days, and searched a large number of houses. Once again, after some days in prison, the six men were released. They denied that they had cut the muktar's hair; but it was widely believed in the village that they had done so. Once again, their common characteristics were that they were right-wing nationalists, hostile to Yorgadjis and the UP.

Shortly after the haircut episode, came the dramatic national events mentioned earlier - an attempt to capture

Limassol police station by offshoots of the EM; many arrests and arms searches; then in March 1970 the attempted killing of President Makarios; a few days later the murder of former Interior Minister Yorgadjis. During this period there were also continued rumours of threatened coups, and most people doubted that elections would be held at all.

I cannot say what the links were between these three village-based incidents, and the disturbances in the capital and Limassol. It is widely believed in the village that there was a strong EM cell there. One villager - an extreme right-wing nationalist closely linked to Greek army officers of similar views - was said to have been called to the Presidential Palace, and personally reprimanded by Makarios. My own view is that the village harboured a strong EM unit, which may have acted more or less autonomously. There is no point in guessing at other connections. Since the failure of the Limassol raid, people with EM connections have had good reason to be extremely cautious; at time of writing (December 1971) the village is again apparently daubed with pro-Grivas slogans.

It is worth noting in passing that Cypriot politics have two distinct levels. One is the formal level of public debate, newspaper articles, speeches in the House of Representatives and so forth; the other is the underground level of groups, stores of weapons, leaflets dropped in the street. Individuals may be active at both levels, and pursue different goals, with different alliances. A man might have loyalties to several national leaders, which are logically in conflict. Added to this is the fact that certain groups or followings are penetrated

by people in fact loyal to other groups, playing the double game of espionage. Or so they may pretend when arrested, wishing to turn state's evidence and secure a pardon. Such factors leave more doubts than certainties in the minds of observers, simply summed up in the common remark men make when discussing motives and loyalties 'plos bori na to xeri?' 'Who can possibly know?'

(iii) The emergence of political parties

I shall now return in time to the emergence of political parties, give brief sketches of the parties and leaders, and how their formation affected the village.

Throughout 1968 there was discussion in the press as to whether or not there would be organised party life and elections. Those papers which were against the government wanted elections because they hoped to gain ground; those which supported the government hoped that elections would strengthen the government's mandate. Under the Cypriot system, the President is elected, and then appoints his ministers who need not be Representatives, or be approved by the Legislative Assembly. The Assembly itself has as its main power the voting of ministerial budgets. Under certain conditions it can also initiate legislation. So the legitimacy of the government does not depend directly on the existence of parties or on the composition of the Assembly. However, under normal circumstances the Assembly would have played a more sharply critical role in its relation to the government. The exceptional inter-communal issues of 1963 onwards made it possible for the Assembly to avoid this responsibility in the name of national solidarity and support for the President. The other factor

which contributed to this was the personal prestige of Makarios himself, coupled with his not inconsiderable personal powers of patronage. Thus there was a sense in which the Assembly was so closely identified with the government that the feeling was widespread that elections would clarify the support for it, in spite of the care Makarios took to remain 'above' party.

When Makarios finally gave his formal approval for the formation of political parties, in February 1969, the first men off the mark were the English-trained barrister Glafkos Clerides and Polykarpos Yorgadjis, who formed the United Party. I have already sketched the events which led to the resignation of Yorgadjis⁽⁵⁾. There was fairly widespread surprise therefore at the alliance between these two men, since it might have been thought that the area of Clerides' solid support, the urban bourgeoisie, would be precisely the area of greatest antipathy to Yorgadjis. It looked like an alliance in which Clerides would have to lose more than he gained. But Yorgadjis' rural organisation of village groups was strong enough to provide a skeletal electoral machine, something which Clerides lacked completely. Three fifths of the islands electorate are village residents; Clerides could not afford to neglect this.

Yorgadjis in turn stood to gain increased respectability, and a share of the otherwise disaffected urban bourgeois vote. People who would never have voted for him by himself, since they regarded him as a semi-literate upstart, could not avoid voting for Clerides. Whatever their personal antipathy to Yorgadjis, they could not support Clerides without also supporting Yorgadjis. In terms of policy UP claimed to be a nationalist party, to be

open to all nationalists to support the tactic of inter-communal talks, to represent the interests of all classes as opposed to those of a single class; to support private enterprise, but also to favour improvements in subsidised education, medical care and other benefits.

Very soon after the formation of the United Party. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides announced the formation of his own party, EDEK. This was also a nationalist party, but of a more democratic-socialist and populist cast. Then Nikos Sampson announced the formation of his own Progressive Party. Takis Ev-dokas, the only public opponent of Makarios was already at the head of DEK, a party which had first been formed by John Clerides (the father of Glavkos Clerides) in 1959 and always a nodal point for the most fanatic Enosists. The two right-nationalist associations, PEK and SEK, were both vertically split, since some members wanted to support the UP, and others did not. They were not political parties, but rather politicised interest groups, representing right-nationalist farmers and workers respectively. Furthermore, it was not clear how strong they were in organisational terms ⁽⁶⁾. AKEL's primacy in party political experience can be judged by the fact that its main election slogan was to be "45 years in the service of the people" whereas its closest competitor in organised party terms, DEK, was just coming up to its tenth disorganised year.

From February to April 1969 the first organised party initiatives started to affect the village. The activists in the village started to discuss what sort of electoral alliances might take place between the parties which had so far officially

formed. Even at this time it was clear that two possible kinds of alliance were favoured and likely; either that all the self-styled nationalist parties would form some sort of grouping against AKEL; or that several nationalist parties would combine against the United Party. In the early spring of 1969 both Lyssarides and Sampson made formal political speeches in Kallo, which was certainly one of the first villages in the island to attract the attention of party leaders. Both speakers drew large audiences and both meetings passed without serious incident. Lyssarides seemed to get the bigger audience, including a number of women who watched from a distance. But Sampson was carried into the villages on the shoulders of a group of young unmarried men, chanting his name. There was a certain amount of tension between the supporters of the two parties over the hanging of banners and use of coffee-shop facilities: the best coffee shop for speeches and for hanging banners happened to belong to a firm Sampson supporter, and for some time it seemed that the Lyssarides people were to be denied this facility. In the end the Sampson supporters relented. This tension was undoubtedly aggravated by the fact that some of the present Sampson supporters had been involved in the episode in 1965 when the Lyssarides group meeting was harassed as I described in chapter eight.

I returned to Cyprus in June 1970 to follow the last three weeks of the election campaign. Some of the events both in Kallo and nationally which took place during my absence have been described above. From now on the concern is with the final stages of the campaign. On arrival in Kallo I decided to concentrate on the PF campaign since it seemed likely that the

dominant political cleavage in the village would be between the PF and UP supporters. This may have led me to underestimate or overlook other important aspects of the pre-election period, so what follows cannot pretend to be a complete account but I believe it is accurate both in detail and emphasis.

(iv) The PF Campaign in the district

The most important development at the national level was the announcement on June 25th that the Progressive Front, headed by the mayor of Nicosia, Odysseus Ioannides had merged with the Progressive Party of Nikos Sampson. The new grouping was to be called the Progressive Front of Change and Power and Sampson was now called the General Organiser of the new party. Some of his Kallo supporters were concerned that in the merger his slate of candidates had been too greatly reduced in favour of the other partner, and indeed the next day bitter articles appeared in AGON the UP newspaper by some of the men Sampson left behind, i.e. who had failed to be adopted as candidates in the new party, calling him 'Judas' and other choice names. The general effect of the merger in Kallo was to hearten the members of both former parties, since obviously neither had stood much chance alone, under the prevailing electoral system. Both parties appealed to those strong nationalists who felt the Makarios government had been too soft in prosecuting Enosis with Greece, and in both parties were to be found a number of people who felt that they were excluded from the monopoly of power and privilege enjoyed by some United Party supporters, and who were suspicious that the main impetus of Greek Cypriot society was towards Britain and away from Greece.

The other important event which was announced on the same day though in much smaller print was that the illegal Ethnikon ^WMetopon/_APaphos had sent a letter to Makarios announcing its dissolution and pledging support to him. A few days later the Limassol branch and its dissident offshoot the Holy Brigade (which between them had been responsible for the daring raid on the Limassol Central Police Station) made similar announcements. Their move was less effective since many of them were already prisoners of the government, but these announcements had the effect of telling the electorate that whatever the alarms and tribulations of the previous eighteen months there was unlikely to be an important armed disruption of the electoral process, unless from outside the island.

On June 26th Nikos Sampson was due to speak in Kammari. According to Pavlos, who had been chosen as one of Sampson's 35 district organisers, his presence in the district, a district in which he was not himself standing, was a personal favour stemming from his concern for the deceased Levendis and his desire to help his friends. For several days before the 26th Pavlos worked hard in the surrounding villages to organise attendance by PF supporters at the meeting. One of Sampson's staunchest supporters in Kallo owns a bus and a taxi, and he himself states that his commercial "T" licence was due to a personal intervention by Sampson in the administrative process, when others including Yorgadjis had failed to do anything. This man was to be seen throughout the pre-election period continually putting his vehicles to work in support of PF meetings around the district, and loudly telling the world why he was doing so.

An hour before the arrival of Sampson buses and cars started to arrive in Kammari; there was an excited atmosphere as old friends, and particularly old EOKA associates recognised each other and their common purpose in arriving. The excitement was intensified by Sampson's brother: every few minutes he would bellow through the highly effective amplification system some of the slogans that Sampson had been hammering home in his newspapers, his speeches and his posters: Axiokratia; Allaghi; Kato i favlokrates; Rule by the Worthy; Change; Down with the Corrupt. He would also say "In a few minutes will arrive the General Organiser of the Progressive Front of Power and Change; will arrive the renowned EOKA Fighter, the man who brings us the Wind of Change and the Message of Victory, NIKOS SAMPSON" Then the amplification system would play stirring martial music until the next announcement. Such tactics were calculated to excite the faithful; but to the UP supporters sitting at another coffee shop but still within earshot of the amplifier, they seemed like precisely the crude demagogic techniques which they always associated with Sampson. They were also depressed by the very large crowd which was gathering to hear him and by the obvious signs of his party's energetic organisation.

Finally Sampson himself arrived. A number of candidates for PF were introduced to the crowd. They were all standing for the Nicosia District and each felt constrained to make a short speech. Among them was the Kallo lawyer, Aglas⁽⁷⁾. Then Sampson himself started to speak. He spoke in a markedly more simple, direct and emotional style to any of the previous speakers, all of whom were concerned to show their mastery, as

educated men of the higher levels of the Greek language, where Demotiki turns towards Katharevousa; Sampson it is often said even by his own supporters "doesn't know how to speak" by which they mean two things: one is that when he speaks his own emotions come across in an uninhibited way, and he can be close to weeping when he speaks of dead friends or social injustice; the second is that his style is simple, eschews the classical structures of formal rhetoric, and relies on such techniques as repeating "And we ask ... they do not answer ... "And we have seen ... Who are the men who? ... we are not the men who ... In spite of the comment that he does not know how to speak, large crowds listen to his speeches with close attention and show no sign of boredom even after an hour and a half of anecdotes. Anecdotes are a potent weapon in his speeches and he was to use a good many on this evening.

He began with memories of the EOKA struggle, names of those who had fallen, reminding the audience of the cause, and the heroism of the dead fighters. Then he went on to a list of names of those fighters who had died after the end of the struggle, and whose killers had not been brought to justice. He mentioned the man from Kallo, a village where he himself had been in hiding as a wanted man, a man whose name they all knew, the hero Levendis. For ten whole years such murders had gone on, as they all knew, and men were walking around in the streets who should at least have been in prison.

He moved on to other themes, to corruption in high and secret places, the arrogance of the rich and their indifference to the poor. He spoke of government officials "with their fat salaries" and their harsh treatment of poor farmers with no

regular income at all. He told a number of stories about how many men had given their life or limbs at various phases of the national struggle in the last 15 years, and how when they or their families had turned to the government for some sort of compensation they had been shabbily treated⁽⁸⁾. He told a story of a widow with four children whose husband had died fighting the Turks and who was ready to start begging in the streets to feed her family; when she had asked a government official what she should do he had answered "marry again" - a patent absurdity in contemporary Cyprus, and one which drew an angry, incredulous gasp from the crowd.

He told a story about their children in the army being entitled to three quarters of a loaf of bread a day and tax money going to pay for this amount of bread, and the lads actually getting only a quarter of a loaf, because of corruption.

By the use of simple rhetorical devices he attacked the United Party as if it were responsible for the mistakes of the government over the last ten years. This was a favourite line of all PF speakers throughout the campaign and needs no comment. As I have already pointed out, the Presidential system of government means that there need be no connection between the government ministers and any political party. Furthermore, Makarios had persuaded the representatives both in 1960 and subsequently that national unity was the most important issue of the hour, so that the House had rarely made use of its powers either of budget veto, or of outspoken criticism of government policies. So that when PF speakers attacked the government and/or the Representatives for inaction, there was a real sense in which they could be said to be attacking the

President. But this they were careful never to do⁽⁹⁾. All other speakers and parties, while hitting out at their rivals, contrived to imply that they themselves were closer to the President and enjoyed more of his support than anyone else, and that people in other parties were only pretending to be pro-Makarios and pretending to enjoy his confidence and favour. Since Glarkos Clerides, as leader of the United Party, also enjoyed Makarios' confidence to the point of being in charge of the intercommunal talks with his Turkish counterpart Raouf Denktash, the PF speakers had somehow to imply that Clerides was pulling the wool over Makarios' eyes, seeming to obey him, while pursuing other plans⁽¹⁰⁾. Their supporters in private conversations took this sort of point much further, and since the other leader of the United Party, the deceased Yorgadjis, had been deeply implicated in the assassination attempt on the President before himself being assassinated, they had plenty of ammunition. In their mouths the UP was a party of thieves, liars, murderers and plotters. Although it had only been in existence for a year, they claimed it was also responsible for everything wrong with Cyprus since 1960. The evidence for this was that 'the same old clique' who had organised the Patriotic Front in 1960 and later taken ministerial jobs were now running the United Party.

The major flaw in this chain of reasoning should have been the apparent gullibility of President Makarios. Since nearly everyone claimed to believe that Makarios was the wisest man on the island, the man who still really controlled everything and everyone, who knew all about whatever was happening, and so forth, this would have clashed with any notion of his gullibility.

The only way to save the argument logically was to insist on the satanic brilliance in deception of the UP leaders and this of course PF people did whenever they could. Logic aside, at various times it suited their case to blur distinctions between government ministers, the Representatives, and the United Party. They could point to three living persons and one dead, one (Yorgadjis) in the United Party who had been either ministers or Representatives and this was enough to justify the charge of "the same old clique and their friends"; that their own party contained several men who through PEK or other means had been representatives they chose to ignore. They numbered no ex-ministers in their ranks.

In his speech Sampson introduced many of his charges by indirect methods, speaking of "those who for ten whole years have fooled the people, cheated the people, betrayed the people". As a practising journalist who has also successfully brought libel actions against several newspapers, he was far too astute to make crude connections between 'those who ...' and the United Party. But it was his plain intention. It was further evidence that both as a speaker and a politician he has far more wit than his opponents like to pretend. He now turned his attentions to nationalism, genuine and false. True Greeks wanted Enosis with Mother Greece and he was sure everyone in his audience agreed with him about that. He would explain what he meant by true Greekness. Greekness did not include leaving one's daughter unbaptised, or worshipping Buddha, nor did it include saying he was ashamed to be Greek or that Greek Army officers in Cyprus were illegal. He had on numerous occasions asked Clerides publicly whether or not his

daughter was baptised and he had as yet received no answer. How could Clerides say he stood for the family and the Church, when this meant having unbaptised daughters? How dare Clerides go around giving speeches with the Greek flag in front of him singing the Greek National Anthem when everyone knew what sort of man he really was?

The men who were responsible for the Green Line, the Zurich Agreements which had led to the Green Line, and who were now carrying the island towards Partition ... everyone knew what sort of men they were. How could Clerides claim to stand for law and order when he failed to collect the guns which had shot down former EOKA fighters like Levendis, had failed to collect the thousand odd guns recently discovered in a storehouse in Nicosia, which had belonged to the man who had organised an assassination attempt on President Makarios? He could not say that the United Party were completely without ability - they were cunning enough to see that when Lellos Dimitriades had had the gall to say "Cyprus for the Cypriots" they could no longer afford to have him as a candidate in their party, because they wished to fool the people into believing that as a party they stood for Enosis, and they realised that people would not be taken in by this. There was however only one party that really wanted Enosis with Mother Greece, that was a truly Greek party, a party concerned with rule by the worthy, with change, with an improvement in life for the poor, with cleaning up corruption, and that was the Progressive Front ... He brought his speech to a close.

I have reported here the substance of Sampson's speech because it raised a number of issues which most of the PF

speakers were to stress; it also was to be repeated back to me by Sampson's supporters fervently and with great conviction for three weeks, with the very examples he had produced and the anecdotes he had recounted with the exact choice of words being repeated by young men as if they themselves had been eyewitnesses to the events, and the events themselves recorded and established by the most impartial tribunals in the world. The most striking fact both about Sampson's speech, the repetitions of his supporters, and the conduct of the whole election in and around Kallo was the intensity of opposition between the UP and the PF; while most of the current flowed from the latter to the former, there was a reciprocal flow which is hardly surprising in view of the PF attacks. For all practical purposes the Communists and the EDEK party of Lyssarides need not have existed, for all the attention that PF speakers paid to them. There was in fact a bitter electoral struggle being conducted between Lyssarides and Clerides but in the main PF supporters took the position that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and were vastly more sympathetic to Lyssarides than to Clerides. This raises the issue of the dimensions of party cleavage: whereas in conventional European terms, Lyssarides as some sort of democratic socialist should have been further away from PF than the more centrist United Party, PF supporters believed that in spite of his leftism Lyssarides was a more genuine nationalist, and more genuinely pro-Makarios than the leaders of the United Party. But the PF supporters believed that they had most to fear from the UP, given the political patronage system. UP leaders had command of patronage, and could buy off

potential PF supporters. PF, like EDEK, was a party of 'outs' - of people out in the cold. In addition, if EDEK took votes from anywhere, the PF people argued, it would be from AKEL, and not from UP (11).

There were few questions after Sampson's speech, and he soon went off with some of the other PF candidates to supper at the house of one of his leading supporters in the village. This he had done the year before after his Kallo speech, and the house he had been to had been that of the wealthiest of Levendis' brothers. This man and Pavlos now joined the Sampson supper in Kammari. The atmosphere was relatively relaxed, but the tension soon mounted: Sampson, like other PF people, believed that a 'landslide' had begun, of former UP supporters coming over to the PF. He suddenly turned on one young man, a former EOKA stalwart who was sitting at the long table. "Look at him" said Sampson, loud enough for all to hear, "When the UP was formed he joined straight away; he became one of their top activists and organisers in this district. And look at him now - now he's come over to us ... because he knows we will win". The young man hung his head and said nothing in reply. A little later and possibly to take the sting out of Sampson's treatment of this man, Pavlos explained to me in front of Sampson that when the UP got organised they sent people out all over the island to get villagers to register as members. "Pachulos, the muktar of Themo, you know is a kounbaros of my father. My father doesn't know much about politics so when Pachulos asked him to sign up in the UP, he signed. Now do you think I'd let my father vote for the UP. There are lots of cases like that, and they

must have seriously overestimated their strength if they take seriously all those bits of paper ..."(12).

Sampson had however a moderating influence on some of his supporters. When for example someone at the table asserted that Clerides and the Turkish leaders were affines because their wives were cousins, Sampson said this was wrong. (The logic behind this astonishing notion was that Clerides' wife was a foreign woman, and assumed not to be a Christian. From there it is still a rather large jump to making her a kinswoman of Dentash' wife).

Later Pavlos said he had been pleased with the turn-out, it had been a good meeting. Sampson leaped on this, harshly. "Oh no, it wasn't a good meeting - I'm not at all satisfied. There should have been a much bigger crowd. You must all work much harder" he told them. They looked suitably chastened. Next day Pavlos was repeating Sampson's words to his Kallo team, with similar inflections and similar results.

When nearly everyone had left an amusing incident took place which was also both highly characteristic of politics in the villages. Our host, with two Kallo men and myself were at the table, as well as an uncle of the host's wife. He was a staunch leftist and very much the worse for drink. He had been jolly before, but now was approaching a sort of privileged, challenging belligerence. He got to his feet and said "I'll tell you about Enosis. We don't want Enosis of a poushtissima sort. We want real Enosis ..." The effect of the way he spoke was to leave the whole issue delightfully vague. But what he was continuously doing, which was an embarrassment to the others present, was to shout out the beginning of the sentence "We

don't want Enosis ...". What he meant by "genuine Enosis" I cannot say, but it would probably involve union with a democratic Greece. Now for half an hour everyone in the room went on drinking and trying to humour him and he went on trying to get a rise out of them. At one point Pavlos said "Uncle, I can see only guns will make you change your views". "Guns? Never ..." replied the old man rolling his eyes. Someone else said "We're going to have to take you for a long ride in the mountains on election day and tie you up among the pines ..." The point of this anecdote is that kinship norms and those restraining political conflict within the village meant that no-one was allowed to get angry with the very provocative old man. However since all had been drinking, the sort of jokes which were made about violence between right and left shows the kind of anxiety in the village over the problems continuing solidarity presents.

Sampson's Kammari speech took place on the first day of the merger of his party with that of Ioannides. From this point on in Kallo this produced close co-operation between the activists of the two former groupings. A number of planning meetings were held in which Patris as the representative of the PEK-Azinas-Ioannides group worked with Pavlos, the Sampson representative, in going through the electoral list, marking down those among the 740 Kallo voters whom it was thought worth attempting to win over. After two long evenings work the first canvass reached a rough verdict of 50 sure votes for AKEL; 20 for EDEK; 50 for UP; 200 for PF and 400 adiaphori (indifferent; uncommitted). In calculating the number of uncommitted voters the usual rule was anyone who was not known

to be a staunch supporter of a party was marked as uncommitted. In the case of a wife or sister, it was assumed that she could be approached if there existed a strong tie with someone in the PF camp. Old people were very often marked down as uncommitted. It was clear to all that the voting system would allow many people who felt themselves to be under cross-pressures to give a few votes to a party merely to satisfy an importunate friend or kinsman, and that therefore it was worth trying to cadge the odd vote or two from any but the most intransigent activists.

The first meeting of the new party in the village numbered about 25 men and boys; the atmosphere was excited, and a number of highly partisan remarks were made by some of the more hot-headed supporters. For example, while the lists were being checked, on several occasions a voter was revealed to be a UP supporter, whereas some people present had imagined he was with them. There was some swearing, then the man who had read the welcoming speech to Sampson when he came to Kallo to speak said "I always said we should stop the sale of AGON in this village" - Agon being the mouthpiece of the United Party.

Such remarks as this became a regular feature of the talk of the younger PF supporters. It was noticeable that PF attracted far more boys in their late teens and early twenties to participate than did other groupings. These boys would sit around the main PF coffee shop ready to hold forth to any listener on the government and the UP's sins over "ten whole years". I heard several discussions about the need for them to give anyone looking for trouble as good as they got, to

prevent the UPs meeting taking place in Kallo, or at the very least to disrupt it. Whenever Pavlos heard such remarks he swiftly clamped down on them, and said that they did not want that sort of trouble, and they were to do nothing of the sort without consulting him. He was continually cooling them down. Much that the younger men said can be seen as the typical 'tough talk' of young men anywhere, but there was none to be heard from the other parties. Indeed, whenever the other party activists wished to denigrate Sampson and his following they said "Who supports Sampson? Just a bunch of kids trying to be tough, and if you look around you'll find that in every village in Cyprus, the kids who like him are the bad ones, the ones who don't work, who fight, gamble, carry guns. So much for his supporters ..."

It was clear during the examination of the electoral lists that although the villagers insist that they know 'everyone' in the village they cannot always identify them from the formal names written down for official purposes. There were long discussions of what person was designated by a particular name: there is no doubt that most adult persons in the village could identify all other adults on sight, but they would not be able to do this formally. The time spent over the lists and the difficulties they produced were stressing the gap between the official world of electoral lists and the face-to-face village world.

Since later in the campaign many village PF supporters were to feel and to suggest that the government officials conducting the elections were biased in favour of the UP, it is important that at the earlier stage they took the electoral

lists seriously, as valid, and made little attempt to check them systematically. I did hear people discuss ways in which one could fraudulently get oneself onto two lists and thus vote twice, but there was no UP collusion suggested in this, rather an individual initiative equally open to supporters of all parties. However PF supporters did discuss, with a degree of seriousness, the power of mukhtars to help the UP get extra votes but they did not suggest it would happen in Kallo, where the mukhtar is weak.

It should not be thought that the PF village leaders looked on their slate of twelve candidates in the Nicosia district as men of high calibre for whom it was morally essential to work. Two of the most prominent Kallo PF activists expressed themselves quite differently. One said sometimes he got thoroughly sick of politics, and disillusioned and wanted no part of it. I asked him why. "When I think that Aglas the lawyer, who is a fool, is a candidate and may become an MP, and I know how much better I am than he is. But when Azinas was looking for good men to be candidates for the party, he went after them with a candle - there were none ..." The speaker suffered under the additional handicap of not being ideologically committed to the PF group but being unable for career reasons to follow any other course. But even men heavily committed to PF told me "The men we have as candidates this election don't impress me. Most of them are simply ambitious and would stand for any party. They are after a steady £200 a month and the prestige and opportunities to make a bit on the side. To build a party organisation and get experience we must use them in this election. But in five

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years time we'll have better men". Such impressions were confirmed from other sources. One candidate standing for the EDEK party admitted to an informant that he would have stood in any party except the communists. E. H. Hammonds, who studied the EDEK party during the pre-election period, concluded that ideologically the EDEK candidates spanned a very wide range; some of them would not accept the words 'democratic socialist' to describe the party, while others would accept no other title. ⁽¹³⁾ In such a small party this is suggestive.

Villagers often showed a developed sophistication on such issues. Their frequent comment "They're all out to line their pockets" was not as wildly inaccurate as it might at first sight have appeared. For many of the candidates £200 a month is a very useful sum. When I commented to one villager that some of the election photographs of the candidates seemed to have been taken a long time ago when the men were younger, he said "Oh they do that to make themselves appear fresh", using a word that is usually applied to the condition of meat or vegetables.

This detachment was even present in comments on Sampson by his own close supporters. Many of them in addition to saying that he did not speak well although he spoke strongly and said things which ought to be said, maintained he did not have the capabilities to be say, President of the Republic. Further that his behaviour was sometimes unpredictable, in a damaging way.

Such views did not stop Pavlos, as Sampson's district agent, working very hard for him. He made sure that every night a bus-load of Kallo PF supporters went off to wherever

a PF speaker was having a meeting. Some of these trips were not uneventful. On June 28th, the lawyer Aglas went to nearby Themo village to speak. The Themo muktar, rich and powerful, is a strong UP supporters. That year one of his grandchildren had been baptised by Yorgadjis, and he himself had thrown a huge party for the occasion. Aglas, in his speech attacked Clerides, and some UP supporters in the audience heckled him. He replied that he was not attacking Clerides as a man, but on the record of his party. A little later a fight broke out between UP and PF people, from which the Kallo PF contingent remained aloof. In the melee, the lawyer's car tyres got slashed.

The same evening in Kallo there was a fight, on the same lines. Yorgadjis had a kounbaros, K. Karas from Kallo, with certain canteen concessions in the government offices in the capital⁽¹⁴⁾. It was often said to me that this man was kept near the Minister so he could inform him of any possible moves by the kin of the murdered Levendis, against the Minister. Karas' younger brother, P. Karas, is one of the most active UP supporters in Kallo. He is also, as it happens a first cousin of the dead Levendis. Levendis' brother Katis, and P. Karas got into a fight about whether or not a UP election poster could be hung up. Katis threatened to tear it up if P. Karas stuck it on the wall. At one point P. Karas said the words 'your poove of a boss is better?' (o poushtis o mastros sou en kallitera? and the two young men had come to blows. The fact that first cousins were fighting, though deplorable, soon worsened, for now another tough young man, Pyrgos, joined in against P. Karas, enraged by the slight on

his friend Sampson. Pyrgos is married to P. Karas' sister⁽¹⁵⁾ and so their relations are gambros/kounyiados; this fight then involved three young men closely related by kinship and affinity. It was to lead to further repercussions a few days later.

(v) The UP campaign and PF's response

The next important incident to take place surrounded the speech by United Party leader Clerides in Market Town. On this evening a busload of young Kallo PF supporters went there. Before the bus - driven by Katis the youngest brother of the deceased Levendis - set out, Pavlos murmured something to him. Katis told the young men in the bus "I don't want any fooling about, and mind those things in the back". I saw a few pieces of cardboard piled one on the other and thinking it was something to do with the busdriver thought no more of it. The bus drove down into the town which was full of people, and went below the main square where Clerides was to speak. The boys in the bus were in a state of considerable excitement, but I still did not know why and finding their company exhausting decided to go and listen to the speech with some older people from Kallo I had seen in the crowd.

Clerides arrived and was clapped and started his speech. He was about seven minutes in, facing the packed square in the artificial light when there was a faint disturbance from the far side. Something was clearly happening, and in a few moments everyone could see what it was: slowly across the square like carnival floats moved a line of posters, held high in the air by eight young Kallo PF supporters. The lettering was crude and cramped, which made what then happened all the

more pointed. A very large number of the people in the crowd who were facing Clerides to listen to his speech turned round to read the posters. Clerides was confronted with several hundred clearly inattentive backs. Once the crowd had managed to decipher the posters which took some time they then had time to ponder their messages:

1. The president of mother Greece condemned the moral instigator of the assassination attempt against him. What party did the instigator belong to?
2. One party leader has in the study of his home a picture of the Queen of England. Do you know who he is?
3. Were the guns which killed the fighters handed over to the police?
4. Who broke the fifth commandment - that is, who swore at his own father from the balcony in public?
5. Who said the Greek officers were illegal?
6. Makarios condemned the moral instigator of the assassination attempt on him. What party did he belong to?
7. One party leader from earliest days has been a spy for the Intelligence Service. Do you know who?
8. In the centre of Nicosia a warehouse was discovered with a thousand illegal weapons. To what party did they belong and what was the purpose of that party?

I shall not here explain the background to each poster; it is enough to say that in each case they referred (obliquely enough to escape libel action) to certain charges and events which Sampson in his newspaper Machi has continuously used as ammunition against Clerides and the United Party. Some of

them refer in particular to the role thought to have been played by the deceased Yorgadjis in two unsuccessful assassination attempts on heads of state.

Clerides lost no time in facing up to the challenge of the posters. He badly needed to regain his position as the focal point of the meeting. He said he could see placards before him (shouts of 'shame to them' from the crowd) and did not propose to answer such questions except to say that the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios clearly had full confidence in him which was why he was entrusted with the conduct of the intercommunal talks; that he did not worship Buddha and that his daughter was baptised at nine months of age. That he was not however a POLITICAL WINDMILL, a quick jab at Sampson's many ideological shifts which brought applause from UP supporters ... "and that he believed ...". But at this point a man in the crowd shouted out "You believe only in money". This man was not from Kallo or standing near the placard-bearers, and he shouted loudly enough for most people in the crowd not to find out what it was Clerides believed in. A number of people started to move down in a threatening way towards the man who had shouted, and the police moved down too and Clerides said from the rostrum "Don't do anything to them ...". For some minutes there was a continual mild disturbance in the crowd, and it seemed as if a brawl would take place, but the moment passed.

Clerides spoke for a much shorter period than when I heard him speak two weeks before in the village of Klirou. Also he did not accept any questions, which was also a departure from his usual practice. But since eight fairly difficult questions

were staring him in the face through most of his speech, this is hardly surprising. He departed and the crowd started to disperse. Clerides then in fact went to Parali village and is reported as having spoken for a long time and taken on questions including some like those on the placards. Since there had been a strong and rather tense PF election speech in Parali a few days previously, where a young man apparently representing the United Party had persistently questioned the main speaker, Clerides' move was not without tactical value.

The Kallo PF supporters got back into their bus and set out for the village three miles away. They were jubilant. They felt they had really defeated Clerides, that his failure to answer the questions was a clear moral defeat. Since they had not seen him speak elsewhere they were actually unaware of the real scope of their 'victory'. Afterwards it was reported to me that Clerides had feared there might be a disturbance and had deliberately curtailed his speech. But the young PF supporters did not have the same perspective as the President of the United Party: where his concern was to avoid violent disruption of the meeting, theirs was to draw public attention to their opposition to him and all he stood for. One of the boys in the bus started to swear excitedly. "I knew it. When he sang the national anthem at the end, did you notice, he got it wrong, he got the words wrong, he put sword where sight should have been". This remark was greeted on all sides with the comment that this was just the sort of thing they expected from such a man. The other lively topic on the way back to the village was the Kallotes' reputation for toughness. One boy told how someone in the crowd had suggested

doing something about the placards and his neighbour had replied "Don't do anything to them, they're Kallotes - they pull pistols on you".

Later I asked the Kallo PF leader where the initiative for the demonstration had come from and he said from Katis, Levendis' brother. He added that Katis probably telephoned Sampson to discuss it, but that was all⁽¹⁶⁾. The next day Sampson's newspaper Machi carried a description of the incident with an accurate wording of the eight posters. Clerides' newspaper Agon also carried a version of the incident, which managed to imply that the head of the United Party had in some way routed the placard bearers. It also showed a big crowd listening to Clerides without the eight men carrying posters. As a photograph this was a considerable technical achievement; editorials masquerading as news coverage are commonplace in Cypriot newspapers.

It was clear from the comments a number of people made that they regarded the behaviour of the demonstrators as an insult to Clerides and a thoroughly wrong-headed approach to politics. I went to a number of election speeches in Cyprus and the one sentence in Market Town "You believe only in money" was the only instance of heckling I heard. Otherwise all speakers were heard in complete silence. At a number of meetings when the speaker called for questions there were none at all from the audiences. It was also noticeable that most of the questions that were asked were asked by men in their late teens or early twenties, who were probably unmarried, and a 'new generation' in politics. Informants when asked to comment on this said that married men with family obligations might be unwilling to

expose themselves to possible hazards by asking questions in public. Thus from several points of view the demonstration by the PF supporters was an innovation, and a daring one at that, for although the young men carrying placards were not family men they were fairly deliberately exposing themselves as enemies of the UP whom they believe have a near-monopoly of power in the island.

The next incident of the campaign was the speech by the United Party candidate Kefiros in Kallo on July 2, three days before the election.⁽¹⁷⁾ He is from Kammari, a retired civil servant who is generally regarded as kindly, honest, and worthy of respect.

Like Vourros and Aglas he is a Nicosia resident, but also like them has citrus orchards in Kammari, and is a regular visitor to the district. He has been extremely active on behalf of his village, particularly over a long struggle with the government about water rights.

Among the people who assembled before the speech in a show of support for the United Party was the muktar of Mastia, and the muktar of Parali. It was the latter who had received the involuntary haircut a few months previously, and when a week ago a PF group had visited his village with some Kallo supporters, the Kallo people had reported with some amusement that the muktar 'had not shown himself' during the meeting. His presence in Kallo was therefore overlaid with several additional meanings. His coffee was ordered by a man who had privately to me expressed the harshest condemnation of the UP's opportunism. The man who brought the coffee was one of the six men arrested for the haircut offence. The Mastia

muktar was one of several who at the time of the incident had sent a telegram to the government asking them to take firm steps to deal with such lawlessness.

There was a good crowd, and Kefiros, like Clerides, had his table draped with a Greek flag. He spoke quietly and briefly. UP was open to and representing all Greek Cypriot nationalists. He stressed the trust the Greek Government and Makarios had in Clerides and his conduct of the talks. He clarified the position of the party on the Co-operative Movement - it was not true that they were against it - they were strongly with it but they did want to see it use its capital more efficiently, and its administration to be more democratic. After his short and conventional speech which I do not repeat here, he asked for questions.

The man who was to ask most of the questions was Lepini, the man who had formally welcomed Sampson to Kallo. He is a heavy, slow-speaking farmer who spent several years in England. His first question essentially identified the UP with the Legislative Assembly, and asked why they had done so little in their ten years. Kefiros answered that the United Party was a new party and could not be held responsible. The questions continued, and at one point Kefiros said he did not know the answer to something, to which Lepini said "But Mr. Kefiros you don't seem to know anything" which in view of the educational and status differences between the two men would normally be seen as an extremely rude remark. Lepini then asked the question about Clerides saying the Greek officers in Cyprus were illegal and that he was ashamed to be Greek. Kefiros tried to answer this by filling out the context:

Clerides had said he was ashamed to be Greek when he had heard that officers from mainland Greece were punishing Cypriot soldiers extremely harshly, in spite of a mainland Greek law which forbade Greek soldiers to take part in the political affairs of a foreign country. As soon as the word xenos left his mouth (foreign) Lepini pounced on it to make the point that Kefiros did not regard Cyprus as Greek.

Kefiros tried to develop his defence against the personal attacks on Clerides. He said that such attacks could not always be answered because otherwise the newspaper would be taken up with nothing else except Clerides' defence of himself, but more to the point the attacks were often baseless and absurd. For example was it conceivable that the Greek Government (which everybody knew to be an extremely strong supporter of the Orthodox Christian faith) would permit a Buddhist to conduct delicate negotiations with the Turks on the national question?

Lepini now turned his attack to the deceased Yorgadjis, by woodenly asking the question from the Market Town demonstration, in exactly the same words: "Makarios criticised the moral instigator of the assassination attempt on him. To what party did he belong?"

Kefiros now switched from defence to attack. Was the questioner holding the UP responsible for the assassination attempt? This slightly alarmed Lepini who said well never mind that, and started to recite a list of names of fighters who had been killed after the end of the Struggle, and whose deaths were popularly attributed to the deceased Yorgadjis. Zampas said he would not speak of the dead man who, whatever

they might say, had been in his time a great fighter for the Greek-Cypriot cause; it would be disrespect to his memory. Some of the cases referred to were in legal process and should not be prejudiced by public discussion. Besides, as he had said before he was not present as an apologist for the much-denounced "ten years" but as the representative of a new party.

Lepini tried again to link Yorgadjis and his reputation to the UP and again Kefiros parried. So Lepini asked "All right, why didn't Makarios attend the funeral of Yorgadjis? Doesn't that prove that Makarios himself believed Yorgadjis to be the moral instigator of the attack against him?" Kefiros said he had not understood the question. Lepini then said in a forthright way "We believe that Yorgadjis' friends deliberately closed his mouth to stop him saying what he knew". Now Kefiros countered "It's all very well saying 'we believe' - but these matters are under investigation and speculation of this kind is simply irresponsible".

It became increasingly clear as the debate went on that Lepini and Kefiros were not communicating with each other. The discussion was in two quite different idioms. That of Kefiros used the ideas of legal process, evidence, and the fact of Clerides' continued occupancy of the role of negotiator with the Turks, to justify his party's position, and never came near to giving an answer to the fundamental but unexpressed question - how could Clerides and the UP have teamed up with a man like Yorgadjis? Lepini used the facts of known associations, assumed motives, personal ambitions to suggest a picture of intrigue and corruption. After the meeting the young PP supporters in the village

insisted that Kefiros "had not answered" any of Lepini's questions. This meant in fact that he had failed to dissociate the UP from the moral stigma of Yorgadjis, from its close association with the corruption of the elite, from its ambiguous position on Enosis. But the educated supporters of the UP afterwards complained that Lepini's questions were either illiterate, or meaningless, or both, and a serious insult to the age and position of a man like Kefiros. The two sides were shooting right past each other, and with very different kinds of weapons.

Kefiros pointed out that as soon as there was the slightest rumour connecting Yorgadjis with the attempt on Makarios, he had resigned from the UP. Lepini did not take this point up but later others explained to me why it was 'no answer'. Since it had been Clerides who had passed the recent special Emergency Law in the absence of Makarios, and since in the event of the death of Makarios, Clerides as President of the Vouli automatically became the President of the Republic, and since Yorgadjis' men in the police force could be relied on under the Emergency Law to round up all opponents, then Clerides so obviously stood to gain by the assassination attempt that they insisted he must have been involved in it. The logic of the situation, and the respective self-interest of the parties involved, as well as the power structures they commanded, dictated the conclusion that Yorgadjis' resignation was just a blind, and meant nothing.

Lepini's next question was "When did Clerides ever speak for Enosis?" Kefiros either pretended to be or genuinely was, taken aback by this question. Perhaps he suddenly realised the

gulf between his way of thinking and that of Lepini. He replied "How can you ask how the man who was the chief defence lawyer of captured EOKA fighters during the Emergency ever spoke for ENOSIS? What do you think the whole struggle was about?"

Another young PF supporter in the crowd tried to argue that Clerides had not defended the fighters because he believed in the cause. "Well why did he do it then?" "Maybe he was trying to build up customers" the boy answered. Kefiros now attacked strongly, by asking the boy had he ever been a fighter? The question was rhetorical for the boy was much too young to have been active in the period 1954-59. But even while Kefiros was attempting to deliver the coup de grace, one of the Kallo buffoons, a butcher whose nickname is 'Chickenshit' with a loud very high-pitched rasping voice, renowned for the outrageous and slightly off-colour things he says, tried to get into the act. He started to say in a somewhat incoherent way that during the struggle the EOKA fighters had never gone around shouting for Enosis, at least he had not heard them ... "Everyone agreed afterwards that whatever the man's faults he had been trying to make some other point and it had simply come out wrongly. But this was not to help him. The Mastia muktar, an impressive man with a very large fighter's moustache, and the reputation for having been one of the main EOKA leaders in the district, made a sign to Kefiros that he wished to use the microphone. He agreed and the muktar, dark-suited and with lowering brows stood at the microphone. "The fighters are insulted by such remarks, both the living and the dead. I remind you all - since there are strangers here who

might easily get the wrong impression from some of the things being said - that from start to finish our one and only purpose as fighters was Enosis ... ". This and his other similar remarks brought a strong round of applause, and rallied UP supporters. It switched the tone from defence to attack. In a sense Kefiros had been about to do something similar when he asked his last questioner if he had been a fighter. The point was for the UP to identify itself directly with the EOKA struggle, and this was what the muktar had now managed to do. The moral was not lost on Kefiros who now pulled out some of the remaining stops. He made the brief point that George Grivas in his first pamphlet had made it absolutely clear that the purpose of the struggle was Enosis. Both the words Grivas and Enosis drew substantial applause.

But the PF group were not put off balance. Why had Clerides not answered the questions during the demonstration? Zampas replied: He had answered them - in Paralimni, and when had the UP ever indulged in carrying placards attacking others?

Now the butcher jumped in again. "Perhaps the other parties don't have anything against them that United could carry posters about ...". Another PF man said "Clerides tried to fool us when he said he'd answer our questions at Market Town and then didn't". Kefiros now repeated that the UP pursued peaceful, civilised methods of campaigning and did not go around carrying posters against people. A PF man said: "But if we had been doing anything illegal the police would have stopped us." Kefiros now said he would accept any questions in good faith, but that he felt that many of the questions which had been asked so far were more in the spirit of provocation than

anything else. He was all for civilised discussion, and so forth.

But it was not to end yet; why had Clerides asked for a salary increase to carry on the inter-communal talks, if he really cared about the future of Cyprus? Kefiros answered that Clerides was not a rich man, and that by taking on the additional burden of the inter-communal talks he was completely ruling out any chance of earning any money by the private practice of law. He sacrificed this to the national interest, and like most other people, he waits at the end of the month for his pay-cheque.

All right then, if he was so keen on the good of his country why did he publicly speak against his father? The relation between one point and another was tenuous. A little later Kefiros remembered the muktar's lesson. "I didn't want to speak about myself, but perhaps I ought to mention that there was an earlier phase of the Cyprus Struggle, that which ended in the uprising of 1931 and for my part in that I went to prison." This brought very loud applause.

The questions seemed to go on for a very long time. The issue of the baptism of Clerides' daughter was again raised. Kefiros tried always to keep his voice low, and to avoid heavy bombast, but he could not silence his questioners. His main tormentor, Lepini, chose one reply as an excuse to give a shrug which said "It's pointless going on with this" and turned his back on the speaker and walked slowly away from the meeting towards the PF coffeeshop. As finally the meeting started to break up, a man arrested for the Parali haircut, went over to the Parali muktar and gave him a handshake.

Elsewhere groups of people went on talking politics for several hours. The Kello political client of the deceased Yorgadjis, K. Karas had arrived from the capital, and was chatting quietly with best known of the deceased Levendis' brothers. The two men had had a fight within the last year when K. Karas had accused him of trying to exploit the memory of his dead brother and had made reference to the Cretan arms trip and the accounts problem⁽¹⁸⁾. However now they were talking on apparently friendly terms. The elections were only three days away, and one of the major opportunities for open conflict, the UP's meeting in Kello, had passed without serious incident. But not without tension, or novelty.

It is worth commenting on some of the factors which are behind the theme of Hellenism. In one election speech by a PF speaker, much attention was devoted to a comparison of the quality of Greek education with that of Britain. The PF man insisted that many British universities were third, fourth and fifth rate, while Greek ones were internationally known to be first class. He complained, as did Sampson, of graduates from Greek universities returning to Cyprus and failing to get jobs, while those from the United Kingdom or America were preferred. He interpreted this as a lack of devotion to Hellenic ideals, and once again, tried to lay it to the charge of the UP.

It is in fact true, that British graduates are favoured by the Civil Service. Greek education is much less costly than that in Britain, especially since British universities started making foreign students pay higher fees. The children

of the urban elite - such as Clerides' daughter - normally go to England rather than Greece. Village children can only rarely afford to follow suit. The better civil service jobs - and much of its work - require fluent English. This is not to be had in the island's schools, and here again village children educated in Greece are at a disadvantage.

Once again, economic factors become overlaid with the facts of language and education which are basic to the nationalist case. The 'wrong' education in economic and career terms is the 'right' education in terms of loyalty to hellenism. So, to go on with the syllogism, the wrong (wealthy, English-educated and English speaking) people are in power, pretending that they want Enosis, which they clearly do not, while the right people who have preferred Greece, and a Greek education, and who are the deserving poor, are kept out of jobs because of their devotion to Greek ideals. I do not argue that such reasoning, and such social facts exist in all or even the majority of cases where men choose to support PF or United. But I am sure from observation that they are present often enough to justify the amount of attention I have given, so far, to the election speeches of the two party leaders.

(vi) Tensions in the last days : village solidarity tested

One of the things which helped reduce tension on the evening of the UP speech in Kallo was the unexpected arrival later on in the village of a man called Marmas, an EDEK candidate who was known to many of the villagers since he sells trucks and spares. He gave an informal and extremely humorous analysis of the elections, and soon had a crowd of fifty men

around him all in a very good mood. Some of the nationalists were saying that EDEK was about to make a secret electoral pact with AKEL, to cross-vote. Both parties denied this in the village, and AKEL argued convincingly that a "secret instruction" to its members could not remain secret for long. Manmas, in his speech took it for granted that the only issue was to belabour the AKEL supporters for not being with EDEK. So the bulk of the discussion was between him and the Akelistes. Because he is naturally a funny man, the whole temper of this episode was light-hearted, and must have helped reduce tension. Later a similar episode occurred when an Independent candidate arrived in the village whose main plank was to lend money without interest. In his case the meeting was sheer buffoonery and the villagers enjoyed themselves wholeheartedly.

In the last few days before the elections certain of the activists started to predict eleventh hour alliances. D. Fanou for example told me he had heard from reliable quarters that there would be co-operation of several parties against the United Party. The final event of importance for the PF supporters in the region was the speech in Market Town on Friday July 3 of Odysseus Ioannides, now the head of their party since the merger. Most of them had certainly never heard him speak in person before although they had seen him on television in the coffeeshop. There was also a good deal of interest to see whether he would have a bigger crowd than Clerides had done. Throughout the election the villagers put great weight on the size of crowds speakers drew, and although people kept saying "Of course you can't be sure, and maybe it

doesn't mean anything," they continued to show great interest in estimates. People got angry with low estimates of their own party's turn-out at meetings. To the villager the strongest image of political organisation is that which would be expressed by an aerial photograph of a man on a low rostrum, surrounded on all sides by followers. A man's following in politics is a concrete and finite number of persons, who can be called out to attend one of his meetings. "Organisation" in politics suggests the ability to turn out these crowds.

Ioannides' meeting was held in a different part of Market Town, so it was hard for anyone to judge objectively the size of his crowd. But PF supporters were jubilant, for they were sure it was much bigger than that of Clerides and that this was a sure sign that they would defeat the UP in the district. After the meeting they said to me "Did you see what a fine boss we've got?" Another said, more poetically, "Ioannides seems to me to be a pure man". He used the word agnos which in modern Greek means pure or chaste, and is the word used for the Lamb of God. Someone else commented "At the very least he isn't a killer".

The evening was not to pass without tension however, After the Ioannides meeting people went back to Kallo and sat around the coffeeshops of the main square. Suddenly there were raised voices. Pavlos, the PF leader who for days had been keeping the younger, more hot-headed supporters quiet was now himself furious, and was directing his remarks to T. Krikou, a thin, very intense man with a reputation for being quick to anger and quick to fight. He is the brother of L. Krikou, one of the two key UP organisers in Kallo. They are first


cousins of the powerful Mastia muktar; their half-brother is Sklyros, the AKEL leader, and he as they well know is a close friend of Pavlos, whose family has several affinal links to Sklyros. (see Table 22).

The burden of Pavlos' remarks was that some unknown UP supporter had reported to Koshis and Clerides the recent brawl in Kallo between P. Karas and his sister's husband, which I described earlier in this chapter, on page 29. The UP leaders had called young Karas in and said "What's all this about some PF people trying to stop UP posters being put up, and beating up our supporters and calling Clerides foul names?" P. Karas had denied all knowledge of the incident whereupon the UP leaders had got angry and said "We know this for a fact. Now tell us all about it." Pavlos kept repeating that some UP poushtis had gone and reported an incident between gambros and kounyiados (ZH and WE) and that this was a very bad thing to have done. "Up till now we have held back, we of PF. For instance when I heard about the punch-up between P. Karas and my koumbaros Pyrgos, I told my koumbaros Pyrgos that it was wrong of him to get into it. He insisted that the whole thing had started out of a joke, but then P. Karas had said 'your poove of a boss is better?' and naturally he got annoyed and there was a brawl. I told him he should have kept his temper. But now I can see it's no good holding back on our part because the other side doesn't play fair. Well, we know a lot of things, many many things and once we start I'm telling you for a fact we shall write things which will never be rubbed out ... "

There was some confused interchange now between Pavlos

SOME LINKS BETWEEN KALLO POLITICAL LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS, JUNE 1970.

Table 22



- 1) Relationships between persons in the same party have not been shown.
- 2) This diagram does not exhaust relationships between parties; only the main ones have been shown.

and T. Krikou who whether he liked it or not by his very presence was put in the position of a UP spokesman. Someone made a remark, which drew from Pavlos the reply "If any one punches me I'll shoot him by morning." T. Krikou said "You want to hit me?" Pavlos said "I'm not hitting anyone ..."

Things were now extremely tense, with people speaking of shooting and brawling. One UP supporter said that everyone was thoroughly against the report to Koshis and Clerides, and that everyone condemned it. This was a frank admission that someone on his side was in the wrong and was meant to reduce the tension. D. Fanou, a strong PF man, a close friend of Pavlos and a specialist in mediation added "Our village has this one special good point; we can have an argument and we don't fall out over it." Pavlos went on muttering dark threats about what his side would do once they started, and D. Fanou kept on condemning the report. The UP supporters kept on joining him in condemnation and the end of the incident was for Pavlos and T. Krikou, who had once seemed on the point of blows, to go off practically arm-in-arm.

Ten minutes later the biggest, toughest of the unmarried PF supporters, and a first cousin of the deceased Levendis, got to his feet to hit someone, in the coffeeshop across the way, and was instantly seized by a number of people who made him sit down quietly. Another incident had been averted.

Saturday was a day on which all political activity was in effect banned by law, and no alcohol was to be sold, as was the case for election day, Sunday. The only event of any interest was the arrival of an AKEL representative in the village to inform the left leaders that there had been an

eleventh hour electoral pact between AKEL and EDEK to cross-vote. AKEL only had two candidates in the Nicosia district, so this gave them ten 'extra' votes. The agreement was that they should vote for the head of EDEK, Vassos Lyssarides, and the last five men on his slate. The reason given in the village by the AKEL representative and passed on by village leaders was that the AKEL leaders had been informed that attempts were being made to get an anti-Makarios block of MPs into the House, mixed up among the various parties. The EDEK candidates to be voted for by AKEL members were those who were guaranteed to be loyal to Makarios. The AKEL man also explained that in another electoral district the party was co-operating with PF in a similar deal for similar reasons. There was to be no cooperation with UP because they were the heart of the anti-Makarios group.

As events were to turn out the cross-voting procedure was to prove extremely difficult to operate, and the returns showed that the commonest tactic adopted by the AKEL group was to tell only their most reliable and sophisticated supporters the full details, and with others to greatly simplify it, so that for instance they voted both AKEL and all the EDEK candidates. The problem facing AKEL was that they might lose votes through spoiled ballots if too many people made mistakes. But their supporters often saw the problem as "supposing so many of our people vote EDEK, but EDEK don't vote for us back, that their people get in and ours don't?" Some AKEL voters told me that they didn't obey the instruction to vote EDEK for this reason.

Election day in the village was to be marked by a

number of minor incidents, which in nearly all cases, and all of the cases in which blows were exchanged, involved supporters of PF quarrelling with UP supporters. Considering that there were three other parties involved in the elections, and in light of the events I have already described, it cannot be thought that these incidents happened in any sense randomly. Such information as I was able to get about how the election passed in other villages of the Nicosia district suggests that such incidents between these two parties' supporters were common⁽¹⁹⁾.

The first incident set the pattern for the day: the PF activist Katis, a brother of the deceased Levendis watched his elderly mother go into the voting booth, from an outside window. He then saw or thought he saw her fail to mark her slip, and then pop it in the box. He told the voting inspector what had happened and the inspector explained that unfortunately there was nothing he could do under the law. He could not allow the old woman to vote again. Soon there were a dozen of the noisier PF supporters all standing outside the village school, where voting was taking place, shouting. They crowded into the doorway where the officials were, bawling comments and suggestions. They said the inspector should help the old people vote in the way they wanted, and that it was a crime to conduct the elections this way, and that undoubtedly this was happening because the inspector was a UP supporter. The senior policeman in charge, after trying to get them to move away quietly, had a word in the ear of Katis' elder brother, and after a while the crowd dispersed. But not before they had been threatened with a suspension of

voting. They went off down the road cursing and complaining, back towards their own booths.

On the way back, Oligos, a PF supporter in his forties, in passing the UP table asked them what sort of dirty work they thought they were up to, rigging things like this? A wealthy young man at the table called out "Shut up you traitor". This proved to be an unfortunate choice of words, and in the context an inexplicable one. Oligos leaped at him and it took several PF supporters to drag him away. The explanation for his extreme rage was uniform on all sides: Oligos had been a leading EOKA activist in the village and had been interned by the British. In prison camp he was beaten up and suffered permanent damage to one leg. He walks with a pronounced limp and is not capable of full agricultural labour. His applications to the post-colonial government for compensation in any form had all been turned down. For a while he had a low-paid government job but towards the end of 1968 he was laid off and failed to get it back in spite of appeals. His brother Patris was a PF activist not because of any loyalty to Sampson, but because of his connections with PEK and PEK's boss, Azinas. But when Sampson spoke about those ex-fighters who had been denied compensation he was speaking about people like Oligos. Everyone in the village regarded Oligos' case as an injustice, regardless of party views, so when the young man used the word 'traitor' he could hardly have picked a more cruel or inflammatory expression.

Although no-one suggested it to me I was aware that close relatives of these two men had been in a fight about six years earlier. Oligos' brother Patris had beaten up the

young man's first cousin for saying things to his daughter. But I do not think this played any part in the incident between the two men, which was a flare-up directly related to relations between their two parties, the incident which had just taken place at the voting booth, and the choice of the word 'traitor' to the older man. Persons to whom I suggested this "past" dispute between the two groups of kin were sure it played no role in the recent one and were even amused at the suggestion.

Outside the house ⁽²⁰⁾ being used as a PF centre a crowd of people collected who soon heard the details of Oligos' outburst. Since they were now physically separated by twenty yards from the UP table, there were two potentially hostile groups facing each other. Little side arguments were going on between people who had got involved, but after ten minutes the whole thing died down again.

There was no doubt but that PF were conducting the most vigorous campaign all day. Their cars went up and down the road bringing voters with prolonged honking of horns, which no-one else did. Moreover they pursued people who were known to be supporters of other parties to the doors of the voting place trying to persuade them. People were literally dragged by the arm (though gently) from the table of one party to PF's table. This caused a good deal of hard feelings among the other party activists and there was much grumbling but no-one was inclined to take the matter up.

There were several more incidents during the day between UP and PF representatives, and usually to do with the inspector and the voting system. Otherwise people in the other parties

seemed to be on good terms with each other, and not inclined to take the whole thing too seriously.

The Minister of the Interior, Komodromos saw fit when the polls had closed to make an announcement over radio and television in which he congratulated the Cypriot people on their coolheadedness, peacefulness and level of political maturity. This was explicitly because the elections passed off without major disturbances. Someone in Kallo who heard this announcement over the television commented "I wonder what he's have said if he'd been in Kallo today?"

When the Kallo results came through there was real joy among the PF supporters. A cheer went up which could be heard all over the village. But when the results for Nicosia district were finally clear, they were downcast for several days, and lay around outside "their" coffeeshop in the evenings drinking and brooding. They started to collect and retail stories of the partiality of the electoral inspectors in the towns and how UP supporters in all sorts of branches of government had used their positions to disadvantage PF. My own belief is that these stories are very greatly exaggerated when it comes to the actual voting process, although I am quite sure that before the election the UP used all the government patronage powers at its disposal to persuade people to support it. The important point here is that many PF supporters were developing a set of views in which the UP gained its 16 seats in the Vouli by illegitimate means. But they also said things which suggested how far this was a rationalisation. For instance Pavlos said to me: "If they had worked in other distrincts for PF as we did in

Kallo, the result would have been very different."

(vii) The election and individual realignment

The elections have been shown to have intensified and defined certain cleavages in village social relations. There were a number of cases where it was clear that the elections forced certain individuals to rethink their alignments, and to demonstrate their positions.

In March 1st 1969 the Sampson newspaper MACHI carried lists of names of supporters in the village and other villages who had signed a letter of support to Sampson. There were certain oddities about some names - some were set down two or three times, others were of known leftists, and so forth. Masonos, a leftist with several younger brothers also thought to be leftists had signed. I heard someone describe him as a dhiploprosopos, two-faced. I asked the left leader, Sklyros, who said it meant nothing, it was a joke and would confuse the rightists. Little more than a year later I thought I could see clear signs that Masonos was now aligned with the PF group in the village - he sat around in their coffee shop, attended their planning meetings, and in conversation supported their line. Again I asked Sklyros, who said, no, he was sure that "Masonos is an ideologist and stable"; but he added that he and his family are two-faced and since his brother's daughter was married to a younger brother of the deceased Levendis and Masonos was renting a shop next door to this young man's coffee shop, he was probably pretending to support them to improve his family and business connections. Sklyros changed his mind three months later when during the elections he saw Masonos energetically working for the PF, trying to

rally votes. He told me that clearly his change was not simulated, it was a real change, because he was actually working for them. "He wasn't stable in his support" Sklyros said regretfully; but this was condemnation, not explanation.

The Mft also lost the support of Hamilos, to the UP. Once again the final proof was that he was seen working hard for them. This seemed to rule out any notion of feigned support.

Both these changes came as a surprise to the leftist leadership. But in other cases the election was merely the formal seal on a situation which had been well known to a certain number of people for a long time. For instance the position of D. Fanou⁽²¹⁾ had started to change as early as 1966. He was then in a state of real conflict, since he was an admirer of Vassos Lyssarides, but saw his career as squarely in the hands of his boss in the Co-operative Department, Andreas Azinas. By the middle of 1968 he had made up his mind in favour of the latter, but did not really get a chance to show this in public until the formation of the political parties in February 1968. The elections were for Fanou a good chance to convince Azinas and the village of the reality of his change of heart. Many people commented that he too, was 'two-faced' and this implies that they have some notion of what it means to be one-faced.

For other people in the village the elections were a chance to repay past favours. The fact that ten years had gone by without elections to the Legislative Assembly meant that people had had a long time to find out which political patrons were to be trusted, and which not. I mentioned in chapter three the case of indecent assault in which a mukhtar was seen to be intervening successfully. In June 1970 the two brothers who had

applied to him for help for their half-sister were to be seen working hard for the UP in Kallo, and the muktar himself put in a strong appearance at the Kallo UP speech by Kefiros. As I have suggested earlier, the more sophisticated villagers are well aware of ideological reasons for support so they do not readily admit quid-pro-quo situations. They use the language of ideology to explain their preferences, but at a very low level of complexity. They do not compare the formal, printed party programmes, and the promises they contain, but rather attack the leaders and candidates of opposed parties as men of no abilities, as crooks, insincere, dishonest and so forth. The only issue in which ideology ever comes to the fore is the question of Union with Greece, but here too the issue is confused since all four of the nationalist parties claim to want Union, and maintain that their way to it is the only correct and responsible way. In this sense, Union is like 'economic growth' in European politics - everyone is in favour of it, and claims to know the mysteries that will bring it. I have already noted that since most personal relations are described as 'friendship' and since the values of friendship in Cypriot culture exclude overt instrumentality but include mutual support, then it follows that any villager who personally knows a political leader in the capital, will tend to support him. Only those few villagers who like D. Fanou and the deceased Levendis have been on good terms with several leaders, face any problem of choice. A villager may describe himself as a friend of a political leader, and he can then be expected to defend this leader in the simple 'ideological' terms I have suggested. It is thus true to say that for the large number of

villagers, politics is an extension of personal relationships. For only a few is it first and foremost a matter of a set of abstract ideas about how society should be organised.

Throughout this chapter the struggle between UP and PF has been the dominant issue, as it was in the elections themselves. Both at national and local levels, this struggle must be seen as having two aspects. One is that the PF supporters believe they are true Enosists, and that the UP approach to Enosis is hypocritical. The other is that PF supporters believe UP is on the way to monopolising patronage power in the island.

It is important to recognise the ease with which one kind of reason may be expressed in terms of the other, and the logic of the fit here. For if it is true that Makarios' closest advisors - some of whom lead the UP - believe they and only they have the proper approach to obtaining Union, then it is natural that they should attempt to exclude from power those they believe are irresponsible in their pursuit of Union. Those who have been excluded readily come to believe that they have been excluded because of their dedication to the ideal, and not because of doubts about their technical skills in pursuing it. Such a situation means that each side must condemn the other in the strongest terms, must suggest the others are hypocrites, traitors in the pay of foreign powers, fanatics and so forth. Because both groups are trying to occupy the same piece of ideological space - that is to monopolise the position of being the sole begetters of Union - they must necessarily fight all the harder to distinguish themselves from each other.

The way in which the Levendis¹ issue has factionalised Kallio expresses the relation of the theme of Enosis to the theme of the

UP monopoly of power. The deceased Levendis is always mentioned by Sampson as a fallen fighter, which stresses his contribution to the struggle for Enosis; that his killer escaped unpunished is laid at the door of Yorgadjis, the former Minister of the Interior who in this version of events deliberately used his power to satisfy his personal whims. Thus the equation implicit in the manipulation of these symbols becomes Levendis : Enosis : selflessness on one side, opposing Yorgadjis : anti-Enosis : self-interestedness on the other. Such views are then easily extended to parties of the chief actors: Sampson, PF leader, who survived the death of his follower Levendis, against Clerides, UP leader who survived the death of his ally, Yorgadjis.

Clearly, for Sampson to have available as a political resource the memory of a dead fighter is a rather special case. On his own estimate, some ten fighters were killed after 1960 in circumstances which he believes to be political. That is not a very broad base for electoral support. However, from a logical point of view death is only an extreme form of exclusion from power; Sampson has other examples of the United Party's abuse of power to deploy, which may not be as dramatic as a killing, but affect more people more of the time. This is the point of his stories about the families of ex-fighters going unprovided. All over Cyprus are people who believe that they made an important contribution to the EOKA struggle which has gone unrecognised by those in power, who have rewarded instead unworthy people, people who 'did nothing' to further the patriotic struggle against the British. There is of course a basic reductionism in their view, which ignores all kinds of

complexity, and reaches a conclusion on the basis of a few cases. Counter-examples are not considered, or are written off as flukes.

So far I have been talking about the meaning of the elections in terms of changes of support, and the values involved in the rallying of support. But what did the elections do to social relations in the village? Among other things they tested to the limits the solidarity of the village, and since this solidarity survived the test, they may paradoxically have served to reinforce it.

In his Kammari speech Sampson made a very strong attack on the UP. The anti-Clerides demonstration in Market Town which was mounted by Kallio PF supporters came close to starting fighting in the crowd, and at the very least caused Clerides to leave the meeting early. The UP speech in Kallio was again a very tense situation, and although there were no signs of fighting starting, the sense of relaxation and anti-climax after the meeting were some measure of the tension it produced. The incident in which the PF leader Pavlos was so publicly angry over the reporting of a pre-election scrap to Clerides was again an extremely tense one, in which UP supporters had to appear very conciliatory in order to keep him in check. Finally on election day itself, a number of small scraps and incidents took place between supporters of the PF, and those of other parties, but particularly of the UP because the PF people believed that the electoral process was being manipulated in their enemies' favour. That they kept up this view after the election is important, for it is a possible indicator of the kinds of issues which will be raised in future elections, issues

which threaten seriously to erode the legitimacy of government and civil service in the eyes of a small but vociferous section of the electorate.

Some votes in the village represented personal issues which had been amplified and distorted by the campaigns of national politicians. Others used their votes in the factionalist spirit of deliberately aligning with a party opposed to that of an enemy⁽²²⁾. However, there were often several reasons for the way a person behaved, as the following cases show.

Kyrilis is an ex-fighter who is widely loved and respected in the village. He is in his mid-thirties, is the youngest of seven popular brothers, most of whom are leftists. I was at a PF planning meeting when people were estimating voting behaviour. When his name arose, someone suggested he would support PF. "No-one knows that for sure. He goes where he likes". His closest friend, and baptismal koumbaros, Pavlos, was present and he did not see fit to contradict the remark. If anyone could have influenced Kyrilis' vote it was Pavlos.

On election day, Kyrilis worked for the PF group. The most compelling reason for this is that he was a close friend of the deceased Levendis. He would therefore feel some obligation to support Sampson. But there is another compelling reason. His wife's sister was seduced by a wealthy man before May 1963. Kyrilis on learning this thought very seriously about killing him; he was partially restrained by Pavlos, who is married to a sister of the rich man's wife. Now over the years the rich man became friendly with several people in the government who became identified with the Yorgadjis faction. Since at the 1970 elections the UP represented that faction, everyone in

Kallo expected him to support UP, and several key persons predicted this to me. They were right. Kyrilis thus had a double reason for supporting PF, given that it was unlikely he would support either of the left parties, AKEL and EDEK. From long discussions with him I learned that he believes Clerides to be a capable man, and that Sampson does not have the personal qualities to hold high office. But for the two reasons given, he could not end up supporting a party which contained his old enemy, the rich man.

A second example of the complexity of alignments. Kanellos before 1954 was apparently a leftist. However for many years he has been a nationalist. In the 1970 elections he strongly supported the PF party. Six months earlier several informants had told he would go with his wife's sister's husband Moustachas the former EOKA leader. It was thought at that time that although Moustachas kept very quiet about his position, he would support Sampson because (1) Sampson is his koumbaros (2) Yorgadjis had failed to help his daughter get a scholarship to university in Greece, and Sampson had helped with this. Thus, Kanellos would ultimately be rallied to Sampson and PF.

However, if we were to examine the background for evidence of factionalist reasons for Kanellos' position, they exist: some years ago, one of Kanellos' two policemen sons (who partly owe their jobs to Moustachas) got into a fight with P. Karas, in the coffeeshops. The issue started with Kanellos telling the young Karas to do something, the latter refusing and calling out some insult, and then a fight developing. Young Karas then decided to sue Kanellos and his son for assault. However he was afraid that the fact that one of Kanellos' sons was a policeman would go against him in court, so he made contact

through his brother with Yorgadjis⁽²³⁾ who telephoned the Market Town police and told them he was interested that the case should go right. In the event, Karas won the verdict and damages in court. He insists that he reduced his share of the damages 'to make it possible for us to make up'.

Now in 1970 Karas was one of the most active UP workers in the village. His older brother, a koumbaros of the deceased Yorgadjis was his direct link to the UP. What can be said about the alignments of Kanellos and Karas? Both were already committed through patronage ties to the parties they supported, and only very compelling reasons would have made them switch. The question is, what effect did their previous personal differences have on their positions? The answer must be that while it did not directly cause their alignments in 1970, it undoubtedly added a great deal of interest to the contest. It provided energy for the prosecution of party propaganda. It was a catalyst for a reaction which had already been started by more fundamental material factors. One of the commonest complaints of the PF group was that Yorgadjis had filled the police force with his own men, and that he ran it as he liked, with the result that any friend of Yorgadjis got preferential treatment. During the 1970 elections I knew of at least three cases where UP supporters in Kallo had successfully sought for intervention on their behalf in police cases against them. One of these cases involved wounding by firearms, and the others have already been discussed. Such issues were at the back (and occasionally the front) of the PF supporters' minds when they attacked the UP for 'ten complete years of corruption'. To say that they would have acted the same way had they had

the chance is not to the point, although it is probably true.

(viii) Conclusion

National elections have been a rare event in Cyprus, and in 1970 they tested the solidarity of villagers, if not to the limits, at least far enough to have disturbed normal social relations quite markedly. In seeking to explain the striking difference between the returns in one village and those in the district at large, one is led to consider the specific ideological resources, the salient issues, and the historical meaning of certain currents in Cypriot politics, which were already introduced in chapter 7, and the later chapters.

The death of a young villager who had been an EOKA activist, proved a potent political resource in the campaign of a nationalist politician; his exploitation of this event made it difficult for clients of his opponent, the Minister of the Interior, and many of them changed from one patron to another less for short-term material reward, than for the relaxation of pressure from kin and friends of the dead man. In addition, two smaller nationalist parties merged, and since a local man was a candidate in one, this merger together with the memory of the dead man provided a strong base for the PF in the village.

The election speeches, debates, and arguments between UP and PF supporters have to be understood in terms of the linking of two themes, from the PF point of view - the theme of being a genuine Hellenist, Greek nationalist, and the theme of being excluded from power by usurpers. In chapter seven the argument was put forward that having little money, being educated in the

Greek language only, and in a Greek university, and subsequently having poor job prospects are part of a pattern. This pattern is different from those whose wealth or connections allow them to learn English, to be educated in an English-speaking environment, and to have better job prospects through proficiency in English and preferred qualifications. To the excluded nationalist, such a contrast has the logic of a syllogism: the wrong people are in power; and are false nationalists; the true nationalists, who show their sincerity for things Greek by being educated in Greece, are excluded from power. Therefore, to be poor and excluded, is to be a true patriot, and vice versa.

To point to such patterns is not to argue that such structural situations always produce the appropriate political outlooks. Poverty and Greek education do not always produce ardent right-nationalists, for the options of alignment with the left, or indifference always exist. There are also other reasons for being a nationalist, and some are neither excluded from power nor monoglot. However, the pattern suggested exists in many individual cases, and the more passionate nationalist politicians campaign on lines which fit this analysis. This partial explanation does something, it is hoped, to take the more passionate pro-Enosis nationalist out of the sphere of irrational or free-floating motives, into a comprehensible context.

UP supporters are not, of course, all English-speaking, elite members with university degrees. Many villagers are the clients of political leaders, however, and their relationship to members of the elite may be thought of as their stake in the status quo. If a man must be a client, it generally suits him

better to be the client of a powerful, well-connected person, than to be the client of a marginal elite member, who himself suffers exclusion from the core of power. To explain why villagers act as they do in politics, involves consideration of a range of factors - social origins, wealth, education, job, patron-client ties, kinship and friendship bonds, and last but not always least, conscious ideological alignment. That is, the understanding of village political behaviour involves a range of factors in relatively complex patterns, and perhaps is therefore closer to the situation of more industrialised countries than might at first sight appear the case.

The elections showed the villagers, already seen to be both prospering and interdependent - seeking to apply traditional norms of village solidarity, to the increasing complex intrusions of national politics. The incidents, sometimes involving limited violence, and often involving a great deal of hostility short of violence, showed the political culture of the village in its most exposed state. The elections caused the re-thinking of alignments for many people, and some of the tension involved was undoubtedly because these alignments bear directly on access to key resources - jobs, scholarships, bureaucratic interventions of all kinds. The villagers in seeking to ensure the protection and prosperity of their dependents, face dilemmas of choice which involve calculations of risk profit and loss of great complexity. Precisely because the business of national politics involves linkages and decisions which are far beyond the control of any villager, the decisions are so difficult, and the tensions so great.

Traditionally villagers competed for scarce resources which were, in the main, in the hands of other villagers, and the rules of their competition were known, derived from the village itself⁽²⁴⁾. More recently, political competition has come to involve a set of ever-widening circles, and on their perimeters men make decisions of great moment. If the name of a villager is supplied to one of these men, placed on or crossed off a list, the villager may lose or gain some critical benefit, in Nicosia, Athens, Prague, Washington or elsewhere. The action is invisible, and without appeal. For this reason, the villagers' hostility is so great to the carrying of tales or retailing of information about co-villagers to these outside men. No 'reasonable' man would do such a thing, but not all men are reasonable. Some are 'fanatics' or 'ideologists'. That is why ordinary villagers say "Don't get mixed up in (political) parties".

The village has remained an important area insofar as some men can be seen to align with national parties to hurt their village enemies, or at least, to express their opposition to or avoidance of them. This kind of behaviour has been widely reported, both for the Mediterranean area and for less developed societies. It is, perhaps, the final measure of the fact that the village preserves some inward-looking social character, in spite of the volume of transactions which flow across its boundaries.

Footnotes to Chapter 11

- (1) This man, ^gPattas, was described in chapter 2, page 6.
- (2) In chapter 8, The Case of the Graduate's Club, Moustachas was again seen intervening in a similar way. This was one of the last occasions his authority went unchallenged, and perhaps contributed to its erosion.
- (3) In chapter 7, page 15-16 some account of these rivalries was given.
- (4) Abner Cohen (1969 b) has argued forcefully that analysis of the symbolism of power relations is a key task of political anthropology, and while I do not follow him in his more aggressive reductionism, I am generally sympathetic to his approach.
- (5) Chapter 7, page 18.
- (6) For example, a government minister who resigned in 1970 to become a UP candidate, explained to E. H. Hammonds that at one point he and his associates had considered taking over the right-nationalist farmer's association PEK, but on closer examination had decided not to bother since they had found little or nothing to take over. (E. H. Hammonds, personal communication). This may of course have been a rationalisation for the fact that the job might have proved harder than they thought.
- (7) Aglas had been a candidate for the Progressive Front, the party basically composed of an alliance between PEK and the Mayor of Nicosia. This party had merged, only a few days before, with Sampson's Progressive Party.
- (8) Later in this chapter I shall describe an incident on election day in which a Kallotis, Oligos, got into a brawl with a younger man who had called him a traitor. Oligos was injured by the British during the Emergency, and most Kallotes think he should have received compensation.
- (9) Only Takis Evdokas, the leader of the extreme right-nationalist party DEK publicly attacked Makarios by name during the elections. He was the man who ran against Makarios for the Presidency in 1968, and failed to get more than 6% of the popular vote.
- (10) Sampson, for example, continually stated that Clerides and Denktash kept no minutes of their conferences, and that the implied reason for this was because they wished to avoid Makarios knowing what they were discussing.
- (11) Lipset (1960, 1967) has written of the tendency for fierce ideological competition between small parties. "This divisiveness encouraged by a multi-party system is perpetuated by the tendency of most parties to attack

- (11) most virulently those with whom they have most in common and with whom they compete for a similar vote, thus magnifying the differences between them" (Lipset, in (ed) Macridis (1967 : 65).
- (12) This comment by Pavlos also was a way of telling Sampson what his father had done, and at the same time, making it clear that his loyalty to PF went as far as persuading his father to change sides.
- (13) E. H. Hammonds is a lecturer in Government at the Polytechnic of Central London (formerly Regent Street Polytechnic). Our close association and continuing discussion of politics encouraged me to bring him to Cyprus in 1970, to observe the elections from the urban, elite perspective. I was fortunate in obtaining a supplement to a Nuffield Small Grant which enabled him to spend three weeks in the island. In this thesis, however, I rely on my own fieldwork material throughout and whenever information has come from another source, this is made clear.
- (14) A senior civil servant told me the following story, which shows what can happen when a man like Karas finds himself with a powerful patron. My informant on first starting work in the government office tried to get a cup of coffee. His colleagues explained that he could not because Karas, who had the coffee concession was a friend of Yorgadjis, and felt it was too far to come. My informant called Karas in and asked him for coffee. Karas did not bring it and a row developed, during which he boasted of his friendship with the Minister, and his own readiness to use a gun. My informant's father had contributed large sums of money to EOKA and also has some very loyal employees, so he told Karas to bring his gun at any time, and see what happened. But although this made him feel better, he did not get any coffee. It is interesting to see how far the elite share the idiom of friends, supporters, guns and power; or even if they do not feel committed to the values implied, they need to use the idiom of men like Karas to deal with him. The man in question comes from one of the richest families in Cyprus and is a university graduate.
- (15) It is worth mentioning that Pyrgos in fact eloped with Karas' sister, some years ago, and at the time, her brothers were extremely angry and would have done him violence had not mediators intervened. The matter was resolved, but it is possible that such a previous difference helped trigger the dispute in 1970. Pyrgos openly boasts that he has killed men, and was once involved in a series of gang killings in Limassol. He is naturally feared in the village. He is a gambler. P. Karas is a gymnasium graduate, and full-time farmer; although unmarried he works his own land, a very rare situation in the village.

- (16) In September 1970 Sampson told me that he had had no advance notice of the Market Town demonstration, and added that he had often stopped his Kallo supporters from doing various things, so that now they probably did not always tell him in advance what they were thinking of doing in case he stopped them. Yet in telling me this and other things, he made it clear that the toughness and readiness to do such things were characteristics he admired in young Kallotes.
- (17) I mentioned in chapter 9 how this man had been extremely active on behalf of his village, Kammari, in its attempts to get an illegal bore-hole made legal.
- (18) I have not previously mentioned this exchange, which took place some years after the trip itself, which was described in chapter eight.
- (19) I do not mean to suggest that there were no violent disputes between other parties elsewhere. In fact there were a number of fights between AKEL supporters and right-nationalists, in various parts of the island. In the villages which surround Kallo I heard of no such incidents. It seems likely that disputes between right and left would be more likely in villages where the non-left were represented by one major party, instead of being distributed fairly evenly between several nationalist parties.
- (20) The house of the village priest. The use of this house was regarded by other groups as typical of PF cunning, since they argued the older women in the village would be unduly influenced into voting for the PF. In fairness, the priest's house is very close to the school, and ideally located.
- (21) From the events of the Lyssarides Group, described in chapter eight.
- (22) Similar behaviour is described by Stirling (1965 : 280-282) Boissevain (1965 : 128) and Cohen (1965 : 146-73).
- (23) The relation between K. Karas and Yorgadjis was discussed on page 29 of this chapter.
- (24) My debt to the ideas of F. G. Bailey in this analysis, is pronounced.

CHAPTER 12

CONFLICT, SOLIDARITY, AND POLITICAL RESOURCES IN A CHANGING VILLAGE : THE ADVENT OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD

Introduction

Some general issues in this study

Two themes have dominated the previous pages. One concerns the impact of modern political ideologies in village life, and the attempts of villagers to contain its divisiveness; the other is the organisational tactics employed by villagers in their struggle to extract material benefits from the political and administrative structures of the modern nation state. It will be obvious that the two themes depend on each other: in few words, modern politics offer new benefits to villagers, but sometimes at the cost of setting them against each other. How they seek to obtain maximum benefits for minimum social cost is what most of the material has been about.

The same themes are implicit in many monographs on politics in developing nations. It has become a commonplace to read of village elders describing some Arcadian state 'before politics came and spoiled things' ⁽¹⁾ yet few writers have directed their attention to this issue explicitly. It is also worth remarking that the persistence of the village as the dominant reference point in the lives of its inhabitants runs somewhat counter both to the recent analytic emphasis on transactions across local boundaries, and the influence of the centre on the periphery. In showing Kallu to be a solidary community, although highly involved in the processes of the larger society, two things are important: one is that in place of the vanishing village,

threatened in Mediterranean ethnography for the last twenty years, there is presented detailed analysis of a persistent village; the other is that in place of the remote, backward, isolated depopulated village, there is presented some analysis of a village integrated into a nation, economically progressive, prosperous and demographically viable⁽²⁾. The implications of studying a village which is more closely integrated into the nation have not until recently, been explored. A number of recent writers have concentrated on the gap between the perspective of the political scientist and the anthropologist (see Weingrod, 1967, Fallers, 1963, Vincent 1969, Cohen 1969) and rightly point to the difficulties in any assumption of the convergence of the two views. Weingrod has insisted that

"The village is not the microcosm of the nation: it is not possible to infer the one from the other. Studying politics on the village level will not assist in understanding how a nation is ruled" (ibid: 123)

But Weingrod is setting up straw men here. No anthropologist has gone on record as thinking that the nation is the macrocosm of the village: but that is not to say that studying politics from (not on) the village level will not assist in understanding how a nation is ruled. Abner Cohen (1969) has forcefully argued that the anthropologist faces a challenge from an invasion of his traditional subject matter - a social unit which can be studied by intensive observation - by political scientists. He argues that anthropology must take more notice of the role of the state in analysis of the units studied, but adds that anthropological analysis compensates for limitation of scale, by its greater analytic depth. Although I have been carrying out part of Cohen's programme of 'the analysis of the symbolism of power relations' I do not think this need be the only claim

made for anthropological study. The notion of political culture, mentioned only in passing by Cohen, is central here, as shown by the work of a political scientist: Waterbury's study of the Moroccan political elite not only appears to have been carried out by fieldwork techniques similar to those used by anthropologists, but also builds on findings by anthropologists to produce the fundamental analytic tools used. The political culture of the Moroccan elite, with its characteristic traits of combining tension with stalemate, of preserving alliance flexibility, and of the defensive use of power are all, it is clear "contingent upon the traditional forms of social organisation in Morocco" (Waterbury, 1970 : 6). This is precisely the reverse of Weingrod's point: it is only through an analysis of traditional and local social organisation that understanding of elite behaviour (and by implication, of the Moroccan state) can be obtained.

It is in the last respect that this study has a special perspective to offer: in many societies the political elite is also a traditional elite, who because of the previous stratification system, have simply remained in position during the changes of recent years. Studies from India in particular, but also from Latin America, suggest that the gap between elite politicians and peasant electorate is huge, and it is such studies which encourage Weingrod to insist that the village study has little to tell us about how the nation is ruled.

Yet in many countries there has been no established traditional elite. Where the traditional social structure allowed competition for power, and the society has displayed a competitive egalitarianism, the new elites have often emerged

very recently from rural origins, and purely local leadership. This is the case, I argue, among Nigeria's Ibos, among the Tolai of New Guinea described by Epstein, and elsewhere. It follows that such elites can scarcely escape in a single generation the influence of their traditional political culture, and thus in a very obvious way, this is essential to any understanding of their behaviour when at the controls of the state (3).

Yet this feature is not limited to acephalous tribal societies turning towards modernity. Rural Cyprus provides a further example of an elite emerging rapidly from rural communities, with only a weak indigenous stratification system. Not only must the rural origins of this elite be understood before sense can be made of national politics, but also, insofar as the elite succeeds in differentiating itself from the rest of the society, then it is equally necessary to understand what elite members are trying to escape from, and here again, the understanding of rural society is a logical requirement. Where there is a secure traditional elite, unchallenged, and with a social and political culture so developed and self-contained that it owes nothing in origins or reaction to peasant society, then it may be understood without reference to peasant societies - although some comparison will be necessary to even establish the discreteness of the two systems. It is more likely, however, that few political elites can properly be understood without close analysis of rural political cultures, and thus, the analysis of the state's role in developing countries must proceed from prior analysis of smaller social units, especially villages.

From these general considerations, I turn first to a recapitulation, chapter by chapter, of the general argument and content of this thesis. After that, there is further analysis of the use of new resources in the politics of the village, and the issue of factors limiting political conflict in village life.

(1) An outline of the main argument

The first chapter sketched the traditional economy of the village, and followed the main changes in population growth, agriculture, communications, and politics. A continuous rise in population was accompanied by the intensive cultivation of new land, and increased cash-cropping made possible by co-operative development of new water resources. The colonial government sponsored improved communications; and mass education. Political leadership from elite politicians, already developed in the 1920s, was suspended, only to re-emerge in the post-war period. Cleavage between right and left in the village began to be institutionalised.

The second chapter explored the importance of land in the social structure of the village, and the need for supplementary occupations, for those whose holding was not viable. The relatively even distribution of land was noted, the status factors involved in different kinds of occupation, particularly the high value that villagers now place on giving their children higher education. The change over in the 1950s to capital-intensive citrus cultivation was stressed, and how this made possible profitable 'white-collar' farming by men whose main occupation is not agriculture.

The third chapter by examining the cycle of property transfer

brought out the critical cultural importance of provision for children at marriage; a consideration of the arrangement of marriage provided the other key feature in the status system of village society, itself linked to property transfer: the competition for suitable marriage partners for one's children, and the way in which this is a key reflection of the inward-looking values of adult villagers. Concerns for the provision of dependents, and the competitive arena of marriage arrangement are constraints on all political behaviour by villagers, and provide one reason why villagers seek to limit the scope of political conflict within the village.

Chapter four examined other bases for association in the social relations of villagers beyond those provided by kinship and affinity. Particularly, ritual godparenthood (koumbaria) friendship, relations based on age, neighbourhood and work were analysed. The importance of transactions with outsiders was discussed, and some of the links between villagers and influential persons described. Some attempt was made to describe the norms of solidarity between co-villagers, and reasons were given for the prominence of such norms in the general desire to keep land, cash and eligible young people within the boundaries of the village. This interdependence, based on increasing prosperity is the basic reason for a solidarity which limits conflict between political groups⁽⁴⁾.

Chapter five was concerned with the opportunities for leadership and power in the village. Formal administrative offices - mostly filled by fulltime farmers - reflected trust from the village at large in the handling of communal affairs, but in themselves were strictly limited in opportunities for

general exercise of power. Education, wealth, external contacts, and the readiness to use force were all bases for power, which was not concentrated in a few persons. Power can be achieved in the village, and is competed for closely.

In chapter six the scope of politics was analysed. A distinction between active leaders, their supporters, and political spectators, the unaligned, cautious or indifferent villagers was made. The social implications, in terms of values and actions, of the labels leftist, and rightist were examined as well as the costs and benefits of alignments with party positions, and extent of political conflict between left and right in village politics. I also discussed the role of groups of followers in Cypriot politics, bound to national leaders by ties of friendship or clientage, and often involved in clandestine, illegal organisation. Finally, the notion of obligation and friendship in political behaviour, particularly voting, was mentioned, in which it was argued that Cypriot culture so strongly approved the principle of reciprocity that in politics, obligation often cut across lines of ideological cleavage. The gap between village and town is not so great that the political broker is deeply mistrusted, and many villagers have fairly direct access to literate persons who can mediate their needs with the larger society.

Chapter seven briefly reviewed the history of the Greek Cypriot community from 1878 to 1970, concentrating on the meaning of the quest for Union with Greece (Enosis) both in its early phase of elite representations to the colonial government, and in the later phase, 1954-59 of armed struggle by EOKA. The importance of membership in EOKA as the key to the

Independence period was stressed, both for the demands made on government to reward proven service and militancy, and for the network of informal political relations which resulted from the residues of the organisation. The intercommunal troubles between Greeks and Turks which erupted in violence from 1963 were matched by a struggle for power between Greek nationalist leaders, which continues at /time of writing with Grivas' latest challenge to Makarios. The increasingly open rivalry between nationalist leaders resulted in tensions at village level between their followers. The emergence in 1969 of a new underground organisation demanding Enosis, attempts on the life of the president and the associated murder of an ex-minister were further signs of instability. The whole period can be seen as one in which the mass of the population has had little direct experience of representative politics, but has nevertheless been involved in great political change, including their increasing social enfranchisement. Political discontinuity has been matched by steady economic development.

Chapters eight to eleven have examined in detail recent political issues involving different segments of the village, and different political fields. A number of disputes between political groups in the village were contrasted, followed by attempts of five villages to expedite the building of a dam; chapter nine was concerned with the administration of a major co-operative, in members of some of these villages were again found in opposition to Market Town, and again allowed their own elite leaders to take most of the important initiatives on their behalf. The last chapter examined in considerable detail the major election campaign of 1970, stressing the deep cleavage

between supporters of two nationalist parties, stemming from the death of a particular village being fed back into the village through the amplification of ^{an} urban leaders campaign. On a number of occasions the fragile peace of the village was tested, without major fracture, thus providing a basis for future control of open conflict.

(11) New political resources : the ambiguity in education

F. G. Bailey has demonstrated that the use of new resources in political competition frequently gives rise to conflict (1969 : 10). Mass education has made social differentiation in rural communities more complex. Villagers generally speak of education as worthy of respect, yet they deny respect to the educated in certain contexts. What factors explain these shifts?

The blocking of a club, which would have symbolised the social distance between educated and less educated villagers, was a message about preserving the social homogeneity of the village, and the personal pre-eminence of a village leader. The club had no role in external relations, and appeared to offer little to the village in general. This dispute is a miniature version of the wider structural cleavage between EOKA activists, and the educated urban elite.

In similar vein, a teacher who wrote a small article for a newspaper describing attempts at political intimidation within the village was presented as having broken norms of solidarity by taking a village dispute to outsiders. His ability to do this depended on his educational skills; his appeal to abstract notions such as free speech, and right of assembly were similarly novel resources in the village arena. Such

resources have their origins in universal suffrage, first introduced under colonial rule. Yet since independence, villagers were seen in administrative issues concerning a dam and a co-operative, to allow a few leaders, sons of the village who had entered the urban elite to take most major initiatives. Suffrage does not confer consciousness of citizens' rights. Men of power are not distinguished by the rules governing their roles, and villagers treat civil servants, politicians, and elite notables all in the same way - as people to beware of, to coax or to implore.

There are certain situations in which the villagers permit their own educated men to lead them, in contrast to the previous cases mentioned: if leadership involves personal risk; if it involves relations with external authorities; if it involves matters of bureaucratic complexity; or if the interests of the leaders and the rest of the villagers are seen to be the same. Often, several of these factors come together in a single situation when for example, a villager needs to deal with a high-status government official. Shaky literacy, peasant speech, the insecurities of being a family head in a hostile unknowable world all make it difficult for a villager to speak out. To criticise an official policy seems to the villager like an attack on the man who speaks for it. Public and private roles are not distinguished. Better to let a wealthy son of the village, educated abroad, an urban resident who 'knows how to speak' and who himself has land in the village, take up such matters. In the absence of a feudal or latifundist tradition, and with the knowledge that customary norms should act to sanction blatant betrayal, villagers can leave their affairs in the hands

of the elite the village has produced, with a limited measure of trust. Self-interest can lead to relations of co-operation, contrary to Banfield's well-known description of the society of 'amoral familists'.

(iii) New resources : committees as controls

Bailey (1965) has examined the role of committees and their decision-making procedures, and their consequences for the handling of social discord. My data show how in times of crisis, the village tends to throw up committees which act both to bridge social divisions, and to express tensions, and once again, educated men are prominent.

The committee as an institution is not bound to mean the same thing in different societies, and it would be a mistake to see village committees as necessarily an aspect of rational, bureaucratic management. The Co-ordinating Committee which was adopted during the Independence struggle was meant to keep villagers from recourse to courts controlled by the colonial government. They were then instruments for internal social control and for ensuring political solidarity. In 1964 the re-emergence of this committee was in direct response to a threatened break in solidarity, a loss of political confidence by the villagers in their defenders.

During my fieldwork, an Advisory Committee emerged during a period of agitation by villagers over water resources. An educated man chaired it, and maintained an orderly procedure. Numbers of villagers used the committee to discuss their views on the water problem, and my interpretation of their participation is that there was a general anxiety that the committee would check the exploitation of the dam issue for party

political benefit, and ensure that the villagers themselves had some control over the conduct of the issue. Like the Co-ordinating Committees, it arose during a crisis of confidence in the village, triggered by external events. Such committees have as one latent function the control of potential social or political division within the village, through a ceremonial re-imposition of behaviour expressing solidarity. In all cases these committees failed to become established, and in the case of the one I observed, it was not possible to decide how much this failure was due to its being swamped national political forces, and how much the three meetings themselves had served their expressive purposes without further action.

(iv) New resources : political demonstrations

In all cross-cultural comparisons there is implicit the problem of how far cultural items, institutions, units, customs are similar or different. It is too often assumed in discussions of politics in developing countries that if the forms of representative government are being followed, then the functions and cultural meanings follow the forms. Through the influence of the mass media, Cypriot villagers have certainly been exposed to images of political protest from other countries. Moreover, in certain phases of colonial rule, notably the Uprising of 1931, and the Independence struggle of 1954-59 certain kinds of political demonstration occurred, which might arguably be said to have been the models for the events of the late 1960s. Therefore it is proper to ask, what were the underlying implications of the dam demonstration, and the electoral demonstration in Market Town, 1970?

The demonstration at the Presidential Palace was, to my

knowledge, the first time the villagers had attempted to further their economic ends by an overtly political message to the government. The event itself was guided and stimulated by the efforts of an educated elite politician, although he was not able to exercise the control over it he wished to do. Since a demonstration could mean many things, such as a serving of notice to a government to quit, a show of physical power, a challenge to the authorities, and so forth, it must be stressed that insofar as it is possible to talk of the character of a demonstration, this one had elements of a plea for attention⁽⁵⁾, rather than anything more threatening; this was suggested by certain things actually said by key members of the demonstration, by the ease with which it was deflected from an open naming of Market Town as the source of its discontent, and by the readiness with which it dispersed. The demonstration was for many of those taking part, a message to the government, through Makarios as Chief Patron⁽⁶⁾ about its dependents' needs. It was only secondarily, and for relatively few of the participants, the calculated use of a new resource in the arena of national politics. My information is inadequate to say how the demonstration appeared to the government, which in any event appeared to support the building of the dam. In subsequent meetings between village committees and senior civil servants there was evidence of serious friction, but no sign that the civil service intended to alter its basic policy. Certainly demonstrations by agricultural interest groups, as well as trade unions were common after this, though it is not possible to say more than that the Five Villages were among the first off the mark.

The 1970 election campaign was, I have argued, a new political experience in the simple sense that few opportunities have arisen since 1930 for Cypriots to choose national representatives. Since it followed an anomalous period of political violence and unrest, no-one really knew how the matter would pass. At the election meetings I attended it was rare for members of the audience to ask questions after the formal speeches. This is partly the legacy of caution, the avoidance of exposure to personal risk, which is a characteristic of adult village conduct. It is partly too a reflection of the gap between the usually educated candidates, with their command of the Greek language at sophisticated levels, and the relatively insecure, unsophisticated audience which mistrusts its own ability to speak coherently.

The demonstration in Market Town against the United Party, and the interrogation of an educated and distinguished United Party candidate by a young village farmer are therefore remarkable. At first sight one might be tempted to use the language of political development, and speak simply of increased participation, democratisation and so forth. I would argue that this would be misleading, without consideration of certain background events. In particular, both actions were carried out by young men who had been heavily influenced by the death of one villager who had been a local EOKA fighter of distinction. They saw themselves as carrying out a particular form of attempt to redress the balance - the election was thus a highly personal matter, a controlled form of revenge, satisfying to personal honour, somewhat dangerous because its consequences were unknown, yet not as dangerous as an actual vengeance killing. The fact that

those prominent in these two situations were all unmarried (although one was engaged) is significant in this respect. Behind them were mature men, married friends of the dead man, who rather than risk such open exposure which would have been irresponsible in terms of their family obligations, were nevertheless able to work hard in the electoral campaign of a nationalist leader sympathetic to their cause.

These demonstrations then appear as a new resource employed by villagers in the national political arena. To the observer who stresses the institutional form of an act, the language of political development will seem appropriate; but the anthropologist is bound to point out that underneath that form are principles of traditional rural society - the expression of dependency, the search for protection, in one case, and in the other, the vindication of personal honour, of loyalty to a dead man.

Political change : conflict in the traditional village

From the limited evidence available to me from the pre-1930 period, the nature of conflict in the village can only be guessed at. A form of political contest centred on the elections for the post of mukhtar but it is not clear how stable were the factions supporting candidates. Nor are the linkages to national elections at all clear; villagers speak as if there were two factions, which were exhaustive and opposed each other in all matters. The little evidence I collected did not support so clear a view. The only thing on which information permit certainty is that the factions did not have anything that should be dignified with the title ideology, that they did not seem to have any clear institutional basis,

and that recruitment to them was on mixed or diverse principles. Finally, there was no suggestion that villagers committed important resources to such factional contests, although urban politicians at national elections spent money on buying village votes.

From the same period there is the important case of the Two Companies, remembered predominantly as an economic matter. Here both sides committed very substantial amounts of money to the dispute, which was settled by a court decision, merging the two parties in a single company. The fact that this dispute, while economically costly, was settled without violence is noteworthy for my argument, in light of the fact that violence with the closest village over water was still occurring thirty years later. Since ⁱⁿ the same period violence and occasionally killings took place within the village, between individuals or limited kin groups, the tentative conclusion is that there was a conscious avoidance of violent conflict between major groups within the village. Insofar as this tendency seems to continue to the present day, it is worth emphasis; but the quality of evidence is not good enough to know if such a pattern in the traditional village is a chance one, or the result of conscious restraint by the villagers. Comparative studies can help settle this.

Because of a number of factors, but particularly, the suppression of institutional and representative politics by the colonial government, for the whole of the 1930s, the entry of national party politics into village life appears to take place suddenly in the early 1940s. Yet individual villagers had already taken up ideological positions before this. Accompanying the change towards increased occupational

differentiation, improved roads and transport, war-time wage labour outside the villagers, the growth of trade union activity took place. Left wing unions re-emerged, after being banned in the 1930s, and nationalist right-wing unions, though on a smaller scale, followed to challenge their power. These institutionalised parties penetrated the village, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were a number of national elections which allowed them to test their strength. In the village contests between the activists of these parties took place, and at the same time, new administrative units, such as the Co-operative Retail Shop provided scope for party competition.

Far the most important aspect of the change was that the parties carried ideological overtones and had a degree of permanence outside the village itself. The ideologies involved differences not only over the Church, the distribution of wealth, and the general form of the economic system, but also involved positions on the nation, independence, and relations with other states such as the USSR and Greece. Because of the relative institutional stability of the local units, membership or allegiance created the basis for relationships outside the village. The entry of ideological politics into village life must be seen as presenting additional social identities for villagers. Before this, conflicts between individuals, families or factions were within a common framework of values; party politics called this common framework into question. They did not destroy it, but they strained it to the limits.

Since it has been stressed throughout that the village is strongly enmeshed in a larger society, it is essential to state that in my view political conflict in the village is not

limited by any putative homeostatic mechanism which can act independently of external situations. There is no mysterious tendency to equilibrium in a system, which can be abstracted from observing the village. The factors limiting conflict within the village result from the values and actions of individual villagers, who see certain clear benefits in so acting. Changes in the external political environment intensify political cleavage in the village, and here it is important to note that continuously since 1955 there has been a political factor dampening conflict between leftist and nationalists at all levels and that is the issue of the relation between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island. While relations between the two ethnic categories are hostile, and constitutionally anomalous and while the appeal for ethnic unity among the Greeks continues to be made by national leaders of all political complexions, then there is a continuing restraint on cleavage at the village level.

But such a comment leaves a great deal of leeway, both for the analyst and the actors. Political leaders do not give up all attempts to test the opposition, simply because an appeal for ethnic unity exists. Above all, institutional units need the occasional exercise of contest to preserve their identity, boundaries, and morale⁽⁷⁾. Thus leaders in the village can be thought of as acting under contradictory restraints. This is borne out in the process of factional conflict on a number of occasions.

For example when both leftists and nationalists had agreed not to contest the elections for a village administrative committee, they then failed to agree about the precise form that

the apportionment of posts should take. This form of contest involves no commitment of valued resources, and in the control of the committee lies little opportunity for economic favouritism or advantage to the winner; the reason why each side attempted to stop the other one gaining advantage thus eludes a material interpretation, and suggests the leaders long-term goals related to maintaining political units at strength, and their own positions.

What is the threat or cost involved in a fully contested election for such a committee? Since the political teams are of roughly equal size, one result of a full contest is that everyone in the village will have to be aligned. Large numbers of people have cross-cutting ties, and such an exhaustive contest undoubtedly strains many social relations in the village. Furthermore, it might involve the temptation to use outside resources. Here a particular danger would be that one side might call in extra supporters to intimidate its rivals⁽⁸⁾. Since the institutions exist linking party units both across villages and to major centres, it is not difficult to arrange a few extra supporters, with no important relations to members of the village community, who can use strong-arm methods. Something of this was happening in the illegal activities earlier which resulted in a mukhtar of another village getting an involuntary haircut.

It is thus fortunate from several points of view that the village administrative elections usually had a low turn-out, and that they were not often the subject of serious party contest. Since such elections are governed by government regulations, they may in any case take place within a framework of control,

which can be used as a resource or as arbitration, depending on specific circumstances and the actor's point of view.

Other forms of factional contest took place in the period 1954-70 however which involved some of the ideological and institutional factors discussed here, but which lacked the rules of competition and governmental framework. They also involved different groupings, only some of which are parties to the conflict just discussed. The dispute involving the followers of Dr. Lyssarides with a number of nationalists threatened to bring - and in some versions, did bring - violence into village political groupings. The incident occurred during a period of unrest and intense activity at the national level, involved the continual use of outside arbitrators, and a period of open breach within the village itself; the values invoked by the two sides were, I have already stressed, in conflict. Unlike the committee elections, the result of this incident was a loss of supporters for one side, and a loss of authority for the leader of the other side. Not only this, but the incident formed a lasting impression on many people in the village, as a dangerous precedent of 'fanaticism'. Once again the prizes at stake are not particularly clear or tangible, but clearly related to ideological views, to group strength, and leadership ambitions; but as in so many village disputes, the situation was undoubtedly aggravated by pre-existing enmities between some of the individuals involved and by the desire of village clients to please or impress their patrons who are political leaders at the level of the nation.

In such situations however, there is an additional factor which undoubtedly serves to moderate political conflict, and

this is the punitive potential of the state. Roads, cars and telephones, as well as the expansion and professionalisation of the police force, to some extent make it more likely that the state will intervene in the case of violence or the threat of violence. This is not a simple matter, since I have also argued that individuals with powerful patrons may sometimes flout the law with impunity - the material on the Ethnikon Metopon suggests this - but on balance the state deters rather than encourages violent political conflict and this was made clear by the behaviour of the police and villagers during election day 1970.

A further set of factors which limit political conflict in the village are those related to a conscious preservation of village solidarity on the part of leaders. As Bailey has pointed out (1965 : 6) many village communities, particularly in India tolerate violent conflict, and are well characterised as 'back-to-back communities'. Swartz, commenting on a study of factionalism in a Burmese village by Spiro (Swartz, 1968, 1969 pp. 4-5; see also paper by Spiro in the same volume) notes that the villagers have a shared goal - the continued existence of the village; furthermore they refuse to allow factional conflict to extend into economic activity. In considering factors which might directly affect such a value it is worth noting in passing that in some societies the fission or secession of village units is a practical possibility, related to factors of population, availability of land and other resources, and the security of groups from attacks. In rural Cyprus although individuals and occasionally whole households leave villages after severe dispute, the lack of

free land would make the departure of large numbers of villagers most difficult, although they might move in small groups to a town.

The reasons why villagers in general should value the continued peaceful existence of the village, some measure of solidarity, and limited conflict, have already been suggested by noting the extent to which the villagers look inwards for their children's marriage partners, for land for cash. They are conscious of this interdependence. Thus, in spite of the economic integration of the village in a national and international economic system, it continues to be a relatively discrete unit for the achievement of status. One consequence of this is that while conflicts between individuals are fairly freely tolerated, those between political groups are/ limited.

Conflict between individuals - even when in serious breach of kinship norms - is recognised as something "natural" when it is over material resources or social reputation. It is of course subject to informal rules, open to mediation, and may be modified by those ceremonial opportunities which normally present themselves through the cycle of the family's development - engagements, weddings, baptisms, and funerals. It is widely considered most unreasonable for close kin to dispute over politics.

Conflict between political groups is regarded with profound disquiet by villagers, and something which is likely to occur but which must be avoided and controlled. Moreover, the rules for the settlement of political disputes are not an agreed code, but an emergent one. Indeed, in some situations, political ideologies make it unlikely that any basic agreement about such rules can be made.

Politics is not seen as a natural activity, and especially when it involves parties, it is to be avoided. Much verbal activity seeks to control the possible disruptions of party politics by the assertions of a norm (disguised as a statement of fact) that this particular village is one where men are not fanatic, and do not allow politics to divide them seriously.

This norm is a prophesy which by repetition fulfils itself. On every occasion when a serious breach is threatened but avoided, the norm gains power for it shows that people are what they say they are. This seems to me to raise a theoretical issue of some difficulty.

Gluckman (1968b) has reviewed the issue of determining structural change and of the use of the notion of equilibrium. He intends these concepts to be of use in analysing institutions and large social systems. But there are difficulties in deciding what the tendency is in a village, or indeed if a social system can be in Gluckman's sense abstracted from a village at all.

There are three logical possibilities. First, a tendency towards an increased solidarity - a success spiral would be an appropriate metaphor. Secondly, a continuation of the existing level of solidarity. Thirdly, a tendency towards increased cleavage. Whether the continuing appeal to a norm of solidarity is a case of the second or third of these possibilities, seems to me beyond decision. It is easy to see what is happening at the extremes. Movement from some putative midpoint in one direction or the other is much more difficult to determine.

It is reasonable to suppose that a particular village moves in one direction or another largely as a result of a particular

historical occurrence, which then becomes the basis for a norm. This does not rule out the importance of predisposing factors such as the strength of cross-cutting ties produced by economic, affinal or ritual interdependence; it suggests however, that structural factors alone will not determine the limitation of political conflict. The actions of particular individuals, and the consequent use of such actions by their incorporation into norms, will play an important role.

In this respect it is curious that Boissevain (1969) in seeking to account for variations in the political organisation of Maltese villages considers only structural variables while elsewhere he insists that

"This study has focused upon a village, but what has now emerged is the importance of the individual. He, not the village, emerges as the important unit in the process of social communication and cultural integration." (p.96)

In his earlier analysis he suggested (1965) that one explanation for the existence of secondary festa partiti - those factions which form to celebrate the secondary, rather than the patron saint of a village - was that with changes in the occupational structure of the villages, individuals sought positions of leadership or prestige which were already filled in the titular saint's confraternities. While such individuals acted within a framework of structural constraints, their actual motivation, energy, and distribution are particular historical events, and Boissevain's analysis would have been more consistent had he explicitly acknowledged this.

The specific historical occasions on which the villagers learned lessons they were to convert into norms of solidarity would be the Two Companies dispute; the initial nationalist

boycott of the Co-operative Retail Shop; and the Lyssarides Group dispute. In each case villagers committed substantial resources to the dispute but later were reconciled after a period of open breach. At each of these points the dispute could have escalated, been prolonged, and become extended in terms of what Spiro (1968 : 419) has termed factional scope.

When a conscious goal of preserving village solidarity exists, certain other tactics will be adopted to make this easier. A clear example of this is the narrow definition of politics used by villagers. Their behaviour may be summarised by saying that they seek to include as little as possible within the definition of politics. Thus, only the most blatant and unequivocally political activities are defined as political, such as the actions of party loyalists at election time. In a number of other areas, there is the explicit denial that politics is relevant to issues - good examples being the early stages of the unbuilt dam, the week-to-week activities of village administrative committees, and the management of CITCOP. Since in fact elections to village committees and to CITCOP in fact take note of party politics (even though they are not dominated by them) villagers are clearly aware of the possible politicisation of such issues. This is precisely the thing they wish to avoid by their assertion that matters are 'village business' or 'economic matters' and therefore 'not politics'.

I have emphasised the importance of special historical factors, and the part played by individuals in limiting political conflict. The villager's definitions of areas of conduct as 'not political' are not in themselves enough to prevent their politicisation. The tendency for national political changes to

swamp or engulf such village controls has already been noted with regard to the dam issue. From accounts in other situations there is evidence that cross-cutting ties and norms of village solidarity can be broken down in times of intensive conflict at national or regional levels. For instance discussing the consequences for a village of a national political conflict in Spain between 1931-36, Lison-Tolosana (1966 : 48) has written

"In practice, the community was divided into two groups characterised and led by two very actively antagonistic minorities, especially that of the left ... Dedication to the cause and party consciousness broke former bonds of friendship and kinship; there was a tendency to greet and be friendly towards members of the same group, while systematically avoiding the others. Quarrels, rivalry and hatred developed out of these estrangements ... During the strike already mentioned brothers struggled against brothers and nephews struck uncles ..."

Lison-Tolosana makes clear conditions which undoubtedly aggravated such conflict, such as a large group of economically discontented people (ibid : 42); but comparative studies are still rare which would refine our understanding of the conditions allowing one community to be disrupted by violent political conflict, while another manages to keep such conflict within certain formal limits. Although I have here stressed factors which limit conflict, the possibility of a break-down in village solidarity cannot be ruled out; it seems reasonable to suggest there are two situations which are discrete. In one, norms and behaviour favour solidarity and restraint; in the other they favour cleavage, and encourage acts of overt hostility. The same organisational bases and ideologies can exist in both situations. A critical question for further research is what factors, structural, historical, cultural or environmental produce the radical change of polarities.

Footnotes to Chapter 12

- (1) See, for example, Ruel's introduction to Leopards and Leaders.
 - (2) There are in fact other recent studies of such similar villages, such as that by Lison-Tolosana.
 - (3) In a culture where Ministers become implicated in assassination attempts on heads of state, and are themselves assassinated, such questions as traditional views of power relations become particularly relevant, and this is cogently argued by Waterbury.
 - (4) Weber's views on forms of solidarity, and Barth's description of relations of incorporation have been helpful to me here.
 - (5) Davis has made a similar point about strikes in Pisticci (Davis 1969).
 - (6) A favourite elite anecdote about Makarios' role as Chief of Patronage is this: a man applied for a civil service job, but proved to lack the relevant qualifications. He was turned down. He applied a second time, and insisted on being interviewed. At the interview a telephone call from Makarios stated that he wished the man appointed. "He isn't properly qualified, your eminence". "But nevertheless, I wish him to be appointed."
- The officials turned to the man, and started to take down his particulars. Place of birth. He gave the name of Makarios' village. The officials sighed. "Why didn't you say so in the first place and save us all this fuss?"
- (7) Cohen (1969) and Bailey (1969) both make this point strongly.
 - (8) Boissevain (1965) has described how in confrontations between parties in Maltese villages, large numbers of outsiders come into a village to support their own party. The potential for dispute between persons with no obligation to avoid dispute is thereby increased.

Appendix 1

THE TURKS OF KALLO

In this thesis I do not consider the Turkish community in Kallo, for several reasons. First, they were a tiny group, which during my fieldwork seemed to play little part in village life; secondly, since the political climate was delicate, it seemed to me not in the best interests of the Turks to single them out for special attention, or even to take too great an interest in their position. I collected information about them as it occurred in normal conversation and with certain trusted informants, sought more detailed information. I took genealogies from several Turkish men.

Nevertheless, some comment on them, however incomplete, is necessary. The most striking fact about the Kallo Turks is the decline in their numbers since 1891, in contrast to the gradual increase of the Greek population. In 1891 there was one Turk in Kallo for every 3 Greeks. In the 1960 Census, this ratio has dropped to 1 Turk for every 18 Greeks. During the same period, the national ratio of Turks to Greeks had changed from roughly 25% : 75% (1881) to 18% : 82% (1960) so the Kallo change is out of all proportion to the relative decline in the proportion of Turks to Greeks. Kallo Turks themselves explain the decline in terms of many of their numbers having married out. However, villagers also told me that numbers of younger Turks left Kallo during the inter-communal disturbances of 1964-5 and went to the Turkish enclaves in the towns. In 1968-70 there were almost no Turks

in Kallo between the ages of 15 and 45, with the exception of a schoolteacher, and one young man of dull intelligence. Although I did not carry out a census of the Turkish residents, I am reasonably sure that their numbers were lower than the 72 recorded in 1960. There were about twenty adults; in all cases they seemed to be rather poor. As might be expected, they took a very quiet, passive role in Kallo affairs, and at various points in the thesis, I mention incidents which involved them (see particularly, the first two cases in chapter eight).

The UN Police made patrols to the village roughly once a month to make sure the Turks were not in difficulties. Occasionally, Turks resident in the Turkish enclaves visited the village to see kin, tend to property and so forth, and I saw them cordially greeted by Greek villagers on a number of occasions. But as I mention in chapters 1 and 8, there have been episodes where individual Greeks attacked the persons or property of Kallo Turks and one factor which probably has contributed to the decline of the Kallo Turkish population has been a feeling of insecurity in face of the increasing and prospering Greek population.

Nevertheless the Turks of Kallo seemed very much part of the Greeks' consciousness, and not always in a negative way. Numbers of older Kallo Greeks spoke some Turkish, and had had economic relations of all kinds with Turks both in and out of the village. During my fieldwork several Kallotes went to a Turkish wedding in a mixed village some fifteen miles away, and the leftist leaders in Kallo in particular did small favours for Kallo Turks, to show their goodwill.

The Greeks however also have a 'foundation myth' about how the current situation came about. It is roughly this:

'In the time of our great grandfathers Kallo was a Turkish village. The Turks owned all the land, but they were lazy. They had Christians working for them as labourers, a few at first, then more. The Turks would pay them by giving them a piece of land here, another piece there - poor land of course - but bit by bit the Christians saved up, and then brought in women, got married, worked hard and made their women work hard and bought more land. Eventually they bought up nearly all the land from the lazy Turks who neither worked them-
...'

Slender support for the view that Kallo was once a pre-dominantly Turkish village (in spite of its Greek name) is supplied by Papadopoulos (1965) who published the djize tax records for 1825-6. These show Kallo as having "27 + 2" payers of the djize tax, paid by adult non-Muslims. Although it is not clear who qualified as an adult, and thus had to pay tax, the suggestion is that the Greek population was much smaller than 329 recorded in 1891. However, it gives no guide to the size of the Turkish population. The earliest school returns from the 1880's show more Turkish than Greek girls at the elementary school, and old people were firm in their insistence that Turkish women did not work in the fields when they were young (about 1920). They were working in the fields in 1968, however.

One other notable event must be mentioned. Old people remember that in 1914 three Kallo Greeks were sent to prison, one for ten years, for burning a Turkish coffee shop in the village. This was apparently triggered, they say, by a speech made locally by a mainland Greek nationalist agitator, Katalanos, and followed the hostilities between Greece and Turkey in 1912-13. This does not seem to have been followed by any marked decline in numbers of Kallo Turks (1901 : 104; 1911 : 97; 1921 : 101). I have no information for what caused the decline to 68 by 1931.

Appendix 2

The Social origins of EOKA militants

My source for this material is Papachrysostomou (1969) Archeion Pesonton, Nicosia. The author is director of the Museum of the Struggle, and must therefore be assumed to write with some authority. Although 229 persons are listed as having fallen, these are spread over six categories, of which I have here considered only (i) 68 persons 'killed in action' (ii) 9 persons 'hanged' (iii) 9 persons who 'died under torture'. I have ignored the 50 persons 'killed by Security Forces, the 79 'slaughtered by the Turks' and 15 persons who were accidental fatalities. My reason for this distinction was a concern to examine the backgrounds of persons who could be assumed to be EOKA militants. Obviously there are further problems with such an approach, for example, the possibility that those militants killed were socially different from those not killed, on the lines of 'other ranks' and 'officers' but I have no data to deal with such problems, and no published study exists at time of writing.

Papachrysostomou gives certain social data for the 68 men 'killed in action'.

<u>By occupation</u>	<u>by education</u>	<u>by age</u>
Schoolboys 16		
craftsmen 12	primary education	under
farmers 13	41	20 ... 17
clerical	secondary	
(ypallili) 7	education	20-30 ... 39
'various	24	
occupations 13		30-40 ... 11
labourers 4	university	
scientist 1	graduates	2
schoolteacher 1		
housewife 1	illiterate	1
68	68	67

There are a number of difficulties here. The 24 men of secondary education might have contained a number who would have gone on to further education. The breakdown by education suggests that at least 16 of them were still attending Gymnasium when they were killed.

Another problem is the meaning of the 13 persons Epangelmatiai Diaphoroi, which could mean either 'different occupations' or 'different professions'. My own analysis of the data Papachryssostomou provides in his short biographies of the dead men (pages 10-30) suggests he has used the classification for a number of cases where no information was available.

There are difficulties in the interpretation of the origins of the men, in terms of an urban/rural classification. Six of the 86 (6.3%) in the three classes I examined (68 + 9 + 9 = 86) were born in one of the six major towns of the island (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, Kyrenia, Paphos). But Michael Attalides (personal communication) on a preliminary examination of some data he has collected, believes that throughout the century, a high proportion of urban residents have themselves been born in villages. That is, place of birth is not in itself sufficient indication of elite or non-elite status. In 1946 77.4% of the island's population lived outside the six major towns, though this figure had fallen to 63.6% by 1960.

One final difficulty is that there are a number of intermediate communities, which can be regarded as country towns, or overgrown villages. They may have 5,000 or 10,000 residents, and are referred to as komopolis in official publications. They sometimes have municipal authorities, a doctor, a

Gymnasium and so forth. My own view is that in terms of elite status, residence in a komopolis counts for little.

The highly qualified picture which emerges, then, is that the EOKA militants killed were probably similar in general social characteristics to the general population. They do not seem to have been heavily skewed in the direction of the urban elite; but many of them were of rural origins, and becoming upwardly mobile through secondary education.

Appendix 3A

Kallo : Questionnaire on Crops and Marketing Methods

Year	Crop	Amount	Price	Mesitis	Merchant
1968					
1967					
1966					
1965					
1964					
1963					
1962					
1961					
1960					

This year how many mesities did you discuss selling your crop(s) with?
(names for each mesities for each crop) Other years?

Is any mesities a relative of yours (singhenis/koumbaros/other)
Who? Which?

Reasons for changing? (slow payment? Better price? Other?)

DEBT: How much money do you owe at the moment? To whom?

How much do you expect to get from your (citrus/other) crops
next year?

Do you intend to sell to the mesities next year?

NAME OF RESPONDENT:

KALLO QUESTIONNAIRE : Crops and Marketing Methods

NAME OF RESPONDENT:

What crops have you been growing this year?

% for own use

% for sale

Five years ago?

Ten years ago?

Your father?

TRACTORS

Do you own a tractor?

Whose tractor do you use?

Is he a relative

koumbaros

close neighbour

other

Do you pay? How much?

If not, how do you arrange it?

How often do you use it?

WORK

Do you ever work for anyone else?

(state relation ...)

Does anyone else work for you?

Do you make a fixed agreement
on rate before?

Appendix 3B

KALLO VILLAGE CENSUS

final version dec-68/Jan 69

(1) full name: paranoman:

village age:

father's name:

village: age:

mother's name:

village: age:

wife's name:

village: age:

w.f. name:

village: age:

w.m. name:

village: age:

(2) wife pregnant: born alive:

living today: died over 15:

intention:

persons in inf's avli; show old people separately(3) name age education occupationmarried children and their spouses(4) name age residence education occupation spouse'
village

KALLO VILLAGE CENSUS

final version Dec 68/Jan 69

(5) ALL jobs and dates:

(6) Did your wife do paid work before your marriage?

(7) Do your wife and daughters do paid work now?

(8) Do they work in your fields now?

(9) People who do paid work for the informant:

<u>name</u>	<u>relation to inf</u>	<u>work</u>
-------------	------------------------	-------------

(10) income: mostly from: total last year:(11) land

inf from parents at marriage: k.s. title:

inf's wife at marriage : k.s. title:

jointly today in village : k.s.

jointly today elsewhere : k.s. at:

land ever sold : k.s. whose:

land ever bought : k.s. title whose:

land given to children :

property to inherit :

wife's expected inheritance :

(12) citrus

<u>year</u>	<u>no. trees</u>	<u>land:</u>	<u>year</u>	<u>price</u>	<u>k.s.</u>
<u>planted</u>		<u>how acquired</u>			

does informant intend to plant more?

(13) water(14) debt: how much do you owe today?

<u>amount</u>	<u>to whom owed</u>	<u>reason</u>
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(15) debt: the most ever owed:

<u>date</u>	<u>amount</u>	<u>to whom</u>	<u>why</u>
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KALLO VILLAGE CENSUS

final version Dec-68/Jan 69

- (16) Is there any money owed to you today?
- (17) Usual guarantors at Synergatiki:
Property or kinita not already mentioned:
- (18) Household
- | | | | | |
|-----------|----|---------|-----------------|---------|
| radio | tv | fridge | washing machine | big gas |
| motor car | | tractor | pump | other |
- (19) Kinship link between inf and wife; its role in decision
- (20) Other affinal links; before or after
- (21) Arravones? Prikosynfonon?
- (22) House
- who built your house?
whose was the plot?
total cost?
- (23) details of work/costs of house:
groom and family:
bride and family:
- (24) who worked on the house?
- (25) wedding expenses:
- (26) koumbari from Kallo: elsewhere:
koumares from Kallo: elsewhere:
baptisers of inf's children:
- | <u>name</u> | <u>relation</u> | <u>occupation</u> | <u>residence</u> |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| (27) children baptised by inf: | | by wife: | |
| (28) date of engagement | | of wedding | |
| inf's age | | wife's age: | |

Appendix 3C

Open-ended interview on disputes, etc.

This took place after I had lived in the village for over a year. The informants had all been interviewed in the main census, from which I drew a sample to represent the main political groupings, also those of age, wealth and occupation. They were also picked because I had reason to think they would talk freely on sensitive topics. Before interviewing them, I went to some trouble to get material on their disputes and quarrels, from other villagers. The interviews took place in my house, with no other people present. They sometimes lasted 4 hours, and rarely less than two.

- (a) Warm-up topics: informants were asked to work out how many first cousins they had, and of these how many were resident in the village.
- (b) They were asked if they had any particular friends, and to say who these were, and state any other relationship.
- (c) They were asked from whom they would borrow small sums of money, and why.
- (d) They were asked to whom they would tell something very secret.
- (e) They were asked which village tailors, butchers and barbers they patronised and why; they were asked about special relationships with any of these men, and here the aim was to see how much kinship determined such transactions. In the course of this area of questioning, most informants supplied interesting data on a range of economic exchanges.

(f) Informants were asked to describe any sharecropping or 'by halves' relationships they could remember. The kinship, or other basis for the relationships was sought.

(g) DISPUTES

Informants were first asked if there was anyone with whom they were on bad terms, not speaking, avoiding, angry with, and so forth. Once they started giving details, they were encouraged to go through all such cases in as much detail as they could remember. I pressed for information about type of relationship, cause of difference, course of the dispute, duration, mode of settlement (if any).

If they denied such disputes, they were either prompted with actual cases I knew of, or asked about legal cases, debt, property transfer (inheritance, dowry, pre-mortem gift etc.).

(h) Informants were asked about cases in which they had sought help for some difficulty, particularly with government processes, and so forth. Here the aim was to elicit data about ta mesa (influence through powerful friends) patron-client relations and related topics. Most informants volunteered such instances readily, indeed with some pride.

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and a selection of works consulted.

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